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ADDENDUM "A 
The following material is a synopsis of the interchange between the 
trial court and Plaintiff's counsel regarding the necessary elements of 
proof which Plaintiffs would have to present in order to establish a prima 
facie case. 
1. The trial court asked Plaintiff's counsel whether she was 
relying upon any documents or testimony other than those provided with 
Plaintiffs' memorandum. Plaintiffs' counsel admitted the only documents 
containing any testimony or evidence were attached to Plaintiffs' 
memorandum.1 
2. Because Plaintiffs' counsel argued, for the first time, that the 
depositions were transcribed incorrectly, the trial court asked Plaintiffs 
counsel why she hadn't raised that objection sooner, and asked what it 
was that she was trying to say. After a rather lengthy interchange, 
Plaintiffs' counsel admitted that her objection was not well taken and 
Defendants had not relied upon any portions of the depositions which 
Plaintiffs considered to be objectionable.2 
3. The trial court then stated to counsel for Plaintiffs that 
Plaintiffs had not provided sufficient testimony to establish a prima facie 
case, so as to avoid a summary judgment being rendered against them.3 
4. The trial court then explained to Plaintiffs' counsel that she 
needed to come forward with admissible testimony which would support 
each of the elements of the causes of action which she was pursuing. As an 
example, the trial court called Plaintiffs' counsel's attention to the fact that 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 773 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10, 1995, R 757-789, at R 775-776 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10, 1995, R 757-789, at R 776-777 
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no special damages had been alleged in the complaint and there was no 
evidence of any damages having been sustained by the Plaintiffs.4 
5. In response to the trial court's concerns that Plaintiffs had not 
established any damages, the following interchange occurred. 
MS. JONES: There is substantial and significant damages to the 
health and well being. 
THE COURT: Have you got any doctor expert testimony to that 
affect? 
MS. JONES: To this point, no Your Honor... .5 
6. The trial court then told counsel for Plaintiffs that they needed 
to provide admissible testimony to support their claims of assault. The 
following quote from the transcript of hearing demonstrates how carefully 
the trial court explained the matter to counsel for Plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Well, let me draw your attention to the assault 
elements. The defendant is liable to the plaintiff for 
assault if one, the defendant acted intending to cause 
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or 
imminent apprehension of such contact. Two, as a 
result the plaintiff was thereby put in imminent 
apprehension of harm or contact. Three, the plaintiff 
suffered injuries proximately caused by the 
defendant's action.6 
7. After hearing the trial court's concerns about the lack of 
testimony and evidence provided by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' counsel stated: 
MS. JONES: I would submit that we can prove those issues on each 
of those that you have stated each of those issues we 
can prove. I have nothing further.7 
4
 Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789 
5
 Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 781-782 
6
 Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 781 
7
 Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 783 
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8. The trial court then stated that even though Plaintiffs' counsel 
was not entitled to additional time the trial court was going to allow 
Plaintiffs' counsel an additional 30 days to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs 
could present a prima facie case, and could establish, with a minimum 
threshold of evidence each one of the required elements of the various 
causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs. 
THE COURT: . . . . I am going to give you some time to 
demonstrate to this court that you can actually prove 
some of these. You give me the names of witnesses 
who will testify that there is some damages there.. . . 
I will give you give you 30 days to get that done and 
to prove to this court that this court should not grant . 
. . Mr. Martin's Motion for Summary Judgment. . . .8 
9. The trial judge then indicated that as of the date of the hearing, 
the Plaintiffs had not met that burden.9 
The trial court commented upon Plaintiffs' lack of evidence of severe 
emotional distress and the proximate cause. 
22. It is well known that, in a civil suit, damages may not 
be recovered unless the plaintiff can prove the existence of 
damages resulting to the plaintiff as a result of a legal wrong 
inflicted by the defendant. "Wrong without damage, or 
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action." 
22 Am. Tur. 2d Damages §4 (1988). Damages recoverable for a 
tort are those limited to those damages directly attributable to 
the tort. Id. §130. The Court notes that all plaintiffs are now 
employed with different employers and are earning more than 
they had been paid while employed by DOT 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 786-787 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, at R 777, lines 10-11 
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23. The only evidence submitted by plaintiffs as to 
emotional damage suffered by plaintiffs as a result of the 
searching consists of an evaluation report made by Dr. Juan A 
Mejia and an affidavit of Dr. Linda J. Gummow. Both 
documents are inadmissible as evidence. Under U.R.C.P. 56(b), 
affidavits are legally admissible evidence in a summary 
judgment proceeding. The Court notes that Dr. Mejia's 
evaluation report must be considered hearsay because it is not 
a sworn affidavit; therefore, it cannot be considered legally 
admissible evidence. Furthermore, Dr. Mejia's evaluation 
cannot be admitted into evidence as a statement for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 803(4) as an exception to the hearsay rule because the 
evaluation by Dr. Mejia was performed solely to aid the 
pursuit of litigation, not for the purpose of diagnosis to 
promote treatment. See Juan A. Mejia's Confidential 
Psychological Evaluation at 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Second 
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit A. As to Dr. Gummow's report, it is inadmissible 
despite its affidavit form because Dr. Gummow did not 
personally examine the plaintiffs. Rather she examined the 
English translations of the plaintiffs' statements and the 
psychological evaluations of plaintiffs made by Dr. Mejia. Dr. 
Gummow's affidavit is not based on her personal knowledge 
or on a direct evaluation of plaintiffs, and is therefore 
inadmissible as hearsay. Without the testimony of these 
psychologists, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to establish 
emotional damages upon which a cause of action could be 
sustained. 
24. While the Court certainly does not condone 
defendant's conduct in this matter, it is apparent that such 
conduct has not appreciably affected the lives of the parties 
such that it can be reduced to monetary damages. Lacking any 
evidence that plaintiffs have incurred any monetary or 
psychological damages resulting from the search conducted by 
defendants, the Court finds the plaintiffs have no cause of 
action against defendants. Accordingly, defendants' Motion 
For Summary Judgment is hereby granted.10 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at paras. 22, 23, and 24 
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LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
* 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * 
MAZARIEGOS, * 
* AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON, /aka/ JEANETTE * 
ROMERO MARKHAM, /dba/ D.O.T.S., * 
DOZENS OF TERRIFIC STAMPS, DOT * 
ADVENTURES, INC., a Nevada * 
corporation, MIGUELANGEL ESQUIVEL, * 
MARIA "COOKIE" REYES, HUMBERTO * 
HERNANDEZ, JOHN DOE I and JANE DOES* 
I-II, * 
* 
Defendants. * tf3(Xfft>&& 
COME the above Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of 
record, Marti L. Jones, and state the following for cause of 
action against the Defendants. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Defendant Jeanette Romero Markham, /aka/ Jeanette R. 
Lynton, is and was a resident of Utah, doing business in Utah as 
Dozens of Terrific Stamps, (D.O.T.S.) during the period of time 
relevant to this case, July 1992 to January 4, 1993. 
H A n 
2. Her primary place of business during the relevant time 
period was 140 S. Mountain View Drive, in Orem, Utah. 
3. In the alternative, Defendant Nevada corporation DOT 
Adventures, Inc. was doing business in the state of Utah as 
Dozens of Terrific Stamps, (D.O.T.S.) during the period of time 
relevant to this case, July 1992 to January 4, 1993. 
4. At the time of incorporation and at all times relevant 
herein, DOT Adventures, Inc. was inadequately capitalized to 
properly conduct the business it purported to engage in. 
5. Defendant Jeanette Lynton at all times relevant herein 
was the sole officer and director of the organization known as 
DOT Adventures, Inc. Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that 
Defendant Jeanette Lynton at all times relevant herein was the 
alter ego of the entity known as DOT Adventures, Inc. 
6. Miguelangel Esquivel is the plant manager of the Orem 
factory of D.O.T.S., and was so during the relevant time period. 
7. Defendant Esquivel is a resident of Utah County, and 
was so during the relevant time period. 
8. Defendant Maria "Cookie" Reyes was a supervisor in the 
Orem factory of D.O.T.S., and was so during the relevant time 
period. 
9. Defendant Maria "Cookie" Reyes is a resident of Utah 
County, and was so during the relevant time period. 
000 
10. Defendant Humberto Hernandez was a supervisor in the 
Orem factory of D.O.T.S., and was so during the relevant time 
period. 
11. Defendant Humberto Hernandez is a resident of Utah 
County, and was so during the relevant time period. 
12. The causes of action arose in Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
13. This complaint is for a sum of more than $20,000.00. 
FACTS 
14. Each of the Plaintiffs named above was employed by the 
Defendant Jeanette R. Lynton, /dba/ D.O.T.S. Dozens of Terrific 
Stamps (hereinafter, DOTS), on or around December 16 and 17, 
1992. 
15. In the alternative, each of the Plaintiffs named above 
was employed by the Defendant DOT Adventures, Inc., /dba/ 
D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific Stamps, (hereinafter, DOTS, Inc.) on 
or around December 16 and 17, 1992. 
16. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on or around December 16 
or 17, 1992, Miguelangel Esquivel, acting within his authority as 
plant manager, stopped all work within the confines of the DOTS 
plant, and called all the employees together. 
17. Defendant Esquivel indicated that someone in the plant 
had stolen a $20.00 bill from one of the plant workers. 
000 
18. Defendant Esquivel then told all the workers that no 
one was to leave the plant until they and their belongings had 
been searched by a supervisor. 
19. When Plaintiff Semidey questioned how Defendant 
Esquivel planned to prove that a $20.00 bill found during the 
search had been stolen, Mr. Esquivel ignored the question. 
20. Defendant Esquivel then told the supervisors to take 
their workers to separate rooms and search them. 
21. The supervisors were responsible to insure that no 
worker left the plant without being searched. 
22. A supervisor thereafter physically searched each of the 
above Plaintiffs and their personal belongings. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
WRONGFUL DETENTION 
23. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
24. Mr. Esquivel's actions, in requiring that all employees 
be subject to physical search of their person and belongings 
before being allowed to leave the premises is a violation of Utah 
Code §76-5-304. 
25. Mr. Esquivel intentionally and unlawfully detained each 
of the above named Plaintiffs, thereby interferring substantially 
with their liberty. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
ASSAULT 
A A A 
26. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
27. By requiring that all employees submit to a physical 
search of their person and belongings before being allowed to 
leave the premises, Mr. Esquivel intentionally created in all 
non-supervisory employees the reasonable apprehension of harmful 
or offensive touching. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
BATTERY 
28. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
29. By requiring all supervisors to physically search the 
person and property of all employees, Mr. Esquivel intentionally 
caused the harmful or offensive touching of all non-supervisory 
employees. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
30. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
31. Mr. Esquivel's actions, in refusing to allow any 
employee to leave work prior to submitting to a physical search 
of their person and belongings constitutes a false imprisonment 
of all non-supervisory employees. 
32. Mr. Esquivel intentionally and unlawfully detained each 
of the above named Plaintiffs, by unreasonably and wrongfully 
Ann 
restraining them from freely leaving the plant with implied 
threats of termination of employment if they did not submit to 
the indignity of a physical search. 
FIFTH AND SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
INTENTIONAL AND RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
33. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
34. Defendant Esquivel's extreme and outrageous actions, in 
requiring every employee to submit to the indignity of a physical 
search, intentionally and recklessly inflicted upon the 
Plaintiffs in this action severe emotional distress. 
35. Defendant Esquivel knew, or should have known, that 
there was a reasonable likelihood that subjecting all employees 
to a physical search of their person and property would cause 
them severe emotional distress. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTRUSION INTO PHYSICAL PRIVACY 
36. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
37. The physical search of each plaintiff constituted an 
unwarranted and tortious intrusion into the physical privacy of 
each plaintiff. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTRUSION INTO PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
38. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
000 
39. The physical search of the personal belongings of each 
plaintiff constituted an unwarranted and tortious intrusion into 
the personal privacy of each plaintiff. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTRUSION INTO PERSONAL AFFAIRS 
40. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all previous 
allegations of this complaint. 
41. Defendant Esquivel interviewed Plaintiff Semidey for 
employment in October of 1992. During that interview Defendant 
Esquivel asked Plaintiff Semidey if he was a member of the LDS 
church. When Mr. Semidey responded that he was, Defendant 
Esquivel asked if he had a valid temple recommend. Defendant 
Esquivel then asked to see the recommend. 
42. Mr. Esquivel's inquiry into Mr. Semidey's religious 
beliefs and qualifications was a completely unwarranted, 
unneccessary, and wrongful intrusion into Plaintiff Semidey's 
private affairs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the 
defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
A. For damages due to the emotional distress and turmoil 
caused by Defendants' tortious and wrongful behavior, in 
particular the mental and emotional distress caused by the 
physical search and the loss of personal dignity. 
000 
B. For punitive damages for Defendants' knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights of 
their employees• 
C. For the specific costs of this suit and attorney's fees 
as permitted by court rule and/or statute. 
D. For such other relief as to the court may seem just and 
proper
* v/ 7 7 
DATED t h i s day of Hinll , 1993. 1 M A54-
MARTI L. JONES 
Attorney-7for Plaintiffs 
000 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the </ * day of April, 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Amend 
Complaint, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint, 
Affidavit of Attorney Marti Jones and Affidavit of Private 
Investigator JoEllyn Booker, and a copy of the proposed Amended 
Complaint to Attorneys for Defendants, Loren D. Martin and Jack 
L. Schoenhals, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111, postage prepaid. , ") ^  
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
P.O.Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 884147-0590 
Telephone: 538-0066 
JACKL. SCHOENHALS (2881) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC. et al., 
Defendants. : 
ORDER 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The above captioned matter came regularly before this Court for hearing 
on Defendant's, Jeanette R. Lynton's, Motion For Summary Judgment and upon 
the Motion to Strike brought before this Court by DOT Adventures, Inc. 
Hearing on the motions was held on August 16, 1994, at the hour of 10:00 am. 
Present were Jeanette R. Lynton, her counsel, Loren D. Martin, who is also 
counsel for DOT Adventures, Inc. Also present was Linda Q. Jones, counsel for 
Plaintiffs. 
Having previously entered its Findings Of Facts And Conclusions Of Law, 
it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
000 
1 
1. Jeanette R. Lynton's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, 
dismissing her upon the merits with prejudice. 
2. The name of Jeanette R. Lynton, /aka/ Jeanette Romero Markham, 
and the d/b/a of D.O.T.S. (Dozens of Terrific Stamps) shall be stricken from the 
caption of this matter in all further pleadings. 
3. The caption of this matter shall be: Walter Semidey, Angel Santiago, 
Humberto Bardales, and Rosa Mazariegos vs. Dot Adventures, Inc., Miguelangel 
Esquivel, Maria "Cookie" Reyes and Humberto Hernandez. The clerk shall make 
appropriate modifications to reflect the change. 
3. DOT Adventures, Inc., Motion To Strike is granted. Any reference 
in any of the pleadings which makes any allegation that DOT Adventures, Inc., is 
undercapitalized or that such corporation is the alter ego of Jeanette R. Lynton is 
ordered stricken. The clerk shall take appropriate action to reflect this Order to 
Strike, which may include, modification of the pleadings by deletion and 
interlineation. 
DATED this X day of August, 1994. 
BY THE CO 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
toyd L. Park 
District Judge 
'14^ 
Attomey For Plaintiffs 
000 
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Post Office Box 11950 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
139 East South Temple Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066 
Jack L.Schoenhals (2881) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMJDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARD ALES, and ROSA 
MAZARffiGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., MIGUELANGEL 
ESQUTVEL, MARIA REYES, HUMBERTO 
HERNANDEZ, JOHN DOE I AND JAMES 
DOES I-H, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This action was commenced in 1993. The original Complaint was dated July 30, 1993. 
Defendants were not served until on or about January 5, 1994. By leave of the Court under an 
Order dated June 13, 1994, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. Included in the original and 
amended Complaints was an additional defendant, Jeanette R. Lynton. In August, 1994, 
Summary Judgment in favor of Ms. Lynton, dismissing her from the case. No action was taken 
by Plaintiffs against the Order which dismissed Ms. Lynton from the case. 
* F \ L t u 
Fourth Judicial District CoLft 
Utah County, S^oUj iah . 
1
 B. SMITti w ^ CARMA 
n.3uuiY 
1 0.00 
Counsel for Plaintiffs, Marti L. Jones, and counsel for Defendants, Loren D. Martin, were 
present at all proceedings. This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment as to all Defendants. Oral arguments on said Motion were heard on February 
10, 1995, at which time the Court gave Plaintiffs additional time, until March 13, 1995, to file 
pleadings which would tend to show why the Court should not grant Defendants' Motion. 
Defendants were given until March 27, 1995, to file responsive pleadings. 
On March 24, 1995, the Court extended Defendants' deadline for filing responsive 
pleadings to March 31, 1995, because Plaintiffs' pleadings were not received by Defendants until a 
week after the March 13 deadline. 
Plaintiffs filed a Second Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment on 
March 13, 1995, and an Amended Second Objection on March 22, 1995. Defendants' Reply To 
Plaintiffs' Second Objection was filed with this Court on April 3, 1995. In its Memorandum 
Decision the Court stated that, "In analyzing the parties' arguments, the Court will disregard 
Plaintiffs' Second Objection in favor of Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection." 
On April 25, 1995, Defendants filed a Motion To Strike and/or Disregard Portions Of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits and an accompanying Memorandum in support thereof. On May 8, 1995, 
Plaintiffs filed an Objection To Defendants' Motion To Strike and/or Disregard Portions Of 
Affidavits and an accompanying Memorandum in support thereof. 
The Court, having received and reviewed the Motion For Summary Judgment, 
memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, Plaintiffs' amended 
second objection and Defendants' reply to Plaintiffs' second objection; having received 
Defendants' motion to strike and/or disregard portions of Plaintiffs' affidavits, memorandum in 
support, Plaintiffs' objection to Defendants' motion to strike and memorandum in support of 
objection; having reviewed the applicable laws, all pleadings, being fully advised in the premises, 
2 (TOfll 
acting under the provisions of Rule 56(c), URCivP, taken in light most favorable to Plaintiffs' 
position, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, lacking any evidence 
that Plaintiffs have incurred any monetary or psychological damages, the Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law as to all alleged causes of action. Plaintiffs, having failed to establish 
compensatory or general damages, punitive damages may not be awarded. 
Because the Court has found no genuine issue of material fact exists and Defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court need not address Defendants' Motion to 
Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs Affidavits. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted, dismissing all causes of action against all Defendants. ^ p j ^ 
3 000 
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THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT the attached is a true, correct, and 
complete copy of entire file of 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
and the endorsements thereon, as the same is taken from and 
compared with the original filed in the office of the Division on 
January 5, 1993, and now remaining on file and of record therein. 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Number: CO 167454 
Sta te of Utah-
DEPARTMENT OF COMME 2 
Division of Corporations & Commercial Code Application for 
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY (^ 1 ( I ; /[ I 
Dp T /\d \l fn Hi r^ S , ^ftt^ . 
(exact corporate mme) j W y j } / \ ? I - C> f • ' * JO. f - O 
1. A corporation of the state of A) do4da , incorporated / P day of F^br**^. 19 ? ? 
2. The corporations period of duration is p^rru fcicd y..%J\ > ; (usually perpetual) 
3. The address of the corporation in the state of incorporation is: A Q 
flow - /naiA^JL fo UfcU - £2 
•tree* iddrcM city/tUte zip 
4. The registered agent in Utah is: Ufo^e jj-i Z^,, k ^ 
The street address of the registered office in Utah is: 
dty ** 
5. The business purposes to be pursued in Utah are: DiS>hr*lpufa2^ nf rxjl^U*^ Sharps 
s fa^.p ft Crassert'-es 
6. The corporation commenced or intends to commence business in Utah on: &~ (- ^ 2> 
7. The names and addresses of the corporation's directors and officers are: 
Name Address City/State/Zip 
Director 51&*Q tt< L^«\i^ f <fo S^ M o t / n k ^ l / i ^ O r . 6 / ^ w / U f ^ ^ O ? ^ 
Director^ 
Director 
President 3 f o i , i * t f t £ - ^ h - n _ / ^ O ^ ^ ^ ^ lA ^tO Or, 0r&^ UttL HH0 Sg 
Vice-President S^Q. i ^ A 
Secretary S^C^-t^j^ 
Treasurer 
8. A certification of Good Standing from the State of Incorporation dated no earlier than ninety (90) day.c 
prior to filing with this office is attached to this application. 
9. The corporation shall use as its name in Utah Oerf /\diNi^hu^
 f pxxL . 
(The corporation shall use its name as set forth at the top of this form unless this name is not available for use in Utah.) 
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that this 
application for Certificate of Authority has been 
examined by me and is, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief,: tme,.€prreqand complete. 
The undersigned hereby accepts 
appointment as Registered Agent for the 
abovte named-corporation. 
Registered Agenf 
Filing Fee: $50.00 
Send completed forms in duplicate to: 
Title: 4 - T Z ^ r r ^ r -
Dated: i&r \o \9^z 
6/92 
corpsdba\ccrtauth.ms? 
State of Utah 
Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code 
160 East 300 South/Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
(801) 530-4849 
CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE STATUS 
I, CHERYL A. LAU, the duly elected, qualified and acting Secretary of State of the 
State of Nevada, do hereby certify that I am, by the laws of said State, the custodian 
of the records relating to corporations organized under the laws thereof; the 
revocation of their corporate charters, and their right to transact and carry on their 
corporate business; and am the proper officer to execute this certif icate. 
I further certify that, at the date of this certificate, DOT ADVENTURES is a 
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Nevada, having fully complied therewith; is entitled to exercise therein all the 
corporate powers and functions recited in its charter or articles of incorporation, and 
is in good standing in this State. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the Great Seal of State, at my office, in 
Carson City, Nevada, this 8th day of December, 1992 
^ — . E£2 & 
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, : J R : 
H a i b i || r ; 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066 
Jack L.Schoenhals (2881) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
Attorneys for all named defendants. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, 
ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARD ALES, and 
ROSA MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON, /aka/ 
JEANETTE ROMERO MARKHAM, 
/dba/ D.O.T.S., DOZENS OF 
TERRIFIC STAMPS (D.O.T.S.), 
MIGUELANGEL ESQUIVEL, 
JOHN DOES I & II, and : 
JANE DOES I-III, : 
Defendants : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
: BRYANT LANCASTER, CPA, 
: MAY 24, 1994 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
000 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Briant Lancaster, CPA, having been first duly sworn, depose and 
say as follows: 
1. That I am a Certified Public Accountant licensed to practice in 
the State of Utah. 
2. That I provide CPA services to DOT Adventures, Inc. That as 
part of such services and in the normal course of business I keep and am 
responsible for all of the books of the company, including payroll. 
3. That the above named Plaintiffs: Walter Semidey, Angel 
Santiago, Humberto Bardales, and Rosa Mazariegos, have been employees 
of DOT Adventures, Inc. and were employed in such capacity on or around 
and during December 16 and 17, 1992. 
4. That I have caused true and correct copies of pay checks to 
each of the Plaintiffs for part of December, 1992, to be attached hereto and 
made a part hereof. 
5. That such paychecks were drawn upon the account of DOT 
Adventures, Inc., as were previous checks. 
6. That the records of DOT Adventures, Inc., reflect that in the 
ordinary course of business, such checks were written to the Plaintiffs, 
delivered to them, presented to the payee bank, and cashed by each of the 
Plaintiffs. 
2 000 
7. That records of DOT Adventures, Inc., reflect that in the 
checks written by DOT Adventures, Inc., to the Plaintiffs were for 
payment for employee services rendered. 
8. That records of DOT Adventures, Inc., reflect that it is a 
Nevada corporation, doing business in Utah. 
9. That records of DOT Adventures, Inc., reflect that on 
December 16 and 17, 1992, Miguelangel Esquivel, Maria "Cookie" Reyes, 
Humberto Hernandez, and Jeanette R. Lynton were employees of the 
corporation 
DATED this 25th day of May, 1994. 
^3^^J^> 
aster, CPA 
On the 25th day of May, 1994, personally appeared Bryant 
Lancaster, CPA, who, being first duly sworn, did execute the above 
affidavit and stated that the information contained in the above affidavit 
was true and correct. 
. ,
 y-Notary Public 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al., 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
Plaintiffs, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 930400503 
DATE May 22, 1995 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Oral arguments were heard on February 10, 1995, at which time the Court gave plaintiffs 
until March 13, 1995 to file pleadings to prove why the Court should not grant defendants' 
motion. Defendants were given until March 27, 1995 to file responsive pleadings. On 
March 24, 1995 the Court extended defendants' deadline for filing responsive pleadings to 
March 31, 1995 because plaintiffs' pleadings were not received by defendants until a week 
after the March 13 deadline. 
Plaintiffs filed a Second Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
on March 13, 1995 and an Amended Second Objection on March 23, 1995. Defendants' 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Second Objection was filed with this Court on April 3, 1995. In 
analyzing the parties' arguments, the Court will disregard plaintiffs' Second Objection in 
favor of plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection. 
On April 26, 1995 defendants filed a Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions 
of Plaintiffs' Affidavits and an accompanying Memorandum in Support. On May 8, 1995 
plaintiffs filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike and/or Disregard Portions of 
Affidavits and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Objection. 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 T 
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The Court, having received and reviewed the motion for summary judgment, 
memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, plaintiffs' 
amended second objection and defendants' reply to plaintiffs' second objection; having 
received defendants' motion to strike and/or disregard portions of plaintiffs' affidavits, 
memorandum in support, plaintiff's objection to defendants' motion to strike and 
memorandum in support of objection; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this matter. The incident giving rise to 
plaintiffs' cause of action allegedly occurred on December 16th or 17th of 1992 at 
defendants' manufacturing plant in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah. Defendant DOT 
Adventures, Inc. (hereafter "DOT") is a Nevada corporation doing business in the State of 
Utah during the time period relevant to this case, July 1992 to January 4, 1993. Defendants 
Miguelangel Esquivel, Marie Reyes, and Humberto Hernandez were, on December 16th or 
17th of 1992, residents of Utah County employed by DOT and working at the manufacturing 
plant in Orem. Plaintiffs Walter Semidey, Angel Santiago, Humberto Bardales, and Rosa 
Mazariegos were, on December 16th or 17th of 1992, employed by DOT and working at the 
manufacturing plant in Orem. 
2. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on or around December 16th or 17th, 1992, defendant 
Esquivel, acting within his authority as plant manager, stopped all work in the plant and 
called all the employees together, alleging that someone in the plant had stolen a $20.00 bill 
from one of the plant workers. Defendant Esquivel then told all the workers that no one was 
to leave the plant until they and their belongings had been searched by a supervisor. 
Defendant Esquivel then directed the plant supervisors to take their workers to separate 
rooms and search them. The supervisors were responsible to insure that no worker left the 
plant without having first been searched. A supervisor thereafter physically searched each of 
the named plaintiffs and their personal belongings. No identifiably stolen money was found. 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 ~T-
000 
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3. Plaintiffs complain that defendant Esquivel's actions, in requiring that all employees 
be subjected to a physical search of their person and belongings before being allowed to 
leave the premises, (a) substantially interfered with plaintiffs' liberty and therefore 
constituted wrongful detention in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-304; (b) intentionally created 
in all non-supervisory employees the reasonable apprehension of harmful or offensive 
touching and therefore constituted assault; (c) constituted battery against plaintiffs by 
intentionally causing the harmful or offensive touching of all non-supervisory employees; (d) 
constituted false imprisonment of all non-supervisory employees by unreasonably and 
wrongfully restraining them from freely leaving the plant with implied threats of termination 
of employment if they refused to submit to the search; (e) intentionally inflicted upon the 
plaintiffs severe emotional distress; (f) recklessly inflicted upon the plaintiffs severe 
emotional distress; (g) constituted an intrusion into the physical privacy of each plaintiff; (h) 
constituted an intrusion into the personal belongings of each plaintiff; and (i) further 
constituted an intrusion into the personal affairs of plaintiff Semidey by asking, during an 
October 1992 employment interview, if Semidey was a member of the LDS church and, 
upon Semidey's affirmative response, by asking if Semidey held a valid temple recommend 
and asking to see the recommend. See Amended Complaint 11 24-42. 
4. In their Answer, defendants deny plaintiffs' allegations and argue (a) that plaintiffs' 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (b) that if defendant 
Esquivel did act in the manner alleged by plaintiffs, such action was outside the scope and 
course of his employment with defendant DOT; (c) that plaintiffs have failed to specify 
special damages as required by U.R.C.P. 9; (d) that the alleged conduct of defendant 
Esquivel does not constitute assault and/or battery because it was not intended to cause harm 
to plaintiffs and/or that there was not a substantial certainty that harm would occur; (e) that 
the alleged conduct of defendant Esquivel was privileged pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
7-3, -12 through -14, and/or that the plaintiffs consented and/or were willing to allow the 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 ^ 
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alleged contact; (f) that the plaintiffs' intentional conduct provoked the alleged conduct on the 
pan of defendant Esquivel; (g) that punitive damages are not appropriate because the alleged 
conduct of defendant Esquivel was not wanton or malicious; (h) that the plaintiffs were not 
physically restrained and there was a means of escape known to all the plaintiffs; (i) that 
defendant Esquivel's conduct, if any, was performed in good faith; (j) that plaintiffs' claims 
are barred by virtue of plaintiffs' own intentional conduct and/or contributory- negligence; 
and (k) that plaintiffs failed to mitigate their own circumstances and/or to mitigate the 
damages. 
5. In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions 
of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed with this Court on April 26, 1995, defendants allege that 
substantial portions of the affidavits do not contain testimony admissible in evidence, as 
required by U.R.C.P. 56(e), and that the plaintiffs improperly create a genuine issue of 
material fact by offering affidavits which contradict prior sworn testimony offered during 
depositions, which defendants allege establish no cause of action. 
6. In their Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion to 
Strike Affidavits, plaintiffs (a) allege that the motion to strike is untimely and legally 
insufficient; and (b) argue that defendants have failed to prove that the affidavits are legally 
inadequate under U.R.C.P. 56(e) or that the affidavits contradict the depositions on material 
issues of fact. 
7. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56; 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The 
Court will first address the issue of summary judgment and, if summary judgment is not 
appropriate, the Court will then address defendant's Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard 
Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits. 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 "A-
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8. In their Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, filed with this 
Court on October 13, 1994, defendants argue that plaintiffs' first and fourth causes of action 
(alleging wrongful detention and false imprisonment, respectively) should be dismissed 
because both are based upon allegations of unlawful detention and because unlawful 
detention, a criminal offense, is not the basis for a civil cause of action. Furthermore, 
defendants argue that force or threat of force, coupled with a reasonable apprehension that 
force will be used, is a necessary element of unlawful detention. Id. at 8-10. Since 
plaintiffs' depositions indicate that the doors remained unlocked, no one used threatening 
words against the employees, and employees were asked if they objected to being searched 
and did not do so, see id. at 9-10 (citing Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos at 17, 28), 
defendants argue that no plaintiff was detained or restrained by force or by threat of force 
and that plaintiffs' first and fourth causes of action should be dismissed. 
9. As to the first and fourth causes of action for unlawful detention and false 
imprisonment, plaintiffs dispute defendants' claim that employees were asked if they objected 
to being searched. In the Amended English Translations of plaintiffs' Affidavits, plaintiff 
Semidey stated, "At no time did [defendant Esquivel] ask if anyone objected to being 
searched. At no time did he indicate that the door was open to whoever wanted to leave." 
See Amended Translation of Affidavit of Walter Semidey, Plaintiffs' Amended Second 
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. Plaintiff Mazariegos 
also stated that Esquivel had told the employees they could not leave. See Translation of 
Affidavit of Rosa Mazariegos, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection, Exhibit C. Plaintiff 
Santiago stated that Esquivel told the employees "that no one could go back to work without 
being searched, and that [they] all had to stay in the cafeteria area until everyone had been 
searched." See Amended Translation of Affidavit of Angel Santiago, Plaintiffs' Amended 
Second Objection, Exhibit C. Plaintiffs also stated they were afraid of losing their jobs if 
they objected to being searched. Furthermore, plaintiff Semidey stated in his affidavit that 
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the door was approximately 30 feet away from the employees; plaintiff Mazariegos stated 
that the door "was a long way away." See Affidavits of Walter Semidey and Rosa 
Mazariegos, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection, Exhibit C. Plaintiffs further allege that 
wrongful detention is a civil cause of action based on the crime of unlawful detention and 
having the same elements. However, plaintiffs allege that wrongful detention does not 
require that there be no avenue of escape. 
10. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' second and third causes of action (alleging assault 
and battery, respectively) should be dismissed because an "assault" requires a wrongful act 
or the threat of bodily harm or violence and "battery" requires a touching with an intent to 
injure or harm or to cause acts of bodily harm or violence. See defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment at 11-14. Again, defendants cite plaintiffs' 
depositions, which indicate that no threat of violence or harm occurred and that no unlawful 
or improper act occurred. See id. at 13 (quoting Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos at 20-21). 
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' second cause of action, alleging assault, does not include 
any allegations supported by testimony or evidence that defendant Esquivel harmed or 
threaten to harm plaintiffs. Defendants further argue that plaintiffs' third cause of action, 
alleging battery, does not include any allegations supported by testimony or evidence that 
defendant Esquivel caused a touching with an intent to injure or harm or to cause acts of 
bodily harm or violence. For these reasons, defendants argue that plaintiffs' second and 
third causes of action should be dismissed. In the alternative, defendants argue that plaintiffs 
consented to be touched and, since consent is a defense to a claim of assault and battery, 
defendants argue that plaintiffs' second and third causes of action should be dismissed. Id. at 
15-16. 
11. Plaintiffs argue that they did not consent to the search. In their affidavits they 
explain that they feared objecting to the search because they believed they would lose their 
jobs if they did not submit. See Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection, Exhibit C. Plaintiffs 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 ^ 
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further argue that, during the time they had to wait for their turn to be searched, they were 
each subjected to an apprehension of an immediate offensive touching. Plaintiffs allege that 
each of them was then personally searched and made to suffer an offensive touching while 
the supervisors looked for the missing $20.00 bill. 
12. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action (alleging intentional 
and reckless infliction of emotional distress, respectively) should be dismissed because the 
Complaint does not allege that defendant Esquivel's conduct was intentional or that such 
conduct was "outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." Id. at 16-22 (quoting Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 970-71 (Utah 1992). Defendants argue that infliction of 
emotional distress requires these elements because a cause of action for emotional distress 
may not be based upon mere negligence. See Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 
1961); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982). Defendants further argue that, 
despite the use of the word "intentional" in the caption to plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of 
action in their Complaint, there is no language in the Complaint which actually alleges that 
defendant Esquivel's conduct was intentional, nor is there any allegation in the Complaint 
that defendant Esquivel's conduct was so outrageous and intolerable that it offended against 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Even if the complaint was amended to 
include such elements, defendants argue that the deposition of Rosa Mazariegos included an 
admission that she knew the purpose of the search was to find the money and that she was 
offended thereby. See defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment at 20-21 (quoting Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos at 51-52). In the alternative, 
defendants argue that plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action should be dismissed because 
none of plaintiffs' depositions indicate that any plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress 
requiring medical attention. 
Memorandum Decision 930400503 ~-
000 
13. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action 
(alleging intrusion into physical privacy, intrusion into personal belongings, and intrusion 
into personal affairs, respectively) should be dismissed. Defendants argue that the invasion 
of privacy action requires the offending party to search a place that an ordinary person would 
consider to be a place of seclusion, such as a private residence or an automobile, and that an 
employer's place of business would not be considered a place of seclusion for employees. 
See defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 24. As to 
plaintiffs' cause of action alleging intrusion into personal affairs, defendants argue that the 
plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants argue that, in 
Utah, such an action does not fall within the parameters of the common law tort of invasion 
of privacy. See defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
25. 
14. Plaintiffs contend that privacy rights of an individual extend not only to a dwelling 
or an automobile, but also to one's personal effects, such as purses or wallets. Plaintiffs 
argue that searching these personal effects without reasonable cause is an actionable invasion 
of privacy. See Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 17. 
The plaintiffs argue that an individual's right to seclusion as in one's home or automobile 
extends onto an employer's property as well. 
15. As to plaintiffs' first cause of action, wrongful detention, the Court finds that 
plaintiffs have not proven that defendants substantially interfered with plaintiffs' liberty. 
Plaintiffs knew the location of an exit and made no attempt to leave. 
16. As to plaintiffs' second and third causes of action, assault and battery, the Court 
does not find any evidence that defendants threatened plaintiffs with any violence or harm. 
According to the Model Utah Jury Instructions, intention to cause harmful or offensive 
contact or imminent apprehensions of such is one of the elements of assault. See M.U.J.I. 
10.18 (Assault Elements). The Court finds no evidence that defendant Esquivel intended the 
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search of plaintiffs to cause harmful or offensive contact, or to cause plaintiffs to be in 
imminent apprehension of such contact. In fact, the deposition testimony indicates that 
plaintiffs understood that defendant Esquivel intended the search to recover a fellow 
employee's stolen property. See defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For 
Summary Judgment at 20-21 (citing Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos at 51-52). The Court 
further finds no evidence that defendant Esquivel intended to cause acts of bodily harm or 
violence, and no evidence that Esquivel attempted to or threatened to cause injury or harm. 
17. As to plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, false imprisonment, the Court again finds 
no evidence that plaintiffs were confined. Plaintiffs were aware of an exit, and plaintiffs 
were not physically restrained. Plaintiffs did not attempt to discover whether the door was 
locked and did not attempt to leave. The Court further finds that defendants did not falsely 
imprison plaintiffs by any threat of force. The Model Utah Jury Instructions state that "[a] 
person is restrained when that person is not free, or reasonably believes that that person is 
not free, to leave a place to which that person has been confined and does not consent to the 
restraint." M.U.J.I. 10.15 (False Imprisonment). The Court finds that, regardless of 
whether plaintiffs consented to the search or whether defendant asked if anyone objected to 
being searched, plaintiffs voluntarily remained and submitted to the search. Even if plaintiffs 
were afraid of losing their employment, they submitted to the search without objecting or 
without attempting to leave the premises. 
18. As to plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
Model Utah Jury Instructions require the elements of outrageous conduct by defendants and 
an intention to cause emotional distress, or actions taken with reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing emotional distress. M.U.J.I. 22.1 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress). The Court does not find that defendants' conduct constituted outrageous conduct. 
Neither does the Court find any evidence that defendants intended to cause emotional distress 
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or that defendants acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional 
distress. 
19. As to plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, reckless infliction of emotional distress, the 
Model Utah Jury Instructions find no liability for the negligent infliction of emotional distress 
absent a showing that defendants should have realized their conduct involved an unreasonable 
risk of causing emotional distress or that, if emotional distress were caused, illness or bodily 
harm might result. M.U.J.I. 22.5 (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress - Part 1). The 
Court finds no evidence that the search was conducted in a manner which would involve an 
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or that any emotional distress might result in 
illness or bodily harm. Accordingly, the Court does not fmd any reason why defendants 
should have realized that such results might occur. 
20. As to plaintiffs' seventh and eighth causes of action, intrusion into physical privacy 
and intrusion into personal belongings, the Court does not find that the search, conducted at 
plaintiffs' place of employment, constituted an "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2)(a) (1977). Plaintiffs made no claims that 
defendants attempted to invade plaintiffs' homes, automobiles, or other areas which could be 
considered places of seclusion for plaintiffs. 
21. As to plaintiffs' ninth cause of action, intrusion into personal affairs, this Court 
does not find this to fall within the parameters of the common law tort of invasion of privacy 
recognized in Utah and in the Restatement of Torts. 
22. It is well known that, in a civil suit, damages may not be recovered unless the 
plaintiff can prove the existence of damages resulting to the plaintiff as a result of a legal 
wrong inflicted by the defendant. "Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does 
not constitute a cause of action." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 4 (1988). Damages 
recoverable for a tort are limited to those damages directly attributable to the tort. Id. § 
130. The Court notes that all plaintiffs are now employed with different employers and are 
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earning more than they had been paid while employed by DOT. See defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment at 6. Accordingly, the Court 
finds plaintiffs have not suffered any monetary damages upon which a cause of action could 
be sustained. 
23. The only evidence submitted by plaintiffs as to emotional damage suffered by 
plaintiffs as a result of the searching consists of an evaluation report made by Dr. Juan A. 
Mejia and an affidavit of Dr. Linda J. Gummow. Both documents are inadmissible as 
evidence. Under U.R.C.P. 56(b), affidavits are legally admissible evidence in a summary 
judgment proceeding. The Court notes that Dr. Mejia's evaluation report must be considered 
hearsay because it is not a sworn affidavit; therefore, it cannot be considered legally 
admissible evidence. Furthermore, Dr. Mejia's evaluation cannot be admitted into evidence 
as a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under Utah Rules of Evidence 
803(4) as an exception to the hearsay rule because the evaluation by Dr. Mejia was 
performed solely to aid the pursuit of litigation, not for the purpose of diagnosis to promote 
treatment. See Juan A. Mejia's Confidential Psychological Evaluation at 1, Plaintiffs' 
Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A. As 
to Dr. Gummow's report, it is inadmissible despite its affidavit form because Dr. Gummow 
did not personally examine the plaintiffs. Rather, she examined the English translations of 
the plaintiffs' statements and the psychological evaluations of plaintiffs made by Dr. Mejia. 
Dr. Gummow's affidavit is not based on her personal knowledge or on a direct evaluation of 
plaintiffs, and is therefore inadmissible as hearsay. Without the testimony of these 
psychologists, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to establish emotional damages upon 
which a cause of action could be sustained. 
24. While the Court certainly does not condone defendants' conduct in this matter, it is 
apparent that such conduct has not appreciably affected the lives of the parties such that it 
can be reduced to monetary damages. Lacking any evidence that plaintiffs have incurred any 
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monetary or psychological damages resulting from the search conducted by defendants, the 
Court finds the plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants. Accordingly, 
defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
25. Because the Court has found no genuine issue of material fact exists and defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court need not address defendants' 
Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs Affidavits. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 22nd day of May, 1995. 
BY-TllExblJRT: 
fUDG^BOYDL. PARK 
cc: Loren D. Martin 
Marti Jones 
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The Defendant, Jeanette R. Lynton, by and through her attorney, Loren D. 
Martin, hereby moves the above-entitled Court for a Summary Judgment, 
dismissing her from this case, as DOT Adventure's, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, 
was just joined as a Defendant. 
The DOT Adventures, Inc., moves that the allegation that it is 
"undercapatalized" and is the alter ego of Jeanette R. Lynton be stricken as 
slanderous. 
This Motion brought under the provisions of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure " Summary Judgment" and under the provisions of Rule 4-501 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration, and supported by accompanying this Motion. 
DATED this 11th day of June, 1994. 
D. Martin 
Attorney for Defendants 
ono 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the 
following: 
Motion For Summary Judgment and Motion To Strike; 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Strike; 
Affidavit of Jeanette Lynton; 
Request For Hearing; and 
Motion For Expedited Disposition; 
were Hand Deliverd to the following, on the 11th day of April, 1994 to the 
following: 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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The Defendant, Jeanette R. Lynton, hereinafter referred to as "Ms. 
Lynton", by and through her attorney, Loren D. Martin, hereby files this 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. DOT Adventures, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "DOT", is a 
Nevada corporation organized under Nevada law on February 10, 1989. 
2. During the period of time relevant to this case, July 1992 to January 
4, 1993, more specifically on or about December 16 or 17, 1992, DOT was doing 
business in Utah County, Utah. 
3. DOT was registered with the Utah Department of Commerce, 
Division of Corporations on January 5, 1993, and is a corporation in good 
standing in both Nevada and Utah. 
4. On or about December 16 or 17, 1994, all named Plaintiffs were 
employed by DOT Adventures, Inc. Such employment is evidenced the by the 
affidavit of Ms. Lynton enclosed herewith and the copies of paychecks for each of 
the Plaintiffs. 
5. Ms. Lynton is President, Director and principal stockholder of DOT. 
6. During the period of time relevant to this case, all other named 
defendants were employed by DOT. 
7. During the period of time relevant to this case, Defendant, 
Miguelangel Esquivel, hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Esquivel", was the plant 
manager of the Orem factory of DOT. Mr. Esquivel acted in such capacity as a 
DOT employee and agent of DOT.1 
1
 Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton, July 10, 1994 
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8. During the period of time relevant to this case, Mr. Esquivel was an 
employee of DOT. 
8. The alleged incident which gives rise to the cause of action occurred 
on December 16 or 17, 1994, at the DOT factory in Orem. Plaintiffs have 
alleged that Mr. Esquivel, "acting within his authority as plant manager, stopped 
all work within the confines of the DOTS plant, and called the employees 
together.2" Plaintiffs allege that they were told by Mr. Esquivel to submit to a 
search, resulting from one employee's claim that $20.00 had been taken by 
persons unknown. Essentially, the employees, maybe somewhere between 20-
503, were each asked to empty their pockets and show their wallets or purses. 
Consequently, Plaintiffs have alleged: wrongful detention, assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, intentional and reckless infliction of emotional distress, intrusion 
into physical privacy, and intrusion into personal belongings. The allegation has 
also been that Mr. Esquivel, on one occasion, asked one of the plaintiffs about his 
religion. Consequently, there is also an allegation of "intrusion into personal 
affairs." 
9. All allegations made against any of the named Defendants is alleged 
to have arisen from the conduct of Mr. Esquivel. 
9. There is no evidence to show that any of the Plaintiffs were ever 
employed by Ms. Lynton. During all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employed by 
DOT.* 
Amended Complaint, page 3, paragraph 16 
Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, April 19, 1994, at page 16. lines 15-22 
See copies of checks attached hereto as Exhibit A 
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10. Ms. Lynton was not present at any time during the alleged search.5 
Defendants have taken depositions of all of the Plaintiffs. None stated that Ms. 
Lynton was present during the alleged search. None stated that they had any 
reason to believe that Ms. Lynton directed, participated, commanded, nor even 
knew of the alleged search until some time later. 
11. Plaintiffs make no claim that Ms. Lynton was present during any 
alleged incident. 
12. Plaintiffs make no claim that Ms. Lynton commanded, directed, or 
even knew of the incidents until some time later. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS AN EMPLOYEE OF DOT ADVENTURES, INC., MR. ESQUIVEL ACTED 
AS AN AGENT OF DOT, NOT MS. LYNTON 
As a DOT employee and plant manager, Mr. Esquivel acted as an agent of 
DOT. Even given the allegations in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, there is 
no basis in fact or law upon which it can be concluded that Mr. Esquivel, on the 
dates of December 16 or 17, 1992, acted as an agent of Ms. Lynton. 
POINT II 
FAILURE OF A CORPORATION TO OBTAIN A UTAH CERTIFICATE OF 
AUTHORITY DOES NOT IMPAIR ITS CORPORATE VALIDITY 
It is not unlawful for a foreign corporation to transact business in Utah. 
There are certain restrictions. However, Utah statutes provide that: 
The failure of a foreign corporation to have authority to 
transact business in this state does not impair the validity of its 
Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, April 19, 1994, at page 16, line 24 
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corporate acts, nor does the failure prevent the corporation from 
defending any proceeding in this state.6 
POINT III 
AN OFFICER OF A CORPORATION IS NOT 
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS OF AN EMPLOYEE 
An officer of a corporation cannot be held personally liable for the 
wrongful conduct of the corporation's employees absent personal involvement 
with the conduct.7 
Even if a tort had been committed against Plaintiffs by Mr. Esquivel as 
plant manager of DOT, Ms. Lynton, as a corporate officer is not personally liable 
unless she participated or directed the conduct.8 
Personal liability cannot be imposed upon a corporate officer just because 
she has administrative responsibility. 
A director, officer, or agent is not liable for torts of the 
corporation or of other officers or agents merely because of his 
office; he is liable for torts in which he has participated or which he 
has authorized or directed.9 
Even given the allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Ms. 
Lynton is not personally liable under a tort/agency theory. 
6
 Utah Code Annotated, § 16-1 Oa-1502(6) 
7
 West v. Costen, D.C. Va., 558 F.Supp 564, 585 (1983) 
8
 Restatement of Torts §877; Morgan v. Eaton's Dude Ranch, 239 N.W.2d 761, 307 Minn. 280 (1976) 
9
 19 C.J.S., Corporations, §544 
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POINT IV 
ABSENT PROOF OF FRAUD AND FAILURE OF THE CORPORATION, 
MS. LYNTON, AS A SHAREHOLDER, CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE 
In almost every situation where a plaintiff has attempted to pierce the 
corporate veil, asking the court to impose personal liability upon a shareholder, 
such request has been preceded by a corporate financial failure. DOT is a 
company which employees more than 70 employees, ships product to 45 states. 
There is no factual basis upon which the claim may be made that DOT is 
"undercapatalized." 
Plaintiffs allegations of "alter ego" and "undercapatalized" are slanderous. 
Such allegations are not, as required by Rule l l 1 0 which requires that allegations 
be, "well grounded in fact." Nor are such allegations, "warranted by existing 
law" nor a good faith extension thereof. 
The law governing the affairs of corporations is the law of the state is the 
law of the state under which the corporation was created.11 However, even 
though the law governing DOT is Nevada, both Nevada and Utah are similar in 
regard to outside creditors ability to pierce the corporate veil. 
Utah law provides that: 
In order to disregard the corporate entity, there must a 
concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation 
is, in fact the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the 
1
 ° Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 
1
 * 19 C.J.S., Corporations, §§ 1990 et seq. 
6
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observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.12 
Nevada law stated slightly different: 
The basic requisites for the application of the doctrine of alter 
ego have been well established. 
(1) The corporation must be influenced and governed by the 
person asserted to be its alter ego. (2) There must be such unity of 
interest and ownership that one is inseparable from the other; and (3) 
The facts must be such that adherence to the fiction of a separate 
entity could, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud.13 
In order to pierce the corporate veil, the Plaintiffs must show that they 
have some reasonable basis in fact that DOT is undercapatalized. In fact, Utah 
case law has used the phrase and required that there be facts to show that the 
corporation has "grossly inadequate capital/'14 
The first prong of the test is the "formalities requirement." There is no 
evidence to show that DOT has not complied with all of the statutory formalities. 
Even though Ms. Lynton is the principal shareholder, having substantial 
ownership of all stock, it must be shown that she clearly disregarded the 
corporate fiction. Second, it must be shown that the corporation does not have 
sufficient funds to pay its debts. One key factor which normally triggers the 
question is the failure of the corporation to pay its debts. There is absolutely no 
evidence that DOT is "undercapatalized." 
1 2
 Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979); Messick v. PHD Trucking 
Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984) 
1 3
 Bonanza Hotel Gift Ship, Inc., v. Bonanza No. 2, 596 P.2d 227. 229 (Nevada 1979) 
1 4
 Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors, 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah App. 1988) 
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Permitting unfounded accusations to trigger a romp through corporate files 
and finances would be strongly contrary to public policy. 
The very purpose of the corporate structure is the 
advancement of limited liability of investors with an underlying 
legislative policy directed to the encouragement of investments. 
Consequently, the corporate structure should never be lightly 
disregarded.15 
POINT V 
THE HOLDING OF A DBA BY MS. LYNTON IS IMMATERIAL 
In the Amended Complaint, the allegation is made that Ms. Lynton had, 
under her own name, personally registered a dba or D.O.T.S. Dozens of Terrific 
Stamps.16 Such allegation is immaterial to the status of the corporation and there 
is no statement that any of the Plaintiffs were ever employed by Ms. Lynton. 
POINT VI 
SLANDEROUS AND UNFOUNDED STATEMENTS SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
In the Amended Complaint, the allegation is made that" At the time of 
incorporation and at all times relevant herein, DOT Adventures, Inc. was 
inadequately capitalized to properly conduct the business it purported to engage 
in."1? 
Such statement is false, has no legal merit, and is slanderous.18 
POINT VII 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits, and admissions submitted in a case show that there is no genuine issue 
D
 West v. Cos tin, supra, at 585 
6
 Amended Complaint, page 1, paragraph 1 
7
 Amended Complaint, page 2, paragraph 4. 
8
 Affidavit of Jeanette Lynton, July 11, 1994. 
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of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.19 
CONCLUSION 
Jeanette R. Lynton's Motion For Summary Judgment should be Granted. 
DATED this 11th day of June, 1994. 
oren D. Martin 
Attorney for Defendants 
1 9
 Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors, supra, at 45 (Utah App. 1988) 
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Defendants. * 
COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of 
record, and hereby object to Defendant Jeanette Lynton's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on the following grounds. 
PLAINTIFFS7 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs dispute Lynton7s statement #1, that "DOT 
Adventures, Inc., is a Nevada corporation organized under Nevada 
law." DOT Adventures (DOT NV) is a Nevada corporation. To the 
1 000 
best of Plaintiffs' knowledge, there is no Nevada corporation 
named DOT Adventures, Inc. (DOT Inc.). (See Nevada certificate of 
Incorporation, and a copy of the Utah Registration, Appendix A).1 
2. Plaintiffs dispute Lynton's statement #2 that DOT Inc. 
was doing business in Utah County between July 1992 and January 
4, 1993. As DOT Inc. was not incorporated until January 5, 
1993,2 when DOT Adventures formally registered this name, it 
could not possibly have been doing business legally in Utah 
County prior to that date. 
3. Plaintiffs dispute Lynton's statement #4, that "all 
named Plaintiffs were employed by DOT Adventures, Inc." It is 
the Plaintiffs' position that they could not possibly have been 
employed by DOT Inc., because said corporation did not exist 
until January 5, 1993, when it was properly registered with the 
State of Utah. 
4. Plaintiffs would also dispute Lynton's argument if 
statements 1, 2, and 4, were re-written to state the proper name 
of DOT NV. The alleged corporate checks which Lynton submits in 
support of her Motion bear the name of DOT, Inc., with an Orem 
1
 While this may seem like minor hair splitting, based on 
the case law cited herein, this point is extremely relevant. 
2
 See, in particular, the date of incorporation given on 
the "Utah Department of Commerce Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code Corporation transcript," attached at Appendix A. 
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address. They are therefore completely unprobative of the 
involvement of DOT NV as the principal behind the Utah factory. 
5. Plaintiffs dispute Lynton's claim #7 that it is an 
undisputed material fact that Miguelangel Esquivel, (Esquivel) 
Jeanette Lynton (Lynton) and the Plaintiffs were acting as agents 
of an alleged Nevada corporation during the period of July 1992 
to January 1993 when the causes of action arose. The copies of 
paychecks given to Esquivel and the Plaintiffs during this period 
are made out by DOT Inc., and give a Utah address. As stated 
previously, there is no indication on those checks of the 
involvement of a Nevada corporation. Lynton has submitted no 
proof that there was a DOT Adventures, Inc., incorporated in 
Nevada, and the corporation doing business in Utah under that 
name was not legally registered until January 5, 1993. 
6. It is a disputed material fact whether DOT NV, as a 
legal non-entity in Utah, had existence in Utah sufficient to 
allow it to create cognizable agency relationships during the 
period in question. 
7. It is a disputed material fact whether or not DOT NV 
chose to act illegally in the state of Utah during the period in 
question. 
8. It is a disputed material fact whether Lynton, as 
President of DOT NV, and the sole officer and director of that 
3 
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company, knew of the requirement to register and also knew that, 
during the period in question between August 1992 and January 
1993, DOT NV was not registered to do business in Utah as a 
foreign corporation. 
9. It is a disputed material fact whether Lynton /dba/ was 
acting on her own behalf, rather than on behalf of DOT NV when 
she established the factory in Orem, Utah, and hired Mr. Esquivel 
and the plaintiffs as agents. 
10. It is a disputed issue of material fact whether Lynton 
knew that the alleged entity DOT Adventures, Inc., on whose 
behalf she signed paychecks to Esquivel and the Defendants, had 
no legal existence prior to January 5, 1993. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Memorandum in support of Lynton's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (Memorandum) alleges six reasons why Lynton's Motion 
should be granted. Paraphrased, these reasons are: 
(a) Mr. Esquivel was an employee and agent of DOT 
Adventures, Inc., not of Ms. Lynton. 
(b) The fact that DOT Adventures, Inc. had failed to 
register as a foreign corporation does not impair its 
validity as a corporation. 
(c) An officer of a corporation is not personally liable 
for the acts of corporate employees. 
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(d) Absent proof of fraud and failure of the corporation, 
shareholder Lynton is not personally liable. 
(e) The fact that Lynton held the dba D.O.T.S., Dozens of 
Terrific Stamps, is immaterial. 
(f) The slanderous and unfounded statements should be 
stricken. 
Lynton's arguments, however, confuse rather than clarify the 
issues. Point (a) is problematic because, as stated previously, 
there was no DOT Adventures, Inc., either in Utah or Nevada, of 
which Esquivel could have been an employee prior to January 5, 
1993. Even assuming a minor error in corporate names, the 
question of precisely whom or what Esquivel was representing is a 
disputed issue of material fact, not a legal justification for 
Defendant Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment. Lynton's second 
argument, (b) relies on inapplicable law and is inappropriate in 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on her own behalf. Neither points 
(c), (d), nor (e) are accurate statements of the applicable law, 
and point (f) is not a legal argument, but a simple, unsupported, 
allegation. 
Defendant Lynton states as undisputed fact that Mr. Esquivel 
was an employee and agent of DOT Adventures Inc. during the 
relevant time period, not of Lynton /dba/ D.O.T.S., Dozens of 
Terrific Stamps (Stamps). This assertion is, in fact, 
5 000 
impossible, as there was no corporation, either in Utah or in 
Nevada, with the name of DOT Adventures, Inc. in existence prior 
to January 5, 1993. 
It is this issue, the issue of Esquivel's principal, that 
forecloses the possibility of Lynton's removal from this case. 
The crucial question in this Motion for Summary Judgment is the 
question of Mr. Esquivel's agency—for whom, or what, was he 
acting during August 1992 to January 1993. Defendant Lynton 
alleges that because Mr. Esquivel's paychecks bore the corporate 
logo of DOT Adventures, Inc., that this is proof positive that 
his actions in Utah were done on behalf of an alleged Nevada 
corporation with that name. However, Lynton has failed to submit 
any indication that there actually was or is a Nevada corporation 
by that name. Furthermore, the address on the alleged corporate 
checks is a Utah address, not a Nevada address. It is a fact 
that DOT Adventures, Inc. was not legally "incorporated" (i.e., 
registered) in the state of Utah until January 5, 1993; as a 
result, if the corporation DOT NV was indeed acting in the state 
of Utah, it was doing so illegally. Furthermore, Mr. Esquivel 
indicated to the plaintiffs, as employees of the factory, that he 
was working on behalf of Lynton, and that all his actions were 
authorized by her. (See Appendix C). 
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Because there are material facts in dispute, Lynton has 
failed to meet the standard of proof required to prevail on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and her Motion should be denied. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
In order to prevail in her Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Lynton must show that there are no disputed material facts and 
that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ. 
P. 56(c). Summary Judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions submitted in a case show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
ISSUE I. LYNTON DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
RAISE UTAH CODE §16-10a-1502(6) AS A DEFENSE. 
In her Memorandum, Lynton argues that U.C.A. §16-l0a-1502(6) 
is proof that the acts of foreign corporations undertaken without 
proper authority may still be defended in court. Plaintiffs have 
no argument with this principle. However, Lynton then argues 
that because DOT NV3 could defend a lawsuit based on acts prior 
3
 Throughout her Memorandum and Affidavit, Lynton confuses 
DOT Adventures, the Nevada corporation, with DOT Adventures, 
Inc., the Utah name for that Nevada corporation. This is more 
than a bit confusing, particularly since the Utah registered 
corporate entity DOT Adventures, Inc. did not exist during the 
period in question. Unless otherwise noted in this Objection, 
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to legal registration and formal state recognition of corporate 
existence, that this is conclusive proof that DOT NV, not she, is 
liable for any tortious act of Esquivel. On the basis of this 
twisted argument, Lynton contends that she has no legal liability 
to the Plaintiffs in this case. 
Lynton, it appears, here confuses her corporate hat with her 
individual hat. She also confuses liability with ability to 
defend. U.C.A. §16-10a-1502 is the section of the Utah code that 
discusses the consequences to a foreign corporation of 
transacting business without authorization. This section 
describes the penalties to DOT NV—the section says absolutely 
nothing about individuals who claim to be acting on behalf of 
unauthorized corporations. The fact that DOT NV may defend an 
action brought against it says nothing about the legal liability 
of Lynton. Lynton's citation of this code section, therefore, is 
completely irrelevant and immaterial to her Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Hypothetically, had Plaintiffs attempted to bar DOT NV 
from defending its own corporate actions, DOT NV could have 
raised this section as a defense. But this hypothetical is not 
the case before us. Plaintiffs have not attempted to prevent DOT 
NV from defending, and indeed, have acted affirmatively to join 
however, Plaintiffs have assumed that Defendant speaks of the 
Nevada corporation DOT Adventures when referring to a time when 
DOT Adventures, Inc. was not in existence. 
8 
the Nevada corporation. Plaintiffs are not, however, convinced 
by Lynton's self-serving allegations that DOT NV, (Statement of 
Facts #7) not she, was the principal prior to DOT NV's legal 
registration with the state of Utah; nor is the submission of 
paychecks bearing the name of DOT Inc., with an Orem address, 
probative in any way of Lynton's allegation that Esquivel was 
acting as the agent of DOT NV. 
ISSUE II. LYNTON'S ALLEGATION THAT DOT 
ACTED ILLEGALLY IN UTAH IS YET ANOTHER GROUND 
FOR LYNTON'S PERSONAL LIABILITY 
U.C.A. 16-10a-1501(l) provides that "A foreign corporation 
may not transact business in this state until its application for 
authority to transact business is filed by the division.11 
Therefore, Lynton's contention that DOT NV, not she, is liable 
for the tortious actions of Mr. Esquivel, is tenuously based on 
the implicit allegation that DOT NV was acting illegally in the 
state of Utah during the period in question. Under U.C.A. 16-
10a-204, however, even if DOT NV is found to be Esquivel's 
principal, if is also found at trial that Lynton, as President of 
DOT NV, was aware of the illegality in DOT NV's status, Lynton 
may be personally liable precisely because of that knowlege. 
4
 The fact that Plaintiffs also confused DOT Adventures, 
the Nevada corporation, with DOT Adventures, Inc., the name under 
which the Nevada corporation now does business in Utah, is 
indicative of the problems in this case. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-204 states "All persons 
purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there 
was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and 
severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting." A 
corporation is a fictional entity, created by law. Because DOT 
NV was already incorporated under Nevada law, it did not have to 
completely re-incorporate under Utah law to become a legally 
recognizable entity in Utah. However, Chapter 16 of the Utah 
Code Annotated does require all foreign corporations doing 
business in Utah to register in order to be recognized as 
incorporated in Utah.5 All DOT NV had to do was to register with 
the Utah Department of Commerce as a foreign corporation doing 
business in Utah. In spite of the minimal requirements, DOT NV 
chose not to become a legally recognizable corporate entity in 
the state of Utah during the period in question. 
Under U.C.A.(1953) § 16-10a-204, where the legal formalities 
are not followed and an individual purports to act on behalf of a 
corporation, knowing that the legal formalities have not been 
complied with, that individual may be jointly and severally 
5
 There are some actions which the statute explicitly 
defines as not doing business. A non-exhaustive list of these 
action is found in U.C.A.(1953) § 16-10a-1501. The actions of 
Defendants' in establishing a factory to manufacture rubber 
stamps and employ more than 70 people (Affidavit of Jeanette 
Lynton, p. 2) does not qualify as "not doing business." 
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liable for the liabilities created by those actions. The 
precursor to this statue was U.C.A. §16-10-139. In Gillham 
Advertising Aacv., Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163, (Utah 1977), the 
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to apply this precursor in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. In Gillham, Ipson, an 
individual purporting to act as the agent of a Nevada 
corporation, entered Utah, rented a racecourse, and began to 
operate the racecourse. Ipson attempted to register as a foreign 
corporation, but his registration was denied because there was 
already a Utah corporation with the name he wanted. In the 
course of doing business in Utah without proper registration, 
Ipson incurred debts. Later he signed an agreement with certain 
creditors. Ipson signed that agreement "Bonneville Raceways by 
Robert K. Ipson, President," in spite of the fact that Ipson was 
well aware that there was no corporation by that name licensed to 
do business in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court held that Ipson was 
personally liable for the debts and liabilities incurred. 
Another case applicable to the present situation is that of 
Sterling Press v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599, (Utah 1978). In that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court held two individuals personally 
liable because they incurred debts using the unregistered trade 
name of a publishing company. The pay checks which Lynton 
submitted in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment indicate 
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that, throughout the period in question, July 1992 to January 4, 
1993, Lynton was signing pay checks to Esquivel and the 
Plaintiffs purportedly on behalf of an unregistered, and thus 
legally non-existent, Utah corporation. 
In Gillham, Ipson at least made an attempt to properly 
register his foreign corporation. Lynton has not even claimed 
that such an attempt was made, prior to January 5, 1993. 
Furthermore, Lynton states in her affidavit that she was the 
President of DOT Inc. (Presumably DOT NV) during the relevant 
time period, as well as the keeper of its employment records. 
The records of the Division of Corporations indicate that Lynton 
was sufficiently aware of the need to register with the Utah 
Division of Corporations that she filed an application for the 
trade name or /dba/ D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific Stamps, in 
August 1992. She also was responsible for registering DOT NV as 
a foreign corporation in Utah on January 5, 1993. Although not 
conclusive, this is certainly substantial circumstantial evidence 
that Lynton knew of the need to register DOT NV and chose not to. 
There is also substantial evidence that Lynton knew that there 
was no Utah corporation (or Nevada corporation, for that matter,) 
with the name that appears on those checks. If this is found to 
be the case after discovery, Lynton would be legally liable, 
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under U.C.A. 16-10a-204,6 for the actions of the purported 
corporation's agents, such as those of Esquivel. 
Finally, there is testimony in the depositions of the 
Plaintiffs that Esquivel presented himself as Lynton's agent, and 
that he presented her as the owner of the company. (See Appendix 
C: Santiago depo., p. 42, lines 23-25; Semiday depo., pp. 60-61, 
lines 22-25, 1; Bardales depo., p.13-14, lines 21-25, 1-5; 
Mazariegos depo., pp. 40-41, lines 21-25, 1.). Although this 
evidence is not conclusive, due to the Plaintiffs' lack of 
education, it is probative of the way Esquivel and Lynton 
presented themselves. Further discovery on these issues is 
clearly necessary, to determine, for example, whether it was DOT 
NV, as a Nevada corporation doing business illegally in Utah 
6
 It could be argued that the language of the statute has 
been changed to be more specific since it was cited in Gillham, 
and thus no longer applies to foreign corporations that fail to 
register, so long as they are corporations in good standing in 
their own state. The language still, however, says "incorporated 
under this chapter." Arguably, registration is the way in which 
foreign corporations become incorporated under this chapter. It 
is the Plaintiffs' position that the language change does not 
materially change the application of this statute to foreign 
corporations that fail to register. A close reading of both the 
new statute and the Commentary to Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act, Commentary on section 204, (Attached at Appendix 
B) indicates that such a reading (i.e., one changing the 
application of this section to foreign corporations that fail to 
register) was not intended by the drafters of the code. In any 
case, the checks submitted by Lynton indicate that she was doing 
business in Utah as DOT Adventures, Inc., which is not even a 
Nevada corporation. 
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through Lynton, or Lynton /dba/, that registered and filed sales 
and other taxes in Utah for the period of time between August 
1992 and January 1993. It is possible, although pure conjecture 
at this point, that Lynton's failure to register DOT NV in 1992 
was an attempt to avoid Utah taxes on the sales and profits of 
the Orem factory. It does seem more than a little coincidental 
that the corporation was properly registered on the second day of 
business, 1993. If, after proper discovery, this were found to 
be the case, it would be manifestly unjust to permit Lynton to 
avoid corporate and other taxes by not properly registering the 
foreign corporation, and then to allow her to also avoid personal 
liability for the consequent debts and liabilities. 
Minutes of corporate director's meetings and other documents 
indicating that Lynton was authorized by the corporation to act 
illegally on its behalf would also provide relevant information 
on these disputed issues. Plaintiffs asked for copies of those 
minutes in their First Request for Production of Documents. 
Defendants refused to supply the minutes on the grounds they were 
irrelevant. For the reasons stated above, these documents are 
not irrelevant, and Defendant Lynton's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied to allow Plaintiffs to complete 
discovery on these issues. 
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ISSUE III. LYNTON'S MEMORANDUM 
MISSTATES THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ALTER 
EGO THEORY OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Lynton also makes a number of arguments that depend upon a 
finding by this Court that DOT NV was, in actuality, a 
legitimate, legal, corporate actor in the state of Utah. 
Lynton#s arguments, that an officer of a corporation is not 
personally liable for the acts of corporate employees, and that 
absent proof of fraud and failure of the corporation, 
shareholders are not personally liable for tortious actions of 
employees, depend entirely on a finding that there was a legal 
corporate actor behind which the corporate directors may shield 
themselves. As has been argued above, the actual legal existence 
of Lynton7s alleged corporate actor is a material disputed fact. 
Without that legal corporation, there is no need for Plaintiffs 
to resort to the alter ego theory. 
However, Plaintiffs will assume, strictly for the sake of 
this section of their Objection, that the Court does eventually 
find that DOT NV was acting as a corporation, although illegally, 
in the State of Utah. Even if this were true, DOT NV's failure 
to observe the corporate formalities would be sufficient to 
establish the first prong of the alter-ego theory under Utah 
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law,7 The Utah Supreme Court examined the alter ego theory in 
some detail in Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc.. 678 P.2d 
791 (Utah 1984). In Messick the Court examined the traditional 
two prong test for determining whether a corporation is the 
"alter ego" of an individual or individuals. As Defendant Lynton 
states in her Memorandum, the first prong of this argument is 
commonly known as the "formalities" argument. Defendant Lynton 
further states in her Memorandum that "there is no evidence to 
show that DOT has not complied with all of the statutory 
formalities." (Memorandum, p.7). This assertion is completely 
contrary to Lynton's own allegations and admitted facts. In her 
statement of Undisputed Facts, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, Lynton 
clearly indicates that DOT NV did not comply with the statutory 
formalities for formal recognition under Utah law until January 
5, 1993, after the claims in this case had arisen. Thus, on the 
7
 Lynton appears to argue, or at least propose, in her 
Memorandum in Support that the law applicable to determining 
whether DOT is Lynton's alter ego is Nevada law, rather than Utah 
law. In general, the internal affairs of a corporation, . . . 
are governed by the state of incorporation. Loveridge v. 
Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 878 (10th Cir. 1982). The external 
affairs of a corporation, however, are subject to general 
conflicts principles, and depend on the issues and the nature and 
location of the controversy. Since the causes of action in the 
present suit arose in the state of Utah the alter ego theory to 
be applied in this case is that of Utah, rather than Nevada. 
However, in determining whether normal corporate formalities have 
been followed, Nevada's law would determine most of those 
formalities. 
16 
basis of her own statements, Lynton and DOT NV do not pass the 
"statutory formalities" prong of the alter-ego test. In Messick, 
the Utah Supreme Court found that "a mere showing of the 
corporation's failure to observe said statutory formalities" is 
sufficient to establish the first prong. Id., at 794. The 
second prong is, according to the Utah Supreme Court "addressed 
to the conscience of the court, and the circumstances under which 
it will be met will vary with each case." Due to the relative 
lack of formal discovery on these issues, Plaintiffs have no way 
of knowing, without completing discovery, the reasons for DOT'S 
failure to properly register, and thus whether the second prong 
is met. This is, therefore, another disputed issue of material 
fact. The failure to register may have been mere oversight, or 
it may have been a deliberate choice. All of these issues, 
however, are disputed subject to further discovery and therefore 
are sufficient to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Lynton's behalf at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment is unwarranted and 
should be denied. There are disputed issues of material fact 
which preclude a determination that DOT NV was the legal 
principal behind Lynton and Esquivel, and that therefore DOT NV, 
and not Lynton, is legally liable. There are also disputed 
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issues of material fact regarding whether or not Lynton's illegal 
actions allegedly taken on behalf of DOT NV were done with the 
knowledge that DOT NV was not properly registered as a corporate 
entity in Utah, Finally, there are disputed issues of material 
fact as to whether Lynton's actions in Utah under the 
unincorporated name of DOT Adventures, Inc. qualify for any 
corporate privilege. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this 
Court to deny Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this of July, 1994. 
I L. JONE; 
RNEY FOR^ : 
ss 
ATTORNEY FOR^PLAINTIFFS 
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CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE STATUS 
lr CHERYL A. LAU, the duly elected, qualified and acting Secretary of State of the 
State of Nevada, do hereby certify that I am, by the laws of said State, the custodian 
of the records relating to corporations organized under the laws thereof; the 
revocation of their corporate charters, and their right to transact and carry on their 
corporate business; and am the proper officer to execute this certif icate. 
I further certify that, at the date of this certif icate, DOT ADVENTURES is a 
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Nevada, having fully complied therewi th; is entitled to exercise therein all the 
corporate powers and functions recited in its charter or articles of incorporation, and 
is in good standing in this State. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the Great Seal of State, at my office, in 
Carson City, Nevada, this 8th day of December, 1992 
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ittuwu VII.11 may i>i* m c i u u c o MI UII: a m c i e s uia.v m 
«aih d i v i d e d into three general classes: 
(a) Provis ions that under the Revised Act 
may be e l ec ted only by specific inclusion 
in the ar t i c l e s of incorpoiation. A list of 
these provis ions is set forth in part e ol 
this c o m m e n t . 
(b) Provis ions that under the Revised Act 
may he e lected by specific inclusion in 
e i ther the art ic les of incorporation or the 
by laws , and the draftsman e lects to in-
c lude the provision in the articles. A list 
of prov is ions that may be elected in ei-
ther the b y l a w s or the art ic les is set forth 
in part f of th is comment . 
(c) Other prov i s ions not referred to in the 
Revised A c t that the draftsman decides 
should be included in the art ic les of in-
corporation. T h i s includes but is not lim-
ited to a n y provision that the Revised Act 
requires or permits to be se t forth in the 
by laws . S e e sect ion 202(2)(c). 
7. Se l f -dea l ing transact ions 
W h e n subs id iar ies or corporate joint ventures are 
>eing formed, special considerat ion should be g iven to 
he inc lus ion of prov i s ions des igned to l imit or avoid 
he unexpec ted appl icat ion of the doctrines of corpo-
a te opportunity and conflict of interest . While this 
ype of c l a u s e wil l not provide total protection, it may 
>e g i v e n l imited effect, for example , by shift ing the 
mrden of proving unfa i rnes s or "exonerating" an ar-
a n g e m e n t from "adverse influences." 
e. Options in Revised Act That M a y B e Elected 
Only in the Articles of Incorporation 
1. Opt ions wi th respect to directors 
(a) Prov is ions e l iminat ing or l imit ing, with 
certain except ions , the l iabil i ty of the di 
rectors to the corporation or its share 
holders for monetary d a m a g e s (section 
841) ( the Revised Act actual ly permits 
such a provis ion to be included in the by-
laws or in a separate resolution, provided 
that it is approved by the s a m e share-
holder vote that would be required to in 
e lude the provision in the articles of in 
corporation». 
ih) Klection of directors by cumulat ive vot 
ing may be authorized (section 728) 
(c) Elect ion of directors by greater than plu 
ralitv of vote mav be authorized (section 
728) ' 
<d» Directors may be elected by classes ol 
shares (sect ion 804 > 
(el Power to remove directors without cause 
may be restricted or e l iminated (section 
—. ^ 808) . 
^—*f) Terms of directors may be staggered so 
C^j that all directors a n not elected in the 
- » ^ s a m e year • sect ion 800) 
^—tg> Power to fill vacancies may be limited to 
the shareho lders isection 810) 
ibl Power to indemnify directors, officers 
and e m p l o y e e s may be l imited (part 9> 
pt ions with respect to shareholders 
1
 Special vot ing groups of shareholders 
m a \ be authorized 'section 725) 
,
 Mu..<um:t IUI vuung "»V voill lg groups 0 f 
shareholders may be prescribed (section 
726). 
d Greater than majority vote may be re-
quired for action by vot ing groups of 
shareholders (sect ions 727 and 1021). 
3 Options with respect to shares 
•<-. • Shares may he divided into c lasses and 
classes into ser ies (sect ions 601 and 602) 
•h> Cumulative vot ing for directors may be 
permitted (section 728). 
• c Distributions m a y be restricted (section 
640). 
<d' Share dividends may be restricted (sec-
tion 623). 
<e» Voting rights of c lasses of shares may be 
limited or denied (section 601) . 
i f Classes of shares m a y be g i v e n more or 
less than one vote per share (section 721) . 
•g» Shares may be redeemed at the option oi( 
the corporation or the shareholder (sec-, 
tion 601). j 
»h» Reissue of redeemed shares m a y be pro-
hibited (section 631) . .,J 
(i> Shareholders may be g iven preemptive 
rights to acquire un i s sued shares (section, 
630). 
<j» Redemption preferences m a y be ignored 
in determining lawfu lness of distribu-
tions (section 640) . 
f Options in Model Act that May Be Elected Ei-
ther in the Articles of Incorporation or in the 
Bylaws. 
1. Options with respect to directors 
l&> Provisions e l i m i n a t i n g or l imit ing , with 
certain exceptions, the l iabil ity of direc-
tors to the corporation or to shareholders 
lor monetary d a m a g e s , provided that the 
provision is approved by the same vote of 
shareholders as would be required to in-
clude the provision in the art ic les of in-
corporation (section 841) . 
•b- Number of directors may be fixed or 
changed within l imi t s (section 803). 
•c Qualifications for directors may be pre-
scribed (section 802) . 
•d Power to compensate directors may be 
restricted or e l imina ted (section 811) 
•t Notice of regular or special meet ings of 
board of directors m a y be prescribed (sec-
tion 822). 
'f Power of board of directors to act without 
meeting may be restricted (section 821). 
k-' Quorum for meet ing of board of directors 
may be increased or decreased (down to 
one third) from majority (section 824). 
K Action at meet ing of board of directors 
mav require a greater than majority vote 
•section 824). 
. Power (if directors to participate in meet-
ing without being physical ly present may 
r<e prohibited (section 820) . 
.: Board of directors may create committees 
and specify their powers (section 825)-
k Power of board of directors to amend by-
laws mav be restricted (sections 1020 
.md 1022) 
uw i roceuuie lor n e a t i n g henel icial owner 
of street name shares as record owner 
may be prescribed (section 723). 
(c) Transfer of shares may be restricted (sec-
tion 627) 
S e c t i o n 203 . I n c o r p o r a t i o n 
Section 203(1) provides that the ex i s tence of a cor-
poration beg ins w h e n the art ic les of incorporation are 
filed, un less a de layed effective date is specified un-
der section 123. Part 1 conta ins detai led rules for the 
filing and effective da te s of documents , all of which 
are applicable to art ic les of incorporation and other 
documents. T h e s e filing rules s implify the process of 
creating a corporation in several respects. 
a. What to File. 
Section 120 requires that only one document 
(which may be an executed original or a n appropriate 
copy of the executed original) and an exac t or con-
formed copy of the d o c u m e n t need be del ivered to the 
Division for filing. T h i s de l ivery m u s t be accompa-
nied by the appl icable filing fee. 
b. Nature of Filing. 
Section 125 provides that the Divis ion files the ar-
ticles by s t a m p i n g t h e m "filed" and recording the 
date and t i m e of acceptance; the Divis ion reta ins the 
articles of incorporation and returns the exact or con-
formed copy to the appropriate party a long wi th a 
receipt for the fee. T h e return of th is copy and the fee 
receipt e s t a b l i s h e s tha t the art ic les h a v e been filed in 
the form of the copy. 
c. Certificate of Incorporation Eliminated. 
Sect ion 125 provides tha t approval by the Div is ion 
is in the form of return of the copy of the art ic les wi th 
a fee receipt rather than a certif icate of incorporation, 
as is the practice prescribed in the Prior Act. S e e the 
commentary to sect ion 125. 
d. Precise Time of Incorporation 
Sect ion 203(1) t ies the precise t ime of incorporation 
to the date and t ime s tamped on the articles . Sect ion 
123 provides in turn that th is is the date and t ime the 
articles are accepted by the Divis ion The creators of 
the corporation may, however , specif} that the corpo-
ration's ex i s t ence will begin on a later date than the 
date of filing, and at a precise t ime mi the filing date 
or the later effective date , to the extent permitted by 
section 123 
e. Conclusiveness of Divisum's Actum on Quvs 
tion of Individual Liability foi Corporate Ac-
tions. 
Under sect ion 203(2) the filing of the articles of 
incorporation as ev idenced by teturn of the s tamped 
copy of the art ic les with the fee receipt is conclusive 
proof that all condit ions precedent to incorporation 
nave been met . except in proceedings brought by the 
state. T h u s the fi l ing of the articles of incorporation is 
conclus ive as to the ex i s t ence of l imited l iabil ity for 
Persons who enter into transact ions on behalf of the 
a corporation" knowing that articles have not been 
filed. Sect ion 204 may protect some of these person.*, 
to a l imited extent , however; see the Commentary t«» 
that section. 
S e c t i o n 204 . L i a b i l i t y for P r e i n c o r p o i a t ion 
T r a n s a c t i o n s 
Karlier vers ions of the Model Act, the Piior Ait. 
and the s ta tu te s of many othei s tates , have lone; pro 
vided that corporate ex i s tence begins only with the 
acceptance of art ic les of incorporation by the fihne, 
agency Many s ta te s a lso have s tatutes that provide 
express ly that those who prematurely act as or on 
behalf of a corporation are personally liable on all 
transact ions entered into or l iabil i t ies incurred before 
incorporation. A review of recent case law indicates, 
however , that e v e n in s ta te s with such s ta tutes courts 
have cont inued to rely on common law concepts of de 
facto corporations, de jure corporations, and corrobora-
t ions by estoppel that provide uncertain protection 
aga ins t l iabi l i ty for preincorporation transacts 
These cases caused a rev iew of the underlying \u 
c ies represented in earl ier vers ions of the Model Act 
and the adoption of a s l ight ly more f lexible or relaxed 
standard. 
Incorporation under modern s ta tutes is so s imple 
and inexpens ive that a strong argument mu> be 
made that noth ing short of filing art ic les of incorpo-
ration should create the privi lege of l imited liability. 
A number of s i tuat ions have ar isen, however, in 
which the protection of l imited l iabi l i ty arguably 
should be recognized even though the s imple incorpo-
ration process establ ished by modern s t a t u t e s has not 
been completed. 
a The s trongest factual pattern for immuniz ing 
part ic ipants from personal liability occurs in cases in 
which the participant honest ly and reasonably but 
erroneously bel ieved the articles had been filed In 
Cransun v International liusmess Machines t\np. 
234 Md. 477 , 200 A 2d 33 (1964), for e x a m p l e , the 
defendant had been shown executed art ic les of incur 
poration s o m e m o n t h s earl ier before he inves ted in 
the corporation and became an officer and director 
He was also told by the corporation's attorney that 
the articles had been filed, but in fact they had not 
been filed because of a mix-up in the attorney's offi< 
The defendant was held not liable on the "corpora1 
obligation 
b Another class of cases , which is less compel 
l ing but in which the partic ipants somet imes haw-
escaped personal l iabi l i ty , involves the defendant 
who mai l s in art ic les of incorporation and then enters 
into a transaction in the corporate name; the let i n is 
e i ther de layed oi the filing officer refuses to file the 
art ic les after receiving them or returns them foi < or 
rec t ion K g , Cantor v Sunshine (ireenery, ltu . 10.'« 
N.J Super 4 1 1 . 3!W A 2d 571 (l!)7i>> Many s ta le dl 
ing agenc ies adopt the practice of treat ing the date .»| 
receipt as the date of i s suance of the certificate even 
though de lays and the review process may result m 
the certificate being backdated The finding of n.aih.i 
hility in cases of th is second type can be considered an 
extens ion of this principle by treating the date of 
original mai l ing or or iginal filing as the date of inmt 
poration 
c A third class of cases in which the part ic ipants 
somet imes h a v e escaped personal l iabil ity involves 
s i tuat ions where the third person has urged immedi 
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WITNESS 
Angel Santiago 
Examination by Mr. Martin 
1 A He wasn't specific "all the time." 
2 Q Did you tell him that you would be there forever? 
3 A What I answered. 
4 Q Yes? 
5 A It was fine. 
6 Q That you stay in the company forever? 
7 A He told me, "Angel, you do a good job. You are going] 
8 to have your position there." He didn't say any date nor when 
9 I was going to finish, that I was going to stay there. 
10 Q Then some day he tells you your work is finished? 
11 A Uh-huh. 
12 Q Is that unlawful, do you believe? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Are we in agreement that it would be lawful for you 
15 to leave at any time "employment" and also legal for the 
16 company to say your work is finished? 
17 A For the company? 
18 Q Yes. 
19 A For the company, yes. 
20 Q Do you understand that there is a difference between 
21 the company and Jeanette Lynton, a difference? 
22 A What do you mean, "there is a difference"? 
23 Q Going back to the heart of the matter, you are listed] 
24 here— 
25 MS. JONES: I am going to object to this question 
rnr^ 
1 because I think it calls for a legal conclusion. 
2 Q (By Mr. Martin) Very good. You are listed here and 
3 Jeanette R. Lynton is listed here in opposition to you, 
4 personally. 
5 A What do you mean? 
6 Q This is you versus Jeanette Lynton, not D.O.T.S. 
7 A Who does D.O.T.S. belong to? 
8 Q The stockholder or holders. 
9 A And not to Jeanette? 
10 Q Yes. 
11 A Does it belong to her? 
12 Q The stock— 
13 A I don't know. The stock or the company. 
14 Q Were you employed by the company? 
15 A Sure. 
16 Q Did you receive payment and a check from the company 
17 named D.O.T.S.? 
18 A Uh-huh. 
19 Q Was Jeanette Lynton present during the checking? 
20 I A No. 
21 Q Do you have any reason to say that you may have some 
22 real action against Jeanette Lynton? 
23 A When a person is responsible for a company and, in 
24 this case, Jeanette presents herself as the owner of the 
25 company, and those persons are responsible for the things that 
happen in the company but there is more than one person, all of] 
them are responsible for what happens in a company. 
Q You believe that the person is individually liable 
for all of the business of the company? 
MS. JONES: Objection, I think that calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) I am asking what he believes. 
A Concerning what— 
Q Do you believe that an owner of a company, a 
corporation, is personally liable under the law? 
A Concerning what, concerning the employees? 
Q Yes. 
A Sure. 
Q This is the problem. 
A Why? 
Q Because it is a corporation by which he was employed 
The corporation paid you? 
MS. JONES: I didn't understand that as a question. 
MR. MARTIN: It was a question. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Counsel has objected to what I said 
and interrupted, stopping her client from responding, because 
she thought that it was not a question. The question is: Were) 
you employed by Jeanette Lynton or the company, the corporation] 
named D.O.T.S.? 
A D.O.T.S. was the one that contracted me. 
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translate a 
and chunks. 
Q 
suggestion. 
Q 
whole sentence at once, not just little bits 
Very good. 
THE TRANSLATOR: I 
(By Mr. Martin) Yo 
checking, true? 
A 
Q 
communicati 
person who 
suggestion 
A 
(By the translator) 
Why no telephone ca 
on to any person in 
had felt offended to 
of the offense? Isn 
(By the translator) 
trusting communication between 
company. 
Q 
A 
eventually 
this. 
Q 
phone. Why 
A 
Because we' 
Meaning Mr. Esquive 
(By the translator) 
-- to Jeanette that 
told him thanks for the 
u were offended by the 
Yes. 
11, letter, personal 
the company from any 
even make a small 
't this also an offense? 
Because there was no 
the manager of the 
1? 
Uh-huh. Even to 
was on the other side of 
Pick up the telephone and call her on the 
not? 
(By the translator) 
ve always been told 
pattern. In order to get up to 
title to address Jeanette -- yo 
I tell you again. 
you have to follow this 
Ms. — he's using a 
u have to go through 
60 
1 
r\f\(\ 
1 Miguel first to get to her. 
2 Q Even when you're no longer employed by the 
3 company, why no phone call after? Why no contact? Such 
4 anger is instilled in these people that you feel that 
5 these people and this conduct is making no offense but 
6 is totally justified. Fear? 
7 A (By the translator) I didn't understand 
8 what you just said. 
9 THE TRANSLATOR: And I said I didn't either. 
10 Q (By Mr. Martin) Someone as an observer, a 
11 neutral observer, could maybe say that this complaint 
12 now against the company is some vendetta. Why would you 
13 say that it would not appear some vendetta? 
14 A (By the translator) I just wanted to make 
15 sure of what my legal rights were. That's why I'm here, 
16 just for that. If I had come and asked you for legal 
17 advise, I would still be here. 
18 Q You mean from the first time you asked me 
19 legal advise you would have been living here or -- I 
20 don't know. 
21 THE TRANSLATOR: No, that's --
22 Q (By Mr. Martin) What isn't, what is a 
23 complaint? 
24 A (By the translator) That's why I'm here, 
25 for the legal thing. I'm not looking for illegalities. 
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1 THE TRANSLATOR: I'm having a little trouble 
2 with the word "liability." Any helpers? 
3 MR- MARTIN: Liability means — 
4 THE TRANSLATOR: I said personal 
5 responsibility is the way — 
6 Q (By Mr. Martin) Okay. "Responsibility" is 
7 not the same as "liability." 
8 THE TRANSLATOR: (Reading from dictionary) 
9 Liabilities, duties -- let me just find it real quick 
10 before reading all this. It says "responsabilidad" a 
11 whole lot in here. 
12 MR. MARTIN: Maybe this is part of our 
13 problem. 
14 THE TRANSLATOR: "Responsibilidad" is a lot 
15 broader, I think. It covers a lot broader spectrum of 
16 meaning. 
17 MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
18 THE TRANSLATOR: I don't know. 
19 MR. MARTIN: I think so. Let me explain --
20 A (By the translator) The question that I 
21 understood was if the corporation is immune from 
22 complaints. 
23 Q (By Mr. Martin) Ah, the reverse. Has 
24 anyone ever told you it's the reverse that's true? A 
25 corporation may be liable, under the law, and the 
12 
I
 mTr-
individual owner is not. Have you ever heard this 
before? 
A (By the translator) No. 
THE TRANSLATOR: The word "liable/1 
jurisprudential definition --
Q (By Mr. Martin) Ah. That's part of the 
problem. Do you know or believe that Jeanette Lynton as 
an individual did anything wrongful to you personally, 
by her own choice? Translate that please, if you can. 
MS. JONES: Yeah. I'm waving because he 
asked you something, and when he asks you something you 
need to translate it back rather than answering. You're 
having conversations with him. 
MR. MARTIN: Maybe. You haven't said 
anything yet. 
A (By the translator) Let's go back a little 
bit and we'll get it. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you have any reason or 
do you believe that Jeanette Lynton as an individual did 
something wrongful to you intentionally? 
A (By the translator) Well, to the point that 
I realized when I was working there, the person that 
most represented -- oh, not represented — the person 
that stood as the owner of the company. However, the 
person that was always there was Miguelangel. 
13 
dm 
Lynton was 
And what I understand, that if 
the only -- I always 
Jeanette 
realized that 
Mr. Miguelangel was under the direction of 
Ms. Jeanette. If there were any people abo 
we never knew about it. We never realized 
Q Part of the deposition purpose 
question, and you listen to the 
answer or give an answer to the 
know --
A 
that. But 
answer the 
(By the translator) 
question to 
question on 
Right, I 
it also must be understood that 
way I'm receiving it, r because it 
direct discussion. It's through an interpr 
know by my 
changed. 
Q 
experience that some 
Very good. 
things will 
Then did Jeanette Lynton ever a 
confine you or prevent you from 
place to another? 
A 
A 
No. 
(By the translator) 
freely movi 
No. While 
working there, she was never directly in ch 
Rather, Mr 
Q 
A 
. Miguelangel. 
So the answer is no 
(By the translator) 
» 
ve Jeanette, 
it. 
is to ask a 
respond and 
what you 
understand 
I'm going to 
's not a 
eter. And I 
be lost or 
rrest you or 
ng from one 
we were 
arge of us. 
No. Directly from her, 
14 
000 
no. Something that we were always told that --
Miguelangel told us, told all of us, that anything that 
he might 
and that 
anything 
and 
Migu 
abou 
you, 
from 
ques 
that 
when 
told 
then 
deta 
many 
Q 
say would be as if Mrs. Jeanette had said it 
he had all of her approbation or approval to do 
in the company. He repeated that many times, 
ears heard it. 
Then I ask you the same question about 
elangel, Mr, Esquivel. 
A (By the translator) What was the question 
t him? 
Q The question: Did Mr. Esquivel ever arrest 
detain you, or stop you by force from freely moving 
one 
A 
tion 
, yes 
$20 
place to the other? Si or no? 
(By the translator) I'm going to answer the 
concerning a specific case in which I felt 
j, I was restricted, and it was on one occasion 
had been lost, which was the quantity that was 
to all of us had been lost. 
Q 
/ in 
ined, 
freedom? 
was 
was 
A 
One moment. Is there only one occasion, 
which you believe that Mr. Esquivel arrested, 
or forcibly prevented you from moving with 
(By the translator) I understand that if he 
in the company it was in order to have someone that 
directing the company, and so --
15 
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1 A (By the translator) Yes. 
2 Q Was there any meeting which you attended for 
3 any good purpose? 
4 A (By the translator) I don't remember. 
5 Q Is there anything that you think positive 
6 about the company? 
7 A (By the translator) Positive in which form? 
8 Q In any form. 
9 A (By the translator) The only one thing that 
10 it bothers me was the offenses from him. The rest I 
11 feel it's okay. 
12 Q "Him," meaning Esquivel. 
13 A (By the translator) Yes. 
14 Q Everyone else is good? 
15 A (By the translator) I never had problems 
16 with anybody there. 
17 Q Do you have problems with Jeanette Lynton? 
18 A (By the translator) No. 
19 Q Why in your court papers do you complain 
20 against Jeanette Lynton? 
21 A (By the translator) I haven't complained 
22 about her. Maybe she's there because she's the owner. 
23 Q Owner of what? 
24 A (By the translator) Maybe she is the owner. 
25 I think she is, because she went a couple of times there 
40 
000 
1 to where we work, and I know she is her. 
2 Q Do you comprehend the difference between a 
3 corporation and a person? 
4 A (By the translator) I know that when it is 
5 a company there's several owners. 
6 Q Do you think Mr. Esquivel is also an owner? 
7 A (By the translator) No. 
8 Q Do you think that an owner of a company is 
9 personally liable? 
10 MS. JONES: I'm going to object, because I 
11 think that calls for a legal conclusion. 
12 MR. MARTIN: I understand. I'm asking what 
13 she believes. 
14 A (By the translator) What is "liable"? 
15 MS. JONES: No, you said it right, but you 
16 didn't finish what he said. 
17 A (By the translator) I think so. 
18 Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you ever hear about the 
19 word "limitados"? 
20 A (By the translator) I understand that a 
21 limit is something that only goes so far. 
22 Q Did you intend to complain against the 
23 company? Did you intend to complain against the company 
24 or Jeanette Lynton as an individual? 
25 A (By the translator) I never have had 
41 
000 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of July, 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT LYNTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT to Counsel for Defendants, Loren D. 
Martin, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, 
postage prepaid. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON, et al., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT LYNTON'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The Defendant, Jeanette R. Lynton, by and through her attorney, Loren D. 
Martin, submits herewith the following Reply Memorandum In Support of 
Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
FACTS WHICH ARE NOT THE SUBTECT OF A GENUINE DISPUTE 
The following facts are established by admissible evidence and are not the 
subject of a genuine dispute: 
f& 
i f)Hf\ 
DOTS ADVENTURES is a Nevada corporation. 
1. DOT ADVENTURES is a Nevada Corporation which was incorporated 
under the laws of the State of Nevada on February 10, 1989.l 
DOT ADVENTURES is a Nevada corporation qualified to do business in Utah as 
DOT ADVENTURES. INC. 
2. The Nevada Corporation, DOT ADVENTURES was duly registered as a 
foreign corporation doing business within the State of Utah on January 5, 1993.2 
Plaintiffs were employed and were paid wages by the corporation. 
3. The Plaintiffs were paid their wages by checks bearing the name "DOT 
ADVENTURES, INC."3 
At the time and place of the alleged conduct, Mr. Esquivel was employed by and 
being paid wages by the corporation. 
4. Mr. Esquivel was paid wages by checks bearing the name "DOT 
ADVENTURES, INC."4 
1 See certified copy of Nevada Articles of Incorporation attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 1. See also 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in which they admit that DOT Adventures is a Nevada corporation, and the first exhibit 
attached to Plaintiffs "Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment." 
2
 See certified copy of State of Utah Department of Commerce Certificate of Registration attached hereto and 
marked as Exhibit 2. Plaintiffs admitted in their Memorandum that DOT Adventures qualified and/or registered 
to do business in Utah on January 5, 1993. See copy of computer print-out from the Utah Department of 
Commerce attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum, establishing the date of registration. 
•* For examples, see copies of checks attached to the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton filed in support of 
Defendant's initial Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
4
 For example, see copy of check attached to the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton filed in support of Defendant's 
initial Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
2 
noo A i i 
Mr. Esquivel, plant manager, was an agent acting in behalf of a principal. 
5. The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Esquivel, "acting within his authority as 
plant manager, stopped all work within the confines of the DOTS plant, and called 
the employees together."5 
6. The Plaintiffs claim that the alleged conduct of Mr. Esquivel occurred at 
the plant located in Orem, Utah, while Plaintiffs were on the premises as employees 
of the plant.6 
DEFENDANTS DISAGREE WITH "PLAINTIFFS' 
"STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS" 
Plaintiffs' pleading entitled: "Plaintiffs' Objection To Defendant Lynton's 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment" contains a so-called "Statement of 
Disputed Material Facts." However, the Statement does not comply with Rule 56(e) 
as quoted below. 
Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' so-called "Statement of Disputed Material 
Facts," and respond by reference to Plaintiffs' paragraph numbers as follows: 
1. There is no genuine issue of fact as to the corporate status of DOT 
ADVENTURES. DOT ADVENTURES is a Nevada corporation authorized to do 
business in Utah under the name of DOT ADVENTURES, INC. See certified copies 
of documents from the State of Utah and the State of Nevada attached hereto as 
Exhibits 1 & 2. 
2. There is no genuine issue of fact as whether or not DOT 
ADVENTURES has been transacting business in Utah as DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
5
 See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, page 3, paragraph 16. 
6
 See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
3
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DOT ADVENTURES has been transacting business in Utah since 1992. It is not 
unlawful or illegal for a foreign corporation to transact business in Utah. No 
foreign corporation automatically loses its corporate status by transacting business in 
Utah, whether its formally qualified not. Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary have 
no legal merit and are not supported by any admissible evidence. The remainder of 
Plaintiffs' allegations in this paragraph constitute nothing but unsupported 
argument. 
3., 4., 5., 6., 7., 8., 9., 10. Plaintiffs' allegations in these paragraphs are not 
supported by references to admissible sworn testimony and/or evidence and 
constitute nothing more than mere allegations or unsupported argument of 
counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF A MATERIAL FACT WHICH 
PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56(e), URCivP, provides as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers . . . referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. . . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
4 
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Defendants' Motion, Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in Support of 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are supported by certified copies of 
official state documents, references to the pleadings on file with the Court, sworn 
testimony contained the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton and official business records 
of the corporation identified and attached to the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton in 
her capacity as President and custodian of records of the corporation. 
Certified copies of documents from the State of Nevada demonstrate that 
DOT ADVENTURES, a Nevada corporation was incorporated in Nevada on 
February 10, 1989. Certified copies of documents from the State of Utah demonstrate 
that DOT ADVENTURES qualified to do business in Utah under the name DOT 
ADVENTURES, INC. 
The sworn testimony of Jeanette R. Lynton demonstrates that the Plaintiffs 
were employed by DOT ADVENTURES, a corporation and were paid their wages by 
corporate payroll check, bearing the name DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
The sworn testimony of Jeanette R. Lynton demonstrates that the Mr. 
Esquivel, plant manager, was employed by DOT ADVENTURES, a corporation and 
was paid wages by corporate payroll check, bearing the name DOT ADVENTURES, 
INC. 
Copies of corporate payroll checks were supplied, identified and attached to 
the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton, the president of DOT ADVENTURES.7 
The alleged acts about which Plaintiffs complain all occurred after DOT 
ADVENTURES was formed and incorporated. 
For examples, see copies of checks attached to the Affidavit of Jeanette R. Lynton filed in support of 
Defendant's initial Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
5 
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Plaintiffs have not provided any testimony or admissible evidence to 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact regarding any of the foregoing 
matters. 
Plaintiffs admit and allege that Mr. Esquivel was "acting within his authority 
as plant manager . . ." when he performed the alleged acts of which Plaintiffs 
complain. 
POINT NO. 2 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE 
FOR POTENTIAL CORPORATE DEBTS OR JUDGMENTS 
There is no allegation that Jeanette R. Lynton knew of the alleged conduct 
until after the event. There is no allegation that Jeanette R. Lynton commanded or 
directed the alleged conduct or was in any manner personally involved in the same. 
It is hornbook law that an officer, director or stockholder of a corporation is 
not personally liable for corporate debts or non-directed and unknown acts of agents 
of the corporation, even a non-complying foreign corporation.8 
POINT NO. 3 
DOT ADVENTURES DID NOT LOSE ITS CORPORATE STATUS BY 
ITS FAILURE TO REGISTER IN UTAH ON AN EARLIER DATE. 
Utah law specifically recognizes the corporate status of a foreign corporation 
doing business within the State. The Revised Business Corporation Act, §16-10a-
1502(6), U.C.A., states that: 
The failure of a foreign corporation to have authority to transact 
business in this state does not impair the validity of its corporate acts, 
nor does the failure prevent the corporation from defending any 
proceeding in this state. 
8 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1960 Rev) Vol. 17 §8524, pp. 748-751. 
6 
Admittedly DOT ADVENTURES did not register to do business in Utah until 
January 5, 1993. Yet, its failure to register earlier did not effect or "impair the 
validity of its corporate acts." Plaintiffs' argument to the contrary lacks merit. 
The Utah Statute is consistent with long established common law. The 
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Second, Section 296 states that: 
An organization formed in one state will be considered a 
corporation within the meaning of a statute or rule of another state. 
The status of DOT ADVENTURES as a corporation is not in question, and the 
Utah Statute cited above is controlling law on the issue. 
However, notwithstanding controlling statutory law, Plaintiffs have cited 
several cases which they allege are applicable. An examination of the cases cited by 
Plaintiffs demonstrates they are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. 
Gillham Advertising Agency., Inc., v. Ipson9, is not applicable. In Gillham, 
the Defendant, Ipson, "personally" leased a racetrack, "began operating it", contacted 
Gillham for advertising services to promote the racing activity "which he personally 
was conducting," and "advanced money in connection therewith." Consequently, 
Ipson became personally liable for the debt incurred. 
Later, purportedly acting as president of a suspended Nevada corporation 
known as Bonneville Raceways Park, Ipson signed an agreement with Gillham 
which "set forth with particularity how and when the debt would be paid,"10 but the 
agreement did not constitute a novation, exonerating Ipson from personal liability. 
9
 Gillham Advertising Agency., Inc., v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977) 
1 0
 Id. at 165. 
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The Supreme Court stated11: 
There is no question but that the debt is Ipson's. When he failed 
to pay, a paper was prepared to set forth with particularity how and 
when the debt would be paid. The paper did not extinguish the debt 
owed by Ipson; it merely stated how and under what circumstances it 
would be paid. There is no evidence or claim that there was a 
novation whereby the corporation would owe the debt and Ipson 
would be released from paying it. 
Plaintiffs cite Sterling Press v. Pettit .12 That case is not applicable. In Sterling, 
the defendants became liable to plaintiff for the publishing costs of a magazine called 
"The Utah Equestrian." After incurring the debt, the Defendants signed and 
delivered a check made payable to Plaintiff on an account bearing the name 
"Investor's Publishing Company." The defendants did not affix their signatures on 
the check, indicating that they were doing so in any representative capacity. The 
check was presented twice for payment but was not paid by the bank. Two months 
after the complaint was filed against the Defendants for writing a bad check, the 
Defendants registered the name "Investor's Publishing Company," as a d /b / a of 
International Land Corporation, a foreign corporation. Defendants then argued that 
the check was really drawn on the corporate account of International Land 
Corporation and they shouldn't therefore be personally liable for the amount of the 
check. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, stating that since the check in question 
bore only the names of the defendants and the name of a non-existent company and 
unregistered d/b/a , the defendants were personally liable.13 
1 1
 Id. at 164. 
1 2
 Sterling Press v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978) 
1 3
 Id. at 600. 
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The cases cited by Plaintiffs are not applicable, are easily distinguishable and 
are not controlling. The controlling law is the Utah Revised Corporation Act. 
POINT NO. 4 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD 
CONCLUDE THAT DOT ADVENTURES IS THE ALTER EGO OF 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON. 
Plaintiffs also cite Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc.,14 in which the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed an alter-ego theory "characterized as "reverse-pierce-of-
the-corporate-veil," or "reverse pierce" theory by which an "insider" may pierce the 
corporate veil to prevent a party outside the corporation from using the entity as a 
shield to defraud the insider. 
In Messick, although the Utah Supreme Court restated the two prong test 
generally applicable to alter-ego claims, the Court determined that there was no 
proof that the corporate entity should be disregarded.15 
In Messick, the Utah Supreme Court quoted from an earlier Utah case and 
stated16: 
In order to disregard the corporate entity, there must be a 
concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, 
in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance 
of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. 
1 4
 Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791, (Utah 1984) 
1 5
 Id. at 794. 
1 6
 Id. at 794 
f\r\r\ 
There is no evidence before the Court upon which the Court could conclude 
that Plaintiffs can demonstrate that they can meet either of the two prongs of the 
two prong test. 
There is no evidence to show that DOT ADVENTURES has not complied 
with all of the corporate formalities and is other than a corporation in good standing 
in both Utah and Nevada. There is no evidence that DOT ADVENTURES has failed 
to pay all of its debts and obligations. 
There is not even a suggestion of evidence that acknowledgment by the Court 
that DOT ADVENTURES is a corporation in good standing which conducts an on-
going business would may result in the sanction of a fraud, promote injustice, or 
that to do so would cause an inequitable result to follow. 
Lacking any evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims, the Court cannot find, 
from a factual standpoint, that Plaintiffs have demonstrated there is an issue of fact 
as to whether DOT ADVENTURES, Inc. was Jeanette Lynton's alter-ego. 
Lacking any factual evidence, Plaintiffs rely upon argument and allegations of 
counsel to the effect that the failure of DOT ADVENTURES, a Nevada corporation, 
to register in Utah in a timely manner constitutes evidence that the corporate form 
has been disregarded. However, Messick does not support Plaintiffs' claim in this 
regard. Furthermore, the Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1502(6) specifically provides that 
failure to register does not invalidate the corporation's existence or status. 
Plaintiffs' unsupported arguments that DOT ADVENTURES, INC., is the 
alter ego of Jeanette R. Lynton are without any factual support and are without 
merit. 
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POINT NO. 5 
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT THAT "DOT ADVENTURES" IS NOT 
THE SAME AS "DOT ADVENTURES, INC." DOES NOT CREATE A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF A MATERIAL FACT 
The certified copy of the DOT ADVENTURES, INC. file from The Utah 
Division Of Corporations And Commercial Code, attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit 2, conclusively establishes that DOT ADVENTURES, the Nevada 
corporation, is the same corporate entity as DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
Plaintiffs have made a series of unsupported claims that "DOT 
ADVENTURES", a Nevada corporation is not the same as "DOT ADVENTURES, 
INC." There is no evidence to support the Plaintiffs' argument. The claims of 
Plaintiff in this regard are nothing but unsupported rhetoric, constitute mere 
allegations of counsel and are wholly without merit. 
The only distinction and the reason for the difference in the name is that the 
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act requires the use of "Inc."17 in the name. 
Nevada law does not.18 Hence, the name of the Nevada corporation in Utah must 
be DOT ADVENTURES, INC. 
CONCLUSION 
A. Since Plaintiffs have produced no testimony or evidence to support 
their arguments in this regard, their "mere allegations," as contained in their 
pleadings do not create an issue of fact under Rule 56, URCivP. 
B. There is no genuine issue of a material fact which precludes the Court 
from ruling upon Defendant Lynton's Motion for summary judgment. 
1 7
 The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, §16-1 Oa-401 (1 )(a) 
1 8
 Nevada Revised Statutes, NRS, 78.035. 
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THEREFORE, Jeanette R. Lynton respectfully submits that she is entitled to 
summary judgment against Plaintiffs as requested in her Motion. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1994. 
Lpren D. Martin / 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the following: 
Response To Plaintiffs' Objection To Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid in the U.S. Mail on the G day 
of August, 1994 to the following: 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
J 
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FIRST. The name of the corporation 1s: 
DOT MKEtfTURES 
Sttafi. Its principal office in tht State of Nevada Is located at 1000 
Cast HllltM Street, Suite 100, Carson City, Nevada 89701, that this 
corporation may maintain an office, or offices, 1n such other place within or 
without the State of Nevada as may be from time to time designated by the Board 
of Directors, or by the By-Laws of said corporation, and that this Corporation 
may conduct all Corporation business of every kind and nature, Including the 
holding of all meetings of Directors and Stockholders, outside the State of 
Nevada as well as within the State of Nevada 
THIRD. The objects for which this Corporation Is formed are: To 
engage 1n any lawful activity. Including, but not limited to the following: 
(A) Shall have such rights, privileges and powers as may be conferred upoii 
corporations by any existing law. 
(B) H*y at any time exercise such rights, p-ivlleges and powers, when not 
Inconsistent with the purposes and objects for which this corporation is 
organized. 
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(C) Shall have power to have succession by Its corporate name for the 
period limited In Its certificate or articles of Incorporation, and when no 
period Is Halted, perpetually, or until dissolved and Its affairs wound up 
according to law. 
(0) Shall have power to sue and be sued In any court of law or equity. 
(C) Shall have power to make contracts. 
(F) Shall have power to hold, purchase and convey real and personal estate 
and to mortgage or lease %ny such real and personal estate with Its franchises. 
The power to hold real and personal estate shall Include tht* power to tike the 
same by devise or bequest In the State of Nevada, or In any other state, 
territory or country. 
(G) Shall have power to appoint such officers and agents as the affairs of 
the corporation shall require, and to allow them suitable compensation. 
(H) Shall have power to make bylaws not Inconsistent with the constitution 
or laws of the United States* or of the State of Nevada, for the management, 
regulation ard government of its affairs and property, the transfer of its 
stock, the transaction of its business, and the calling and holding of meetings 
of Its stockholders. 
(1) Shall have power to wind up and dissolve itself, or be wound up or 
dissolved. 
(J) Shall have power to adopt and use a common seal or stamp, and alter the 
same at pleasure. The use of a seal or stamp by the corporation on any 
corporate documents is not necessary. The corporation may use a seal or stamp, 
If (t desires, but such use or nonuse shall not In any way affect tne legality 
of the document. 
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(K) Shall have power to borrow money and contract debts when necessary for 
the transaction of its business, or for the exercise of its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises, or for ir\y other lawful purpose of its Incorporation; 
to Issue bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, debentures, and other 
obligations and evidences of indebtedness, payable at a specified tti»e or 
times, or payable upcn the happening of a specified event or events, whether 
secured by mortgage, pledge or otherwise, or unsecured, for money borrowed, or 
in payment for property purchased, or acquired, or for any other lawful object. 
(L) Shall have power to guarantee, purchase, hold, sell, assign, transfer, 
mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of the shares of the capita! stock of, or 
any bonds, securities or evidences of the Indebtedness created by, any other 
corporation or corporations of the State of Nevada, or any other state or 
government, and, while owners of such stock, bonds, securities or evidences of 
'ndebtedness, to exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of ownership, 
Including the right to vote, if any. 
(H) Shall have power to purchase, hold, sell and transfer shades of Its own 
capital stock, and use therefor its capital, capital surplus, surplus, or other 
property or fund. 
(N) Shall have power to conduct business, have one or more offices, and 
held, purchase, mortgage and convey real and personal property in the State of 
Nevada, and in any of the several states, territories, possessions and 
dependencies of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any foreign 
countries. 
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(0) Shall have power to do all and everything necessary and proper for the 
accomplishment of the objects enumerated In Its certificate or articles of 
Incorporation, or any aaiendment thereof, or necessary or Incidental to the 
protection and benefit of the corporation, and, In general, to arry on an/ 
lawful business necessary or Incidental to the attainment of tne objects of the 
corporation, whether or not such business 1s similar In nature to the objects 
set forth 1n the certificate or articles of Incorporation of the corporation, 
or any amendment thereof. 
(P) Shall have power to itake donations for the public welfare or for 
charitable, scientific or educational purposes. 
(Q) Shall have power to enter Into partnerships, general or limited, or 
Joint ventures, 1n connection with any lawful activities. 
FOURTH. That the total number of voting common stock authorized that 
may be Issued by the Corporation 1s TVENTY-FIVE HUNDRED (2,500) shares of Uock 
without nominal or par value and no other class of stock shall be authorized. 
Saf: shares without nominal or par value may be Issued by the corporation from 
time to time for such considerations as may be fixed from time to time by the 
Board of Directors. 
FIFTH. The governing board of this corporation shall be known as 
directors, and the number of directors may from time to time be Increased or 
decreased In such manner as shall be provided by the By-Laws of this 
Corporation, providing that the number of directors shall not be reduced to 
less than one (1). 
000 
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The name and post office address of the first Board of Directors *hall 
be one (1) in number and listed as follows: 
H A S POST OFFICE ADDRESS 
Lents E. Laughlln 1000 East William Street, Suite 100 
Carson City, Nevada 89701 
SIXTH. The capital stock, after the amount of the subscription price, 
or par value, has been paid 1n, shall not be subject to assessment to pay the 
debts of the Incorporation. 
SEVENTH. The name and post office address of the Incorporator signing 
the Articles of Incorporation 1s as follows: 
HAS POST OFFICE MPRESS 
Lewis E. Laughlln 1000 East William Street, Suite 100 
Carson City, Nevada 89701 
EIGHTH. The resident agent for this corporation shall be: 
LAUGHUN ASSOCIATES, INC. 
The address of said agent, and, the principal or statutory address of this 
corporation In the state of Nevada, shall be: 
1000 East William Street, Suite 100 
Carson City, Nevada 89791 
H E M . The corporation is to have perpetual existence. 
TEWTH. In furtherance and not 1n limitation of the powers conferred by 
statute, the Board of Directors Is expressly authorized: 
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Suojtct to the By-Laws, 1f any, adopted by the Stockholders, to make, 
alter or amend the By-Laws of the Corporation. 
To fix the amount to be reserved as working capital over and above its 
ca^Hal stock paid 1n; to authorize and cause to be executed, mortgagee and 
Hens upon tne real and personal property of this Corporation. 
By resolution passed by a majority of the whole Board, to designate one (1) 
or more committees, each committee to consist of one or more of the Directors 
of the Corporation, which, to the extent provided In the resolution, or in the 
By-Laws of the Corporation, shall have and may exercise the powers of the Board 
of Oirectors in the management of the business and affairs of the Corporation. 
Such committee, or committees, shall have such name, or names, as may be stated 
In the By-Laws of the Corporation, or as may be determined from time to time by 
resolution adopted by the Board of Directors. 
When and as authorized by the affirmative vote of the Stockholders 
holding stock entitling them to exercise at least a majority of the voting 
power given at a Stockholders meeting called for that purpose, or when 
authorized by the written consent of the holders of at least a majority of the 
voting stock Issued and outstanding, the Board of Directors shall have power 
and authority at any meeting to sell, lease or exchange all of the property and 
assets of the Corporation, including its good will and Its corporate 
franchises, upon such terms and conditions as Its board of Directors deems 
expedient and for the best Interests of the Corporation. 
HEttHUJ. No shareholder shall be entitled as a matter of right to 
subscribe for or receive additional shares of any class of stock of th* 
Corporation, whether now or hereafter authorized, or try bonds, debentures or 
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securities convertible Into stock, but such additional shares of stock or other 
securities convertible Into stock may be Issued or disposed of by the Board of 
01 rectors to such persons and on such terms as In Its discretion It shall deem 
advisable. 
TWELFTH. No director or officer of the Corporation shall be personally 
liable to the Corporation or any of Its stockholders for damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director or officer Involving any act or omission of any 
such director or officer; provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall 
not eliminate or limit the liability of a director or officer (1) for acts or 
omissions which Involve Intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of 
law, jr (11) the payment of dividends in violation of Section 78.300 of the 
Nevada Revised Statutes. Any repeal or modification of this Article by the 
stockholders of the Corporation shall be prospective only, and shall not 
adversely affect any Umiutfon on the personal liability of a director or 
officer of the Corporation for acts or omissions prior to such repeal or 
modification. 
THIRTEENTH. This Corporation reserves the right tj amend, alter, 
change or repeal any provision contained in the Articles of Incorporation, in 
the Mt^ntr now or hereafter prescribed by statute, or by the Articles of 
Incorporation, and all rights conferred upon Stockholders herein are granted 
subject to this reservation. 
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I9 THE UNDERSIGNED, being the Incorporator hereinbefore named for the 
purpose of forming a Corporation pursuant to the General Corporation Law of the 
State of Nevada, do make and file these Articles of Incorporation, hereby 
declaring and certifying that the facts herelnstated are true, and accordingly 
have hereunto set my hand this ^ /Jt^THay of s5&^> / "»< * ^  • 19 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
) SS: 
CARSON CITY ) 
T 
On this 3 HK\ day of J'" v " " * - i 
I, a Notary Public In 
• 19^ I in Carson C1tyf Nevada, 
and for Carson City, State of before me, the undersigned 
Nevada, personally appeared: 
Le*1$ E. Laughlln 
Known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
document and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
« M « I * I 
SONNE! WALKER 
IT'ASY PUBUC • f^ VAOA 
OCUCIAS COUNTY 
My*O0» tT- 'UCc! ?fi *"W I 
FEB 07 193) ^ 
TrniuMv of *T«" 
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THE UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT the attached is a true, correct, and 
complete copy of entire file of 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC 
and the endorsements thereon, as the same is taken from and 
compared with the original filed in the office of the Division on 
January 5, 1993, and now remaining on file and of record therein. 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE OFFICES OF THE DIVISION. 
File Number: CO 167454 
: * « M I | ) K P A R T M K N T O K ( X ) M M F 
Division of Corpo ra t i ons & Commerc ia l Code A n n l i r $ i t i n n f o r 
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
Dor A d u ^ h i r / ^ 
l v 1 . I ' i 
(exact corporate name) 
1. A corporation of the state of A)(?0 4d.cx , incorporated / 0 day of Ffbrua.^ 19 ff**? . 
2. The corporations period of duration is p^rru ftial (usually perpetual). 
3. The address of the corporation in the state of incorporation is: A n 
fioM. - Shoved to ^ ^ k ULL 
city/»Ute 
4. The registered agent in Utah is: Heo^e h\-t L^^ kvx 
The street address of the registered office in Utah is: 
»lroe* ftddicM city zip 
5. The business purposes to be pursued in Utah are: flfSfWb^fc^vs nt r\j l^L*^ g j - tu^ps 
'*^*p 
6. The corporation commenced or intends to commence business in Utah on: #*- f - °\ 2~ 
7. The names and addresses of the corporation's directors and officers are: 
Name Address Citv/State/Zip 
Director .TflgriO f k L^A^X^ (*fo ^ tl'looM i^ U . 4A Or. 6fJ>^ fAhoL ^ o S " l ? 
Director 
' O 
Director 
PresidentTen«*kk L^^fr^ /</o £^ < W u ^ \)x*to Or, Or^. U/zL 2Ho$K 
Vice-President Saft ^ f l 
Sccretary_ 
Treasurer 
8. A certification of Good Standing from the State of Incorporation dated no earlier than ninety (90) days 
prior to filing with this office is attached to this application. 
9. The corporation shall use as its name in Utah Drvr fidiNu^hir*£
 f UXJCL . . 
(The corporation shall use its name as set forth at the top of this form unless this name is not available for use in Utah.) 
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that this 
application for Certificate of Authority has been 
examined by me and is, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief tmeypcorreqaqd complete. 
The undersigned hereby accepts 
appointment as Registered Agent for the 
abovte named-corporation. 
^h 3 ^ , 
Registered Agent 
Filing Fee: $50.00 
Send completed forms in duplicate to: 
itle:_ddZt^dl2£LrL T tle 
Dated: ,x.r xo \<m 
6/92 
corpsdba\ccrtauth.mst 
State of Utah 
Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code 
160 East 300 South/Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
(801) 530-4849 
f\ A Ck r , - ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE STATUS 
I, CHERYL A. LAU, the duly elected, qualified and acting Secretary of State of the 
State of Nevada, do hereby certify that I am, by the laws of said State, the custodian 
of the records relating to corporations organized under the laws thereof; the 
revocation of their corporate charters, and their right to transact and carry on their 
corporate business; and am the proper officer to execute this certif icate. 
I further certify that, at the date of this certif icate, DOT ADVENTURES is a 
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Nevada, having fully complied therewith; is entitled to exercise therein all the 
corporate powers and functions recited in its charter or articles of incorporation, and 
is in good standing in this State. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the Great Seal of State, at my office, in 
Carson City, Nevada, this 8th day of December, 1992 
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FILED IN 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STA'c OP UTAH 
UTA'J O:!;HTY 
OCT 13 I I •»•» A i P W 
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Telephone: 538-0066 
Jack L. Schoenhals (2881) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al., : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
: MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs, : JUDGMENT-FAILURE TO STATE 
: CAUSE OF ACTION 
vs. : 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et al., : Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Defendants. : Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants, DOT Adventures, Inc., Miguelangel Esquivel, Marie 
Reyes, and Humberto Hernandez, by and through-their attorney, Loren 
D. Martin, submit the following Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Summary Judgment as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant, DOT Adventures, Inc., (hereinafter referred to 
as "DOT"), is a Nevada corporation qualified to do business in 
Utah.1 
2. The incident, giving rise to Plaintiffs' cause of action, 
allegedly occurred on December 16th or 17th of 1992, at the 
Defendant's manufacturing plant in Orem.2 
3. Defendants, Miguelangel Esquivel, Marie Reyes and 
Humberto Hernandez, on December 16th or 17th of 1992, were employed 
by DOT, working at the manufacturing plant in Orem. 
4. Plaintiffs, Walter Semidey, Angel Santiago, Humberto 
Bardales, and Rosa Mazariegos, on December 16th or 17th of 1992, 
were employed by DOT, working at the manufacturing plant in Orem, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Plant." 
5. DOT'S business is the design, manufacture and marketing 
of a large variety of small rubber stamps used by purchasers to 
decorate personal communications. 
6. The manufacture and shipment of such rubber stamps is 
accomplished at the Plant. 
7. At the time and place of the incident, Miguelangel 
Esquivel, hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Esquivel," was employed 
by DOT as manager of the manufacturing plant,3 employed to oversee 
1
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Hearing, August 
16, 1994, paragraphs 1 & 2 
2
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Hearing, August 
16, 1994, paragraph 3 
3
 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, page 3, paragraph 16 
2 
and efficiently manage the ongoing daily manufacture and shipment 
of DOT products. 
8. At the time and place of the incident, Marie Reyes, 
hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Reyes" and Humberto Hernandez, 
hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Hernandez" were employed by DOT as 
supervisors, acting under the authority and direction of Mr. 
Esquivel.4 
9. The incident giving rise to Plaintiffs' cause of action, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Incident", occurred on either 
December 16th or 17th, 1992. 
10. The Incident is alleged to have happened and is described 
by Plaintiffs as follows: 
a. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Mr. Esquivel gave 
instructions that all work at the Plant would stop and 
that all employees were to gather to the lunch area of 
the Plant.5 
b. At the lunch area, Mr. Esquivel indicated to 
everyone that he had received information that twenty 
dollars ($20.00) had been reported stolen from one of the 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, pages 2-3, paragraphs 8 
and 10 
5
 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, page 3, paragraph 16 
3 
plant workers. 
c. At the lunch area, Mr. Esquivel gave directions that 
all employees would be checked or searched. Plaintiffs 
prefer to use the term searched. Defendants prefer to 
use the term checked. 
d. Mr. Esquivel stated that if anyone objected, he or 
she was to indicate that objection or raise their hand. 
No person objected. No person raised their hand.7 
e. Mr. Esquivel gave instructions that all male 
employees were to individually, one at a time, go to the 
men's room with Mr. Hernandez. The female employees were 
to go to the women's room with Mrs. Reyes. 
f. The male Plaintiffs report that in the rest room 
they were asked to show their pockets, wallets and inside 
of shoes. 
g. While none of her clothing was removed, the female 
employee, Rosa Mazariegos, alleges that she was also 
asked to loosen her bra and that Mrs. Reyes touched her, 
running her fingers along and inside the lower line of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, page 3, paragraph 17 
Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 31, lines 14-17 
4 
her bra. Rosa Mazariegos did not say at that time that 
she objected to the procedure or the alleged touching.9 
No other person has described any similar touching and 
none is alleged. 
h. Mrs. Reyes said that if the incident had been 
ordered by the police, such actions would have been 
lawful. Whereas, she believes that the same action 
ordered by Mr. Esquivel constituted an unlawful and 
actionable offense.10 
i. As the checking was completed, Mr. Esquivel told 
everyone to go back to work. Everyone went back to work. 
j. No person stated that there was, at any time, any 
indication made, verbal or otherwise, that anyone would 
be prevented or restrained from leaving the Plant. The 
doors remained unlocked. No guard was posted. No person 
was ever told that they would not be permitted to leave. 
Not one of the Plaintiffs ever left. No identifiably 
stolen money was ever found. 
10. Although Plaintiffs allege that they were told that no 
8
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 43, lines 7 through 
24 
9
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 37, line 28 
10
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 57, line 23, through 
page 58, line 6 
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one was to leave,11 no door was ever locked or barred.12 None of 
the Plaintiffs made any attempt to leave. None were ever 
restrained. No guard was ever posted. No physical show of force 
or restraint were ever made. There is no claim that there was any 
indication that any restraint would be used to prevent anyone from 
leaving. No person was ever told that they would not be permitted 
to leave. In fact, Plaintiff, Walter Semidey, stated in his 
deposition that no one ever stated that he would be prohibited from 
leaving.13 
11. Until the formal Complaint was filed with the Court and 
served, no Plaintiff ever objected about the incident to any DOT 
supervisor or officer. No objection was ever received by DOT until 
the formal Complaint was filed more than six months later. By that 
time, all Plaintiffs were employed under different circumstances 
with a different employer. All Plaintiffs report that they are 
presently earning more than they had been previously paid by DOT. 
12. In none of their depositions did any Plaintiff claim that 
there was any force used. There was no physical pain caused. The 
checking was not done with anger. None of the Plaintiffs stated 
that they ever had any fear that they would be injured in any way. 
11
 Plaintiffs7 Amended Complaint, page 4, paragraph 18 
12
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 53, lines 13-14 
13
 Deposition of Walter Semidey, page 109, lines 17-19 
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13. In their depositions, none of the Plaintiffs stated that 
they had any fear nor were they given any reason to fear injury. 
They had no fear of injury and there is no statement that any 
injury was intended. Plaintiff, Walter Semidey, fairly described 
the reason for this action when he acknowledged that, "The sole 
reason for us being here is the feeling of offense as a result of 
this conduct, meaning the search incident."14 
14. In none of their depositions did any of the Plaintiffs 
claim that anyone ever said that if they did not consent to the 
checking, retaliation would be taken against them. Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that they all are presently earning more money with 
their new employment that they were when working for DOT. There 
has been no physical injury or loss. None has been claimed. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants herewith respond to each Cause of Action alleged in 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as follows: 
POINT 1 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED. 
Unlawful detention, a criminal offense, is not the basis for a 
civil cause of action. 
The Utah Code Ann. §76-5-403 provides as follows: 
(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he 
14
 Deposition of Walter Semidey, page 115, lines 14-17 
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knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere 
substantially with his liberty. 
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
"Wrongful Detention," under the Utah Criminal Code, §76-5-304, 
is a crime, but the Utah Criminal Code does not establish a civil 
liability or a civil penalty. 
In order to establish "unlawful detention" a person must 
demonstrate that force or the threat of force coupled with a 
reasonable apprehension of the use of force were utilized to detain 
or restrain the person. 
In Mildon v. Bvbee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962), a 
claim of malicious prosecution was made against a Deputy Sheriff, 
who armed with a warrant of arrest for one person, mistakenly took 
another into custody and drove away with him in the officer's car. 
In reviewing a directed verdict of no cause of action, the Utah 
Supreme Court equated false imprisonment with unlawful detention 
and stated: 
Nevertheless, false imprisonment occurs whenever there is 
an unlawful detention or restraint of another against his 
will. 
(Id. at 459.) 
In Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 
507, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
We wish to invite attention to a distinction in the 
law which we believe has been confused in the briefs. 
False arrest may be committed only by one who has legal 
authority to arrest or who has pretended legal authority 
to arrest. False imprisonment may be committed by anyone 
who imprisons without a legal right 
"Any exercise of force, or express or implied threat 
8 
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of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived 
of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not 
wish to remain or go where he does not wish to go, is an 
imprisonment. * * * The essential thing is the restraint 
of the person. * * * If the words of conduct are such as 
to induce a reasonable apprehension of force, and the 
means of coercion are at hand, a person may be as 
effectually restrained and deprived of liberty as by 
prison bars. * * *" 11 R.C.L. 793, 794, sec. 5. 
(Id. at 509.) 
From the foregoing cases, one must conclude that in order for 
the restraint to be "unlawful", the restraint must be imposed with 
force or with the threat of force coupled with a reasonable 
apprehension that force will be used if the person being restrained 
does not comply. 
In the case at hand, regardless of the Criminal Statute, the 
Plaintiffs must demonstrate, as a matter of fact, that they were 
"unlawfully detained." According to the rule of law in Hepworth 
cited above, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were 
restrained and deprived of liberty by force or the threat and a 
reasonable apprehension of force. 
The depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate that no 
Plaintiff was detained or restrained by force or the threat of 
force. When asked if anyone had locked the doors so she could not 
leave or if anyone had used threatening words, Rosa Mazariegos' 
response was: "No."15 In fact, Rosa Mazariegos testified that Mr. 
15
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, pg. 28, lines 13-18. 
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Esquivel asked if any person objected to being checked or searched 
and no one raised their hand.16 
In the case at hand, since no Plaintiff was detained or 
restrained by force or by the threat of force, Plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate, as a matter of fact or law, that they were 
"unlawfully" detained and therefore have a claim of false 
imprisonment. 
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is for "Wrongful 
Detention"17 and in support thereof the Complaint alleges that 
Defendant Esquivel unlawfully detained the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs7 Fourth Cause of Action is for "False Imprisonment"18 
and in support thereof the Complaint alleges that Defendant 
Esquivel "unlawfully detained" the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs7 First 
and Fourth Causes of action against the Defendants, are one and the 
same. The Plaintiffs7 Fourth Cause of Action must therefore be 
dismissed, as a matter of law. 
Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, pg. 17, lines 7-16. 
See Complaint, paragraphs 15-17, pg. 3. 
See Complaint, paragraphs 2 2-24, pg. 3. 
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17 
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POINT 2 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT AND 
PLAINTIFFS7 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY MUST BE 
DISMISSED. 
An "assault" requires a threat of force and bodily harm coupled 
with a wrongful act. 
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §2, at pages 316-317, the 
definition of assault is as follows: 
An assault may be defined as any intentional, 
unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or 
force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, 
under such circumstances as create a well founded fear of 
imminent peril, coupled with the apparent present ability 
to effectuate the attempt if not prevented. Also the 
term has been defined as an unlawful attempt, coupled 
with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another; an attempt or offer, with force or 
violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from 
malice or wantonness, under such circumstances as denote, 
at the time, an intention to do it, coupled with a 
present ability to effectuate such intention. 
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937) the Utah 
Supreme Court, in accord with the foregoing definition stated: 
It is too elemental to require argument, that to point a 
loaded revolver at another to frighten or wound him 
constitutes an assault . . . . 
(Id. at 1132.) 
To constitute an "assault" there must be a wrongful act. In 
6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §8, at pg. 328, citing the Utah case of 
Ganawav v. Salt Lake Dramatic Association, 17 Utah 37, 53 P. 830, 
the following comment is found: 
There can, however, be no assault or assault and 
11 
battery without a wrongful act. It is not every touching 
or laying on of hands that constitutes an assault and 
battery; to gently touch another for the purpose of doing 
a lawful act does not amount to an assault and battery; 
the touching of, or injury to, another must be done in an 
angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent manner so as to 
render the act unlawful. Similarly, an accidental hurt, 
in which the actor is blameless, does not amount to a 
battery. 
A cause of action for battery is based upon an allegation and 
the establishment of intent, malice, anger, etc. In 6A C.J.S. 
Assault & Battery §8, at pg. 329 the following is found: 
Generally, intent is an essential element in an 
action for assault and battery. More precisely, it is 
the rule that intent is the gist of the action only where 
the battery was committed in the performance of an act 
not otherwise unlawful; or as it is sometimes stated, 
there is no assault and battery unless the touching was 
with intent to injure, or unless defendant was otherwise 
engaged in a trespass or other unlawful transaction at 
the time of the act complained of. . . . 
There can, however, be no assault or assault and 
battery without a wrongful act. . . . 
Utah is in accord with the common law cited above to the 
effect that there must be intent to injure or harm in order to 
constitute an assault or a battery. In Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 
2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
doctor who touched a minor, young lady neighbor, to emphasize his 
point of view was not guilty of an assault or battery. The Court 
stated: 
Plaintiff, a minor female at the time of the alleged 
terrifying touching, and an adult at time of the trial, 
said one thing, and defendant, an adult male, said 
another, i.e., that he touched simply to call attention 
12 
by way of explanation that he, a doctor, disliked the 
degradation attendant on plaintiffs repeated suggestions 
that his role in society best could be described by the 
sound of a duck. . . . 
On such highly emotional and controversial evidence 
the jury apparently believed the doctor was put upon with 
greater force and vigor, by the plaintiff's unkind, 
opprobrious epithets than was the plaintiff by the gentle 
touching designed only to warn, not to wound. Hence we 
cannot say that the jury erred in finding that there was 
not that kind of intentional touching amounting to a 
technical battery. 
(Id. at 839-840.) 
In the case at hand, Rosa Mazariegos testified in her 
deposition that she was in fact touched, but in no way was pain or 
harm inflicted. She testified as follows: 
Q. Did anyone push you? 
A. (By the translator) How — what do you mean? 
Q. Push with the hands. 
A. (By the translator) No. 
Q. Did anyone hit you? 
A. (By the translator) No. 
Q. Did anyone hit you? 
A. (By the translator) No. 
Q. Did anyone cause you pain? 
A. (By the translator) Physical pain — 
Q. Yes. 
A. (By the translator) or moral? 
Q. Physical pain. 
A. (By the translator) No.19 
The sworn testimony of the Plaintiffs fails to reveal or 
demonstrate any threat of violence or harm, any unlawful or 
improper act, or other such conduct as is necessary to demonstrate 
19
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, pgs. 20, lines 15-25 and 
page 21, lines 1-2. 
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that the Plaintiffs were subjected to an "assault," or a "battery." 
Plaintiff's Complaint, Second Cause of Action for Assault does 
not allege a wrongful act or the threat of bodily harm or violence. 
The Complaint alleges: 
19. By requiring that all employees submit to a 
physical search of their person and belongings before 
being allowed to leave the premises, Mr. Esquivel 
intentionally created in all non-supervisory employees 
the reasonable apprehension of harmful or offensive 
touching.20 
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that 
Defendant Esquivel engaged in any threats and/or acts of bodily 
harm or violence, the Plaintiffs7 Third Cause of Action must be 
dismissed. 
Plaintiff's Complaint, Third Cause of Action for Battery does 
not allege an intent to injure or harm. The Complaint alleges: 
19. By requiring all supervisors to physically 
search the person and property of all employees, Mr. 
Esquivel caused the harmful or offensive touching of all 
non-supervisory employees.21 
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that 
Defendant Esquivel caused a touching with an intent to injure or 
harm, or cause acts of bodily harm or violence, the Plaintiffs' 
Third Cause of Action must be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, Para. 19. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, Para. 21. 
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POINT NO. 3 
PLAINTIFFS GAVE THEIR CONSENT TO BE TOUCHED, AND CONSENT 
IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A CLAIM OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY, 
AND PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE 
DISMISSED. 
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §16, at pgs. 337-338 the 
defense of consent is set forth as follows: 
It is a defense to an action for assault or an 
assault or battery that the injured party consented to, 
or participated in, the acts causing the injury, and such 
consent may be either express or implied. This is the 
rule at least in cases where life and limb are not 
exposed to serious danger in the common course of things, 
and where the damaged inflicted have not exceeded the 
bounds of the consent or invitation. . . . 
It is a general rule that one cannot maintain an action for a 
wrong occasioned by an act to which he has consented, under the 
familiar maxim "volenti non fit injurie," except where the act 
involves the life or person, or a breach of the peace, or amounts 
to a public offense.22 
According to the Restatement of Torts: 
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to 
occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and 
need not be communicated to the actor. 
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by 
another to be intended as consent, they constitute 
apparent consent and are as effective as consent in 
fact.23 
In the case at hand, the sworn deposition testimony of the 
74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, §49 
Restatement, Torts 2d §892 
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Jose Humberto Bardales demonstrates he did not object to being 
searched and consented to the search. He stated: 
I had this coat on. I was wearing a coat. I opened 
it in the way that I had it opened so that he could see 
the pockets and tell that there wasn't anything there. 
I asked him if he wanted me to do anything else. 
I asked him if he wanted me to take off my shoes or 
anything else. He said, No, that was sufficient. Then 
I left, and the next person went in.24 
Since the Plaintiffs gave their consent to be searched, and in 
at least one instance invited the search, Defendants have 
established their Defense of Consent and the Plaintiffs' Second and 
Third Causes of Action must be dismissed. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFFS' FIFTH AND SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION -INTENTIONAL 
AND RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the 
Utah Supreme Court established the rule of law concerning claims 
for emotional distress. The Court stated: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the arguments 
advanced, convinces us that, conceding such a cause of 
action may not be based upon mere negligence, the best 
considered view recognizes an action for severe emotional 
distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact or 
physical injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with 
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) 
where any reasonable person would have known that such 
would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to 
be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they 
24
 Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, pg. 40, lines 20-25 
and pg. 41, lines 1-2. 
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offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. This test seems to be a more 
realistic safeguard against false claims than to insist 
upon finding some other attendant tort, which may be of 
minor character, or fictional. 
(Id. at 347.) 
Samms v. Eccles, goes so far as to say that even though a 
person's conduct may be extremely offensive to another person, that 
in and of itself is not sufficient to create a cause of action in 
Utah. In Samms v. Eccles the Court said: 
We quite agree with the idea that under usual 
circumstances the solicitation to sexual intercourse 
would not be actionable even though it may be offensive 
to the offeree. 
(Id. at 347.) 
The landmark case of Samms v. Eccles has been followed in 
numerous Utah cases. See Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 200 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 842 P.2d 896 (1992). In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), citing Samms v. Eccles, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action for 
emotional distress may not be based upon mere negligence. 
. . . 
. . . . 
In the instant case, there is not so much as an 
allegation that defendants intended in any way to harm 
plaintiffs or any one of them. The summary judgment was 
therefore proper. [Emphasis added.] 
(Id. at 100.) 
In White v. Blackburn, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 787 P.2d 1315, 
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0), the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
To support a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, appellant must show the 
following elements: (1) outrageous conduct by the 
defendant; (2) the defendant's intent to cause, or the 
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 
emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and 
(4) an actual and proximate causal link between the 
tortious conduct and the emotional distress. . . . 
at 21.) 
In Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 
P.2d 949 (1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, Retherford must show that (i) 
Gailey's, Randall's, Johnson's, and Bateson-Hough's 
conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offended against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality; (ii) they intended to cause, or 
acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, 
emotional distress; (iii) Retherford suffered severe 
emotional distress; and (iv) their conduct proximately 
caused Retherford's emotional distress. . . . 
at 33.) 
In Sperber v. The Galiaher Ash Company, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
P.2d 1025 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although Sperber does not allege that galigher Ash Co. 
discharged him with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress upon him, he does assert that the company's 
conduct was "intentional, malicious and in reckless and 
wanton disregard of the effect of such conduct ..." or, 
in other words, that Galigher Ash knew that its conduct 
would cause emotional distress. To state a claim, 
however, a plaintiff must additionally allege conduct on 
the part of the defendant that is outrageous and 
intolerable to the extent that it offends societal 
standards of morality and decency. 
18 
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(Id. at 4.) 
In the case at hand the Plaintiffs complaint alleges as 
follows: 
26. Defendant Esquivel's extreme and outrageous 
actions, in requiring every employee to submit to the 
indignity of a physical search, intentionally and 
recklessly inflicted upon the Plaintiffs in this action 
severe emotional distress. 
27. Defendant Esquivel knew, or should have known, 
that there was a reasonable likelihood that subjecting 
all employees to a physical search of their person and 
property would cause them severe emotional distress.25 
Intention to harm is a prerequisite under Reiser v. Lohner. 
Under the rule established in Reiser v. Lohner. the complaint must 
allege intentional conduct in order to state a claim for relief for 
severe emotional distress. In the alternative, if intention to 
harm is not alleged, the plaintiff must allege that any reasonable 
person would have known the conduct was "of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality."26 
Liability for emotional distress does not extend to mere 
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or 
other trivialities. There is no occasion for the law to intervene 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraphs 2 6 and 27. 
Samms v. Eccles, at page 347. 
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in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. 
In the case at hand, while the caption in the Fifth and Sixth 
Causes of Action contains the word "INTENTIONAL," there is no 
language in the complaint which claims the conduct of Esquivel was 
intentional. Paragraph 27 clearly refers only to negligent 
conduct; and, under the rule in Samms v. Eccles and Reiser v. 
Lohner negligent conduct, even reckless negligent conduct is not 
sufficient to sustain a claim for emotional distress in Utah. 
There is no allegation in the complaint that the conduct was so 
"outrageous and intolerable" that it offended "against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 
The complaint must therefore be dismissed because the 
complaint fails to allege that Defendant Esquivel intended to harm 
the Plaintiffs and/or that Esquivel's conduct was so offensive that 
it was "against the standards of decency and morality." 
Even if the complaint was amended to include such claims, the 
testimony would not support such claims. The testimony of Rosa 
Mazariegos on this issue included an admission that she knew the 
purpose of the checking was to find the money and that she was 
offended because of the inquiry. Her testimony was as follows: 
Q. Do you believe that the purpose of the checking 
was to offend you as an individual person, solo? 
27
 Restatement, Torts 2d, Emotional Distress, Comment to 
§46. 
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A. (By the translator) I think they wanted to know 
who had the money. 
Q. It's "yes" or "no." 
A. (By the translator) Both things, to offend and 
to find the money. If they check it's because they think 
they have the money. 
Q. The question is to offend — a plan to offend 
everyone or to offend only you. 
A. (By the translator) I don't know they were 
looking for money, and they check everybody, and that is 
what offends.28 
In none of the depositions did any of the Plaintiffs claim 
that they suffered severe emotional distress. None of the 
Plaintiffs sought medical attention. None of the Plaintiffs 
complained at the time. Plaintiffs describe the Incident as 
offensive, nothing more. 
The deposition testimony of the parties compels a finding of 
fact that Esquivel's conduct was motivated by a sincere desire to 
protect the employees from theft by their fellow employees; and, 
to recover stolen property for one of the employees. The testimony 
does not and would not support a finding that Esquivel acted with 
an intent to harm or injure the Plaintiffs and/or that his conduct 
offended against the "standards of decency and morality." 
Plaintiffs' complaint lacks the requisite allegation of 
intentional conduct and/or offense against standards of decency and 
morality. Plaintiffs' complaint, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
28
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, pg. 51, lines 22-25 and 
pg. 52, lines 1-10. 
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for Intentional and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress must 
be dismissed. 
POINT 5 
PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH, EIGHTH, AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
MUST BE DISMISSED. 
In 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity §10, the following 
is found: 
The elements of the tort of invasion of privacy by 
means of intrusion and seclusion have been variously 
defined. The tort has been described as consisting of an 
invasion or interference by physical intrusion or some 
other form of investigation or examination, into a place 
where plaintiff has secluded himself, or into his private 
or secret concerns, that would be highly offensive to an 
ordinary, reasonable person. Other authorities have 
stated that the elements are intrusion, which may consist 
of watching, spying, prying, besetting, overhearing, or 
some other similar conduct, intrusion upon plaintiff 
which concerns those aspects of himself, his home, his 
family, his personal relationships, and his 
communications which one normally expects will be free 
from exposure to defendant, substantial and unreasonable 
intrusion, and an intentional act or course of conduct by 
defendant. Still other authorities have simply stated 
the elements of the tort as the existence of secret and 
private subject matter, the right in plaintiff to keep 
that subject matter private, and the obtainment by 
defendant of information about that subject matter 
through unreasonable means. 
In Cox v. Hatch, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 761 P. 2d 556 (1988) the 
Utah Supreme Court examined the Restatement of Torts (1977) 
regarding the torts of invasion of privacy as follows: 
Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has evolved 
over the years into four separate torts. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1977) defines four different types of 
invasion of privacy. Section 652A of the Restatement 
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states: 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy 
of another is subject to liability for 
resulting harm to the interests of another. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon 
the seclusion of another, as stated 
in §652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the 
other's name or likeness, as stated 
in §652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity 
given to the other's private life, 
as stated in §652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light 
before the public, as stated in 
§652E. 
(Id. at 6.) 
In Cox v. Hatch, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
publication of the photograph of a person with Senator Hatch did 
not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court stated: 
In sum, we hold that pictures of public officials and 
candidates for public office taken in public or semi-
public places with persons who either pose with them or 
who inadvertently appear in such pictures may not be made 
the basis for an invasion of privacy or abuse of personal 
identity action. . . . 
(Id. at 6.) 
Defendants have been unable to identify any other Utah case 
law on the subject. Defendants therefore conclude that the only 
causes of action for intrusion into privacy which have been 
recognized by the Utah Courts are those set forth in the 
Restatement cited and quoted in Cox v. Hatch. 
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Plaintiffs/ Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action. 
In the case at hand, the Plaintiffs' complaint, Seventh and 
Eighth Causes of Action are based upon claims that the Defendant 
Esquivel caused the Plaintiffs' bodies and belongings to be 
searched, while they were at their place of employment. Neither of 
the two causes of action fall within the only available category, 
i.e. "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another." 
Plaintiffs were asked to go to the men's and women's rest 
rooms, respectively and were searched. All the Plaintiffs describe 
the search as occurring in the rest rooms. The testimony as 
contained in the depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate that the 
only conduct complained of consisted of the search and/or offer to 
search the Plaintiffs while they were at their place of employment. 
There are no claims and no evidence of any attempt by Defendants to 
invade the Plaintiffs' personal residences, automobiles or anything 
which could be remotely considered to be a place of Plaintiffs' 
"seclusion." 
Even if Plaintiffs were to amend their complaint to state a 
cause of action, as recognized in Utah, the deposition testimony 
would not support a claim that Defendants' conduct is actionable. 
Plaintiffs' Seventh and Eight Causes of Action must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
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Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action, 
Plaintiffs7 Ninth Cause of Action is based upon a claim that 
the Defendant Esquivel inquired into the religious affiliation of 
the Plaintiff Semidey and asked whether Semidey had a "valid temple 
recommend."29 Plaintiffs allege that such conduct constituted an 
"unwarranted, unnecessary, and wrongful intrusion into Plaintiffs 
Semidey's private affairs."30 
Again, referring to Cox v. Hatch and the Restatement. such 
conduct does not fall within the parameters of the common law tort 
of invasion of privacy recognized in Utah and in the Restatement. 
Since Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action fails to state a claim 
for relief which is recognized in either Utah common law or in the 
Restatement, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, and it must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law does not provide a cause of action or remedy for 
conduct which another deems improper, rude, anti-social, impolite 
or nothing more than transient and personally offensive. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state claims upon which relief 
may be granted under recognized common law in Utah. 
Even if Plaintiffs' Complaint were to be amended, the 
29
 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 33. 
30
 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 34. 
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deposition testimony of Plaintiffs fails to demonstrate that 
Plaintiffs could sustain a cause of action even if the causes of 
action were properly stated. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action must be 
dismissed, no cause of action. 
DATED this // day of 3epLeiubgr, 1994. 
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of 
the following: 
Motion For Summary Judgment; and 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion Summary Judgment; 
were placed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on the IT day of 
September, 1994, addressed to the following: 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
* 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * 
MAZARIEGOS, * 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* 
* 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * 
Defendants. * 
* 
COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of 
record, and hereby object to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the following grounds. 
STATEMENT OP DISPUTED FACTS 
1. The DOTS company hired primarily (85%-95%) non-English 
speaking hispanic workers. These workers were also primarily 
members of the L.D.S. religion. (Affidavits of Plaintiffs, 
Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
• i • ' * w J 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO 
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FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Judge Boyd L. Park 
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2. The principal language in the plant for verbal 
communication of any kind was Spanish. (Affidavits of Plaintiffs, 
Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
3. Defendant Esquivel was plant manager for DOTS. During 
his initial employment interview with Plaintiff Semidey, Mr. 
Esquivel required Mr. Semidey to show him a current L.D.S. temple 
recommend. Mr. Esquivel implied to Mr. Semidey that this was in 
order to determine whether he should be hired. (Semidey 
Affidavit, Attachment A). 
4. In his capacity as plant manager, and by virtue of his 
authority, Mr. Esquivel regularly, from two to four or more times 
a week to twice a day, would stop all work on the factory floor, 
and call all workers to the cafeteria area. Thereafter, Mr. 
Esquivel would deliberately and intentionally harangue and 
otherwise verbally abuse and insult the ethnic and religious 
sensibilities of the plaintiffs and other factory workers. 
(Affidavits of Plaintiffs, Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
5. Defendant Esquivel, in his tirades to plant workers, 
regularly and repeatedly called the workers thieves, robbers, and 
crooks. Mr. Esquivel also regularly and repeatedly accused the 
plant workers of being wetbacks. (Affidavits of Plaintiffs, 
Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
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6. Defendant Esquivel also regularly accused the plant 
workers of not paying their tithing (a principle of the LDS 
religion). Mr. Esquivel in his sermons would indicate to the 
factory workers that their lives were not going well because they 
were not obedient to the commandments of God. (Affidavits of 
Plaintiffs, Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
7. Mr. Esquivel's harangues often lasted more than one 
hour. (Mazariegos Affidavit, Attachment B). 
8. On or around December 16 or 17, 1992, Mr. Esquivel, 
following previous custom, again gathered all factory workers 
together. (Complaint; Affidavits of Plaintiffs, Attachments A, B, 
C, and D). 
9. The precise time of day is disputed. (Bardales 
Affidavit; Attachment C). 
10. This time, Mr. Esquivel excused the four or five non-
hispanic workers. (Affidavits of Semidey, Mazariegos, Santiago, 
Attachments A, B, and D). 
11. Mr. Esquivel spoke in Spanish to the remaining workers. 
(Plaintiff's Affidavits, Attachments A, B, C, and D.) Mr. 
Esquivel told them that a co-worker had complained to him that 
she was missing $20.00. (Plaintiff's Affidavits, Attachments 
A,B,C, and D). 
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12. Mr. Esquivel then stated "I am going to do something 
that I know is against the law. I am going to search you all." 
(Semidey Affidavit; Mazariegos Affidavit; Bardales Affidavit; 
Attachments A, B, and C). 
13. Some of the Plaintiffs remember that Mr. Esquivel then 
continued "If anyone objects, let him raise his hand, and we will 
know who the thief is."(Mazariegos Affidavit; Bardales Affidavit; 
Attachments B and C). Another Plaintiff does not remember that 
Mr. Esquivel every asked such a question, or stated such a thing. 
(Semidey Affidavit; Attachment A). 
14. None of the factory workers raised their hands to 
object, because none wanted to be branded a thief in front of the 
others, and because they knew they would lose their employment. 
(Plaintiffs' Affidavits; Attachments A, B, C, and D) . 
15. Mr. Esquivel then instructed the female and male 
supervisors to take each individual, one at a time, into the 
bathrooms to search them. (Plaintiffs7 Affidavits; Attachments A, 
B, C, and D). 
16. Mr. Esquivel also instructed the supervisors and the 
workers that no one was to return to their assigned work area 
without being searched.(Mazariegos Affidavit; Attachment B)• 
17. Mr. Esquivel's demand that the plaintiffs and other 
factory workers submit to this search was a deliberate and 
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calculated insult, intended to humiliate and outrage their 
sensibilities• (Plaintiffs' Affidavits; Attachments A, B, C, and 
D). 
18. In the alternative, Mr. Esquivel acted in deliberate and 
intentional disregard of the emotional distress and humiliation 
caused by his insulting behavior and accusations. Given that Mr. 
Esquivel is of Mexican origin, he knew or should have known that 
the statements he made and the forced search of the Hispanic 
factory workers would result in emotional distress and 
humiliation, even physical illness. 
19. These instructions gave rise in each plaintiff to the 
apprehension of an immediate offensive touching. (Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits; Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
20. The male supervisor did not physically touch most of 
the male workers. 
21. One of the female supervisors had each woman undo her 
pants, undo her bra, and loosen her shirt, so the supervisor 
could place her hands under the shirt and waistband and 
physically run her hands around the mid-riff and waist of each 
woman. (Mazariegos Affidavit, Attachment B). 
22. This female supervisor also physically ran a pencil 
through the hair of the women she searched. (Mazariegos 
Affidavit, Attachment B). 
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23. Plaintiffs did not consent to this procedure, but 
allowed it to happen through fear. (Plaintiffs' Affidavits, 
Attachments A, B, C, and D). 
24. Plaintiffs suffered extreme outrage, emotional 
distress, and mental stress due to this treatment. (Semidey 
Affidavit; Mazariegos Affidavit; Bardales Affidavit; Santiago 
Affidavit; Affidavits of Matilde Mazariegos, Pastora Mazariegos, 
Maira Bardales and Diana Semidey; Attachments A, B, C, D, E, F, 
G, and H). 
25. Plaintiff Rosa Mazariegos became physically and 
emotionally ill. As a result, she was unable to engage in 
remunerative employment for some 2 and 1/2 months. (Mazariegos 
Affidavit; Affidavits of Matilde Mazariegos and Pastora 
Mazariegos; Attachments B, E, and F) . 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Standard of Review: In order to prevail upon their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Defendants must demonstrate that there are 
no material disputed facts, and that th^y are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ. P. 56(c) In determining 
whether there are material disputed facts, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Batchelor, 83 2 
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P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992). This standard is particularly 
important where, as here, discovery has not been completed and 
all witnesses have not provided affidavits. In fact, Defendants 
have, to this point, completely failed, by Interrogatory or other 
means to even request the names and addresses of Plaintiffs' 
proposed witnesses. 
Furthermore, although the depositions of the Plaintiffs have 
been taken, formal objections have been raised regarding the 
adequacy of interpretation, and thus the accuracy of the 
deposition transcripts as rendered in English. Formal objection 
has also been raised to the adequacy of the changes Plaintiffs' 
counsel has submitted for the record. 
Summary: Defendants have failed to meet their burden of 
proof, i.e., to prove that there are no material disputed facts 
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs have alleged facts, disputed and undisputed, 
sufficient to permit them to prevail at trial on each of their 
causes of action. 
Defendants' Motion is predicated upon the Court's accepting 
their characterization of the following disputed facts: 
(1) Defendants deny that Plaintiffs were unlawfully 
detained or falsely imprisoned. On the contrary, Plaintiffs 
contend that they were restrained from returning to their 
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normal work stations, and forced to remain in the cafeteria 
area of their workplace until they submitted to a physical 
search. Plaintiffs' sworn affidavits indicate that Mr, 
Esquivel unlawfully forced them to enter the restroom of 
their employer and submit to an illegal search of their 
person and belongings. 
(2) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' causes of action 
for assault and battery must be dismissed because there was 
no "force" or "bodily harm." Plaintiffs Verified Complaint 
shows that indeed, they were threatened with, apprehensive 
of, and in some cases forced to submit to offensive contact 
of another with their person. 
(3) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs "consented" to 
the assault and battery to which they were submitted. 
Plaintiffs dispute this characterization of their actions; 
they were coerced into submission. 
(4) Defendants argue that Mr. Esquivel's actions can 
not be considered "outrageous and intolerable . . . 
[sufficient] to offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." The abuse Plaintiffs 
suffered at the hands of their employer, DOTS and its 
representative Mr. Esquivel, was indeed outrageous and 
8 
intolerable, and offensive to generally accepted standards 
of decency and morality. 
(5) Finally, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' claims 
for invasion of privacy should also be dismissed because 
there was no actionable invasion of privacy. The search of 
the Plaintiffs' personal belongings, pockets, and persons, 
as well as the request to see Mr. Semiday's temple 
recommend, are actionable invasions of personal space and 
personal, private, facts. 
The determination of each of these issues requires the 
adjudication of material facts. Some of these issues are mixed 
fact and law, where the jury must determine what was "reasonable" 
under the circumstances, and how the conduct of the parties is to 
be measured under that standard.1 Therefore each of these 
issues must be presented to the jury, and a summary judgment for 
the Defendants can not be granted. 
1
 See Johnson v. Skaqqs, 668 P.2d 565 (Utah 1983), where 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment because issues 
of reasonableness remained that had to be determined by the jury. 
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Issue I: Plaintiffs/ Allegations Establish a Prima Facie Case of 
False Imprisonment, Plaintiffs' Allegations also Establish a 
Prima Facie Case of Wrongful Detention 
The elements of a prima facie case for False Imprisonment 
under Utah law require that the Plaintiffs allege (and prove at 
trial) that: 
By the exercise of force, or the express or implied threat 
of force, [they were] compelled to remain where [they] do 
not wish to remain or to go where [they] do not wish to go. 
The essential thing is the restraint of the person. If the 
words or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable 
apprehension of force, and the means of coercion are at 
hand, a person may be as effectually restrained and deprived 
of liberty as by prison bars. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. 
Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507. 
In Hepworth, two individuals acting as floorwalkers for a 
ballroom required two patrons to accompany them across the 
ballroom floor to a room near the entrance of the ballroom. 
There was no evidence of force, other than the authority of the 
individuals, in their capacity as floorwalkers. This case was 
tried to a jury, and the jury found for the Plaintiff. On 
appeal, the verdict was upheld. 
Plaintiffs herein state that Defendant Esquivel was their 
plant manager, and habitually harrassed and intimidated them. 
They have stated that he was angry. They have further stated 
that he required them to remain away from their normal work area, 
and that he required them, one by one, to enter a bathroom and 
submit to a search. Plaintiffs have stated that the nearest exit 
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was some thirty feet away, and that it was closed. Whether there 
was a reasonable exit and whether there was a substantial threat 
of force are questions for a jury to decide, after presentation 
of all the evidence. These disputed issues of fact preclude a 
summary judgment for the Defendants. 
Defendants allege that a criminal cause of action, i.e., 
that established in the Utah Code for Wrongful Detention, cannot 
serve as the basis for a civil cause of action. Defendants cite 
no legal support for this statement, which is clearly contrary to 
law. For example, it is common tort law that violation of a 
statute is "negligence per se."2 In the case of the Utah 
statute, it is clear that Utah legislators chose to make criminal 
an act somewhat less than the normal standard for false 
imprisonment. Utah Code §76-5-304 states that Ma person commits 
unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully 
so as to interfere substantially with his liberty." Whether or 
not Plaintiffs were falsely imprisoned, Mr. Esquivel did, 
unquestionably, knowingly restrain them, unlawfully, so as to 
interfere substantially with their liberty. This is prima facie 
evidence of Mr. Esquivel's (and DOT'S) negligence, at a minimum. 
2
 See, for example, Dan Dobbs, Torts and Compensation, at 
118, West Publishing Co. (St. Paul, 1985); Marshall Shapo, Tort 
and Injury Law, 207-217, Mathew Bender & Co. (New York, 1990). 
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It is not unreasonable to require Defendants to pay the damages 
caused by their unlawful acts. 
Issue II; Plaintiffs' Allegations and Testimony Establish a Prima 
Facie Case of Assault and/or Battery. 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' allegations and 
testimony are insufficient to state a cognizable claim for either 
assault or battery. Defendants rely for their argument upon 
definitions of assault and battery that are criminal in nature, 
such as the definition given in 6A C.J.S. (cited in Defendants' 
Memorandum, p.12.) The tort of assault differs from the crime. 
The definition of assault in Tort, as opposed to criminal law, is 
expressed succinctly in §10 of Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 1984: 
The interest in freedom from apprehension of a harmful 
or offensive contact with the person, as distinguished from 
the contact itself, is protected by an action for the tort 
known as assault, [emphasis added]. 
Prosser and Keeton define battery in §8 as: 
A harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting 
from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a third 
person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that such a 
contact is imminent, is a battery, [emphasis added].3 
3
 For similar definitions, both of which clearly state 
"offensive touching11 as one possiblity, see the definitions found 
in the Restatement on Torts, §§ 18 and 21. 
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Mr. Esquivel's actions, in requiring Plaintiffs to submit to a 
search of their person and their belongings created in their 
minds the apprehension of an immediate offensive touching. 
Plaintiff Mazariegos was touched, offensively, in a manner to 
which she did not consent. (Mazariegos Affidavit; Attachment B). 
Defendants further argue that Mr. Esquivel did not have the 
necessary intent to cause harm. It is clear in the law of Torts 
that the relevant intent is not the intent to cause harm. 
Rather, "it is enough that [the actor] intend to inflict either 
an offensive or harmful contact, or to bring about an 
apprehension of such contact." Id., §20, Comment on Subsection 
(1). Mr. Esquivel obviously intended to bring about an 
apprehension of offensive physical contact when he told 
Plaintiffs they were going to be searched. 
As a second argument for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims 
for assault and battery, Defendants argue that any claim is 
barred because Plaintiffs consented to the search. Plaintiffs 
did not consent. Rather, Plaintiffs were coerced into 
submission. Comment c to §892 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, (1977) explains: 
If a reasonable person would not understand from the words 
or conduct that consent is given, the other is not justified 
in acting upon the assumption that consent is given even 
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though he honestly so believes; and there is no apparent 
consent. 
§892B of the Restatement expands upon the topic of consent, 
and indicates three areas in which consent, although obtained, is 
invalid. The third of these is the case of consent obtained 
under duress. Assuming, solely for the sake of this argument, 
that Plaintiffs did consent to Mr. Esquivel's tortious actions, 
they did so under duress. The comment on duress does not attempt 
a definition of the type of duress that might vitiate consent. 
Rather, the comment indicates that 
[It is not] certain that the duress must be of a type 
to which a person of ordinary firmness or a reasonable 
person would yield, though this may be important in 
determining whether the other party's will was actually 
overborne. Age, sex, mental capacity, the relation of the 
parties and antecedent circumstances all may be significant. 
The type of conduct to which the other party consents is 
also important. Id, §892B, Comment on Subsection (3) 
[emphasis added]. 
Any determination of whether or not Plaintiffs consented, and 
whether or not that consent was voided due to duress is a 
determination of fact, and must be decided by a jury. Defendants 
allege Plaintiffs consented. Plaintiffs state that they did not 
consent. Defendants assert that Mr. Esquivel properly 
interpreted Plaintiffs' inaction as consent. This is a disputed 
issue of fact, and as such must be determined by a jury, in the 
context of all the factual circumstances. Furthermore, precisely 
14 
what all the factual circumstances were also requires a factual 
determination. Facts must be determined by a jury. Therefore, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on these issues must be 
denied. 
Issue III; Plaintiffs' Allegations and Testimony Are Sufficient 
To Establish a Prima Facie Case of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
is a case directly on point. In that case, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that evidence of emotional stress—Plaintiff's 
psychologist told her not to return to work in her previous 
environment—and evidence that Defendant's employees had 
"shadowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening looks 
and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at work in ways that 
made her job more stressful," was sufficient to state a cause of 
action. In the present case, relatives of the Plaintiffs support 
with their affidavits the intense emotional and physical 
suffering caused to the Plaintiffs by Mr. Esquivel's behavior. 
As causative actions, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Esquivel 
systematically abused his position as plant manager to verbally 
and emotionally abuse Plaintiffs and compel them to submit to an 
unlawful search of their persons and possessions. A second case 
of interest, on these facts, is Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach 
Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash 1977). In that case, the Washington 
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Supreme Court, En Banc, determined that allegations by a Mexican-
American that his employer had permited other employees to 
engaged in deliberate taunts, slander, and racial epithets, and 
that this behavior on the part of his employer and co-worker had 
caused him to suffer severe emotional distress, due to the 
humiliations and public exposure to scorn and ridicule, was 
sufficient to state a cause of action for what Washington calls 
the Tort of Outrage—the Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, 
Definition of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, This 
case is, of course, not controlling on this court, but it is 
instructive, given the similarity of circumstances. 
Under the terms of these cases, Plaintiffs have alleged 
sufficient conduct and harm to meet the requirements of a prima 
facie case. For purposes of this Motion, Plaintiffs' factual 
allegations, supported by their affidavits and the affidavits of 
other family members, must be taken as true and Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on these causes of action must also 
be denied. 
Issue IV: Plaintiffs7 Allegations and Testimony State a Prima 
Facie Case for Invasion of Privacy by Unreasonable Intrusion upon 
the Seclusion of Another. 
Defendants contend that the allegations in Plaintiffs' 
complaint and testimony are insufficient to demonstrate an 
"unreasonable" intrusion upon their seclusion. Plaintiffs' 
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personal belongings were physically searched, their pockets were 
examined, and in at least two cases, their persons were 
physically handled. Defendants contend that an actionable 
"intrusion into Plaintiffs' seclusion" is limited to intrusion 
upon Plaintiffs in the privacy of their own homes or automobiles. 
It is the Plaintiffs' contention that the privacy rights of an 
individual extend not merely to a dwelling or automobile, but 
also to such personal effects as purses and wallets. Plaintiffs 
further contend that, without reasonable cause, the subjection of 
these personal effects to physical search is an actionable 
invasion of privacy. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, as cited 
in Defendants' Memorandum and in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1988), establishes a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion 
upon the seclusion of another. The key term in this statement is 
unreasonable. Plaintiffs contend that the physical search they 
and their belongings were subjected to was an unreasonable 
intrusion upon their seclusion. Again, this is a question of 
fact—was the search an unreasonable intrusion, or was it not. 
In Johnson v. Skaggs, cited above in footnote l, the Utah Supreme 
Court overturned the grant of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgement because the issue of reasonableness needed to be 
determined by a jury. Here, as there, whether Defendants' 
intrusion into Plaintiffs affairs was reasonable is a material 
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issue. Because this is a disputed issue of material fact, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted. 
Defendants also argue that Mr. Esquivel's request to see 
Plaintiff Semiday's L.D.S. Temple Recommend was not an 
unreasonable intrusion into his personal seclusion. From the 
beginning of the establishment of the United States, it has been 
a tenent of public life that an individual's private religious 
beliefs and affairs are among the most personal of interests. 
Defendant Esquivel's question as to whether or not Mr. Semiday 
had a temple recommend, and his request to see that recommend, 
are comparable to asking a Catholic individual when he or she 
last went to confession. For a secular employer to base an 
employment decision on determinations of status or worthiness 
made by a separate and distinct religious organization is clearly 
against well established state and federal law and policy. This 
is not a case where Plaintiffs voluntarily chose to work for a 
religious organization, nor is it the case of a religous 
organization with a valid interest in staffing its activities 
with its own members. Rather, this is a private, secular, 
factory, producing rubber stamps for commercial sale. There is 
strong public policy, both Federal and State, against basing 
employment decisions on religious or racial grounds. Plaintiffs 
do not contend that they were discriminated against. Rather, 
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they contend that Defendant Esquivel deliberately sought out for 
employment, by means of invasive personal questions in employment 
interviews, individuals such as themselves. It is the 
Plaintiffs' contention that, due primarily to their minority 
status, their limited ability to communicate in English, and 
their limited employment skills, Defendants deliberately hired 
them, knowing that they would be easily manipulated, controlled, 
and harrassed. The issue is one that must be decided ultimately 
by a jury: Given all the circumstances, was Mr. Esquivel's 
question and request an unreasonable invasion of Mr. Semiday's 
privacy? 
CONCLUSION 
Because there are numerous material disputed facts that must 
be resolved by the jury, and because Defendants' contention that 
cannot state a cognizable claim for relief is manifestly false, 
Plaintiffs object to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
all counts. 
Wherefore: Plaintiffs request that this Court deny said 
Motion and calendar a pre-trial scheduling conference to set this 
matter for trial. \ 
DATED this / day of October, ] 
MARTI L. JOKES 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
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COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Walter Semidey, quejante en el caso arriba titulado, y 
dice lo siguiente: 
Yo entre a trabajar en la compania de DOTS alrededor del 
primero de Septiembre, 1992. Antes de ser contratado, tuve una 
entrevista con el gerente de la planta, quien se llamaba 
MiguelAngel Esquivel. Durante esta entrevista el me pregunto si 
yo era miembro de la iglesia Mormona. Yo le conteste que si, yo 
era miembro. Entonces, me pregunto que si yo tenia recomendacion 
para el templo. Le dije que si, lo tenia, y me lo pidio. Yo 
pense que era una cosa extrana, porque nunca en mi vida me habian 
pedido mi recomendacion en una entrevista del empleo, pero queria 
el trabajo, asi que se la di para que la pudiera ver. Yo no 
sabia que el hecho de preguntar eso era contra la ley. 
Estuve trabajando en la empresa de DOTS unos tres meses. 
Durante mi tiempo alii, observe cosas que nunca en mi vida habia 
visto. Por ejemplo, cada vez que el Sn. Esquivel se molestaba 
con cualquier persona o cualquier departamento, el reunia a toda 
la planta. Casi siempre estuvo enojado, y nos hablaba en voz 
fuerte o nos gritaba. El hablaria de que habia tenido que mandar 
a descansar algunas personas. Varias veces nos dijo que si 
pagabamos nuestros diezmos, y no habia trabajo o teniamos que 
descansar unos dias, deberiamos ir con nuestro obispo a pedir 
ayuda, porque la iglesia tenia responsibilidad de compensarnos 
los dias de descanso cuando estabamos pagando diezmos. Muchas 
veces nos hablo duro y fuerte, acusandonos de ser rateros y 
rateras. En una ocasion nos amenazo con registrarnos a todos al 
salir del trabajo, porque segun el alguien estaba robando los 
sellos. 
Ademas de rateros, tambien nos acusaba de ser mentirosos. 
Nos decia que la mayoria de nosotros eran ilegales. Eso de 
acusar a la gente de ser ilegales el lo utiliciaba como amenaza. 
Para mi, era manera de recordarles a las personas que no tenian 
libertad, y que el podia con una llamada causarles muchos 
problemas. De esta manera solia controlar a la gente, y hacer 
que ellos se portaban de acuerdo con lo que el queria. 
Pero la ofensa mas grande para mi fue el dia en que nos 
registro a todos. Ese dia el mando descansar al departamento 
donde trabajaban las pocas mujeres americanas que habian en la 
fabrica. Las mando a todas en ese departamento a sus casas, 
Despues, nos reunio a los demas. Eramos entre treinta y cuarenta 
personas y todos eramos gente hispana. Nos informo de un robo de 
veinte dolares, y nos dijo que el iba hacer algo que estaba fuera 
de la ley, pero que lo iba hacer, que era registrarnos a todos. 
En ningun momento prequnto si alguien se oponia a ser revisado. 
En ningun momento indico que la puerta estaba abierto a quien 
queria salir. Ademas, la puerta estaba bastante lejos, como 
treinta pies, de donde estabamos sentados. Despues de eso el 
salio del area y nos dejo con los supervisores. Habia dos grupos 
de mujeres. Algunas fueron revisadas en el bano de arriba, otras 
fueron revisadas abajo en una oficina. A los hombres, nos reviso 
todos arriba en el bano de los hombres. Yo estaba molesto, 
nervioso y enojado. Casi no lo podia creer. Me preguntaba y 
volvia a preguntarme, ^como era que ellos iban a saber la 
diferencia entre el billete de veinte que se habian perdido y un 
billete de veinte que tal vez yo tenia en mi cartera? No captaba 
entender como pensaban comprobar algo. Me sentia ancioso y 
atemorizado. Creia que me iban a revisar todo mi cuerpo. Creia 
que me iban hacer quitar mi ropa, y que me iban a tocar en todas 
las partes de mi cuerpo. Yo no queria ser revisado, pero no veia 
manera de librarme de alii. 
Al entrar en el bano, yo pregunte a mi supervisor como iba a 
saber que el billete en mi cartera era el veinte que se habian 
perdido. El no sabia que contestarme. Despues de la revision me 
sentia avergonzado y humillado. Me sentia destrozado 
emocionalmente. Me enojaba con mi esposa y mis hijos. Me sentia 
muy molesto, muy defensivo, muy agresivo. Dure asi varios dias, 
como una semana, hasta despues de la Navidad. El registro no 
habia tenido ningun resultado. Yo no sabia que si esto iba a 
volver a pasar o no. No me podia calmar hasta que me despideron 
del trabajo. Aunque tambien la manera en que me despidio me 
molesto, despues, al no tener que regresar alii diariamente, y 
viver bajo la amenaza de otra revision, yo empece a calmerme, y a 
sentirme mejor. 
DATED this 3f day of Cottb^C 1994. 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
^Ln the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this 3l day of 
O'C/ic b^/^ / 19 9j , before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared [dalior S^,>i ^e y, "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of ^ /rf- to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
/*'-£& 
€mji SUE ANN WARNICK Notary Public >^ STATE Oc UTAH ( Z^yy,\ Ccrrm ExoresAUG 18. 1997 Y 
^ - ' ^ •* ^ 3 7 ^NTERSTPROVrUTlfUSO' / 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
kl &1^^L^/l'l7U^/t 
Notary Public 
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COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Walter Semiday, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began working at the DOTS company around the first of 
September, 1992. Before I was hired, I had an interview with the 
plant manager, whose name was MiguelAngel Esquivel. During this 
interview he asked me if I was a member of the Mormon (LDS) 
church. I answered yes, that I was a member. Then he asked me 
if I had a temple recommend. I told him that yes, I did, and he 
asked to see it. I thought this was a strange thing, because 
never in my life had someone asked to see my temple recommend in 
an employment interview, but I wanted the job, so I gave it to 
him so that he could see it. I did not know that it was against 
the law to ask this question. 
I worked in the DOTS business some three months. During my 
time there, I observed things that I had never seen before. For 
example, every time that Mr. Esquivel got angry with some person 
or some department, he would gather together the entire plant. 
Almost always he was angry, and he would speak to us in a strong 
voice or yell at us. He would say that he had had to lay off 
some people. Many times he told us that if we paid our tithing, 
and there wasn't work or we were laid of for a few days, we 
should go to our bishop and ask for help, because the church had 
the responsibility to compensate us for the days were were laid 
off if we were paying our tithing. Many times he spoke to us 
hard and strong, accusing us of being robbers. In one occasion 
he threatened that he was going to search us all as we left work, 
because, he said, someone was stealing the stamps. 
Besides robbers, he also accused us of being liars. He 
would say that the majority of us were illegals. This, of 
accusing the people of being illegals, he used as a threat. As I 
saw it, it was a way of reminding the people that they were not 
free, and that he could with one phone call cause them many 
problems. This way he habitually controlled the people, and made 
them behave the way he wanted them to. 
But the greatest offense, for me, was the day that they 
searched us all. That day he laid off the department where the 
few American women worked. He sent everyone in that department 
home. After, he gathered the rest of us together. We were 
between thirty and forty people, and all of us were Hispanic 
people. He informed us of a robbery of twenty dollars, and told 
us that he was going to do something that was against the law, 
but that he was going to do it, that was, to search us all. At 
no time did he ask if anyone objected to being searched. At no 
time did he indicate that the door was open to whoever wanted to 
leave. Furthermore, the door was quite distant, around thirty 
feet, from where we were seated. After that he left the area and 
left us with the supervisors. There were two groups of women. 
Some were searched in the upstairs bathroom, others were searched 
below in an office. The men, we were all searched upstairs in 
the men's bathroom. I was upset, nervous, and angry. I almost 
couldn't believe it. I asked myself and kept asking myself, how 
it was that they were going to know the difference between the 
twenty dollar bill that had been lost and a twenty dollar bill 
that maybe I had in my wallet? I could not understand how they 
thought to prove anything. I felt anxious and threatened. I 
believed that they were going to search my entire body. I 
believed that they were going to make me take off my clothes, and 
that they were going to touch me in every part of my body. I did 
not want to be searched, but I did not see any way to liberate 
myself from there. 
Upon entering the bathroom, I asked my supervisor how he was 
going to know that the bill in my wallet was the twenty that had 
been lost. He did not know what to answer. After the search I 
felt ashamed and humiliated. I felt emotionally destroyed. I 
got angry with my wife and my children. I felt very upset, very 
defensive, very aggressive. I continued this way for some days, 
like a week, until after Christmas. The search had not had any 
result. I did not know if this was going to happen again or not. 
I was not able to calm down until I was let go from work. Even 
though the way in which I was let go upset me, afterwards, when I 
didn't have to return there on a daily basis, and live under the 
threat of another search, I began to calm down and to feel 
better. 
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Judge Boyd L. Park 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Rosa Mazariegos, quejante en el caso arriba titulado, 
y dice lo siguiente: 
Yo entre a trabajar en la compania de los sellos a 
principios de Noviembre, 1992. De pronto empeze a sentir mal. 
El gerente de la fabrica se llamaba MiguelAngel Esquivel. El dia 
en que empeze a trabajar el gerente nos reunio a todos y nos 
empezo a gritar, y decirnos groserias. Nos decia que eramos un 
atajo de flojos y araganes. Decia "Estoy seguro que alia, en el 
otro lado de donde son, ustedes lo han pasando cortando nopales. 
Se que vienen aqui para hacerse grandes." 
Despues de unos dias llegue a comprender que ese mismo, de 
las reuniones y los gritos y los groserias, el Sn. Esquivel hacia 
casi todo los dias, y a veces dos veces al dia. Entre otras 
cosas, solia decirnos "Estoy seguro que no pagen los diezmos. Se 
que por eso les va mal." Tambien nos decia "Estoy seguro de que 
son unos hipocritas. Adelante me sonrian, y atras hablen de me, 
estoy seguro." Nos acusaba de no tener entrada al templo de la 
iglesia. Nos acusaba de ser mojados y decia que el sabia quienes 
eran los illegales. 
Pero lo peor de la situacion era que despues de pasar hasta 
mas de una hora gritandonos, el Sn. Esquivel vendria a donde yo y 
los demas estaban trabajando, y nos acusaba de estar flojos 
porque estabamos bajos en la producion. Tambien todos los dias 
mandaba una u otra de las mujeres latinas a limpiar el cuarto del 
perro. El Sn. tenia un perro. Lo traia a la fabrica, donde lo 
metia en un cuarto con alfombra. Todos los dias el Sn Esquivel 
mandaria decir que una u otra mujer fuera a limpiar el popo del 
perro, o banar al perro. El sabia de lo insultante que fue, para 
una mujer hispana, trabajadora, verse obligado recoger el popo de 
un perro que pertenecia a otra persona. Una vez me toco hacerlo. 
Aunque tuve una mesa llena de trabajo, la supervisora me dijo que 
tenia que dejar lo que estaba haciendo para ir a levantar el popo 
del perro y lavar bien con detergente a la alfombra. 
Por la presion, de ser atacado y maldicho, de ser insultado 
y humillado constantemente, yo no podia dormir bien. Aunque 
comia algo, no me gustaba la comida como antes. No tenia sabor. 
Tenia dolores de cabeza casi todo los dias. A pesar de todo 
esto, lo mas grave de todo fue el dia en que nos revisio. 
Ese dia, nos reunio como siempre en el area de la cafeteria. 
El area de la cafeteria era unos diez metros de la entrada a la 
fabrica. Empezo a gritarnos. Decia "Se ha perdido un dinero. 
Todos aqui son unos rateros y rateras. De aqui nadia va a salir 
si no se deja revisar." Tambien dijo "El que no se deja revisar, 
es porque tiene el dinero." Despues nos dijo que todos teniamos 
que entrar al bano uno por uno con la supervisora. Yo no quise 
que me revisara, pero tenia miedo de oponerme, por las 
acusaciones y gritos que vendria sobreme, y por que no veia 
manera de salir. Por estas razones, y porque nos habia dicho que 
no podiamos salir, y estaba bastante lejos la puerta, yo otra vez 
me veia obligado a someterme. Cuando me toco entrar al bano la 
supervisora me hizo desabotonar mis pantelones y soltar mi blusa. 
Tambien me hizo desabrocharme el brasier. Despues, ella metio 
sus manos debajo de mi blusa, y me toco todo el area de mi 
cinturon y hasta debajo de mi brasier. Despues me dijo que me 
quitara mis zapatos y calcetines, y que me subiera las piernas de 
mis pantelones arriba de mis rodillas. A final de todo ella 
metio un lapiz en mi cabello y me reviso todo el cabello con el 
lapiz. 
Yo llegue a mi casa destrozada. Tuve un flujo de sangre que 
no era normal, pero que me venia a causa de los nervios y 
temores. Estuve casi histerico. No podia dormir en toda la 
noche. Aun asi no queria perder el trabajo, y regrese al 
trabajo, aunque andaba con muchos nervios y mucho coraje. A unos 
pocos dias despues intente hablar con el Sn. Esquivel, para 
decirle de lo mal que era la revision. Ese mismo dia me boto del 
trabajo, 
Al salir del trabajo empeze a calmarme de los nervios, 
aunque dure otros meses sin sentirme con las fuerzas emocionales 
suficiente para volver a buscar trabajo. Durante todo este 
tiempo mi hermana me cuidaba con te de tila, y otros remedios 
caseras, para ayudarme a calmar y reestablecerme. 
DATED this *>l day of QaM^r- 1994. 
ROSA' DELIA MAZARIEGOS 
In the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this 3 I day of 
^^ , 19 9w, before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared Ao$«< ^ / ^ / ^ ^ / ^ "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of fa, 0 ^  /V/ 3/ Y^'iL to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature ^s voluntary and 
the document truthful. ^ 
JAY KNIGHT Notary Public 
ZIONS FIRST NATL BANK 
406 N. STATE STREET 
OREM. UT 84057 
rfsUU PYP 5-13-98 
V 
Residing at: w ^ ^ 
My commission expires: 5*"Q-%t 
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COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Rosa Mazariegos, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began to work in the stamp company the beginning of 
November, 1992. Almost immediately I began to feel bad. The 
manager of the factory was called MiguelAngel Esquivel. The day 
that I began to work the manager gathered everyone and began to 
yell at us and tell us insulting things. He told us that we were 
a pack of slackers and lazybones. He said "I am certain that 
there, on the other side from where you are from, you all spent 
your time cutting cactus.1 You came here to become great." 
After some days I came to understand that this same thing, 
the meetings and the yelling and the insults, Mr. Esquivel did 
almost every day, and sometimes twice a day. Among other things, 
he would say to us "I am certain that you don't pay your tithing. 
I know that's why things go badly for you." He would also say to 
us "I am certain that you are a bunch of hypocrites. To my face 
you smile at me, but behind my back you tell tales of me, I am 
certain." He would accuse us of not being able to enter the 
temple of the church. He would accuse us of being wetbacks and 
say that he knew who the illegals were. 
But the worst of the situation was that after spending up to 
over an hour yelling at us, Mr. Esquivel would come to where I 
and the rest were working, and accuse us of being lazy because we 
were low in production. Also every day he would send one or 
another of the Latin women to clean the dog's room. The man had 
a dog. He would bring it to the factory, where he would put it 
in a carpeted room. Every day Mr. Esquivel would send an order 
telling one woman or another to go clean up the dog poop, or wash 
the dog. He knew how insulting it was, for an Hispanic woman, a 
worker, to be obligated to clean up dog poop of a dog that 
This expression is idiomatic, somewhat the equivalent of 
"All you could do was clean toilets" in English. 
belonged to another person. One time it came to me to do it. 
Even though I had a table full of work, the supervisor told me 
that I had to leave what I was doing to go and pick up the dog 
poop and wash the carpet with detergent. 
Because of the pressure, of being attacked and degraded, of 
being insulted and humiliated constantly, I was unable to sleep 
well. Although I ate somewhat, food didn't interest me like 
before. It had no flavor. I had headaches almost every day. In 
spite of all this, the worst of everything was the day that they 
searched us. 
That day, he gathered us like always in the cafeteria area. 
The cafeteria area was about ten meters from the entrance to the 
factory. He began to yell at us. He said "Some money has been 
lost. Everyone here is a bunch of robbers. From here no one 
leaves if they are not searched." He also said "Whoever does not 
let themselves be searched, it is because they have the money." 
Then he told us that we all had to enter the bathroom one by one 
with the supervisor. I did not want to be searched, but I was 
afraid to object, because of the accusations and yelling that 
would come upon me, and because I didn't see any way out. For 
those reasons, and because he had told us that we could not 
leave, and the door was a long way away, I again saw myself 
obligated to submit. When it was my turn to enter the bathroom 
the supervisor made me unbutton my pants and loosen my blouse. 
She also made me undo my bra. Then she stuck her hands under my 
blouse and ran her hands all over the area of my waist and even 
under my bra. Then she told me to take off my shoes and socks, 
and to roll my pant legs up above my knees. Last of all, she 
stuck a pencil in my hair and searched through all my hair with 
the pencil. 
When I got home I was devastated. I had a bloody discharge 
that wasn't normal, but that was caused by my nerves and fear. I 
was almost hysterical. I couldn't sleep all night long. But 
even so, I didn't want to lose my job, and I returned to work, 
although I was very nervious and angry. A few days later I tried 
to speak with Mr. Esquivel, to tell him how wrong the search had 
been. That same day he fired me. 
Upon leaving work I began to calm down, although it was some 
months before I felt sufficient emotional strength to return to 
look for work. During all this time my sister took care of me, 
with linden tea and other home remedies, to help me calm down and 
recover. 
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COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Angel Santiago, quejante en el caso aqui titulado, y 
dice lo siguiente: 
Empeze a trabajar por la compania DOTS en el otono del ano 
1992. Trabaje por la compania por unos cuatro meses. Durante 
este tiempo el majordomo de la fabrica acustumbraba a insultarnos 
a la gente casi diario. El nos reunia y se pondria a dicirnos 
cosas como "Ustedes son unos ladrones, son rateros, son unos 
malagradecidos, son unos habladores por que hablan mal de la 
empresa." Tambien nos dicia que eramos unos flojos a trabajar. 
Nos decia que no pagabamos diezmos, y que por eso las cosas iban 
mal en la empresa. Ademas nos acusaba de ser mojados, y nos 
decia que si venia la migra nos llevaria a todos. Una vez llego 
a dicirnos que estaba harto de los chismes de la gente, y que 
eramos unos vochinchosos. 
El dia de la revision el Senor Esquivel nos reunia como 
siempre. Estaba muy enojado. Otra vez comenzo a insultarnos a 
todos. Dicia que eramos unos rateros, y que habia llegado al 
colmo y que el tendria que revisarnos a todos. Antes habia 
mandado a las mujeres americanas a sus casas. 
El Senor Esquivel decia que nos iba a revisar uno por uno, 
que tendriamos que entrar al bano con el supervisor, quien nos 
revisaria. Esto fue el colmo de los insultos. En mi paiz, de 
Puerto Rico, nadia puede revisar a otro persona sin que tiene un 
order de cateo. Aun con orden de cateo, la revision tiene que 
ser hecho por un oficial del gobierno. Humillar a otra persona 
de este manera, revisarles y accusarles de ser rateros, es de lo 
peor. Esta contra la ley que un jefe abusa de su poder para 
insultar y revisar a la gente asi. 
Pero yo ya habia quejado antes, de otro jefe. Habia ido con 
Job Service y me habian dicho que no podian hacer nada; que aqui 
en Utah los jefes podian correr a la gente cuando les daba la 
gana, y que no habia nada que se podian hacer. Entonces, cuando 
Esquivel nos exigia que fueramos revisados, yo creia que si me 
opusiera a ser revisado, me iba a correr del trabajo ese mismo 
dia. Esquivel tambien nos dijo que nadia podia regresar al 
trabajo sin ser revisado, y que todos teniamos que quedarnos en 
el area de la cafeteria hasta que todos habian sido revisado. 
Eran mas de cuarenta personas. No queria ser revisado, pero 
oponerme significaba perder el trabajo. 
Los dos banos estaban arriba, y al subir las escaleras uno 
por uno los demas personas en la cafeteria nos veia, y nos decia 
que ibamos a ser revisado, que nos iba a tocar, que nos iba a 
palpar todo. Yo me sentia humillado y ofendido. Tambien sentia 
sin poder de oponerme. Pense que no habia remedio, que nadia me 
creyria, aunque tambian sabia que no era justo y tal vez estaba 
contra la ley. * 
DATED thisJS^ day of C/C'^VJ*< . 1994. 
^ ^ 5 ^ 
ANGEL SANTIAGO 
In^the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this 3 I day of 
L <^7w^c^ / 19 #-/, before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared f^n <?/ \u n± 1 <i , "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to\ine his/hc&r identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of /^ </, /V», *VJ Lf& ,r€- to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
Notary/ Pub^fc 
, 1 r 
Residing at: "/-^  
My commission expires: * ^  
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DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Angel Santiago, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began to work for the company DOTS in the fall of 1992. I 
worked for the company for about four months. During this time 
the manager of the factory customarily insulted the people almost 
daily. He would gather us together and begin saying things to us 
like "You are a bunch of thieves, robbers, ungratefuls; you are 
talebearers because you speak badly of the company." He would 
also tell us that we were a bunch of lazy workers. He would say 
that we didn't pay our tithing, and because of this things went 
badly in the company. What's more, he would accuse us of being 
wetbacks, and would tell us that if immigration came they would 
take us all away. One time he even told us that he was sick of 
people's gossip, and that we were a bunch of scandlemongers. 
On the day of the search Mr. Esquivel gathered us together 
like always. He was very angry. Once again he began to insult 
us all. He said that we were a bunch of robbers, that this was 
the last straw,1 and that he was going to have to search us all. 
Before this he had sent the American women to their homes. 
Mr. Esquivel said that they were going to search us one by 
one, that we would have to enter the bathroom with the 
supervisor, who would search us. This was the height of insult. 
In my country, Puerto Rico, no one can search another person 
unless he has a search warrant. Even with a search warrant, the 
search has to be made by a government official. To humiliate 
another person this way, by searching them and accusing them of 
being robers, is the worst. It is against the law for a boss to 
abuse his power by insulting and searching people like this. 
But I had already complained before, about another boss. I 
had gone to Job Service and they had told me that they could not 
do anything; that here in Utah bosses could fire people whenever 
they wanted to, and that there was nothing they could do. 
1
 This is an idiomatic expression. It literally says 
"things had become too much," but carries the stronger meaning of 
"this was the last straw." 
Therefore, when Esquivel demanded that we be searched, I believed 
that if I objected to being searched, he was going to fire me 
that same day. Esquivel also told us that no one could go back 
to work without being searched, and that we all had to stay in 
the cafeteria area until everyone had been searched. There were 
more than forty people. I did not want to be searched, but to 
object would mean losing my job. 
The two bathrooms were upstairs, and while climbing the 
stairs one by one the rest of the other people in the cafeteria 
were looking at us and telling us that we were going to be 
searched, that it was going to be our turn, that they were going 
to palpate everything. I felt humiliated and offended. I also 
felt powerless to object. I thought that there was no 
alternative, that no one would believe me, although I also knew 
that it was not right and that it might be against the law. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF HUMBERTO 
MAZARIEGOS, * BARDALES 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
Defendants. * 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Humberto Bardales, quejante en el caso aqui titulado, 
y dice lo siguiente: 
Empeze a trabajar para la compania DOTS el primero de agusto 
del ano 1992. Trabaje por la compania por unos cinco meses. 
Durante este tiempo el gerente, MiguelAngel Esquivel me maltrato 
moralmente e emocionalmente. 
Frecuentemente, un minimo de dos veces por semana y muchas 
veces mas, el solia reunir a todo el personal para llevar a cabo 
unas reuniones con el unico objetivo de maltratar y maldicer a 
los trabajadores. Nos acusaba de varias cosas, con intencion de 
ofendernos por sus ofensivas palabras. Solia dicer que los 
empleados eramos unos rateros, que el sabia que estabamos robando 
los sellos. Tambien dicia que el estaba investido de la 
autoridad que la Senora Jeanette Lynton le habia otorgado para 
hacer lo que el quisiera con los empleados. Basandose en que 
mochos empleados eran Mormones, el dicia que deberiamos pagar 
nuestros diezmos para Siguier en el trabajo. Tambien nos 
amenezaba con dicer que si nos despidia, tendriamos que ir a 
pedir ayuda de nuestros obispos para que nos daria de comer. 
Sobre todo, lo mas insultante, y la experiencia que tuvo 
mayor impacto negativo de forma emocional y sicologicamente fue 
cuando el Senor Esquivel nos reunio una tarde despues del 
almuerzo para decirnos que una companera de trabajo se le habian 
perdido $2 0.00 de su cartera, y que el iba a encontrar al ladron. 
El Sn Esquivel fue muy enojado. Grito a todos "Ustedes son unos 
rateros y rateras.11 Grito que estaba cansado de tratarnos. En 
seguida, el autorizo al Senor Humberto Hernandez, quien era un 
empleado de su confianza para que registrara a todos los hombres, 
uno por uno, en forma individual en el bano de los hombres. A 
las mujeres, se les iba a registrar de forma igual por la Senora 
Maria Reyes en el bano de las mujeres y la Sna Suleika iba a 
registrar a otra grupo de las mujeres en un cuarto del mismo 
edificio. Al fin el Sn. Esquivel dijo, "Yo se que esto es algo 
indebido, pero de todos modos lo voy hacer para encontrar a un 
ladron o una ladrona." Tambien dijo que "El que no se dejara 
registrar era el ladron.11 
De esta forma se procedio a revisar unos cuarenta personas, 
cada quien yendo en su turno para ser registrado. Se nos dijo 
que teniamos que llevar con nosotros nuestros abrigos y nuestros 
utencilios de portar nuestros alimentos. Yo sentia amenazado. 
Sabia que me iba a palpar fisicamente, y tocarme. No queria que 
me revisara. Tampoco queria que me llegaran a nombrar el ladron. 
Sabia que si me fuera oponer, iba a perder el trabajo y que todos 
iban a decir que era el ladron. 
Esta experiencia fue uno de los peores de mi vida. Me dejo 
muy nervioso y me sentia deprimido. Me enojaba con mi esposa sin 
razon. Estuve muy emocional y inestable por alrededor de un mes 
despues de dejar la compania. Aun estoy sospechoso de la gente, 
en particular mis supervisores, y me es dificil confiar y llevar 
me bien con ellos. 
DATED this 3 \ day of C C"f , 1994. 
In the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this 31 day of 
OCTOBER , 19 Q4 , before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared JOSE HUMBERTO BARDAT#E.s"who is personally know to 
me11 or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of IITAH DRTVF.P T.TPFMSF. # 1^ 05521? t o b e 
the person who signed the preceding document m my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
ry Public 
QjblLL ( A^kM l^ L 
21*. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CAROL L. HERRICK 
310 South Main, Suite 308 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
My Commission Expires 
March 7, 1996 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * TRANSLATION OF 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF HUMBERTO 
MAZARIEGOS, * BARDALES 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants. * 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Humberto Bardales, Plaintiff in the above entitled 
case, and states the following: 
I began to work for the DOTS company the first of August of 
1992. I worked for the company for some five months. During 
this time the manager, MiguelAngel Esquivel, mistreated me 
morally and emotionally. 
Frequently, a minimum of two times a week and many times 
more, he would gather all the personnel together to carry out 
meetings with the sole object of mistreating and censuring the 
workers. He would accuse us of many things, with the intention 
of offending us with his offensive words. He habitually told us 
that we the workers were a bunch of robbers, that he knew that we 
were robbing the stamps. He also would say that he had been 
invested with the authority that Mrs. Jeanette Lynton had given 
him to do whatever he wanted with the employees. Basing himself 
on the fact that many of the employees were Mormon, he would say 
that we needed to pay our tithing to continue in the work. He 
also threatened us that if he sent us away, we would have to go 
to ask help from our bishops in order to have enough to eat. 
Above all, the most insulting, and the experience that had 
the most negative emotional and psychological impact was when Mr. 
Esquivel gathered us together one afternoon after lunch to tell 
us that a work companion had lost $20.00 from her purse, and that 
he was going to find the thief. Mr. Esquivel was very angry. He 
shouted at everybody "You are a bunch of robbers." He yelled 
that he was tired of dealing with us. Immediately he authorized 
Mr. Humberto Hernandez, who was an employee he trusted, for him 
to search all the men, one by one, individually, in the men's 
bathroom. For the women, they were to be searched in like manner 
by Mrs. Maria Reyes in the women's bathroom and Mrs. Suleika was 
going to search another group of women in a room in the same 
building. At the end, Mr. Esquivel said "I know that this is 
something wrong, but in any case I am going to do it to find a 
thief." He also said, "whoever did not permit himself to be 
searched was the thief." 
In this way they proceeded to search some forty people, each 
one going in his turn to be searched. They told us that we had 
to bring with us our coats and our lunch bags or boxes. I felt 
threatened. I knew that I was going to be physically patted and 
touched. I did not want them to search me. I knew that if I 
objected, I was going to lose my job, and that everyone was going 
to say that I was the thief. 
This experience was among the worst of my life. It left me 
very nervous and depressed. I got angry with my wife without 
reason. I was very emotionally unstable for around a month after 
I left the company. Even now I am suspicious of people, in 
particular my supervisors, and it is difficult for me to confide 
in them and get along easily with them. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC-, et. al. 
Defendants. 
* AFFIDAVIT OF MATILDA 
* MAZARIEGOS 
* 
* 
* 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Matilda Mazariegos, y dice lo siguiente: 
Yo soy hermana de Rosa Mazariegos, guejante en el caso 
arriba titulado. Yo he vivido en la misma casa con mi hermana 
Rosa agui en Provo por mas de cinco anos. 
Despues de gue ella empezo a trabajar en los sellos, su 
caracter cambio mucho. Antes, ella era de character alegre, muy 
resuena. Llegaba a la casa despues del trabajo tranguilo y 
calmada, y se ponia hacer el guehacer de la casa. Pero cuando 
trabajaba en los sellos, casi siempre llegaba enojada y con 
muchos nervios. Llegaba con dolores de cabeza, y le era dificil 
terminar con lo que tenia que hacer. Tambien empezo actuar de 
manera amargada y triste. Se enojaba con nosotros, y muchas 
veces no queria hacer sus quehacers, ni comer. 
Yo me acuerdo del dia que llego Rosa a la casa y nos dijo 
que ese dia en el trabajo le habia revisado. Rosa llego a la 
casa enojado y muy nerviosa. No se podia calmar. No podia 
comer, ni tampoco podia dormir bien. Despues de salir de la 
compania en Diciembre, se empezo a calmar un poco, pero duro 
otros dos o tres meses antes de que podia relajarse lo suficiente 
para volver a trabajar. 
DATED this .5/ day o/)}&&; 2^ / 1994. 
tUM^ ///&^a>^£ar^/ 
MATILDE MAZARIEGOS^ 
the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this ^/ day of 
^^f1^S/^)J / 19 t/t/t before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared/KATJA^F- y^/*X/t/?/<rG<^ "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of U A ^i^c ts.x^iy Jz^^sS2s^n^_ <L^ to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
Residing at: ^lytdC^t^ 
Ncrcary Public 
^z^ 
My commission expires: ^—/ "p — / ^ 
SUSAN 30LLA«oH 
«
y W C rATEttUTM 
-3rlRST3cCuP,"r'3AN'< 
_CCMM, EX? 5-^-95 j 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * TRANSLATION 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF MATILDA 
MAZARIEGOS, * MAZARIEGOS 
4c 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants. * 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Matilda Mazariegos, and states the following: 
I am the sister of Rosa Mazariegos, plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I have lived in the same house with my sister 
Rosa, here in Provo, for more than five years. 
After she began to work in the stamps, her character changed 
a great deal. Before, she had a happy character, very cheerful. 
She would arrive horn from work tranquil and calm, and set about 
the chores of the house. But when she worked in the stamps, she 
would almost always arrive angry and nervous. She would come 
home with headaches, and it was difficult for her to finish the 
things she had to do. She also began to act sour and sad. She 
would get angry with us, and many times she did not want to do 
her chores, nor eat. 
I remember the day that Rosa arrived home and told us that 
that day at work they had searched her. Rosa arrived home angry 
and very nervous. She could not calm down. She couldn't eat, 
nor could she sleep well. After leaving the company in December, 
she began to calm down somewhat, but it was another two or three 
months before she could relax enough to return to work. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF PASTORA 
MAZARIEGOS, * ESPERANZA MAZARIEGOS 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
• 
Defendants. * 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Pastora Esperanza Mazariegos, y dice lo siguiente: 
Yo soy hermana de Rosa Mazariegos, quejante en el caso 
arriba titulado. Yo he vivido en la misma casa con mi hermana 
Rosa aqui en Provo por mas de cinco anos. 
Despues de que ella empezo a trabajar en los sellos, su 
caracter cambio mucho. Un dia ella llego y me dijo que ese dia 
ademas de su trabajo normal el Senor, su jefe, le habia mandado 
limpiar el popo de un perro que tenia alii. Antes, ella era de 
character alegre, muy resuena. Llegaba a la casa despues del 
trabajo tranquilo y calmada. Le gustaba bailar con el radio, y 
tambien cantar. Tambien le gustaba bromear. 
Pero mientras trabajaba en los sellos, casi siempre llegaba 
enojada y con muchos nervios. Tambien llegaba casi siempre con 
dolores de cabeza. Yo la veia con muchos nervios, y le hacia que 
tomara te de tila para calmarse los. Tambien le hacia masajes 
casi todo los nochos, y le ponia la pomada Vicks en la cabeza 
para que se relajara y para que se calmara. 
Despues del dia de la revision, Rosa llego a un grado peor 
de nervios. Yo me preocupaba por que temia que iba a traumarse 
por tantos nervios. No podia dormir. Comio poco, y le caia mal 
la comida. Despues de salir de la compania se empezo a calmar un 
poco, pero segia con los nervios por unos meses despues. 
DATED this 3 ^ — daY of^^S>^^^ 1994. 
^MJ&^^— b / * y g ^ ^ 
PASTORA ESPERANZA MAZARIEGOS 
le County of Utah, S£ate of Utah, on this ^/ day of 
^S^U^ / 1 9 ^ s before me the undersigned notary, 
p£r£onally appeared /%^TV#A £~. /^ ^^ .^ /^^ ^^ 'who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/herv identity- through documentary 
evidence in the form of /^'A AJ'IUSL&'LI ^L/'s* s^n^ ^^ to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in m$ presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the s^nature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
Residing at: ^/^£^^ -CZ~^~ 
I ( 7 • 
—N Notrary Pub l i c 
My commission e x p i r e s : 0-—/^- /*> 
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LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
* TRANSLATION 
* AFFIDAVIT OF PASTORA 
* ESPERANZA MAZARIEGOS 
* 
* 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Pastora Esperanza Mazariegos, and states the 
following: 
I am the sister of Rosa Mazariegos, plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I have lived in the same house with my sister 
Rosa here in Provo for more than five years. 
After she began to work in the stamps, her character changed 
significantly. One day she arrived home and told me that that 
day, in addition to her normal work, the Master, her boss, had 
sent her to clean the dog poop of the dog that he had there. 
Before, she was a happy person, very cheerful. She would arrive 
home from work tranquil and calm. She liked to dance with the 
radio, and sing. She also like to joke. 
But while she worked in the stamps, almost always she would 
arrive home angry and very nervous. Also, she almost always 
arrived with a headache. I noticed that she was extremely 
nervous, and I made her take linden tea to help her calm them. I 
also gave her massages almost every night, and rubbed Vick's 
vapor rub on her head so she would relax and calm down. 
After the day of the search, Rosa became even more nervous. 
I was worried, because I was afraid she would make herself sick 
because of her nerves. She could not sleep. She would only eat 
a little, and it wouldn't sit well with her. After she left the 
company she began to calm down a bit, but she continued extremely 
nervous for some months afterwards. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * 
MAZARIEGOS, * 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * 
Defendants. * 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Diana Semidey, y dice lo siguiente: 
Yo soy la esposa de Walter Semidey, guejante en el caso 
arriba titulado. Yo me acuerdo del dia en que llego Walter a la 
casa a decirme que ese dia habian revisado a todos los 
trabajadores hispanos. Despues de ese dia, su caracter y manera 
de ser cambio mucho. Antes era de caracter calmado, casi siempre 
feliz, y no se molestaba de mucho. Despues de ese dia casi 
siempre andaba tenso, muy nervioso, y con mucha agresion. Se 
enojaba diariamente conmigo o con nuestros hijos. Ese ano no 
AFFIDAVIT OF DIANA 
SEMIDEY 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
pasamos la Navidad como en otros anos, por que Walter no se 
sentia con interes. Por una parte estaba enojado y con mucha 
agresion. Por otra parte estaba deprimido, y no tenia interes en 
hacer nada de lo que normalmente haciamos. Walter duro asi hasta 
que lo despideron de la empresa. Despues, a unos dias, empezo a 
calmarse y reestablecerse. 
DATED this ^ day of ^^^UU^J 1994. 
DIANA SEMIDEY / 
In the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this S( day of 
06&hU/1~ # 199H' i before me the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared "Big**. Sesntd*^ / "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of /s/Z/t t o b e 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
^2/6/ tfiMasg^xL/ 
Notary Public 
Residing at: ltuL4~ C^^ ^^r"i [/jf^J^ 
My commission expires: 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
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MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
* TRANSLATION OF 
* AFFIDAVIT OF DIANA 
* SEMIDEY 
* 
* 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
* 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Diana Semidey, and states the following: 
I am the wife of Walter Semidey, a plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I remember the day that Walter arrived home to 
tell me that that day they had searched all the Hispanic workers, 
After that day, his character and way of being changed a great 
deal. Before his character was calm, almost always happy, and 
there wasn't much that upset him. After that day, he was almost 
always tense, nervous, and very agressive. Daily he would get 
angry with me or with our children. That year we didn't spend 
Christmas like we had in other years, because Walter wasn't 
interested. One the one hand, he was angry and very aggressive. 
On the other hand, he was depressed, and he wasn't interested in 
doing the things that we normally did. Walter stayed like this 
until he was laid off from work. Afterwards, some days later, he 
began to calm down and stablize himself. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
* AFFIDAVIT OF MAIRA 
* BARDALES 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
VIENE Maira Bardales, y dice lo siguiente: 
Yo soy la esposa de Humberto Bardales, quejante en el caso 
arriba titulado. Nos casamos el seis de Abril de 1990. En la 
temporada importante por fines de este queja, habiamos estado 
casados unos dos anos. Humberto empezo a trabajar en los sellos 
el primero de Agusto. Desde el principio, habia un cambio 
marcado en su comportamiento. Antes, era una persona feliz, 
calmado, tranquilo. Despues de trabajar alii, llegaba muy 
enojado a la casa. Al principio, no me queria decir lo porque. 
Despues me empezo a contar del tratamiento que recibia en la 
compania. El empezo a buscar otro trabajo, e incluso, fue a Job 
Service unos veces, pero no encontro nada. 
El dia de la revision me conto al llegar en casa. Pude ver 
que fue una experiencia humillante para el. Le sentio pena y 
verguenza decirmelo. Despues de eso el paso una temporada de 
unos quince dias muy deprimido y con mucho rabia. Se enojaba 
conmigo y con nuestra hija diariamente. Cuando dejo de trabajar 
en los sellos, tardo un tiempo un reestablecerle completamente 
como antes. Aun asi, empezo a mejorar su aspecto emocional desde 
el dia en que salio de ese empresa. 
DATED this day of /D , 1994. 
a/rex jL/QK 
MAIRA BARDALES 
In the County of Utah, State of Utah, on this 31 day of 
19 94, before me the undersigned notary, OCTOBER 
personally appeared MAIRA MARLENY B0NILLA# "who is personally know to 
me" or "who proved to me his/her identity through documentary 
evidence in the form of UTAH IDENTIFICATION CARD 4 151954685 to be 
the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and 
the document truthful. 
\-a^^^3^?^^^ * A^ 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
ry Public^ 
aAMLfrA; ( X^ii JL 
S-n-qte 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CAROL L. HERHICK 
310 Souwi Man, Suite 308 
Salt «.a*9 C. v uteh 34101 
My Co-nrtssion Expires 
Ma*^ 7 1996 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
* TRANSLATION 
* AFFIDAVIT OF MAIRA 
* BARDALES 
* 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
* 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Maira Bardales, and states the following: 
I am the wife of Humberto Bardales, plaintiff in the above 
titled case. We were married the sixth of April of 1990. In the 
time period important for the ends of this complaint, we had been 
married some two years. Humberto began to work in the stamps the 
first of August. From the beginning, there was a noticable 
change in his behavior. Before, he was a happy, calm, tranquil 
person. After working there, he would arrive home angry. In the 
beginning, he did not want to tell me why. Later he began to 
tell me of the treatment that he received in the company. He 
began to look for other work, and even went to Job Service a 
couple of times, but he didn't find anything• 
The day of the search he told me about it when he got hom. 
I could see that it had been a humiliating experience for him. 
He was pained and embarrassed to tell me about it. After this he 
was very depressed and angry for some fifteen days. He would get 
angry with me and with our daughter on a daily basis. When he 
stopped working in the stamps, it took a while for him to 
reestablish himself completely like before. But even then, his 
emotions began to get better from the day that he stopped working 
in that company. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL 
SANTIAGO, HUMBERTO 
BARD ALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., 
a Nevada Corporation, et al. 
Defendants 
: INTERIM ORDER 
: REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
: MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
: Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
: Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge presiding, 
for hearing on, February 10, 1995, in regard to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Attending were Marti L. Jones, counsel for the 
Plaintiffs, and Jeanette Lynton, President of DOT Adventures, Inc., and her 
counsel, Loren D. Martin. Having reviewed the pleadings and heard 
argument, the Court Orders the following: 
1. The Court grants Plaintiff until March 13, 1995, to show any basis 
they may have as to why this matter should continue, and that full Summary 
Judgment as requested by Defendant's should not be granted as to all 
remaining alleged causes of action. As a minimum, Plaintiff shall provide 
the following: 
a) a list of witnesses for trial and a proffer as to what each 
witness will say, including the specifics as to what they will say about their 
damages, along with supporting corroboration or expert witnesses, if any; 
b) any tangible evidence that would support Plaintiffs claim 
for damages; and 
c) any appropriate testimony to be presented at trial. 
All documents which Plaintiffs may wish to file with the Court for further 
consideration shall be received and filed on or before close of business on 
March 13,1995. 
2. Defendant shall have until March 27, 1995, to reply. 
3. If any party feels further oral argument is needed, the respective 
party shall make such request. If no further hearing is requested, a decision 
regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment J3^si5^^pade by the 
Court. Any request for hearing shall be madejao later thanJVfarch 27, 19^5. 
<*/. ' " ^ \ : "^—" 
DATED this l|fh day of February, 1995. J 
udge'Doyd^. Park 
District Judges , 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 15th day of February, 
1995 to the following: 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
tux/ S Wffiwuf 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZAREIGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON, et., al. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS7 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civ. No. 930400503 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of 
record, and hereby submit the following Second Objection to 
Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Memorandum is filed in accordance with the Court's 
Order to provide proof of damages, argument in support of why 
Plaintiff's affidavits and those of the relatives should be 
allowed as evidence, given that their depositions have been 
taken, a list of additional proposed witnesses, with a synopsis 
of their proposed testimony, and any additional evidence and 
arguments as to why Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment 
should not be granted. The evidence of damages will be referred 
to in the body of this Memorandum, and will be attached in 
Appendix A. The required list of proposed witnesses and their 
proposed testimony will be attached as Appendix B. This leaves 
two issues to be addressed in the body of this memo: The initial 
question of why Plaintiffs' affidavits should be considered as 
evidence, and the second issue of additional evidence and 
arguments against Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue !:• Plaintiffs' Affidavits 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits are legally admissible evidence in a 
Summary Judgment proceeding. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), 
(c). Where depositions have been taken, affidavits will not be 
allowed to dispute previous testimony. In additions depositions 
given under oath and with the possibility of cross-examination, 
are generally given more evidentiary weight than affidavits. 
However, where the affidavits discuss areas and issues not 
discussed in the depositions, or discuss those issues in more 
depth or detail than was sought or permitted in the depositions, 
the evidence offered by the affidavits must be considered in that 
light. This is precisely the reason why, in considering this 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs' Affidavits must be 
considered in addition to their depositions. 
As a discovery tool, depositions can be used in many ways. 
A party may chose to use depositions to elicit the opposing 
party's strongest case. Or depositions may be used as a forum 
for discovering other information. Depending upon how they are 
used, depositions may or may not be the equivalent of testimony a 
trial. Generally, however, there are significant differences, no 
the least of which is that the deposing party, in this case the 
opposing party, is in charge of direct questioning. A Plaintiff, 
or for that matter, a Defendant, is under no duty to present 
their own case when they are being deposed by an opposition 
party. Neither is a Plaintiff required to know or fully 
understand the legal theories involved in bringing a lawsuit. 
That, presumably is why they hire attorneys. In this case, the 
Plaintiffs' causes of action, for Assault, Battery, False 
Imprisonment, Wrongful Detention, and various claims for Invasion 
of Privacy, were set forth in some detail in their Verified 
Complaint. In response to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants 
filed an Answer, denying that "the intent to cause and offensive 
contact [was sufficient to] qualify for the intentional tort of 
Assault and/or Battery," and claiming a number of inapplicable 
statutory defenses, including the statute priviledging a 
reasonable detention in a shoplifting situation. Defendants' 
next course of action was to schedule the Plaintiffs' 
depositions. Each Plaintiff's deposition took between three and 
five hours. However, the transcripts are comparatively short, 
slightly more than fifty pages each. Of those pages, 
approximately sixteen pages of Mr. Semiday's deposition (pp. 33-
45; 60-62;) was directed at discovering the factual basis for the 
causes of action. Even more notable is the fact that not one 
question was asked about Mr. Semiday's individual cause of action 
for breach of privacy in his employment interview. Mr. 
Santiago's deposition slightly more relevant material, 
approximately twenty six pages, (pp.22-25; 29-40; 45-47; 49-55) 
but this is still less than half of the deposition. Mr. 
Bardales' deposition contains still more relevant information, 
this time approximately thirty pages. But even these estimates 
are broad, and include several questions regarding the legal 
nature of the Plaintiffs' case, questions which the Plaintiffs 
did not and do not have the knowledge to answer. Of the four 
depositions, Ms. Mazariegos' contains the highest percentage of 
relevant material. However, Ms. Mazariegos' deposition also 
contains the highest number of errors in translation—of the 
fifty-six total pages, thirty eight, or more than 62%, have 
significant errors in translation, frequently several errors to a 
page. The errors and omissions in the translations materially 
change the detail and accuracy of the information imparted in her 
deposition. 
By law, the subject of any deposition has the substantive 
right to review the transcript for error. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 30(e). However, in this case, given the limitations on 
the Plaintiffs' competence in the English language, this 
substantive right is rendered illusory. One way to remedy this 
problem would be to require a transcript of the Spanish 
testimony. That way, the Plaintiffs could review the transcript 
in a language in which they were literate. For obvious reasons, 
this solution is practically unworkable. To date, the courts 
have established no solution to this problem. In this case the 
Plaintiffs' attorney was one of the few people with the bilingual 
abilities necessary to review the video taped records and make 
the necessary corrections to the English language transcript. 
Therefore, that review was done, in order to correct the 
transcript. On July 17 1994 Plaintiffs'attorney filed lists of 
the requested corrections to each deposition, based on her 
understanding that such corrections in translation would be 
allowed. The Defendants objected to those corrections, on the 
basis that the Plaintiffs did not personally review the 
deposition transcripts and determine the errors for themselves. 
Defendants have, to date, made no claim that the corrections were 
inaccurate, merely that they were made by the attorney, not the 
deponent. Again, the rules of civil procedure require that the 
witness be allowed to correct the transcript. That right is, in 
the present case, illusory without some variation in the 
procedure. Therefore, so long as Defendants object to those 
corrections, Plaintiffs7 will be forced to object to any use of 
the mistranslated portions of the transcripts. 
Plaintiffs are willing to stipulate to the accuracy of the 
depositions, if the corrections are accepted as indicated. 
Without those corrections, however, Plaintiffs will maintain 
their objections to the depositions. Even if the corrections are 
made as asked for, however, this Court should actively consider 
the affidavits Plaintiffs submitted in support of their Objection 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This is so because 
of the limited questioning regarding the facts and substantial 
confusion created on several occasions by the defense attorney's 
question's and the translation process. By analogy, the 
syntactically confuse and mistranslated deposition testimony may 
be an accurate picture of what the cross-examination might look 
like, while the affidavits present a more accurate picture of 
what Plaintiffs' direct testimony will be. 
Therefore, because the depositions as transcribed are 
inaccurate and because they contain limited testmony regarding 
the actual issues of the case, Plaintiffs' Affidavits should be 
actively considered as supplemental testimony in determining 
whether or not to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Again, the only substantive legal basis for not accepting the 
Affidavits as evidence in support of Plaintiffs' claims would be 
a claim that the Affidavits materially contradict the deposition 
testimony. No such claim has been raised, and therefore the 
affidavits must be considered as evidentiary support for 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Issue II; Additional Considerations 
Plaintiffs have alleged nine specific causes of action in 
their complaint. Five of those causes of action are intentional 
torts. Three of the causes of action are for invasions of 
privacy. For each of these eight causes of action Plaintiffs 
have established a prima facie case, by their own testimony and 
that of others. In each case, that prima facie case presents 
issues of disputed material fact that can only be decided by a 
jury by a trial on the merits. 
Wrongful Detention. Plaintiffs' first cause of action is 
for Wrongful Detention. Wrongful detention is a civil cause of 
action, based on the crime of unlawful detention. The elements 
of wrongful detention are a knowing, unlawful, restraint of a 
person that interferes substantially with his liberty. 
Plaintiffs have stated, in their Verified Complaint, Depositions, 
and Affidavits, that the Defendant Miguelangel stated prior to 
beginning the search that what he was doing was illegal. (Semiday 
Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p. 23; Affidavits of 
Semiday and Bardales). That statement indicates knowledge of 
illegality, a presumably knowledge of the offensiveness of the 
act—given that society had declared it illegal, it may 
presumably be considered highly offensive to reasonable people. 
The fact that wrongful detention is also a crime provides the 
element of unlawfulness. Finally, Plaintiffs have also testified 
that they were compelled to remain in the cafeteria area of the 
plant where they worked until they submitted to entering a 
bathroom with a supervisor to be physically searched.(Bardales 
deposition, p. 23; Affidavit of Mazariegos;) . Until everyone^JLxr^ 
the plant had submitted they were not allowed to return to their 
normal work positions. Defendants have argued that this was not 
substantial interference with liberty because Plaintiffs could 
have walked out of the plant. However, wrongful detention does 
not require that there be no avenue of escape. In Orem City v. 
Fillmore, (Case # 93 10 0350), a Utah Fourth Circuit case 
involving the crime of Unlawful Detention, the Defendant 
prevented someone else from backing out of a parking space by 
intentionally placing his car behind the parked car. Even though 
the individual in the car was in no way prevented from getting 
out and walking away, the Defendant was convicted of this crime 
on June 7, 1993. 
The defense has also argued that one cannot create a civil 
cause of action from a crime. This is simply not true. Criminal 
law protects the interests of the society at large.1 As a 
1
 See, for example, Privacy in the Workplace, Jon D. Bible 
and Darien A. McWhirter, pp. 4-8 (Quorum Books, Westport Conn.) 
1990; The American Law of Torts, Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. 
Krause, and Alfred W. Gans. (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, New 
York) 1991, §26:3. 
result, the standard of proof in a criminal case is always higher 
than that of a civil case. However, criminal cases are brought 
on behalf of the state, not the individual, and the money damages 
available in a civil case are not available in criminal cases.Id. 
Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the existence of a 
crime, particularly an intentional crime, presupposes a parallel 
civil cause of action for damages caused by the unlawful actions 
of the defendant(s). 
Assault. The elements of a prima facie case for civil 
assault are an act, made with the intention to inflict a harmful 
or offensive contact, that places another in apprehension of an 
immediate harmful or offensive contact. Restatement 2d. Torts 
S21. The interest that is protected by this cause of action is a 
purely mental interest, and requires no evidence of actual 
damages.2 The Plaintiffs in this case have testified that 
Defendant Esquivel, acting in his capacity as plant manager, 
required each of them to submit to a physical search.(Depositions 
and Affidavits of each Plaintiff). Esquivel stated that the 
search was illegal.(Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales 
Deposition, p. 23; Affidavits of Semiday and Bardales). The fact 
that he knew the search was illegal is prima facie evidence that 
he also knew it would cause offensive contact to the plaintiffs. 
2
 The Law of Torts. 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming 
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray. (Little, Brown & Co, Boston) 
1986. Interference with the person, § 3.4. 
Furthermore, Defendant Esquivel's intent may also be inferred 
from other circumstances of this case, such as the relationship 
between the harm he was allegedly preventing, i.e., the stolen 
twenty dollar bill, and the action he took to remedy the harm. A 
jury might well find on the facts of this case that Esquivel's 
primary intent was to give offense to the forty hispanic members 
of his workforce. For example, the fact that Esquivel apparently 
made no attempt to limit his questioning to individuals with some 
proximity or ability to take the twenty dollars, and the fact 
that no theft would have been provable even if the physical 
search had found a twenty dollar bill,3 might well be interpreted 
by a jury as proof positive that Esquivel's only intent was to 
cause offense. For all of the above reasons, it would be more 
than reasonable for a jury to find that, when he required the 
plaintiffs to submit to a physical search, Defendant Esquivel 
acted intentionally to create in the Plaintiffs and their co-
workers the apprehension of an offensive touching. The 
Plaintiffs have further testified that Esquivel's action had that 
specific effect, and did indeed place them in apprehension of an 
immediate offensive touching.(Affidavits of Semiday, Santiago, 
Bardales). 
3
 See, for example, Plaintiff Semiday's question regarding 
how a twenty dollar bill in his wallet could be distinguished 
from that allegedly stolen. Semiday Deposition, pp. 40-41. 
p~ #> ,t 
Defendants argue, in counter to this cause of action, that 
the mere threat of an offensive contact is not sufficient to 
permit a recovery. This would be a nice theory, except that it 
is clearly contrary to the law of civil assault.4 The case law 
and the Restatement 2d Torts clearly recognize a cause of action 
for the right to be free of the apprehension of offensive bodily 
contact. 
Defendants have also raised the affirmative defense of 
consent, arguing that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for 
assault because none of them objected to the search, and all of 
them voluntarily permitted themselves to be searched. The 
Plaintiffs have specifically disputed this assertion, contending 
that they did not consent, but rather that they were coerced into 
submission. The issue of consent is, except in extraordinary 
cases, an issue for the jury to decide. In this case, the basic 
facts may be interpreted in more than one way. A jury might find 
that because none of the Plaintiffs objected they therefore 
consented—the doctrine of implied consent. However, this same 
doctrine requires the trier of fact to determine whether the 
conduct of the Plaintiffs in this case may reasonably be 
understood as consent. Restatement 2d Torts S892 Furthermore, 
the trier of fact will also be require to determine whether that 
implied consent was given under duress. According to §892B of 
4
 See, for contrary definitions: ; see also, 
the Restatement, "duress is constraint of another's willby which 
he is compelled to give consent when he is not in reality willing 
to do so." In determining the existence of duress, the 
Restatement requires that the age, sex, mental capacity, relation 
of the parties and any antecedent circumstances be considered. 
Therefore, it would be quite reasonable for a jury to find that, 
given the power of Defendant Esquivel to fire the Plaintiffs at 
will, given their limited job skills and the limited alternative 
jobs available to them, given Esquivel's previous implicit 
threats against any who might be illegal aliens, and given 
Esquivel's explicit statement that whoever did object was 
presumably the thief, (Mazariego Affidavit)5 no reasonable person 
could interpret the Plaintiffs7 submission to be searched as an 
express or implied consent sufficient to priviledge the 
Defendants' actions. Because the facts are susceptible of more 
than one interpretation, the issue of consent must, by consistent 
court rulings, be determined by the jury. Because consent is an 
absolute defense to all of the causes of action alleged in this 
complaint, this discussion is applicable to each of the remaining 
causes of action. 
This is also in her deposition, as properly translated. 
Battery. The elements of a civil cause of action for 
battery applicable to this case6 are the intentional infliction 
of a harmful or offensive contact to the person of another.7 
These elements have been alleged in at least two of the searches. 
The physical search of Rosa Mazariegos was full of offensive 
contacts, from the hands run around her midrif to the pencil that 
was used to poke through her hair.(Mazariegos Deposition, 
Affidavit). Given, as has already been shown, that Esquivel 
clearly intended, at a minimum, an illegal and presumably 
offensive contact, all of the elements of a Battery are present. 
This is also true in the case of Mr. Semiday, where the 
individual conducting the search removed Mr. Semiday's shoes and 
socks, although the element of offensive touching is not as 
pervasive as it is in the case of Ms. Mazariegos.(Semiday 
Deposition, p. 41) 
As discussed above, consent is an absolute defense to a 
claim for battery, and thus the issue of whether Plaintiffs 
6
 In order to simplify the issues, I have deliberately 
avoided the complicated phrasing of the hornbooks, intended to 
include cases of transferred intent or intent merely to cause 
apprehension, but not actual harm. It does not appear to me that 
these additional elements contribute anything to the present 
discussion, therefore I have avoided them were possible. 
7
 See, for example, Restatement 2d. Torts §18; Handbook on 
the Law of Torts 5th Ed., William Prosser and Paige Keeton, West 
Publishing Co. 1988, pp. 39, §9. 
consented to the battery or were coerced is an issue of fact for 
the jury. 
False Imprisonment. The applicable elements of the tort of 
False Imprisonment are an action/ intended to confine another 
within boundaries fixed by the actor, a resulting confinement/ 
and a conscious awareness of the confinement. Restatement 2d, 
Tortsr §35. A confinement results, according to the Restatement, 
where there is no reasonable means of escape. Id. §3 6. According 
to the Restatement, it is unreasonable for someone to refuse to 
utilize a means of escape of which he is himself aware where it 
only entails a slight inconvenience or the minor risk of nominal 
liability. However, escape is not required, even where the means 
exist, "if the circumstances are such as to make if offensive to 
a reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity."Jd. In the 
first place, in this case, any individual worker who sought to 
escape would have had to walk a distance of some thirty feet from 
the cafeteria area to the door. Given the distance, it was 
impossible to tell whether the door had been locked, and whether 
escape was a real, or merely illusory possibility. Furthermore, 
escape or attempted escape in the circumstances of this case 
would, in all probability, have entailed a loss of employment, 
defamation, and possibly deportation, given Defendant Esquivel's 
previous threats. Granted, under Utah law, the individual would 
have had a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy. The question presented by this remedy, 
however, is the question of whether the individual falsly 
imprisoned under these circumstances is required to object and 
suffer the consequences before being able to obtain redress. Is 
it reasonable to require that this means of escape be utilized 
before a, cause of action may be stated? Or is it more reasonable 
to determine that the Plaintiffs were effectively confined to the 
cafeteria area by Mr. Esquivel's combined threats and behavior, 
and that no reasonable means of escape existed? Because 
reasonable men could differ on this question, and because the 
parties to this case do differ on this issue, this is another 
issue that must be determined by the trier of fact. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. This is, 
according to the Restatement, a comparatively new tort action. 
However, it is one that the Utah courts have expressly 
recognized.9 The elements of this cause of action have been 
8
 See, for example, Berube v. Fasion Place Mall, where it 
was held that forcing an employee to consent to a polygraph might 
raise such a cause of action. 
9
 See, for example, Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 
1238, (Utah App. 1989) Utah Court of Appeals held that evidence 
was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether 
Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; Pentecost v. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), In 
reversing the lower court's grant of Summary Judgment to the 
defendant, the Utah Supreme Court held that material issues of 
fact existed as to whether a the self help actions of a 
landlord's agent raised a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court as the intentional causing of 
severe emotional distress through extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Pentecost, supra note 6, at 700. This definition was set forth 
in a case with facts quite analogous to those of the instant 
case. In Pentecost, a landlord's agent resorted to self help, 
rather than legal process, in evicting the Plaintiff and her 
children and seizing their personal belongings, allegedly as 
compensation for non-payment of rent. As in the present case, 
the agent's self-help remedies were illegal. The Plaintiff also 
alleged that the actions taken by the agent were intentional and 
malicious. While the Plaintiffs in the present case have not 
specifically alleged that Mr. Esquivel's actions were malicious, 
the facts they have alleged, including a demonstrated pattern of 
hiring almost exclusively hispanic individuals with limited 
English capability, (arguably a substantially more vulnerable 
population than the average white anglo-saxon); the ongoing 
verbal harrassment and accusations; the complete lack of probable 
cause for the search; and the complete lack of probability that 
the search would do anything except offend and demoralize a 
vulnerable population, could well support a finding of 
deliberate, malicious intent to debase and demean the Plaintiffs 
and the other workers. Because reasonable men could differ on 
the outrageousness of the Defendants' actions, in compelling 
nearly forty hispanic immigrant workers, legal and illegal, to 
submit to a fruitless and baseless search of their persons and 
property, this is yet another factual issue which must be 
determined by a jury. 
Invasion of Privacy. The causes of action alleged by the 
Plaintiffs all involve the specific area of privacy labelled 
intrusion into private affairs. The Restatement 2d Torts §652B 
defines the specific elements of the tort of Intrusion upon 
Seclusion as the intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
or concerns, where the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. In this case, the Plaintiffs have alleged 
that Defendants' search of their coats, bags, wallets, purses, 
and lunch sacks were all invasive intrusions in their personal 
belongings—belongings wherein the Plaintiffs had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. A search of an individual's wallet is, 
in fact, one of the specific examples cited in this section of 
the Restatement. The search of an individual's purse, coat 
pockets, pants pockets, and lunch sack are parallel invasions of 
personal items and personal privacy. Again, a jury might find 
that the Plaintiffs' alleged consent will bar recovery on this 
cause of action. On the other hand, a jury might also find that 
the broad based, coercive nature of the search, without 
reasonable cause, raises the level of offensiveness of the 
invasion and would permit a recovery on this cause of action. 
The invasion of physical privacy occasioned by the illegal 
search, -and the invasion of the psychological privacy of Mr, 
Semiday when he was required to show his temple recommend, are 
equally offensive invasions of areas of restricted personal 
interest. It is also important, in determining the offensiveness 
of this request, to note that the fact that an LDS church member 
does or does not have a temple recommend is indicative of even 
more personal, intensely private facts, than the simple question 
may indicate* An answer to that question provides an employer 
with information regarding sexual habits, smoking and drinking 
habits, the individual's financial affairs, and involvement with 
the LDS Church. A reasonable person may consider any or all of 
this question deeply private and personal. More than one court 
has specifically held that the invasion of privacy claim is 
specifically a claim for injury to emotions and mental suffering. 
See, for example, Froelick v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993, 
995. For more specific details regarding these violations, and 
the express issues of public policy that prohibit such 
violations, .see Privacy in the Workplace, supra, n.l, pp.64-66, 
and 83. This volume also has an entire chapter devoted to the 
legality of workplace searches of employee's persons and 
property. The authors reach the conclusion, at the end of this 
chapter, that "the legality of a search hinges essentially on the 
manner, scope, justification and location of it. Searches of 
people attract greater judicial scrutiny than inspections of 
places, gven the higher level of intrusiveness involved. . . . 
the central issue usually boils down to whether the employee had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in question." Id. 
p.169. Again, it is the Plaintiffs7 position that they had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their wallets, their 
purses, the pockets of their clothing, and the personal 
possessions, including lunch bags, which they brought to work. 
The search in this case is not comparable to a locker or desk 
search. The Plaintiffs were told that they were going to be 
physically searched, along with their belongings. Although the 
level of actual intrusion then depended upon the supervisor doing 
the searching, the fact that some were forced to submit to more 
invasive searches does not obviate the fact that the privacy 
interests of each Plaintiff, in his or her person and property, 
were invaded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts 
must be denied. For each cause of action, there are facts in 
evidence at this time that would support differing perspectives 
on whether the Plaintiffs7 protected interests, in freedom from 
apprehension of an offensive touching, freedom from an offensive 
touching, freedom from false imprisonment and wrongful detention 
and freedom from invasions of privacy, had been violated. 
Plaintiffs have attached, as stated previously, the reports of 
two psychologists. One report deals specifically with the harm 
caused to the Plaintiffs in this case, the other report deals 
with the nature of the psychological damages, and how they are 
comparable to the psychological damages caused by sexual 
harrassment and other forms of abusive conduct. These reports, 
coupled with the Affidavits and the unchallenged portions of the 
depositions, as well as the Affidavits of the Plaintiffs' family 
members, give substantial support to the Plaintiffs' contention 
that they each suffered psychological distress, depression, 
embarrassment and humiliation due to the forced search. These 
affidavits also support a finding that Ms. Mazariegos suffered 
severe psychological distress, sufficient to upset her menstrual 
cycle, causing continual bleeding, and cause severe migraine 
headaches. For all of the above reasons, therefore, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that this court deny Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
DATED this day of March, 1995. 
MARTI L. JONES 
ATTORNEY TOR PLAINTIFFS 
APPENDIX A 
CONFIDENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF JOSE 
HUMBERTO BARDALES; ROSA D. MAZARIEGOS; ANGEL 
M. SANTIAGO AND WALTER SEMIDAY. EVALUATION 
DONE BY JUAN A. MEJIA, PH.D. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA GUMMOW, PH.D. 
jaan A, Mejia, Ph.L. 
Licensed Clinical Psychologist 136 East South Temple, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1121 
(801)328-4500 
FAX (801) 328-4565 
CONFIDENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL. EVALUATION 
Clients: Jose Humberto Barcales 
Rosa D. Mazanegos 
Angel M. Santiago 
Walter Semidey 
Dates of evaluation: February 18 & 19, 1S95 
Date of report: March 10, 1995 
Evaluator: Juan A. Mejia, Ph.D. 
Referred by: Marti L. Jones, Attorney 
Method of evaluation: CIinicallnterviews; MinnesotaMultiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI); Incomplete 
Sentences Blank; and Projective Drawings. 
Mr. Bardales, Ms. Mazariegos, Mr. Santiago, and Mr. Semidey 
were referred by their attorney, Ms. Jones, for a psychological 
evaluation in connection to their lawsuit against DOT Adventures 
Inc., being heard at the Fourth Judicial District Court by Judge 
Boyd L. Park. Specifically, Ms. Jones was interested in an 
assessment of emotional damage to the plaintiffs, if any, in 
connection to events in this case. Available in preparing this 
report were affidavits by all four plaintiffs in this case as well 
as affidavits by some of their family members. 
The first time I saw the plaintiffs, on February 18, 1995, I 
explained to Mr. Bardales, Ms. Mazariegos, Mr. Santiago, and Mr, 
Semidey the nature and purpose of the evaluation I was conducting 
of them. I further explained that I would be rendering my opinions 
in a report that would be sent to their attorney, Ms. Jones, but 
that the judge and aefendants in their case would have likely 
access to this report. As such, I explainea that the information 
that they discussed with me was not confidential. They all 
appeared to understand these principles of confidentiality, and we 
proceeded with the evaluation. 
Since Spanish is the primary language for all four plaintiffs, 
all testing and interviewing was conducted in Spanish. Although 
they came together, they were interviewed anc tested individually. 
The four plaintiffs worked at DOT Adventures Inc. According 
to the information they provided in this evaluation and in their 
affidavits, they were subjected to frequent talks by the manager, 
Mr. Esquivel, in which he made insulting comments to the workers, 
calling them "thieves" and "lazy," and talking about their paying 
tithing to the LDS Church. A major event occurred in December 1992 
reoortedly when somebody lost a 20 dollar bill, and Mr. Esquivel 
had everybody searched after allegedly letting non-Hispanic workers 
go. Also, the three male plaintiffs were involved in an incident 
a few days later in which they complained about being shortchanged 
in their paychecks for overtime pay that they had accrued, but was 
not included in their paychecks. Mr. Esquivel reportedly was very 
upset about their demands, but paid them as he reportedly had 
originally offered. 
JOSE HUMBERTO BAPDALES 
Mr. Bardales is a 26 year, 4 month old married Hispanic male. 
He is a polite young man who came nicely dressed. He wears his 
hair very short, as if he had shaved his head recently. He looks 
younger than his chronological age. 
Mr. Bardales was born on October 26, 1968, in Puerto Cortez, 
a small coastal town in Honduras. He is the second of 11 siblings. 
His parents divorcea when he was four. He was raised by his 
mother, who remarriea when he was 11. he described his father as 
'very quiet, gentle' and reported a good relationship with him, 
with frequent contact after the divorce. He described his mother 
as "very compassionate and helpful.' He reported a good 
relationship with his stepfather, whom he described as "a good 
man.' He reported good relationships with his siblings. 
Mr. Bardales graduated from high school in 1985 in Honduras. 
He described himself as a good student who typically obtained 
grades ranging from 85% to 95% in the grading system. After high 
school, he obtained a certificate in Electricity and Mechanics from 
a technical institute in Honduras. 
Mr. Bardales is currently attending English as a Second 
Language classes which he said are helpful. He reported adequate 
English language skills, with better receptive abilities than 
expressive abi1lties. 
At 19, Mr. Bardales served an LDS mission in Tegucigalpa which 
he regarded as a good experience. At 22, he married a 21 year old 
woman. They have a three year old daughter. They emigrated to the 
United States in 1991. 
Besides his work at DOTS, Mr. Bardales has worked at a 
lumberyard, Deseret Industries, and a frozen food production 
facility. He described himself as a very good worker. 
Mr. Bardales reported being in good health. He denied ever 
using alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Mr. Bardales reported always having had "a positive attitude" 
towards life. He has "many" friends whom he sees frequently. 
However, most of his time is spent at home, with his family. 
Mr. Bardales indicated that he was humiliated by the frequent 
talks. He was especially humiliated when he was searched for the 
20 dollar bill. He said that the male supervisor who searched him 
checked his billfold and the pockets in his clothing and coat. 
He complained about being shortchanged in pay some days later. 
He is convinced that he was then terminated because he complained. 
Mr. Bardales indicated that the emotional trauma that he 
experienced at that time was exacerbated because it happened around 
Christmas. He said that at the time he was very nervous, depressed, 
irritable, and suspicious of others. He said that he continues to 
have some suspiciousness of others, especially in the workplace. 
He said that he "forced himself" to overcome his negative.feelings 
because he felt that they were impacting his relationship with his 
wife and young daughter. The affidavit from his wife corroborated 
his report of depressive and anxiety symptomatology. From their 
descriptions, it appeared that he was acutely depressed and anxious 
for about three months after this incident. 
ROSA D. MAZARIEGOS 
Ms. Mazariegos is a 51 year, 4 month old divorced Hispanic 
female. She appeared very upset about the circumstances around 
this case, often talking about them as if they had just occurred. 
She also came across as a person with strong religious beliefs; she 
often mentioned the LDS Church as a source of emotional support. 
Ms. Mazariegos was born on November 12, 1943, in Ciudad del 
Anima, Honduras. She is the third of five siblings. Her father 
was a security guard, and her mother was a housewife. She 
described her father as "a very patient gentleman, without vices," 
and her mother as "very religious, a beautiful mother." She 
reported good relationships among family memoers. 
Ms. Mazariegos completed six years of formal education in 
Honduras, reportedly two years short of the requirements for a high 
school diploma in Honduras. She described herself as a good 
student. She said that she had to discontinue her education due 
to poverty. In Honduras, secondary education is not free and her 
parents were unable to pay her tuition. 
Ms. Mazariegos reported minimal Englisn language skills. She 
has recently began attending English as a Second Language classes. 
She reported minimal English language skills. 
At 19, Ms. Mazariegos married a 19 year old man. They have 
five children who are now 32, 28, 26, 19, and 18. They separated 
after 15 years because of his drinking. She obtained a divorce 
one year ago. She said that she never remarried because she did 
not want her daughters to grow up with a stepfather. 
In 1986, Ms. Mazariegos came to this country with her two 
youngest daughters; her eldest daughter already lived here. Since 
then, her sisters have joined her in this country. Currently, she 
is living with two of her sisters and her youngest daughter. She 
said her goals in life are to "find her companion to be sealed in 
the Temple" and "to go preach the Gospel;" she expects to achieve 
these goals after her youngest daughter marries. 
Besides her work at DOTS, Ms. Mazariegos has worked in the 
fields, caring for children, at Deseret Industries, and as a 
seamstress. She described herself as a good worker. 
Ms. Mazariegos reoorted being in good hea^t.n. She deniea ever 
using alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Ms. Mazariegos said that she is hacpy wit.n her life, -in spite 
of the stress involved in having to raise her daughters on her own. 
She reported occasional sleep disturbance due to her concern over 
her daughters' welfare. She has four good friends whom she sees 
weekly. Her leisure activities include reading and dancing. 
Ms. Mazariegos was traumatized not only oy the events that 
the other plaintiffs related, but also because she reportedly was 
forced to clean dog droppings from a carpet at an office. She said 
that Mr. Esquivel brought a dog to work, and made a different 
Hispanic female worker clean after the dog relieved himself en the 
carpet and also wash the dog. She is convinced that he was well 
aware that these requests were humiliating to the women. 
When Ms. Mazariegos was searched for the 20 dollar bill, the 
female supervisor reportedly made her undo her pants and bra, pull 
her blouse out of her pants, take off her shoes and socks, ana roll 
up her pants above her knees. After feeling various parts of her 
body, the supervisor ran a pencil through Ms. Mazariegos' hair. 
Ms. Mazariegos said that she was devastated by this experience. 
She reported post traumatic stress-like symptomatology immediately 
after the search, including stress induced menstrual flow, sleep 
disturbance, and appetite disturbance. A few days later, when she 
went to talk to Mr. Esquivel about what had happened, "as a fellow 
Mormon," she reportedly was fired from the job. Ms. Mazariegos 
said that she knew Mr. Esquivel previous to working at the stamp 
factory because they had attended the same LDS chapel. Thus, in 
addition to the reported emotional trauma inflicted by Mr. Esquivel 
through his harangues and the search, she was further distressed 
and disappointed because it was being perpetrated by someone who 
shares her LDS faith. 
From Ms, Mazariegos* report as well as from the reports 
contained in her sisters' affidavits, Ms. Mazariegos was quite 
depressed and anxious while working at the stamp factory. Also, 
she appeared to continue to exhibit depressive and anxiety 
symptomatology for about three months after these events. 
ANGEL M. SANTIAGO 
Mr. Santiago is a 42 year old Hispanic male. He came casually 
dressed. He came across as being characteristically reserved, 
although he appeared to be very open in this evaluation. 
Mr. Santiago was born on February 14, 1953, in Ponce, an urban 
center in Puerto Rico. He is the third of seven siblings. He 
described his father as "a very passive man, to the point that my 
mother lost her patience with him often." He described his mother 
as a "hard working, strict" woman. He reported good relationships 
among family members. 
Mr. Santiago completed nign scnool ir Puerto Pico. He 
described himself as a good st,uden^, with grades from A to C. 
After high school, he received train-ng as a clumber. 
Mr. Santiago reported little c^al English language abilities 
and no written English language SKI lis. He has received some 
English as a Second Language instruction, but with limited benefit. 
At 25, Mr. Santiago married an "8 year old woman. They have 
three children who are now 14, 13, and 10. They divorced after 13 
years of marriage. After the di/orce, he decided to come to the 
U. S. mainland looking for 'sometmng different, a change;' his 
two sons came with him, and his daugr.rer remained with his ex-wife. 
At 40, he married a 23 year old Caucasian American woman. This 
marriage lasted only six montns. According to him, his second wife 
was unable to get along with his children and insisted that he send 
them to Puerto Rico; he opted for a di/orce. He is currently seeing 
a woman in her 30s, with whom ne recorted a good relationship. 
In Puerto Rico, ne worked as a plumoer, but he has quit this 
occupation because he found out tha*^  he did not like to do it. In 
Utah, besides the work at DOTS, he nas worked as a machine operator 
and as a janitor. Mr. Santiago described himself as a good worker. 
Mr. Santiago reported being ir good health. He denied ever 
using alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Mr. Santiago said that he is hapoy with his life, in spite of 
the stress involved in raising his LWO sons as a single father. 
He reported occasional sleep disturbance, due to his concern over 
his children. He said that he has "many" friends, whcm ne sees 
frequently, but most of his time is spent with his children. 
When he was searched, the male supervisor made him empty his 
pockets and checked his billfold. Mr. Santiago was extremely upset 
about this search, saying that it caused him sleep disturbance, and 
feelings of insecurity and helplessness. He felt "trapped' because 
he was unsure if he could get another job. He was angry because 
he felt that what Mr. Esquivel had done was illegal and insulting. 
Mr. Santiago said that there was talk at DOTS about a few 
workers who were particularly upset aoout the search, including the 
three male plaintiffs. When he was among one of the workers who, 
a few days later, complained about being shortchanged in their pay, 
he was promptly terminated. He said that at the time that he was 
terminated, he was told by his supervisor that he was "rebellious." 
Mr. Santiago reported depressive and anxiety symptomatology for 
some months after these events. 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
Mr. Semidey is a 43 year old Hispanic male. He is a visibly 
overweight man who came casually dressed. He appeared to be 
assertive and at times he sooke for the group. 
Mr. Semidey was born on March 2, 1953, in Coamo, a small town 
in Puerto Rico, but grew up in Ponce, an urban center in Puerto 
Rico. He is the youngest of two siblings. He reported an 
uneventful childhood with good relationships among fami 1y•members. 
Mr. Semidey graduated from high school in 1971 in Puerto Rico. 
He described himself as a good student, who typically obtained 
grades of B and C. After high school, he completed one year of an 
electronic training program, but discontinued it due to financial 
difficulties. 
Mr. Semidey received English as a Second Language instruction 
when he first arrived in the U. S. mainland, but discontinued it 
once he obtained a job. He reported limited expressive skills, but 
better receptive English language skills. 
At 23, Mr. Semidey married a 20 year old woman. They have 
three children who are now 18, 17, and 15. He reported very good 
relationships with his wife and children. He came to the U. S. 
mainland with his family in 1991, seeking better opportunities. 
Besides his work at DOTS, Mr. Semidey has worked as a 
maintenance worker, dishwasher, and assembly worker. He is 
interested in carpentry. He described himself as a good worker. 
Mr. Semidey reported asthma since childhood, for which he uses 
inhalers. He reported sleep apnea; he sleeps with a machine which 
ensures that his brain will receive enough oxygen. 
Mr. Semidey reported a past pattern of alcohol abuse. He quit 
drinking in August, 1986, when he converted to the LDS faith. 
Mr. Semidey reported a history of past acute depressive 
episodes. One episode occurred in 1984 when his 57 year old mother 
and his 35 year old sister died from cancer the same year. His 
depression was so acute that it included psychotic-like symptoms. 
The other episode was about five years ago, when he lost a job, 
causing considerably difficult financial circumstances for him and 
his family. At that time, his depression was so acute that it 
included suicide-like ideation. At the time of this evaluation, 
he was under significant emotional stress due to the recent loss 
of his job; his wife, who worked at the same place, also lost her 
job. He is convinced that their terminations were unfairly based 
on discrimination. He has "three or four" friends, whom he sees 
frequently, but he said that most of his time is spent with his 
wife and children. 
In talking about the events regarding the 20 dollar bill 
search, Mr. Semidey was so upset that he talked about these events 
as if they had occurred a few days ago. During the search itself, 
Mr. Semidey said that the supervisor made him take his socks and 
shoes off. He said that he was furious that he was "treated like 
a thief without being one." He asked the supervisor who was 
searching him how the stolen 20 dollar bill could be differentiated 
from other 20 dollar bills. When his wallet was searched, there 
was a 20 dollar bill there, cut, nothing was said to him. Mr. 
Semidey said that re was emotionally devastated immediately 
following the search. He resorted depressive and. anxiety 
symptomatology for several months following these events, including 
irritability with his wife and children. His wife's affidavit 
corroborated that he was irritable and depressed, with symptoms of 
anhedonia, immediately following these events. 
Mr. Semidey was also among the workers who complained about 
being shortchanged in their pay a few days later. The supervisors 
acknowledged that the workers were underpaid, and they paid out the 
appropriate amount following the complaints. Mr. Semidey believes 
that he was fired because of this complaint. His firing occurred 
a few days after these events, around Christmas, which made it even 
more traumatic for him. He said that they told him that he was let 
go because there was no work, but he said that he worked at a 
department where there had never been any shortage of work in the 
previous nine months. He believes that he was identified as one 
of a group of workers who were particularly upset about the search 
and being underpaid, and that his firing was in retaliation for it. 
RESULTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 
A. Intellectual functioning 
There is no standardized test of intelligence in English or 
Spanish with a normative population that adequately represents 
these four plaintiffs' backgrounds and could thus be used validly 
with them. In all of their cases, their intelligence is estimated 
to be in the Average range, wi~h an estimated IQ of at least 100. 
In all of their cases, their verbal and written performance during 
this evaluation as well as their reported schoci history are 
consistent with this level of estimated intelligence. 
B. Personality functioning 
Each one of the plaintiffs was administered the Spanish 
language versions of the MMPI and the Rotter's Incomplete Sentences 
Blank. Each one also completed the Man/Woman/House/Tree Projective 
Drawi ngs. 
JOSE HUMBERTO BARDALE3 
Mr. Bardales' obtained MMFI validity profile indicated that 
he presented a technically questionable set of responses. Given 
that his cultural background as a Honduran is significantly 
different to the background of the MMPI normative population, this 
obtained questionable validity is not unexpected. As it is often 
seen in the MMPIs of Hispanic clients, the noted tendency was 
toward minimization of psychcpathology. 
In spite of his minimization, his obtained MMPI clinical 
profile was still able to detect clinical problems, most likely 
depression and anxiety. There is nothing of clinical significance 
previous to the traumatic events at DOTS that would predispose them 
to clinical depression and anxiety. One interpretation of his 
obtained MMPI clinical profile is that he was acutely depressed and 
anxious at the time cf the search, which has left him vulnerable 
to depression and anxiety at this time. 
His responses to the Incomplete Sentences Blank reflected: 
strong family orientation; strong religious beliefs; and 
positivistic attitude. His Projective Drawings reflected 
extroversion. 
ROSA D. MAZARIEGOS 
Ms. Mazariegos' MMPI validity profile indicated that she 
presented a technically questionable set of responses. Given that 
her cultural background as a Honduran is significantly different 
to the background of the MMPI normative population, this obtained 
questionable validity is not unexpected. As it is often seen in 
the MMPIs of Hispanic clients, the noted tendency was toward 
minimization of psychopathology. 
Her obtained MMPI clinical profile was within normal limits, 
with no indication of psychopathology. This obtained orofile could 
be due to her tendency toward minimization. 
Her responses to the Incomplete Sentences Blank reflected: 
strong family orientation; strong religious beliefs; desire to meet 
a marriage mate; ruminations about injustice; and self perception 
as honest. Her Projective Drawings reflected attention to detail. 
ANGEL M. SANTIAGO 
Mr. Santiago's obtained MMPI validity profile indicated that 
he presented a valid set of responses. His obtained MMPI clinical 
profile was within normal limits, with no indication of 
psychopathology. 
His responses to the Incomplete Sentences Blank reflected: 
strong family orientation; strong religious beliefs; perception of 
being discriminated against due to being Hispanic; and self 
perception as being a bit shy. His Projective Drawings reflected 
positive thoughts about his girlfriend. 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
Mr. Semidey's obtained MMPI validity profile indicated that 
he presented a valid set of responses. His obtained MMPI clinical 
profile indicated the presence of significant emotional problems, 
most likely in the context of clinical depression. Given that Mr. 
Semidey had just lost his job at the time of this evaluation, the 
presence of clinical depression is not unexpected. Also, his 
obtained MMPI clinical profile is consistent with his reported 
previous history of acute depressive episodes, most likely 
exacerbated by the traumatic events at DOTS. In ct^er words, he 
was likely to be vulnerable to depression previous to the events 
at DOTS, but the considerable emotional trauma that, r,a reportedly 
suffered there has made him even more vulnerable tc depression. 
He appears to be currently clinically depressed. 
His responses to the Incomplete Sentences Blank reflected: 
strong family orientation; a positivistic attitude toward life; and 
self perception as unpretentious and friendly. His Projective 
Drawings reflected extroversion. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There is no question in my mind that all *cur plaintiffs 
suffered significant emotional trauma at the time c- the events at 
DOTS. To varying degrees, they all reported symptoms consistent 
with depression and anxiety, in a pattern similar tc cost traumatic 
stress disorder, for about three months following these events. 
The etiology of their depression and anxiety symptomatology appears 
to be in the humiliation and harassment as a result c~ the frequent 
talks by the manager, the search, and the plaintiffs' terminations. 
In each case, there were different idiosyncratic -actors which 
exacerbated the emotional damage. 
It should be noted that there was no evidence of past or 
current symptom exaggeration in my interviews with the plaintiffs 
nor in the results of standardized psychological testing produced 
by them. To varying degrees, they all attempted to portray 
themselves as free of psychcoathology at this time, out as having 
been emotionally damaged at the time of the events at DOTS. Their 
stories, as reflected in their current interviews and past 
affidavits, were generally consistent with each ctrer and devoid 
of any apparent inappropriate magnification of symctoms. 
Mr. Bardales appears to have become vulneraole to ongoing 
depression and anxiety following the events at DOTS. He appears 
to try very hard to have the most positivistic attitude toward life 
as possible. To some degree, he is happy with his life because of 
his strong ties to his family and his church, but he currently has 
minimized signs of depression and anxiety. 
Ms. Mazariegos reported the most tangible indicators of 
emotional trauma. Besides the events connected to trie search, she 
reportedly was made to clean a carpet where a dcg had relieved 
himself. This experience appeared to be very humiliating and 
upsetting to her. During the search, she appears to have been 
subjected to the worst humiliation of all the plaintiffs given the 
more intensive manhandling that she had to endure. The symptoms 
that she reported experiencing immediately after the search are 
also indicative of a more prominent manifestation of emotional 
damage. A significant factor in magnifying the emotional damage 
to her has to do with her very strong identification as an LDS 
believer. She was very disappointed by Mr. Esquive^, whom she had 
initially trusted as someone who strongly shared her LDS beliefs. 
Mr. Santiago came across as the most emotionally reserved of 
all the plaintiffs. His style appears to be to "suffer in silence," 
with apparent helplessness. Still, he also reported signs of 
significant depression and anxiety symptomatology at the time of 
the events at DOTS. He seems to have been left with ongoing 
feelings that he is likely to be discriminated on the job as a 
Hispanic. 
Mr, Semidey was particularly emotionally vulnerable to being 
traumatized by the events at DOTS because of previous depressive 
episodes, including one involving a previous loss of a job. 
Indeed, he came across as having been significantly emotionally 
damaged at the time of the events at DOTS, with reports of very 
prominent manifestations of depression and frustration. Further, 
he apparently has been become even more emotionally vulnerable 
following the events at DOTS. At the time of this evaluation, he 
was clinically depressed apparently as a result of his recent loss 
of a job, with the exacerbating perception that he was terminated 
due to discrimination. 
JuaniA. Mejia, Ph.D. 
Licensed \Psychologist #403 
Conger A Gummow 
247 £. 2100 S. 
Salt Lako City, UT 84115 
Affadavit of Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
1. I am over the ago of 21, and I am competent to testify as to ail matters set 
forth herein from my professional knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. I am a psychologist, and I am certified by the State of Utah to conduct 
Competency and Guilty and Mentally I!)/ Diminished Capacity evaluations for the 
State of Utah. In this capacity, I have evaluated many Hispanic defendants. In 
my private practice in Salt Lake City, Utah, I have evaluated Hispanic patients 
who were referred by physicians, Workers Compensation, and Vocational 
Rehabilitation. I am familiar with the psychological literature on the Hispanic 
population in the United States. 
3. On March 13,1995,1 examined the following materials at the request of M. 
Jones: Psychological Evaluation of Jose Humberto Bardales, Rosa D. 
Mazariegos, Angel M. Santiago, and Walter Semidey done by Juan A. Mejla, 
Ph.D. and dated March 10,1995; English translation of statements of the above 
named individuals. 
4. Based upon my training and experience and the evaluations and statements 
of the plaintiffs, it is my opinion that the plaintiffs suffered significant emotional 
injury at their place of employment, DOT Adventures. The plaintiffs were 
exposed to continual verDal harassment and threats that culminated in a search 
of ail Hispanic workers while non Hispanic workers were allowed to go home. 
The female plaintiff was subjected to an extensive body search as well as having 
been asked to do non job related tasks for her supervisor that she considered to 
be humiliating. All of the workers were fired when they complained of their 
treatment and the lack of payment of over time wages. 
5. Based upon my training and experience, the Hispanic workers found 
themselves in a situation in which they felt they had to recourse other than 
submit to a personal search that they felt to be both wrong and degrading. All 
felt that they would lose needed employment if they pretested or that they would 
be thought to be thieves. It is well known In the professional literature of my field 
that placing an individual in a situation with inescapable punishment causes 
severe reactions. Psychologically, the person shows irritability, depression, anrt 
anxiety. Behavior away from the work site is affected. If the stress Is prolonged 
and severe, as it was In this case, physical manifestations can occur (pain, 
menstrual dysfunction, exacerbation of illness, etc.) 
6. The symptoms of these individuals would be classified as Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, Acute DSM-IV 309.81. 
7. Cultural factors related to the Hispanic heritage make it more difficult for 
Hispanic workers to deal with harassment First, ''Hispanic cultural values 
encourage positive interpersonal relationships and discourage negative 
competitive, and assertive ;nteractions~ what we have called the "simpatica" 
script" (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky & Betancourt, 1984 in Geisinger book). 
Second, the newer Hispanic citizen, as are these plaintiffs, are more likely to 
remain isolated from the host culture and to retain the values of the mother 
culture. Third, Hispanic, particularly recently immigrated Hispanics, find it more 
difficult to deal with the psychological aspects of both work related and illness 
related stress. These workers tend to experience psychological stress as 
physical symptoms (as did these plaintiffs). See DuAiba and Scott (1993). 
Fourth, due to limited acculturation to the host culture, many Hispanics do not 
identify with the host culture and do net know how to avail themselves of 
services or protections (Marks, et al., 1987). This iimited knowledge of their 
rights was a theme repeated by all plaintiffs. Fifth, individuals who believe in 
their own efficacy or ability to change their situation, do better at coping with a 
variety of situations including illness. The sense that events are outside of one's 
control Is more common among the Hispanic worker, particularly the Hispanic 
worker of low socioeconomic status (Ell and Haywood, 1985). 
8. Because many Hispanic workers have poor self-efficacy and poor knowledge 
of resources and options, emotional injury among Hispanic workers is more 
common among Hispanic workers, and employers of Hispanic workers have a 
responsibility to be sensitive to the acculturation needs of these individuals 
(DuAiba and Scctt, 1993) 
9. I have been informed that the plaintiffs are attempting to file a civil complaint 
in fourth district court against their former employer in which damages are 
claimed for the injuries associated with their former employment. 
10. The opinions expressed herein are stated to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability within the field of my expertise. 
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compensation applicants: A cross-cultural MMPI study .I Clinical Psychology 
49,913-917. 
Ell, KO., Haywood, L J. (1985). Sociocultural factors in Ml recovery: An 
exploratory study. International Journal of Psychiatry In Medicine. 1£,157-175. 
Geisinger, K.F. (1992). Psychological Testing of Hisoanics. American 
Psychological Association Prass: Washington, D.C. 
12. Further affiant sayeth not. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 1995. 
Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. this 13th day of 
March, 1995. 
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APPENDIX B 
WITNESS LIST 
WITNESSES 
At this time, Plaintiffs may call any or all of the 
individuals who have submitted reports and/or affidavits in this 
case. Thus witnesses may include each of the four Plaintiffs; 
Expert Witnesses Juan Mejia and Linda Gummow; relatives of the 
Plaintiffs such as Pastora and Matilda Mazariegos, Diana Semiday, 
and Maira Bardales. In each case the affidavits and/or reports 
that have already been submitted contain the basic testimony of 
the witness. In addition, Plaintiffs plan to call as additional 
witnesses Rocio Escobar and Jorge Sanchez. These two individuals 
are Mexican nationals, who worked at the DOTS factory around the 
time of this incident. 
Rocio Escobar will testify that she was subjected to a 
physical battery of her person, similar if not identical to the 
battery experienced by Plaintiff Mazariegos. 
Jorge Sanchez will testify that on at least one occasion he 
attempted to discuss the problems caused by Defendant Esquivel's 
verbal abuse of the work force with the plant owner and DOTS 
president, Jeanette Lynton. 
Finally, Plaintiffs reserve the right to call as witnesses 
any other individuals employed at the DOTS factory during the 
time period between August 1992 and January 1993. At the present 
time the names and addresses of all members of this class of 
potential witnesses, with the exception of the named Defendants, 
are unknown. Once those names and addresses are discovered, and 
the individuals interviewed, where possible, Plaintiffs will 
supplement this discovery. 
APPENDIX C 
Copies of the Amended English Translations of 
the Affidavits originally submitted in 
support of Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZAREIGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON, et., al. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
(AMENDED) 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civ, No. 930400503 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COME the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of 
record, and hereby submit the following Second Objection to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Memorandum is filed in accordance with the Court's 
Order to provide proof of damages, argument in support of why 
Plaintiff's affidavits and those of the relatives should be 
allowed as evidence, given that their depositions have been 
taken, a list of additional proposed witnesses, with a synopsis 
of their proposed testimony, and any additional evidence and 
arguments as to why Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment 
should not be granted. The evidence of damages will be referred 
to in the body of this Memorandum, and will be attached in 
substantive right is rendered illusory. One way to remedy this 
problem would be to require a transcript of the Spanish 
testimony. That way, the Plaintiffs could review the transcript 
in a language in which they were literate. For obvious reasons, 
this solution is practically unworkable. To date, the courts 
have established no alternative solution to this problem. In 
this case the Plaintiffs' attorney was one of the few people with 
the bilingual abilities necessary to review the video taped 
records and make the necessary corrections to the English 
language transcript. Therefore, that review was done, in order 
to correct the transcript. On July 17, 1994 Plaintiffs' attorney 
filed lists of the requested corrections to each deposition, 
based on her understanding that such corrections in translation 
would be allowed. The Defendants objected to those corrections, 
on the basis that the Plaintiffs did not personally review the 
deposition transcripts and determine the errors for themselves. 
Defendants have, to date, made no claim that the corrections were 
inaccurate, merely that they were made by the attorney, not the 
deponent. Again, the rules of civil procedure require that the 
witness be allowed to correct the transcript. That right is, in 
the present case, illusory without some variation in the 
procedure. Therefore, so long as Defendants object to those 
corrections, Plaintiffs' will be forced to object to any use of 
the mistranslated portions of the transcripts. 
Plaintiffs are willing to stipulate to the accuracy of the 
depositions, if the corrections are accepted as indicated. 
Without those corrections, however, Plaintiffs will maintain 
their objections to the depositions. Even if the corrections are 
made as asked for, however, this Court should actively consider 
the affidavits Plaintiffs submitted in support of their Objection 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This is so because 
of the limited questioning regarding the facts and substantial 
confusion created on several occasions by the defense attorney's 
questions and the translation process. By analogy, the 
syntactically confused and mistranslated deposition testimony may 
be an accurate picture of what the cross-examination might look 
like, while the affidavits present a more accurate picture of 
what Plaintiffs' direct testimony will be. 
Therefore, because the depositions as transcribed are 
inaccurate and because they contain limited testimony regarding 
the actual issues of the case, Plaintiffs' Affidavits should be 
actively considered as supplemental testimony in determining 
whether or not to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Again, the only substantive legal basis for not accepting the 
Affidavits as evidence in support of Plaintiffs' claims would be 
a claim that the Affidavits materially contradict the deposition 
testimony. No such claim has been raised, and therefore the 
affidavits must be considered as evidentiary support for 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Issue II: Additional Considerations 
Plaintiffs have alleged nine specific causes of action in 
their complaint. Five of those causes of action are intentional 
torts. Three of the causes of action are for invasions of 
privacy. For each of these eight causes of action Plaintiffs 
have established a prima facie case, by their own testimony and 
that of others. In each case, that prima facie case presents 
issues of disputed material fact that can only be decided by a 
jury by a trial on the merits. 
Wrongful Detention. Plaintiffs' first cause of action is 
for Wrongful Detention. Wrongful detention is a civil cause of 
action, based on the crime of unlawful detention. The elements 
of wrongful detention are a knowing, unlawful, restraint of a 
person that interferes substantially with his liberty. 
Plaintiffs have stated, in their Verified Complaint, Depositions, 
and Affidavits, that the Defendant Miguelangel stated prior to 
beginning the search that what he was doing was illegal. (Semiday 
Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p. 23; Affidavits of 
Semiday and Bardales). That statement indicates knowledge of 
illegality, and presumably knowledge of the offensiveness of the 
act—given that society had declared it illegal, it may 
presumably be considered highly offensive to reasonable people. 
The fact that wrongful detention is also a crime provides the 
element of unlawfulness. Finally, Plaintiffs have also testified 
that they were compelled to remain in the cafeteria area of the 
plant where they worked until they submitted to entering a 
bathroom with a supervisor to be physically searched.(Bardales 
deposition, p.23; Affidavit of Mazariegos;). Until everyone in 
the plant had submitted they were not allowed to return to their 
normal work positions. Defendants have argued that this was not 
substantial interference with liberty because Plaintiffs could 
have walked out of the plant. However, wrongful detention does 
not require that there be no avenue of escape. In Orem City v. 
Fillmore. (Case # 93 10 0350), a Utah Fourth Circuit case 
involving the crime of Unlawful Detention, the Defendant 
prevented someone else from backing out of a parking space by 
intentionally placing his car behind the parked car. Even though 
the individual in the car was in no way prevented from getting 
out and walking away, the Defendant was convicted of this crime 
on June 7, 1993. 
The defense has also argued that one cannot create a civil 
cause of action from a crime. This is simply not true. Criminal 
law protects the interests of the society at large.1 As a 
1
 See, for example, Privacy in the Workplace, Jon D. Bible 
and Darien A. McWhirter, pp. 4-8 (Quorum Books, Westport Conn.) 
1990; The American Law of Torts, Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. 
Krause, and Alfred W. Gans. (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, New 
York) 1991, §26:3. 
result, the standard of proof in a criminal case is always higher 
than that of a civil case. However, criminal cases are brought 
on behalf of the state, not the individual, and the money damages 
available in a civil case are not available in criminal cases. 
Id. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the existence of a 
crime, particularly an intentional crime, presupposes a parallel 
civil cause of action for damages caused by the unlawful actions 
of the defendant(s). 
Assault. The elements of a prima facie case for civil 
assault are an act, made with the intention to inflict a harmful 
or offensive contact, that places another in apprehension of an 
immediate harmful or offensive contact. Restatement 2d. Torts 
S21. The interest that is protected by this cause of action is a 
purely mental interest, and requires no evidence of actual 
damages.2 The Plaintiffs in this case have testified that 
Defendant Esquivel, acting in his capacity as plant manager, 
required each of them to submit to a physical search.(Depositions 
and Affidavits of each Plaintiff). Esquivel stated that the 
search was illegal.(Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales 
Deposition, p. 23; Affidavits of Semiday and Bardales). The fact 
that he knew the search was illegal is prima facie evidence that 
he also knew it would cause offensive contact to the plaintiffs. 
2
 The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming 
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray. (Little, Brown & Co, Boston) 
1986. Interference with the person, § 3.4. 
Furthermore, Defendant Esquivel's intent may also be inferred 
from other circumstances of this case, such as the relationship 
between the harm he was allegedly preventing, i.e., the stolen 
twenty dollar bill, and the action he took to remedy the harm. A 
jury might well find on the facts of this case that Esquivel's 
primary intent was to give offense to the forty Hispanic members 
of his work force. For example, the fact that Esquivel 
apparently made no attempt to limit his questioning to 
individuals with some proximity or ability to take the twenty 
dollars, and the fact that no theft would have been provable even 
if the physical search had found a twenty dollar bill,3 might 
well be interpreted by a jury as proof positive that Esquivel's 
only intent was to cause offense. For all of the above reasons, 
it would be more than reasonable for a jury to find that, when he 
required the plaintiffs to submit to a physical search, Defendant 
Esquivel acted intentionally to create in the Plaintiffs and 
their co-workers the apprehension of an offensive touching. The 
Plaintiffs have further testified that Esquivel's action had that 
specific effect, and did indeed place them in apprehension of an 
immediate offensive touching.(Affidavits of Semiday, Santiago, 
Bardales). 
3
 See, for example, Plaintiff Semiday's question regarding 
how a twenty dollar bill in his wallet could be distinguished 
from that allegedly stolen. Semiday Deposition, pp. 40-41. 
Defendants argue, in counter to this cause of action, that 
the mere threat of an offensive contact is not sufficient to 
permit a recovery. This would be a nice theory, except that it 
is clearly contrary to the law of civil assault.4 The case law 
and the Restatement 2d Torts clearly recognize a cause of action 
for the right to be free of the apprehension of offensive bodily 
contact. 
Defendants have also raised the affirmative defense of 
consent, arguing that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for 
assault because none of them objected to the search, and all of 
them voluntarily permitted themselves to be searched. The 
Plaintiffs have specifically disputed this assertion, contending 
that they did not consent, but rather that they were coerced into 
submission. The issue of consent is, except in extraordinary 
cases, an issue for the jury to decide. In this case, the basic 
facts may be interpreted in more than one way. A jury might find 
that because none of the Plaintiffs objected they therefore 
consented—the doctrine of implied consent. However, this same 
doctrine requires the trier of fact to determine whether the 
conduct of the Plaintiffs in this case may reasonably be 
understood as consent. Restatement 2d Torts S892 Furthermore, 
the trier of fact will also be require to determine whether that 
4
 See, for example, Restatement 2nd, Torts § 18; 6 Am Jur 
2d/ §110. 
implied consent was given under duress. According to §892B of 
the Restatement, "duress is constraint of another's will by which 
he is compelled to give consent when he is not in reality willing 
to do so." In determining the existence of duress, the 
Restatement requires that the age, sex, mental capacity, relation 
of the parties and any antecedent circumstances be considered. 
Therefore, it would be quite reasonable for a jury to find that, 
given the power of Defendant Esquivel to fire the Plaintiffs at 
will, given their limited job skills and the limited alternative 
jobs available to them, given Esquivel's previous implicit 
threats against any who might be illegal aliens, and given 
Esquivel7s explicit statement that whoever did object was 
presumably the thief, (Mazariegos Affidavit)5 no reasonable 
person could interpret the Plaintiffs' submission to be searched 
as an express or implied consent sufficient to privilege the 
Defendants' actions. Because the facts are susceptible of more 
than one interpretation, the issue of consent must, by consistent 
court rulings, be determined by the jury. Because consent is an 
absolute defense to all of the causes of action alleged in this 
complaint, this discussion is applicable to each of the remaining 
causes of action. 
This is also in her deposition, as properly translated. 
Battery. The elements of a civil cause of action for 
battery applicable to this case6 are the intentional infliction 
of a harmful or offensive contact to the person of another.7 
These elements have been alleged in at least two of the searches. 
The physical search of Rosa Mazariegos was full of offensive 
contacts, from the hands run around her midriff to the pencil 
that was used to poke through her hair.(Mazariegos Deposition, 
Affidavit). Given, as has already been shown, that Esquivel 
clearly intended, at a minimum, an illegal and presumably 
offensive contact, all of the elements of a Battery are present. 
This is also true in the case of Mr. Semiday, where the 
individual conducting the search removed Mr. Semiday's shoes and 
socks, although the element of offensive touching is not as 
pervasive as it is in the case of Ms. Mazariegos.(Semiday 
Deposition, p. 41) 
As discussed above, consent is an absolute defense to a 
claim for battery, and thus the issue of whether Plaintiffs 
In order to simplify the issues, I have deliberately 
avoided the complicated phrasing of the hornbooks, intended to 
include cases of transferred intent or intent merely to cause 
apprehension, but not actual harm. It does not appear to me that 
these additional elements contribute anything to the present 
discussion, therefore I have avoided them were possible. 
7
 See, for example, Restatement 2d. Torts §18; Handbook on 
the Law of Torts 5th Ed., William Prosser and Paige Keeton, West 
Publishing Co. 1988, pp. 39, §9. 
consented to the battery or were coerced is an issue of fact for 
the jury. 
False Imprisonment. The applicable elements of the tort of 
False Imprisonment are an action, intended to confine another 
within boundaries fixed by the actor, a resulting confinement, 
and a conscious awareness of the confinement. Restatement 2d, 
Torts, §35. A confinement results, according to the Restatement, 
where there is no reasonable means of escape. Id. §3 6. According 
to the Restatement, it is unreasonable for someone to refuse to 
utilize a means of escape of which he is himself aware where it 
only entails a slight inconvenience or the minor risk of nominal 
liability. However, escape is not required, even where the means 
exist, "if the circumstances are such as to make if offensive to 
a reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity."Id. In the 
first place, in this case, any individual worker who sought to 
escape would have had to walk a distance of some thirty feet from 
the cafeteria area to the door. Given the distance, it was 
impossible to tell whether the door had been locked, and whether 
escape was a real, or merely illusory possibility. Furthermore, 
escape or attempted escape in the circumstances of this case 
would, in all probability, have entailed a loss of employment, 
defamation, and possibly deportation, given Defendant Esquivel's 
previous threats. Granted, under Utah law, the individual might 
then potentially have had a cause of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. The question 
presented by this remedy, however, is whether or not the 
individual falsely imprisoned under these circumstances is 
required to object and suffer the consequences before being able 
to obtain redress. Is it reasonable to require that this means 
of escape be utilized before a cause of action may be stated? Or 
is it more reasonable to determine that the Plaintiffs were 
effectively confined to the cafeteria area by Mr. Esquivel's 
combined threats and behavior, and that no reasonable means of 
escape existed? Because reasonable men could differ on this 
question, and because the parties to this case do differ on this 
issue, this is another issue that must be determined by the trier 
of fact. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. This is, 
according to the Restatement, a comparatively new tort action. 
However, it is one that the Utah courts have expressly 
recognized.9 The elements of this cause of action have been 
8
 See, for example, Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), where it was held that forcing an employee 
to consent to a polygraph might raise such a cause of action. 
9
 See, for example, Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 
1238, (Utah App. 1989) Utah Court of Appeals held that evidence 
was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether 
Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), In 
reversing the lower courts grant of Summary Judgment to the 
defendant, the Utah Supreme Court held that material issues of 
fact existed as to whether a the self help actions of a 
landlord's agent raised a claim for intentional infliction of 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court as the intentional causing of 
severe emotional distress through extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Pentecost, supra note 9, at 700. This definition was set forth 
in a case with facts somewhat analogous to those of the instant 
case. In Pentecost, a landlord's agent resorted to self help, 
rather than legal process, in evicting the Plaintiff and her 
children and seizing their personal belongings, allegedly as 
compensation for non-payment of rent. As in the present case, 
the agent's self-help remedies were illegal. The Plaintiff also 
alleged that the actions taken by the agent were intentional and 
malicious. While the Plaintiffs in the present case have not 
specifically alleged that Mr. Esquivel's actions were malicious, 
the facts they have alleged, including a demonstrated pattern of 
hiring almost exclusively Hispanic individuals with limited 
English capability, (arguably a substantially more vulnerable 
population than a comparable group of white English speakers); 
the ongoing verbal harassment and accusations; the complete lack 
of probable cause for the search; and the complete lack of 
probability that the search would do anything except offend and 
demoralize a vulnerable population, could well support a finding 
of deliberate, malicious intent to debase and demean the 
Plaintiffs and the other workers. Because reasonable men could 
differ on the outrageousness of the Defendants' actions, in 
emotional distress. 
compelling nearly forty Hispanic immigrant workers, legal and 
illegal, to submit to a fruitless and baseless search of their 
persons and property, this is yet another factual issue which 
must be determined by a jury. 
Invasion of Privacy. The causes of action alleged by the 
Plaintiffs all involve the specific area of privacy labelled 
intrusion into private affairs. The Restatement 2d Torts §652B 
defines the specific elements of the tort of Intrusion upon 
Seclusion as the intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
or concerns, where the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. In this case, the Plaintiffs have alleged 
that Defendants' search of their coats, bags, wallets, purses, 
and lunch sacks were all invasive intrusions in their personal 
belongings—belongings wherein the Plaintiffs had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. A search of an individual's wallet is, 
in fact, one of the specific examples cited in this section of 
the Restatement. The search of an individual's purse, coat 
pockets, pants pockets, and lunch sack are parallel invasions of 
personal items and personal privacy. Again, a jury might find 
that the Plaintiffs' alleged consent will bar recovery on this 
cause of action. On the other hand, a jury might also find that 
the broad based, coercive nature of the search, without 
reasonable cause, raises the level of offensiveness of the 
invasion and would permit a recovery on this cause of action. 
The invasion of physical privacy occasioned by the illegal 
search, and the invasion of the psychological privacy of Mr. 
Semiday when he was required to show his temple recommend, are 
equally offensive invasions of areas of restricted personal 
interest. It is also important, in determining the offensiveness 
of this request, to note that the fact that an LDS church member 
does or does not have a temple recommend is indicative of even 
more personal, intensely private facts, than the simple question 
may indicate. An answer to that question provides an employer 
with information regarding sexual habits, smoking and drinking 
habits, the individual's financial affairs, and involvement with 
the LDS Church. A reasonable person may consider any or all of 
this question deeply private and personal. More than one court 
has specifically held that the invasion of privacy claim is 
specifically a claim for injury to emotions and mental suffering. 
See, for example, Froelick v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993, 
995. For more specific details regarding these violations, and 
the express issues of public policy that prohibit such 
violations, see Privacy in the Workplace, supra, n.l, pp.64-66, 
and 83. This volume also has an entire chapter devoted to the 
legality of work place searches of employee's persons and 
property. The authors reach the conclusion, at the end of this 
chapter, that 
the legality of a search hinges essentially on the 
manner, scope, justification and location of it. 
Searches of people attract greater judicial scrutiny 
than inspections of places, given the higher level of 
intrusiveness involved. . . . the central issue usually 
boils down to whether the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area in question. Id. 
p.169. 
Again, it is the Plaintiffs7 position that they had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their wallets, their purses, the 
pockets of their clothing, and the personal possessions, 
including lunch bags, which they brought to work. The search in 
this case is not comparable to a locker or desk search. The 
Plaintiffs were told that they were going to be physically 
searched, along with their belongings. Although the level of 
actual intrusion then depended upon the supervisor doing the 
searching, the fact that some were forced to submit to more 
invasive searches does not obviate the fact that the privacy 
interests of each Plaintiff, in his or her person and property, 
were invaded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts 
must be denied. For each cause of action, there are facts in 
evidence at this time that would support differing perspectives 
on whether the Plaintiffs' protected interests, in freedom from 
apprehension of an offensive touching, freedom from an offensive 
touching, freedom from false imprisonment and wrongful detention 
and freedom from invasions of privacy, had been violated. 
Plaintiffs have attached, as stated previously, the reports of 
two psychologists. One report deals specifically with the harm 
caused to the Plaintiffs in this case, the other report deals 
with the nature of the psychological damages, and how they are 
comparable to the psychological damages caused by sexual 
harassment and other forms of abusive conduct. These reports, 
coupled with the Affidavits and the unchallenged portions of the 
depositions, as well as the Affidavits of the Plaintiffs' family 
members, give substantial support to the Plaintiffs' contention 
that they each suffered psychological distress, depression, 
embarrassment and humiliation due to the forced search. These 
affidavits also support a finding that Ms. Mazariegos suffered 
severe psychological distress, sufficient to upset her menstrual 
cycle, causing continual bleeding, and cause severe migraine 
headaches. For all of the above reasons, therefore, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that this court deny Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ml DATED this adw day of March, 1995. 
MARTI L. JONES 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
APPENDIX A 
CONFIDENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF JOSE 
HUMBERTO BARDALES; ROSA D. MAZARIEGOS; ANGEL 
M. SANTIAGO AND WALTER SEMIDAY. EVALUATION 
DONE BY JUAN A. MEJIA, PH.D. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA GUMMOW, PH.D. 
Juan A. Mejia, Ph.D. 
Licensed Clinical Psychologist 136 East South Temple, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1121 
(801)328-4500 
FAX (801) 328-4565 
CONFIDENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
C'lents: Jose Humberto Bardales 
Rosa D. Mazariegos 
Angel M. Santiago 
Walter Semidey 
Da^es of evaluation: February 18 & 19, 1995 
Date of report: March 10, 1995 
Evaluator: Juan A. Mejia, Ph.D. 
Referred by: Marti L. Jones, Attorney 
Metnod of evaluation: Clinical interviews; MinnesctaMuHiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI); Incomplete 
Sentences Blank; and Projective Drawings. 
Mr. Bardales, Ms. Mazariegos, Mr. Santiago, and Mr. Semidey 
were referred by their attorney, Ms. Jones, for a psychological 
evaluation in connection to their lawsuit against DOT Adventures 
Inc., being heard at the Fourth Judicial District Court by Judge 
Bcyd L. Park. Specifically, Ms. Jones was interestec m an 
assessment of emotional damage to the plaintiffs, if any, in 
connection to events in this case. Available in preparing this 
report were affidavits by all four plaintiffs in this case as well 
as affidavits by some of their family members. 
The first time I saw the plaintiffs, on February 16, 1995, I 
explained to Mr. Bardales, Ms. Mazariegos, Mr. Santiago, and Mr. 
Semidey the nature and purpose of the evaluation I was conducting 
of them. I further explained that I would be rendering my opinions 
ir a report that would be sent to their attorney, Ms. Jones, but 
that the judge and defendants in their case would have likely 
access to this report. As such, I explained that the information 
that they discussed with me was not confidential. They all 
appeared to understand these principles of confidentiality, and we 
proceeded with the evaluation. 
Since Spanish is the primary language for all four plaintiffs, 
all testing and interviewing was conducted in Spanish. Although 
they came together, they were interviewed and tested individually. 
The four plaintiffs worked at DOT Adventures Inc. According 
to the information they provided in this evaluation and in their 
affidavits, they were subjected to frequent talks by the manager, 
Mr. Esquivel, in which he made insulting comments to the workers, 
calling them "thieves" and "lazy," and talking about their paying 
tithing to the LDS Church. A major event occurred in December 1992 
-epcrtedly when somebody lost a 20 dollar bill, and Mr. Esquivel 
naa everybody searcned after allegedly letting non-Hispamc workers 
gc. Also, the three male plaintiffs were involved m an incident 
a few days later in which they complained about being shortchanged 
-'n their paychecks for overtime pay that they had accruec, but was 
not included in their paychecks. Mr. Esquivel reportedly was very 
upset about their demands, but paid them as he reportedly had 
originally offered. 
JOSE HUMBERTO BARDALES 
Mr. Bardales is a 26 year, 4 month old marrieG Hispanic male. 
He is a polite young man whc came nicely aressea. He wears his 
hair very short, as if he had shaved his nead recently. He looks 
younger than his chronological age. 
Mr. Bardales was born on October 26, 1963, in Puerto Cortez, 
a sma"!l coastal town in Honduras. He is the seconc cf 11 sidings. 
His oarents divorced when he was four. He was raised oy his 
mcther, who remarried when he was 11. He described his father as 
'very quiet, gentle5' and reported a good relationship with him, 
with frequent contact after the divorce. He described his mother 
as "very compassionate and helpful." He reported a good 
relationship with his stepfather, whom he descrioed as "a good 
man. He reported good relationships with his siblings. 
Mr. Bardales graduated from high school in 1985 in Honduras. 
He described himself as a good student who typically obtained 
grades ranging from 85% to 95% in the grading system. After high 
school, he obtained a certificate in Electricity and Mechanics from 
a technical institute in Honduras. 
Mr. Bardales is currently attending English as a Second 
Language classes which he said are helpful. He reported adequate 
English language skills, with better receptive abilities than 
expressive abi1ities. 
At 19, Mr. Bardales served an LDS mission in Tegucigalpa which 
he regarded as a gooa experience. At 22, he married a 21 year old 
woman. They have a three year old daughter. They emigrated to the 
United States in 1991. 
Besides his work at DOTS, Mr. Bardales has worked at a 
lumberyard, Deseret Industries, and a frozen food production 
facility. He described himself as a very good worker. 
Mr. Bardales reported being in good health. He cemea ever 
using alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Mr. Bardales reported always having had "a positive attitude" 
towards life. He has "many" friends whcm he sees frequently. 
However, most of his time is spent at home, with nis family. 
Mr. Bardales indicated that he was humiliated by the frequent 
talks. He was especially humiliated when he was searched for the 
20 collar bill. He said that the male supervisor whc searched him 
cnecked his billfold and the pockets in his clothing and coat. 
He complained about being shortchanged in pay some days later. 
He is convinced that he was then terminated because he complained. 
Mr. Bardales indicated that the emotional trauma that he 
experienced at that time was exacerbated because it happened arouna 
M-. Santiago completed high school in Puerto Rico. He 
cJesc^ioea himself as a good student, with grades from A 10 C. 
Apter high school, he received training as a piumber. 
Mr. Santiago reported little oral English language abilities 
and no written English language skills. He has received some 
English as a Second Language instruction, but with limited benefit. 
At 25, Mr. Santiago married an 13 year old woman. They have 
three children who are now 14, 13, and 10. They divorced after 13 
./ears of marriage. After the divorce, he decided to come to the 
U. S. mainland looking for "something different, a change;" his 
two sons came with him, and his daughter remained with his ex-wife. 
At 40, he married a 23 year old Caucasian American woman. This 
marriage lasted only six months. According to him, his second wife 
was unable to get along with his children and insisted that he send 
them to Puerto Rico; he opted for a divorce. He is currently seeing 
a woman in her 30s, with whom he reported a good relationship. 
In Puerto Rico, he worked as a plumber, but he has quit this 
occupation because he found out that he did not like to do it. In 
Utah, besides the work at DOTS, he has worked as a machine operator 
and as a janitor. Mr. Santiago described himself as a good worker. 
Mr. Santiago reported being in good health. He denied ever 
using alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Mr. Santiago said that he is happy with his life, in spite of 
the stress involved in raising his two sons as a single father. 
He reported occasional sleep disturbance, due to his concern over 
his children. He said that he has "many" friends, whom he sees 
frequently, but most of his time is spent with his children. 
When he was searched, the male supervisor made him empty his 
pockets and checked his billfold. Mr. Santiago was extremely upset 
about this search, saying that it caused him sleep disturbance, and 
feelings of insecurity and helplessness. He felt "traoped" because 
he was unsure if he could get another job. He was angry because 
he felt that what Mr. Esquivel had done was illegal and insulting. 
Mr. Santiago said that there was talk at DOTS aoout a few 
workers who were particularly upset about the search, including the 
three male plaintiffs. When he was among one of the workers who, 
a few days later, complained about being shortchanged m their pay, 
he was promptly terminated. He said that at the time mat he was 
terminated, he was told by his supervisor that he was "rebellious." 
Mr. Santiago reported depressive and anxiety symptomatology for 
some months after these events. 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
Mr. Semidey is a 43 year old Hispanic male. He is a visibly 
overweight man who came casually dressed. He appeared to be 
assertive and at times he spoke for the group. 
Mr. Semidey was born on March 2, 1953, in Coamc, a small town 
in Puerto Rico, but grew up in Ponce, an urban center in Puerto 
Rico. He is the youngest of two siblings. He reported an 
uneventful childhood with good relationships among family members. 
Mr. Semidey graduated from high school in 1971 in Puerto Rico. 
He described himself as a good student, who typically obtained 
grades of B and C. After high school, he completed one year cf an 
electronic training program, but discontinued it due to financial 
difficu1 ties. 
Mr. Semidey received English as a Second Language instruction 
when he first arrived in ttre U. S. mainland, but discontinued it 
once he obtained a job. He reported limited expressive skills, but 
better receptive English language skills. 
At 23, Mr. Semidey married a 20 year old woman. They have 
three children who are now 18, 17, and 15. He reported very good 
relationships with his wife and children. He came to the U. S. 
mainland with his family in 1991, seeking better opportunities. 
Besides his work at DOTS, Mr. Semidey has worked as a 
maintenance worker, dishwasher, and assembly worker. He is 
interested in carpentry. He described himself as a good worker. 
Mr. Semidey reported asthma since childhood, for which he uses 
inhalers. He reported sleep apnea; he sleeps with a machine which 
ensures that his brain will receive enough oxygen. 
Mr. Semidey reported a past pattern of alcohol abuse. He quit 
drinking in August, 1986, when he converted to the LDS faith. 
Mr. Semidey reported a history of past acute depressive 
episodes. One episode occurred in 1984 when his 57 year old mother 
and his 35 year old sister died from cancer the same year. His 
depression was so acute that it included psychotic-1ike symptoms. 
The other episode was about five years ago, when he lost a job, 
causing considerably difficult financial circumstances for nim and 
his family. At that time, his depression was so acute that it 
included suicide-like ideation. At the time of this evaluation, 
he was under significant emotional stress due to the recent loss 
of his job; his wife, who worked at the same place, also lost her 
job. He is convinced that their terminations were unfairly based 
on discrimination. He has "three or four" friends, whom he sees 
frequently, but he said that most of his time is spent with his 
wi fe and chi1dren. 
In talking about the events regarding the 20 dollar bill 
search, Mr. Semidey was so upset that he talked about these events 
as if they had occurred a few days ago. During the search itself, 
Mr. Semidey said that the supervisor made him take his socks and 
shoes off". He said that he was furious that he was "treated like 
a thief without being one." He asked the supervisor who was 
searching him how the stolen 20 dollar bill could be differentiated^ nor 
cecress'or ana anxiety. The^e is nothing of clin^ca* significance 
orevious to tre t^auma^c events at DOTS tnat would predispose them 
to ciimcal depression and an;<iety. One interpretation of his 
obtained MMPI cMnicai profile is that he was acutely deoressed and 
anxious at tne time of the search, which has left nim vulnerable 
to depress\on and anxiety at this time. 
His responses tc the Incomplete Sentences Blank reflected: 
strong family orten tat!on; strong religious oeliefs; and 
positivistic attitude. His Projective Drawings reflected 
extroversion. 
ROSA D. MAZARIEGOS 
Ms. Mazariegos' MMPI validity profile indicated that sne 
presented a technically questionable set of responses. Given that 
her cultural background as a Honduran is significantly different 
to the background of the MMPI normative population, this obtained 
questionable validity is not unexpected. As it is often seen in 
the MMPIs of Hispanic clients, the noted tendency was towara 
minimization of psychopatho1ogy. 
Her obtained MMPI clinical profile was within normal limits, 
with no indication of psychopathology. This obtained profile could 
be due to her tendency toward minimization. 
stron 
a marnag 
as honest. 
ANGEL 
Mr. Santiago's obtained MMPI validity profile indicated that 
he presented a valid set of responses. His obtainec MMPI clinical 
profile was within normal limits, with no incication of 
psychooathology. 
His responses to the Incomplete Sentences 3'ank reflected: 
strong family orientation; strong religious beliefs: cerception of 
being discriminated against due to being Hisoan"-:; and self 
perception as being a bit shy. His Projective Drawings reflected 
positive thoughts about his girlfriend. 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
Mr. Semidey's obtained MMPI validity profile ~°d*cated that 
he presented a valid set of resoonses. His obtained MMPI clinical 
profile indicated the presence of significant emctiona" problems, 
most likely in the context of clinical depression. Given that Mr. 
Semidey nad just lost his joe at the time of this e.a;jation, the 
oresence of clinical depression is not unexpected. Also, his 
obtained MMPI c I mica* prof lie is consistent witr. -13 reported 
previous history o f acute depressive ecisooes, most likely 
000 
exacerbated "by the traumata events at DC""3. !•" other wcrds, ne 
was likely to be vulnerable to deoress^or crevic.us tc the events 
at DOTS, cut the considerable emotional trauma tnat he reportedly 
suffered there has maae him even more vulnerable to depression. 
He appears to be currently clinically depressed. 
His responses to the Incomplete Sentences 3 lank reflected: 
strong farm I y or i en tat i on ; a positivisti: atcicude coward life; and 
self perception as unpretentious and friend*;/. His Projective 
Draw 1 ngs ref I ecced extrovers i on . 
SUMMARf AND CONCLUSIONS 
There is no question in my mind that all four plaintiffs 
suffered significant emotional trauma at the time of the events at 
DOTS. To varying degrees, they all reported symptoms consistent 
with depression and anxiety, in a pattern similar to post traumatic 
stress disorder, for about three months following these events. 
The etiology of their depression and anxiety symptomatology appears 
to be in the humiliation and harassment as a result of the frequent 
talks by the manager, the search, and the plaintiffs' terminations. 
In each case, there were different idiosyncratic factors which 
exacerbated the emotional damage. 
It should be noted that there was no evidence of past or 
current symptom exaggeration in my interviews with the plaintiffs 
nor in the results of standardized psychological testing produced 
by them. To varying degrees, they all attempted to portray 
themselves as free of psychopathology at this time, but as having 
been emotionally damaged at the time of the events at DOTS. Their 
stories, as reflected in their current interviews and past 
affidavits, were generally consistent with each other and devoid 
of any apparent inappropriate magnification of symptoms. 
Mr. Bardales appears to have become vulnerable to ongoing 
depression and anxiety following the events at DOTS. He appears 
to try very hard to have the most positivistic attitude towara life 
as possible. To some degree, he is happy with his life because of 
his strong ties to his family and his church, but he currently has 
minimized signs of depression and anxiety. 
Ms. Mazariegos reported the most tangible indicators of 
emotional trauma. Besides the events connected to the search, she 
reportedly was made to clean a carpet where a cog had relieved 
himself. This experience appeared to be very humi Mating and 
upsetting to her. During the search, she appears tc ria^ e been 
subjected to the worst humiliation of a 1 1 the plaintiffs given the 
more "intensive manhandling that she had tc endure. rne symptoms 
that she reported experiencing immediately after the se^rcn are 
a^sc indicative of a mere prominent mar i festat i or, cf emotional 
damage. A significant factor in magnifying the emotional damage 
to her has to dc with her very strong identification as an LDS 
believer. She was very disappointed by Mr. Esquivel, whom she had 
initialIv trusted as someone who strongly shared her LDS beliefs. 
n n 0 
Mr. Santiago came across as the most emotionally reserved of 
all the plaintiffs. His style appears to be to "suffer in silence," 
with apparent heip1essness. Still, he also reported 'signs of 
significant depression and anxiety symptomatology at the time of 
z'ne events at DOTS. He seems to have been left with ongoing 
feelings that he is likely to be discriminated on the job as a 
H i span i c, 
Mr. Semidey was particularly emotionally vulnerable to being 
traumatized by the events at DOTS because of previous depressive 
episodes, including one involving a previous loss of a job. 
Indeed, he came across as having been significantly emotionally 
damaged at the time of the events at DOTS, witn reports of very 
prominent manifestations of depression and frustration. Further, 
he apparently has been become even more emotionally vulnerable 
following the events at DOTS. At the time of this evaluation, he 
was clinically depressed apparently as a result of his recent loss 
of a job, with the exacerbating perception that he was terminated 
due to discrimination. 
Juan\A. \Mejia, Ph.D. 
LicensedlPsychologist #403 
Conger & Gum mow 
247 E. 2100 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Affadavit of Linda J. Gumrnow, Ph.D. 
1. I am over the age of 21, and I am competent to testify as to all matters set 
forth herein from my professional knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
2. I am a psychologist, and I am certified by the State of Utah to conduct 
Competency and Guilty and Mentally III/ Diminished Capacity evaluations for the 
State of Utah. In this capacity, I have evaluated many Hispanic defendants. In 
my private practice in Salt Lake City, Utah, I have evaluated Hispanic patients 
who were referred by physicians, Workers Compensation, and Vocational 
Rehabilitation. I am familiar with the psychological literature on the Hispanic 
population in the United States. 
3. On March 13, 1995, I examined the following materials at the request of M. 
Jones: Psychological Evaluation of Jose Humberto Bardales, Rosa D. 
Mazariegos, Angel M. Santiago, and Walter Semidey done by Juan A. Mejia, 
Ph.D. and dated March 10, 1995; English translation of statements of the above 
named individuals. 
4. Based upon my training and experience and the evaluations and statements 
of the plaintiffs, it is my opinion that the plaintiffs suffered significant emotional 
injury at their place of employment, DOT Adventures. The plaintiffs were 
exposed to continual verbal harassment and threats that culminated in a search 
of all Hispanic workers while non Hispanic workers were allowed to go home. 
The female plaintiff was subjected to an extensive body search as well as having 
been asked to do non job related tasks for her supervisor that she considered to 
be humiliating. All of the workers were fired when they complained of their 
treatment and the lack of payment of over time wages. 
5. Based upon my training and experience, the Hispanic workers found 
themselves in a situation in which they felt they had to recourse other than 
submit to a personal search that they felt to be both wrong and degrading. All 
felt that they would lose needed employment if they protested or that they would 
be thought to be thieves. It is well known in the professional literature of my field 
that placing an individual in a situation with inescapable punishment causes 
severe reactions. Psychologically, the person shows irritability, depression, and 
anxiety. Behavior away from the work site is affected. If the stress is prolonged 
and severe, as it was in this case, physical manifestations can occur (pain, 
menstrual dysfunction, exacerbation of illness, etc.) 
6. The symptoms of these individuals would be classified as Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, Acute DSM-IV 309.81. 
7. Cultural factors related to the Hispanic heritage make it more difficult for 
Hispanic workers to deal with harassment. First, "Hispanic cultural values 
encourage positive interpersonal relationships and discourage negative, 
competitive, and assertive interactions- what we have called the "simpatica" 
script" (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky & Betancourt, 1984 in Geisinger book). 
Second, the newer Hispanic citizen, as are these plaintiffs, are more likely to 
remain isolated from the host culture and to retain the values of the mother 
culture. Third, Hispanic, particularly recently immigrated Hispanics, find it more 
difficult to deal with the psychological aspects of both work related and illness 
related stress. These workers tend to experience psychological stress as 
physical symptoms (as did these plaintiffs). See DuAlba and Scott (1993). 
Fourth, due to limited acculturation to the host culture, many Hispanics do not 
identify with the host culture and do not know how to avail themselves of 
services or protections (Marks, et al., 1987). This limited knowledge of their 
rights was a theme repeated by all plaintiffs. Fifth, individuals who believe in 
their own efficacy or ability to change their situation, do better at coping with a 
variety of situations including illness. The sense that events are outside of one's 
control is more common among the Hispanic worker, particularly the Hispanic 
worker of low socioeconomic status (Ell and Haywood, 1985). 
8. Because many Hispanic workers have poor self-efficacy and poor knowledge 
of resources and options, emotional injury among Hispanic workers is more 
common among Hispanic workers, and employers of Hispanic workers have a 
responsibility to be sensitive to the acculturation needs of these individuals 
(DuAlba and Scott, 1993). 
9. I have been informed that the plaintiffs are attempting to file a civil complaint 
in fourth district court against their former employer in which damages are 
claimed for the injuries associated with their former employment. 
10. The opinions expressed herein are stated to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability within the field of my expertise. 
11. References: 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (4th Edition). American Psychiatric Association Press: 
Washington, D.C., page 424. 
DuAlba, L & Scott, R.L. (1993). Somatization and malingering for worker's 
compensation applicants: A cross-cultural MMPI study. J. Clinical Psychology. 
49,913-917. 
Ell, K.O., Haywood, L. J. (1985). Sociocultural factors in Ml recovery: An 
exploratory study. International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine, 15. 157-175. 
Geisinger, K.F. (1992). Psychological Testing of Hispanics. American 
Psychological Association Press: Washington, D.C. 
12. Further affiant sayeth not. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 1995. 
Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D 
y<^L<_-w<—^•^-^r\<j-' 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D. this 13th day of 
March, 1995. fc-3C—a^>i n iT» *% rf» i ar *TMrar - * j 
ROBERT E. CONGER \ 
Notary Public D 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Comm. Exp. Aug. 8,1991 
ANTHONY OR. SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84118 
j**ipKjmj^s*2M&x>»<mjmjm^jmjm^,MKjai 
My commission expires: 
* - " > « 
APPENDIX B 
WITNESS LIST 
WITNESSES 
At this time, Plaintiffs may call any or all of the 
individuals who have submitted reports and/or affidavits in this 
case. Thus witnesses may include each of the four Plaintiffs; 
Expert Witnesses Juan Mejia and Linda Gummow; relatives of the 
Plaintiffs such as Pastora and Matilda Mazariegos, Diana Semiday, 
and Maira Bardales. In each case the affidavits and/or reports 
that have already been submitted contain the basic testimony of 
the witness. In addition, Plaintiffs plan to call as additional 
witnesses Rocio Escobar and Jorge Sanchez. These two individuals 
are Mexican nationals, who worked at the DOTS factory around the 
time of this incident. 
Rocio Escobar will testify that she was subjected to a 
physical battery of her person, similar if not identical to the 
battery experienced by Plaintiff Mazariegos. 
Jorge Sanchez will testify that on at least one occasion he 
attempted to discuss the problems caused by Defendant Esquivel's 
verbal abuse of the work force with the plant owner and DOTS 
president, Jeanette Lynton. 
Finally, Plaintiffs reserve the right to call as witnesses 
any other individuals employed at the DOTS factory during the 
time period between August 1992 and January 1993. At the present 
time the names and addresses of all members of this class of 
potential witnesses, with the exception of the named Defendants, 
are unknown. Once those names and addresses are discovered, and 
the individuals interviewed, where possible, Plaintiffs will 
supplement this discovery. 
APPENDIX C 
Copies of the Amended English Translations of 
the Affidavits originally submitted in 
support of Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC,, et. al. 
Defendants• 
* AMENDED TRANSLATION OF 
* AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER 
* SEMIDAY 
* Civ. No- 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Walter Semiday, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began working at the DOTS company around the first of 
September, 1992, Before I was hired, I had an interview with the 
plant manager, whose name was MiguelAngel Esquivel. During this 
interview he asked me if I was a member of the Mormon (LDS) 
church. I answered yes, that I was a member. Then he asked me 
if I had a temple recommend. I told him yes, I did, and he asked 
to see it. I thought this was a strange thing, because never in 
my life had someone asked to see my temple recommend in an job 
interview, but I wanted the job, so I gave it to him so that he 
could see it. I did not know that it was against the law to ask 
about this. 
I worked at the DOTS firm some three months. During my time 
there, I observed things that I had never seen before in my life. 
For example, every time that Mr. Esquivel got angry with some 
person or some department, he would gather the entire plant 
together. He was almost always angry, and he would speak to us 
in a loud voice or yell at us. He would say that he had had to 
send several people home for a few days. Several times he told 
us that if we were paying our tithing, and there wasn't work or 
we were laid off for a few days, we should go to our bishop to 
ask for help, because the church had the responsibility to 
compensate us for the days were were laid off when we were paying 
our tithing. Many times he spoke to us hard and strong, accusing 
us of being robbers- On one occasion he threatened that he was 
going to search us all as we left work, because according to him, 
someone was stealing the stamps. 
Besides being robbers, he also would accuse us of being 
liars. He would say that the majority of us were illegals. This 
thing about accusing people of being illegals, he used it as a 
threat. In my opinion, it was a way of reminding people that 
they were not free, and that with one phone call he could cause 
them many problems. This was the method he generally used to 
control people, and make them behave the way he wanted them to* 
But the greatest insult, in my opinion, was the day that we 
were all searched. That day he gave the day off to the 
department where the few American women worked. He sent everyone 
in that department home. After, he gathered the rest of us 
together. There were between thirty and forty of us, and all of 
us were Hispanic. He informed us of a theft of twenty dollars, 
and told us that he was going to do something that was against 
the law, but that he was going to do it, which was to search us 
all. At no time did he ask if anyone objected to being searched. 
At no time did he indicate that the door was open to whoever 
wanted to leave. Furthermore, the door was quite distant, around 
thirty feet, from where we were seated. After that he left the 
area and left us with the supervisors. There were two groups of 
women. Some were searched in the upstairs bathroom, others were 
searched downstairs in an office. We men were all searched 
upstairs in the men's bathroom. I was upset, nervous, and angry. 
I almost couldn't believe it. I asked myself again and again how 
it was that they were going to know the difference between the 
twenty dollar bill that had been lost and a twenty dollar bill 
that maybe I had in my wallet? I could not understand how they 
thought to prove anything. I felt anxious and threatened. I 
believed that they were going to search my entire body. I 
believed that they were going to make me take off my clothes, and 
that they were going to touch every part of my body. I did not 
want to be searched, but I did not see any way to free myself 
from the situation. 
Upon entering the bathroom, I asked my supervisor how he was 
going to know that the bill in my wallet was the twenty that had 
been lost. He did not know what to answer. After the search I 
felt ashamed and humiliated. I felt emotionally devastated. I 
got angry with my wife and my children. I felt very upset, very 
defensive, very aggressive. I continued this way for several 
days, like a week, until after Christmas. The search had not had 
any result. I did not know if this was going to happen again or 
not. I was not able to calm down until I was let go from work. 
Even though the way in which I was let go upset me, afterwards, 
when I didn't have to return there on a daily basis, and live 
under the threat of another search, I began to calm down and to 
feel better. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA Q. JONES 
LINDA Q. JONES, #5732 
MARTI L. JONES, #5733 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-0276 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * TRANSLATION OF 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, * MAZARIEGOS 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Rosa Mazariegos, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began to work in the stamp company the beginning of 
November, 1992. Almost immediately I began to feel bad. The 
manager of the factory was .called MiguelAngel Esguivel. The day 
that I began to work the manager gathered everyone and began to 
yell at us and tell us insulting things. He told us that we were 
a pack of slackers and lazybones. He said "I am certain that 
there, on the other side from where you are from, you all spent 
your time cutting cactus.1 You came here to become great." 
After some days I came to understand that this same thing, 
the meetings and the yelling and the insults, Mr. Esguivel did 
almost every day, and sometimes twice a day. Among other things, 
he would say to us "I am certain that you don't pay your tithing. 
I know that's why things go badly for you." He would also say to 
us "I am certain that you are a bunch of hypocrites. To my face 
you smile at me, but behind my back you tell tales of me, I am 
certain." He would accuse us of not being able to enter the 
temple of the church. He would accuse us of being wetbacks and 
say that he knew who the illegals were. 
But the worst of the situation was that after spending up to 
over an hour yelling at us, Mr. Esquivel would come to where I 
and the rest were working, and accuse us of being lazy because we 
were low in production. Also every day he would send one or 
another of the Latin women to clean the dog's room. The man had 
a dog. He would bring it to the factory, where he would put it 
in a carpeted room. Every .day Mr. Esquivel would send an order 
telling one woman or another to go clean up the dog poop, or wash 
the dog. He knew how insulting it was, for an Hispanic woman, a 
worker, to be obligated to clean up dog poop of a dog that 
1
 This expression is idiomatic, somewhat the equivalent of 
"All you could do was clean toilets" in English. 
belonged to another person. One time it came to me to do it. 
Even though I had a table full of work, the supervisor told me 
that I had to leave what I was doing to go and pick up the dog 
poop and wash the carpet with detergent. 
Because of the pressure, of being attacked and degraded, of 
being insulted and humiliated constantly, I was unable to sleep 
well. Although I ate somewhat, food didn't interest me like 
before. It had no flavor. I had headaches almost every day. In 
spite of all this, the worst of everything was the day that they 
searched us. 
That day, he gathered us like always in the cafeteria area. 
The cafeteria area was about ten meters from the entrance to the 
factory. He began to yell at us. He said "Some money has been 
lost. Everyone here is a bunch of robbers. From here no one 
leaves if they are not searched." He also said "Whoever does not 
let themselves be searched, it is because they have the money." 
Then he told us that we all had to enter the bathroom one by one 
with the supervisor. I did not want to be searched, but I was 
afraid to object, because of the accusations and yelling that 
would come upon me, and because I didn't see any way out. For 
those reasons, and because he had told us that we could not 
leave, and the door was a long way away, I again saw myself 
obligated to submit. When it was my turn to enter the bathroom 
the supervisor made me unbutton my pants and loosen my blouse. 
She also made me undo my bra. Then she stuck her hands under my 
blouse and ran her hands all over the area of my waist and even 
under my bra. Then she told me to take off my shoes and socks, 
and to roll my pant legs up above my knees. Last of all, she 
stuck a pencil in my hair and searched through all my hair with 
the pencil. 
When I got home I was devastated. I had a bloody discharge 
that wasn't normal, but that was caused by my nerves and fear. I 
was almost hysterical. I couldn't sleep all night long. But 
even so, I didn't want to lose my job, and I returned to work, 
although I was very nervious and angry. A few days later I tried 
to speak with Mr. Esquivel, to tell him how wrong the search had 
been. That same day he fired me. 
Upon leaving work I began to calm down, although it was some 
months before I felt sufficient emotional strength to return to 
look for work. During all this time my sister took care of me, 
with linden tea and other home remedies, to help me calm down and 
recover. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs< 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
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AMENDED TRANSLATION OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANGEL 
SANTIAGO 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Angel Santiago, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, 
and states the following: 
I began to work for the company DOTS in the fall of 1992. I 
worked for the company for about four months. During this time 
the manager of the factory customarily insulted the people almost 
daily. He would gather us together and begin saying things to us 
like "You are a bunch of thieves, robbers, ungratefuls; you are 
talebearers because you speak badly of the company.11 He would 
also tell us that we were a bunch of lazy workers. He would say 
that we didn't pay our tithing, and because of this things went 
badly in the company. What's more, he would accuse us of being 
wetbacks, and would tell us that if immigration came they would 
take us all away. One time he even told us that he was sick of 
people's gossip, and that we were a bunch of scandlemongers. 
On the day of the search Mr. Esquivel gathered us together 
like always. He was very angry. Once again he began to insult 
us all. He said that we were a bunch of robbers, that this was 
the last straw,1 and that he was going to have to search us all. 
Before this he had sent the American women to their homes. 
Mr. Esquivel said that they were going to search us one by 
one, that we would have to enter the bathroom with the 
supervisor, who would search us. This was the height of insult. 
In my country, Puerto Rico, no one can search another person 
unless he has a search warrant. Even with a search warrant, the 
search has to be made by a government official. To humiliate 
another person this way, by searching them and accusing them of 
being robbers, is the worst. It is against the law for a boss to 
abuse his power by insulting and searching people like this. 
But I had already complained before, about another boss. I 
had gone to Job Service and they had told me that they could not 
do anything; that here in Utah bosses could fire people whenever 
they wanted to, and that there was nothing they could do. So 
1
 This is an idiomatic expression. It literally says 
"things had become too much," but carries the stronger meaning of 
"this was the last straw." 
when Esquivel demanded that we be searched, I believed that if I 
objected to being searched, he was going to fire me that same 
day. Esquivel also told us that no one could go back to work 
without being searched, and that we all had to stay in the 
cafeteria area until everyone had been searched. There were more 
than forty people. I did not want to be searched, but to object 
would mean losing my job. 
The two bathrooms were upstairs, and while climbing the 
stairs one by one the rest of the other people in the cafeteria 
were looking at us and telling us that we were going to be 
searched, that it was going to be our turn, that they were going 
to palpate everything. I felt humiliated and offended. I also 
felt powerless to object. I thought that there was no 
alternative, that no one would believe me, although I also knew 
that it was not right and that it might be against the law. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, * AMENDED TRANSLATION OF 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA * AFFIDAVIT OF HUMBERTO 
MAZARIEGOS, * BARDALES 
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vs. * 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. * Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants. * 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Humberto Bardales, Plaintiff in the above entitled 
case, and states the following: 
I began to work for the DOTS company the first of August of 
1992. I worked for the company for about five months. During 
this time the manager, MiguelAngel Esquivel, abused me morally 
and emotionally. 
Frequently, a minimum of two times a week and many times 
even more, he would gather all the personnel together to carry 
out meetings with the sole object of abusing and insulting the 
workers. He would accuse us of many things, with the intention 
of offending us with his offensive words. He habitually told us 
that we the workers were a bunch of thieves, that he knew that we 
were stealing the stamps. He also would say that he had been 
endowed with the authority that Mrs. Jeanette Lynton had granted 
him to do whatever he wanted with the employees. Basing himself 
on the fact that many of the employees were Mormon, he would say 
that we needed to pay our tithing in order to continue working. 
He also threatened us by saying that if he dismissed us, we would 
have to go to ask help from our bishops so that they would 
provide food for us to eat. 
Above all, the most insulting thing, and the experience that 
had the most negative emotional and psychological impact was when 
Mr. Esquivel gathered us together one afternoon after lunch to 
tell us that a co-worker had lost $20.00 from her purse, and that 
he was going to find the thief. Mr. Esquivel was very angry. He 
shouted at everybody "You are a bunch of thieves." He yelled 
that he was tired of dealing with us. He immediately authorized 
Mr. Humberto Hernandez, who was an employee he trusted, to search 
all the men, one by one, individually, in the men's bathroom. 
The women were to be searched in like manner by Mrs. Maria Reyes 
in the women's bathroom and Mrs. Suleika was going to search 
another group of women in a room in the same building. Finally 
Mr. Esquivel said "I know that this is something illegal but I'm 
going to do it anyway, to find a thief." He also said, "anyone 
who wouldn't permit himself to be searched was the thief." 
In this way they proceeded to search some forty people, each 
one going in his turn to be searched. They told us that we had 
to bring with us our coats and our lunch bags or boxes. I felt 
threatened. I knew that I was going to be physically frisked and 
touched. I did not want them to search me. I knew that if I 
objected, I was going to lose my job, and that everyone was going 
to say that I was the thief. 
This experience was one of the worst of my life. It left me 
very nervous and depressed. I got angry with my wife without any 
reason. I was very emotional and jittery for around a month 
after I left the company. Even now I am suspicious of people, in 
particular my supervisors, and it is difficult for me to confide 
in them and get along well with them. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Judge Boyd L. Park 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Pastora Esperanza Mazariegos, and states the 
following: 
I am the sister of Rosa Mazariegos, plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I have lived in the same house with my sister 
Rosa here in Provo for more than five years. 
After she began to work at the stamp place her character 
changed significantly. One day she came home and told me that 
that day, in addition to her normal work, the Master, her boss, 
had ordered her to clean up the poop of a dog that he had there, 
Before, she had a happy disposition, very cheerful. She would 
arrive home from work tranquil and calm. She liked to dance with 
the radio, and sing. She also liked to joke around. 
But while she was working at the stamps place, she would 
almost always arrive home angry and very nervous. She would also 
almost always come home with a headache. I noticed that she was 
extremely nervous, and I made her take linden tea to help her 
calm down. I also gave her massages almost every night, and 
rubbed Vick's vapor rub into her head so she would relax and calm 
down. 
After the day of the search, Rosa's nervous condition 
worsened. I was worried, because I was afraid she was so nervous 
that she would make herself sick. She could not sleep. She 
would only eat a little, and it didn't sit well with her. After 
she left the company she began to calm down a bit, but she 
continued to be nervous for some months afterwards. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
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COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Matilda Mazariegos, and states the following: 
I am the sister of Rosa Mazariegos, plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I have lived in the same house with my sister 
Rosa, here in Provo, for more than five years. 
After she begem to work in the stamps, her character changed 
a great deal. Before, she had a happy character, very cheerful. 
She would arrive home from work tranquil and calm, and set about 
doing the household chores. But when she worked at the stamps 
place she would almost always arrive angry and very nervous. She 
would come home with headaches, and it was difficult for her to 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et. al. 
Defendants. 
* AMENDED TRANSLATION 
* AFFIDAVIT OF MAIRA 
* BARDALES 
* 
* Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
* Judge Boyd L. Park 
* 
* 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Maira Bardales, and states the following: 
I am the wife of Humberto Bardales, plaintiff in the above 
titled case. We were married on the sixth of April of 1990. In 
the time period important to this complaint, we had been married 
for over two years. Humberto began to work at the stamps place 
on the first of August. From the beginning, there was a 
noticable change in his behavior. Before, he was a happy, calm, 
tranquil person. After working there, he would come home very 
angry. At first he did not want to tell me why. Later he began 
to tell me about the treatment that he was receiving at the 
company• He began to look for other work, and even went to Job 
Service a couple of times, but he didn't find anything. 
The day of the search he told me about it when he got home. 
I could see that it had been a humiliating experience for him. 
He was hurt and embarrassed to tell me about it. After this he 
went through a period of time when he was very depressed and 
angry for about fifteen days. He would get angry with me and 
with our daughter every day. When he stopped working at the 
stamps place it took a while for him to recover completely like 
he was before. But even then, his emotions began to get better 
from the day that he got out of that company. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
150 N. 100 W., PROVO, UTAH 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
HUMBERTO BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
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AMENDED TRANSLATION OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF DIANA 
SEMIDEY 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COMES Diana Semidey, and states the following: 
I am the wife of Walter Semidey, a plaintiff in the above 
entitled case. I remember the day that Walter arrived home to 
tell me that on that day they had searched all the Hispanic 
workers. After that day, his character and way of being changed 
a great deal. Before his character was calm, almost always 
happy, and there wasn't much that upset him. After that day, he 
was almost always tense, very nervous, and very aggressive. 
Daily he would get angry with me or with our children. That year 
we didn't spend Christmas like we had other years, because Walter 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et ah, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO STRIKE and/or 
TO DISREGARD PORTIONS OF 
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants, by and through their attorney, Loren D. Martin, hereby move the Court to 
strike and/or disregard all or part of Plaintiffs' affidavits. Plaintiffs's affidavits contain multiple 
conclusionary statements, inadmissible hearsay and do not meet minimal foundational 
requirements. This motion is accompanied by a supporting Memorandum. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 1995. 
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
^PPjeS? 
ren D. Martin 
ttorney at Law 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above Motion To Strike 
and/or Disregard Portions Of Plaintiffs' Affidavits and the Memorandum In Support Of 
Defendants' Motion To Strike and/or To Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, was placedLm. 
the U S Mail, postage prepaid on the 25th day of April, 1995, addressed to the following 
Law Offices of Linda Q Jones 
Linda Q Jones, 
Marti L Jones 
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Provo, Utah 84604 /Tl\ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE and/or 
TO DISREGARD PORTIONS OF 
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants, by and through their attorney, Loren D. Martin, submit this Memorandum In 
Support Of Motion To Strike and/or To Disregard Portions Of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. By pleading dated November 1, 1994, Plaintiffs submitted their own affidavits and 
affidavits of others. The original affidavits were written in Spanish, accompanied by what 
purported to be English translations thereof. 
2. By pleading dated March 13, 1995, Plaintiffs submitted revised English 
translations. 
3. No explanation was given for the revisions. The revised translations have been 
submitted without further comment. 
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4. In an attempt to determine the type of changes made, Defendants' counsel made an 
interlinear comparison of the Affidavit of Walter Semidey. That comparison is set forth in Exhibit 
A, attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVITS DO NOT CONTAIN 
TESTIMONY WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE SO AS TO MEET THE 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56(e) 
A party opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment must demonstrate that genuine issues 
of fact exist by reference to documents and to testimony admissible in evidence. Rule 56(e), 
URCivP, provides, in part, as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. [Emphasis 
Added] 
Plaintiffs have submitted multiple affidavits which contain substantial quantities of hearsay 
testimony, but the affidavits generally do not relate the conversations nor establish any appropriate 
foundation. Instead, the affidavits most often only provide conclusions as to the ultimate effect of 
the conversations; and/or, the affidavits draw conclusions regarding the effect and/or the meaning 
of an incident or conversation; and/or, the affidavits set forth the declarant's mental impressions, 
what the declarant may believe other parties intended, or the declarant's arguments and conclusions 
of law. 
Changes made to the most recent submissions are of no significant consequence. 
Substantially all of the statements made in the affidavits do not meet the minimum standards of 
Rule 56(e), 
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URCivP, as testimony admissible in evidence in order to create an issue of fact. Most of the 
statements made in the affidavits are just simply not admissible. 
POINT NO. 2 
STATEMENTS MADE IN THE AFFIDAVITS MAY NOT BE OFFERED TO 
CONTRADICT STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE DEPOSITIONS. 
A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting or changing his own 
prior testimony.1 The 11th Federal Circuit has held that:2 
When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the 
existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create 
such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, 
previously given clear testimony. 
The 7th Federal Circuit has held that:3 
In Babrocky, we held that "a party should not be allowed to create issues of 
credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony." ... In so holding, we noted 
that if we allowed a party to create a genuine issue of material fact by changing his 
prior testimony: "the very purpose of the summary judgment motion—to weed out 
unfounded claims, special denials, and sham defenses—would be severely 
undercut." ... We also noted that the plaintiff had not explained the contradiction or 
attempted to resolve the disparity. 
Stated another way, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the same long standing rule, "that 
Plaintiffs testimony is no stronger than its inconsistent weakness."4 
A comparison of the Plaintiffs' Depositions with the presently submitted Affidavits reveals 
that the present documents are an attempt to expand from the sole issue related to the checking or 
searching to one of general allegation of rude and disrespectful treatment in the work place. 
Rudeness or disrespect do not constitute a basis for the multiplicity of the causes of action alleged. 
1
 Camfield Tires, Inc., v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, at 1365-1366 (8th Cir 1983). 
2
 Van T Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, at 657 (8th Cir 1983). 
3
 Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F2d 334 (7th Cir 1992). 
4
 Ross v. Olsen, 481 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah 1971). 
3 
Sample extracts from the depositions of each of the Plaintiffs, preceded by a brief narrative, 
follows No attempt has been made to make an exhaustive comparison 
WALTER SEMIDEY— Affidavit v Deposition 
His Affidavit, apparently attempting to indicate there was no escape and force was used to 
detain him and others, required as an element of an allegation of false imprisonment, Mr Semidey 
states5. 
At no time did he ask if anyone objected to being searched At no 
time did he indicate that the door was open to whoever wanted to leave 
Furthermore, the door was quite distant, around thirty feet from where we 
were seated 
In his Deposition he said 
Q Did you ever see any force used against any person to facilitate the 
search9 
A (By the translator) No, because the men went into the men's bathroom and 
the women into the women's We went in voluntarily 6 
Q At this checking or searching or — was there a forced detention other than 
what you thought, even though unexpressed to you, that if you objected in 
any way you would be terminated in your employment9 
A (By the translator) Like I said before, I felt intimidated There was nothing 
that was obligatory, but it was very clearly said yet or no Why should I 
make any objection9 Or if I make an objection I'd lose my job or I stay or I 
don't know 
ROSA MAZARIEGOS—Affidavit v Deposition 
In her Affidavit, Rosa Mazanegos, attempting to expand her damages well beyond what 
she stated in her Deposition, stated8 
When I got home I was devastated I had a bloody discharge that 
wasn't normal, but that was caused by my nerves and fear I was almost 
5
 Affidavit of Walter Semidey, page 3 lines 11-14 
6
 Deposition of Walter Semidey, page 43, lines 3-7 
7
 Deposition of Walter Semidey, page 56 lines 1-9 
8
 Affidavit of Rosa Mazanegos, page 4 lines 7-18 
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hysterical. I couldn't sleep all night long. But even so, I didn't want to 
lose my job, and I returned to work, although I was very nervous and 
angry. A few days later I tried to speak with Mr. Esquivel, to tell him how 
wrong the search had been. That same day he fired me. 
Upon leaving work I began to calm down, although it was some 
months before I felt sufficient emotional strength to return to look for work. 
During all this time my sister took care of me, with linden tea and other 
home remedies, to help me calm down and recover. 
In her Deposition she said: 
Q Did you ever complain to anyone at work? 
A (By the Translator) No. 
Q At any time? 
A (By the Translator) Only with my family. 
Q Did anyone ever treat you differently after the checking than before? 
A (By the Translator) No. 
Q Were you ever paid more or less either before or after the checking? 
A (By the Translator) No. They always paid me the same. 
Q Did anyone tell you that if you did not cooperate you would lose your job? 
A (By the Translator) No. 
Q Did anyone take anything from you? 
A (By the Translator) No. 
Q Did anyone lock any doors so that you could not leave? 
A (By the Translator) No, but I didn't have to go out because it was time to be 
working.9 
Q Did you work from the time you left the company in this case until you 
began working at the one you work now? 
A (By the Translator) I stay home a long time until now that I started working 
again. 
Q Why did you start working again? 
A (By the Translator) Because I need to. I can't stay idle or doing nothing. 
Q Why did you stay home? For children or family? 
A (By the Translator) For my family. 
Q Did you try to look for work during that time? 
A No. 
Q Other than the checking, did these people offend you in any other way? 
A (By the Translator) The truth is that he always had meetings and he made us 
waste time.10 
Q You came back to work the next day after the checking? 
9
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 27, line 22 — page 28, line 16 
10
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, page 36, line 12 — page 37, line 4 
5 000 
A (By the Translator) I think so. I don't remember. 
Q Were you angry the next time you came to work? 
A (By the Translator) Yes. I was upset. I was feeling bad for about a 
month.11 
ANGEL SANTIAGO—Affidavit v. Deposition: 
The very noticable thing about Mr. Santiago's Affidavit is that he portrays quite a 
striking difference in personality than during his Deposition. In his Affidavit, Mr. Santiago 
expands upon how he was humiliated, offended, and powerless:12 
The two bathrooms were upstairs, and while climbing the stairs one by one 
the rest of the other people in the cafeteria were looking at us and telling us 
that we were going to be searched, that it was going to be our turn, that they 
were going to palpate everything. I felt humiliated and offended. I also felt 
powerless to object. I thought that there was no alternative, that no one 
would believe me. 
In b ^ : ^position he said: 
Q Did any person prevent you from just leaving? 
A No one. 
Q Then the checking was voluntary? 
A It was voluntary, if you think that if someone leaves that they loose their job 
or then they say he took the money. 
Q Who said this? 
A It is obvious to think that. 
Q But no one said that? 
A It is not necessary for them to say it. 
Q Don't evade the question. Did anyone say this? 
A No. n 
Q Did anyone assault you? 
A No. 
Q Did anyone cause you to fear for your safety? 
A No, no fear. 
Q Did anyone cause you to believe that you would be harmed? 
A No, I don't fear.14 
li
 Deposition of Rosa Mazanegos, page 48, lines 15-22 
12
 Angel Santiago Affidavit, page 3, lines 8-15 
13
 Deposiuon of Angel Santiago, page 35, lines 7-17 
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HUMBERTO BARD ALES—Affidavit v. Deposition 
In his Affidavit, Mr. Bardales said:15 
I felt threatened. I knew that I was going to be physically frisked and touched. 
In his Deposition he, mentioning no threat or forced detention, he said: 
Q Did Mr. Hernandez [the person doing the checking in the rest room] touch 
your person with his hands or otherwise? 
A (By the translator) No. The only thing was that he — well, I gave it [his 
wallet] to him and he opened it. Okay? He gave it to me, and I put it back. 
Q Did Mr. Hernandez keep anything that belonged to you? 
A No. 
Q At any time Mr. Esquivel first spoke when people were in the cafeteria, did 
anyone move to secure the doors or the exits? 
A (By the translator) The doors were always kept shut, so there was no need 
to do that. 
Q Oh. This is a correct answer to the question. I appreciate that. Did anyone 
that you saw secure or lock the doors? 
A No/ 6 
Q Did anyone touch your person, other than what you've described, in any 
way? 
A No.17 
Q Did you see any person touched in a harmful or offensive manner? 
A (By the translator) No. In the plant, no. 
Q At any time? 
A N o / 
CONCLUSION 
The affidavits cannot be used to contradict the prior sworn testimony. The Depositions 
establish that there is no cause of action. 
14
 Deposition of Angel Santiago, page 40, lines 1-7 
15
 Humberto Bardales Affidavit, page 3, lines 5-6 
16
 Deposition of Humberto Bardales, page 41, lines 22-25 — page 42, lines 1-13 
17
 Deposition of Humberto Bardales, page 44, lines 1-3 
18
 Deposition of Humberto Bardales, page 44, lines 13-16 
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With Mr. Semidey's deposition, there appears to be no basis upon which his cause of 
action could be justified as a matter of law. 
Mr. Bardales said that no person ever prevented his leaving the plant. He was never 
touched in a harmful or offensive manner.5 
Mr. Santiago said that no person ever prevented him leaving and he never had any fear for 
his safety. 
Ms. Mazariegos said that she would have continued to work at the plant but for the fact that 
some days after the checking she was laid off. She suffered no monetary damage from the 
checking. She just felt bad. After being laid off she stayed home for her family for about a month 
and then went to work at another place where she is paid more. 
None of the Plaintiffs are able to say more than that they were offended and treated rudely 
and with lack of respect. There is no cause of action for rudeness. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 1995. 
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
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EXHIBIT A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT TRANSLATIONS OF THE 
WALTER SEMIDEY'S AFFIDAVIT AS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS' 
COUNSEL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Affidavit of Walter Semidey, dated October 31,1994, was first submitted to 
this Court by Plaintiffs' Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated 
November 1, 1994. The Affidavit was in Spanish. An unsigned English translation accompanied 
the Spanish version. 
2. An Amended Translation Of Affidavit Of Walter Semidey was submitted to this 
Court as an attachment to Plaintiffs' Second Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment. 
3. Plaintiffs' counsel has also made extensive argument over the translation of 
Plaintiffs' depositions. 
4. In an attempt to determine what all the fuss was about, Defendants' counsel made a 
standard interlinear comparison of Plaintiffs' first and second translations of the Walter Semidey 
Affidavit as follows: 
COMPARATIVE INTERLINEAR TEXT OF THE TWO TRANSLATIONS: 
Comes Walter Semiday [sic], Plaintiff in the above entitled case, and states the following: 
I began working at the DOTS company around the first of September, 1992. Before I was 
hired, I had an interview with the plant manager, whose name was Miguel Angel Esquivel. During 
this interview he asked me if I was a member of the Mormon (LDS). [The letters, "LDS" were not 
in the original Spanish language affidavit.) I answered yes, [that] I was a member. Then he asked 
me if I had a temple recommend. I told him that yes, I did, and he asked to see it. I thought this 
was a strange thing, because never in my life had someone asked to see my temple recommend in 
1 000 
an [employment] job interview, but I wanted the job. so I gave it to him so that he could see it. I 
did not know that it was against the law to ask [this question] about this. 
I worked in the DOTS business some three months. During my time there. I observed 
things that I had never seen before in my life. For example, every time that Mr. Esquivel got angry 
with some person or some department, he would gather [together] the entire plant together. He 
was almost always [he was] angry, and he would speak to us in a [strong] loud voice or yell at us. 
He would say that he had had to [lay off some] send several people home for a few days. [Many] 
Several times he told us that if we [pai4] were paying our tithing, and there wasn't work or we 
were laid [ef] off for a few days, we should go to our bishop and ask for help, because the church 
had the responsibility to compensate us for the days were were [sic] laid off [if] when we were 
paying our tithing. Many times he spoke to us hard and strong, accusing us of being robbers, [fe] 
On one occasion he threatened that he was going to search us all as we left work, because, [he 
said] according to him, someone was stealing the stamps. 
Besides being robbers, he also [accused] would accuse us of being liars. He would say 
that the majority of us were illegals. This[ref] thing about accusing [the] people of being illegals, 
he used it as a threat. [As I saw it] In my opinion, it was a way of reminding the people that they 
were not free, and that [he could] with one phone call he could cause them many problems. This 
[was he habitually controlled the] was the method he generally used to control people, and [made] 
make them behave the way he wanted them to. 
But the greatest [offense, forme] insult, in my opinion, was the day that [they] we were all 
searched [us all]. That day he [tei4] gave the day off to the department where the few American 
women worked. He sent everyone in that department home. After, he gathered the rest of us 
together. [We] There were thirty or forty [people] of us. and all of us were Hispanic [people]. He 
informed us of a [robbery] theft of twenty dollars, and told us that he was going to do something 
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that was against the law, but that he was going to do it, [that] which was[T] to search us all. At no 
time did he ask if anyone objected to being searched. At no time did he indicate that the door was 
open to whoever wanted to leave. Furthermore, the door was quite distant, around thirty feet, 
from where we were seated. After that he left the area and left us with the supervisors. There 
were two groups of women. Some were searched in the upstairs bathroom, others were searched 
[below] downstairs in an office. [The] We men, were all searched upstairs in the men's bathroom. 
I was upset, nervous, and angry. I almost couldn't believe it. I asked myself [and kept asking 
myself] again and again, how it was that they were going to know the difference between the 
twenty dollar bill that had been lost and a twenty dollar bill that maybe I had in my wallet? I could 
not understand how they thought to prove anything. I felt anxious and threatened. I believed that 
they were going to search my entire body. I believed that they were going to make me take off my 
clothes, and that they were going to touch [me in] every part of my body. I did not want to be 
searched, but I did not see any way to [liberate] free myself from [thefe] the situation. 
Upon entering the bathroom, I asked my supervisor how he was going to know that the bill 
in my wallet was the twenty that had been lost. He did not know what to answer. After the search 
I felt ashamed and humiliated. I felt emotionally [destroyed] devastated. I got angry with my wife 
and may children. I felt very upset, very defensive, very aggressive. I continued this way for 
[some] several days, like a week, until after Christmas. The search had not had any result. I did 
not know if this was going to happen again or not. I was not able to calm down until I was let go 
from work. Even though the way in which I was let go upset me, afterwards, when I didn't have 
to return there on a daily basis, and live under the threat of another search, I began to calm down 
and to feel better. 
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
LorenD.Martin (2101) 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 884147-0590 
Telephone: 538-0066 
Jack L. Schoenhals (2881) 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendants, by and through their attorney, Loren D. Martin, hereby file this Reply To 
Plaintiffs' Second Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment set forth 
14 separately numbered paragraphs containing facts established by specific references to sworn 
testimony and identified exhibits. 
2. Plaintiffs' Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated 
November 1, 1994, did not disagree with the statement of facts provided by Defendants as 
required by Rule 4-501(2)(b), Code of Judicial Administration. Instead, Plaintiffs provided an 
additional set of facts, most of which were irrelevant. 
ooo 
3. Nor did Plaintiffs' Second Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, dated March 13, 1995, disagree with the statement of facts as required by Rule 4-
501(2)(b). 
4. Plaintiffs have not met the minimum requirements of Rule 56(e), URCivP, which 
requires an appropriate response to a motion for summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiffs have 
provided: 
a. letters from two psychologists which are inadmissible; 
b. additional sets of "affidavits", purporting to be second "amended translations", 
which are irrelevant; 
c. what appears to be an argument that all judicial proceedings, depositions, affidavits 
and transcripts must be in Spanish; 
d. no evidence as to damages as required by the previous Order of this Court; and 
e. additional argument, attempting to support their allegations. 
5. At a hearing held on February 10, 1995, this Court granted Plaintiffs until March 
13, 1995, to show any basis they may have as to why this matter should continue. At a minimum, 
this Court required that Plaintiffs provide: 
a. a list of witnesses for trial and a proffer as to what each witness will say, including 
the specifics as to what they will say about their damages, along with supporting 
corroboration or expert witnesses, if any; and 
b. any tangible evidence that would support Plaintiffs' claim for damages. 
6. Attempting to comply with the Order, Plaintiffs have provided additional argument, 
new translations of Plaintiffs' affidavits, and letters from two recently contacted psychologists 
whose testimony would not be admissible. There has been no showing of any damages. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
PLAINTIFFS' HAVE STILL FAILED TO RAISE AN ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT WHICH PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 4-501(2)(b), Code of Judicial Administration, requires that: 
All material facts set forth in the movant's (Defendants') statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. [Emphasis 
added.] 
As yet, none of Plaintiffs' memorandum have complied with Rule 56(e) or Rule 4-
501(2)(b). Consequently, Defendants' Statement Of Facts must be deemed admitted for the 
purposes of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and it is appropriate to grant the Motion. 
Plaintiffs' purpose for extensive argument over and submission of multiple translations of 
affidavits is uncertain. It is uncertain whether translation is an attempt to mislead the Court into 
uncertainty as to the possibility that there may be genuine issues of fact, or whether the extensive 
arguments and submission of multiple translations is to increase the cost of litigation to 
Defendants. 
Defendants' counsel did not take time to make a careful interlinear comparison of all the 
different translations. One was picked at random—the first one—that of Walter Semidey. That 
interlinear comparison is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The changes from one translation to the 
next are insignificant and immaterial. 
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Whatever the reason, Plaintiffs' position cannot be improved by submission, of multiple or 
ci '»;.:! '• r : " ' :*•• •* :* specific changes made in •:..• 
translation oi IIK-I ./liidawi- ,:nd jiv^ u;t explanat.,... . - . .nanges and cor :.:•• -
statements. 
A jj .- -,;:., ••* ! -^ M.» ip.-'.-^' ' • • •!.••• *'ie stated that the reason she agreed :«• 
bring this action before MA* * o •: u(l.s nit- meiJeia i:. u:,;,.; *-he was checked or search*-.: 
Affidav!* \K . Mazariegos expands ihe modems to being, "an.-eked and degraded, or being 
il ..': , 
Federal and State case law has established that a party cannot create a genui ^ 
material fact by contradicting or changing his own prior testimony.3 The 11th Federal Circuit lias 
hel< 11 lial *' 
When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the 
existence of any genuine issue of material fact,'that party cannot thereafter create 
such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, 
previously given clear testimony. 
The 7th Federal Circuit has held that:5 
In Babrocky, we held that "a par ty should not LV uii> - ..\. u create issues o! 
credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony." ... In so holding, we noted 
that if we allowed a party to create a genuine issue of material fact by changing his 
prior testimony: "the very purpose of the summary judgment motion—to weed out 
unfounded claims, special denials, and sham defenses—would be severely 
undercut." ... We also noted that the plaintiff had not explained the contradiction or 
attempted to resolve the disparity. 
Stated another way, Uk : \m Mipremc i . J ^ j ; : ^ .. _ .;. . : . . . , 
Plaintiffs testimony is no stronger than its inconsistent weakness,"5 Whatever the reason for 
1
 Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, April 19, 1994, p. 46, line 25 through p. 47, line 14, and p. 55, lines 16-25. 
2
 Affidavit of Rosa Mazariegos, page 3, para 2. 
3
 Camfield Tires, Inc., v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, at 1365-1366 (8th Cir 1983). 
4
 Van T. Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, at 657 (8th Cir 1983). 
5
 Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F2d 334 (7th Cir 1992). 
6
 Ross v. Olsen, 481 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah 1971). 
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submission of multiple translations and affidavits, confronted with contradictory statements, the 
C ' ! • * . • * ' • . » the weakest of a parties 
multiple statements. 
POINT NO. 2 
RECENT LETTERS FROM PSYCHOLOGISTS AS TO PLAINTIFFS' 
EMOTIONAL STRESS IN 1992 ARE INADMISSIBLE BOTH IN FORM, 
CONTENT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As JOM.- . •••d-1 • v the provisions of Rule 56(b), I JRCivP, affidavits 
are legally admissible e\ nieua iii a Summarv Judgment proceeding, Letters are not. A letter from. 
a psychologist is not admissible. Affidavits or testimony of the two belated psychologists are not 
a : : : , : - ' • • * * 
Rule 8u3i4,i, ^t^i R,, c)i L\klence, provides an exception to hearsay in regard to 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, as follows: 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception 
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment 
Case law provides clarr ;caiiui: u iik d\n nw..;,,;,^ 01 (in: K.. J
 l4Jiu ;;ic reasoning Denial :;iis 
hearsay exception/ I 'tab's a uns have also held that to qualify as an exception to the prohibition 
ai>a-:^  .u\ir- - . r--?ier;f> statement must m- r ;J t^  ^ rr-^nced foundatiora! 
test: \\ •• dcv-i.i;j,i; . , ;.\ ... maiai.:; i:\c statements consist. : ; 
treatment, and L2> i> :i reason;;;Me for the physician to rely on the :niormation in his diagnosis or 
treatment? Such foundational requirements are imposed to assure that the patient has a, "'strong 
motivation to be trum: ; "} 
7
 Plaintiffs' Second Objection To Defendants11" Motion For Summai y Judgment, page 2, para 2, lines 1-2. 
8
 Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2ci 200, 204 (8th Cir. 1981), cited in: Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial 
Commission Of Utah, 832 P.2d 477 (Utah App. 1992); and Hansen v. Heath, 852 P,2d 977 (Utah 1993). 
9
 Hansen \ ». Heath, supra, at 979. 
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In the present matter, the Plaintiffs' statements to psychologists were not made for the 
p:irp*)M <>r diaurv-H^ •• :reatment. Plaintiffs" statement- « \{v: psychologists were solely 
for the purpose 01 aidir.g tuc p\.; -,Uit oi in;s litigation .i.» .^\ : :. * olojjsl» as 
expen witnesse- \ l - (iumiiiou lia- never seen am of ihe Plaintiffs and -ic purpose of the 
P ^ ;;,-,•:;;•; ' . ..]• ' * *v., ..j,,,.1 ' • * \ t , . : . . . . , s , * \>^ , ; ^ purpose of diagnosis 
and treatment. The aliida\it o . iLv iv.,\i.;ea. , : i .i„ ;^.^ • isai upon 
hearsay10: 
On March 13, 1995,1 examined the following materials at the request of M. Jones: 
Psychological Evaluation of Jose Humberto Bardales, Rosa D. Mazariegos, Angel 
M. Santiago, and Walter Semidey done by Juan A. Mejia, Ph.D. and dated March 
10, 1995; English translation of statements of the above named individuals. 
The purpose o! \L^ C\„ i.^um was sole!) to provide information foi pi irsuit : f this present 
litigation. Juan A. Mejia so stated in his letter as follows11: 
Mr. Bardales, Ms. Mazariegos. Mr. Santiago, and Mr. Semidey were referred by 
their attorney, Ms. Jones, for a psychological evaluation in connection to their 
lawsuit against DOT Adventures Inc., being heard at the Fourth Judicial District 
Court by Judge Boyd L. Park. Specifically, Ms. Jones was interested in an 
assessment of emotional damage to the plaintiffs, if any, in connection to events in 
this case. Available in preparing this report were affidavits by all four plaintiffs in 
this case as well as affidavits by some of their family members. 
Plaintiffs did not go to the ps\cnoiogiy. . \ u:.!ui^' ••-.• :i: 
psychologist solely for the pin pose of litigation As to Rule 803(4), both Federal and Utah case 
] ; ^ ^n:;,\ n *:;tinctv -^ twer \ MvaMij physician. .» • .camming physiciai ..in. .: 
professional :: . i :J». - • • *. 
of a current condition The Federal Rules of Evidence in this regard, also Rule 803(4), have the 
Letter affidavit of Lirvr : t ium. n-\. PhD. March L> 1995, page 1, para 3 
Letter titled. "Confidential Psychological Evaluation ' hian. A Mejia, PhD, March 10, 1995., page 1, para 1. 
o 
i iOf ...» —% 
same provisions as the Utah Rule and have been similarly interpreted.12 Secondary sources on the 
sub ject have set forth the same reasoning13: 
Courts have historically drawn distinctions between uiaimosing and treating 
physicians and examining, i.e., nontreating—physicians in the admission of 
testimony concerning the plaintiffs out-of-court complaints of pain and suffering. 
The distinctions have largely reflected the belief that statements made to a physician 
from whom the injured person seeks treatment are inherently more trustworthy than 
statements made to a physician whom the plaintiff has consulted for the main, if not 
sole, purpose of obtaining a favorable trial witness. 
Such distinctions have been long standing. As an example, the U.S. 8th Circuit Court has 
held14 m :'; 
Since it is clear that the doctor cna iu ippenee 101 me puipu.se a 
effecting a cure of his injury but only to , as a favorable witness, the 
doctor's testimony as to the history ol the case given him K appellee v\as 
inadmissible because of hearsay. 
Since the proffered testimony of the two psychologists would not be admissible as a matter 
of law, a basic issue of damages would necessarily have to be resolved in the Defendants' favor.13 
Ansen: mc iesimioin .. u\ ..•
 r. . .n -L.L, ., •. :nc ai:creu .. :,;.:; . .:i:ci..:g ;-:.<: ...:r. . a 
required 10 establish a cause ol".:cnon can run ne MIOWII. 
There is no evidence to show actual damages. The Statement Of Facts previously set forth 
"Plaintiffs acknowledge that the« all are presently earning more money with then new employment 
than they were when working for DOT .Adventures, Inc."16 There has been no physical injury or 
loss Noi le has been cla ime c! I he i evidence of damages 
12
 Padgett v. Southern Ry.y 396 F.2d 303 (6th Cir 1968). 
13
 Damages In Tort Actions, MInzer, Nates, Kimball , Axelrod (V: ( ' 1 - u *J " : - ' ••]*). 
1
* Chicago N.W. Ry. v. Garwood, 167 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1948) 
15
 Damages In Tort Actions, op cit. §4.32(3)(ii)(A). 
16
 D e f e n d a n t s' M e m o ra n d u m I n S u p p o r t O f M o t i o n F o r S u m m ar y J i i d g n i e i I t, p a g e 7, p a r a 14.. 
POINT NO. 3 
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM 
DENYING THAT THEY GAVE CONSENT 
No Pla,Ii:it:i:fT e"'\ ei objected about an> incident during the period of their employment I Jo 
objection was ever received by a ny of the Defendants until the formal Complaint was filed more 
than six months later, lone after a!! Plaintiffs had t^ rminarr*c? t*mpIo\ mer.t with DOT VI * "nrure* 
they all voluntarily went to the cafeteria, went to the rest rooms, and complied with all requests. 
Silent compliance may be taken for consent, The Plaintiffs did noth ing to ob ject to any of what 
they now claim was continual, abusive, humiliating, intentional and offensive treatment. 
In fact, h ;::c depositio . :• the first named Plaintiff, Mr. \\ „\w; Semidey, he said, "We 
went in voluntari1 • *" V\' *" " rh,*r" w a • -:rrur"s tK'-.r w:v ^b1: - " *n 
Plaintiffs are i » . . . ^ . ~ .^.. . J-'L.-...- equitable 
estoppel prevents one from asserting or establishing a position contrary to that represented by their 
conduct and actions upon wh ich another relied. Even if it could be shown, that Defendants engaged 
ir. av-Li ;..i! ic u ( i ^ „ :
 t- . not ron^t . .. t .:n;,:i- a^ u* _ 
a J ccir.menrs. the only thing upon which Defendants could rel\. in ::caied that the Plaintiffs ail 
z nser.r^ * ' i ± i ^ r.% * * ^ - of the Plair^ff* e1 "•- *r w :"<• *Ht\ ' " \vr r^w- ( -*"*v:u' r!v, 
thereof constituted a misrepresentation of their unseen and unexpressed injuries. Regarding the 
question of consent, the 'Restatement, T^v- "' ! $>°r\ rrv. id--1 *\vs 
l^jeanlng 0|- Consent. (1; Cu \L ^ m iact for conduct to 
occur. It may be manifested by actio ,. .:J need not be communicated to 
the actor, (2) If words or conduc: are reasonabh understood by another to be 
17
 Defendants'' Memoranda; -. • • Sap -n Of Motion F\-r Summary Judgment, page 6, para 11. 
18
 Deposition of Waiter Semidey. p;.je 43, line 7. 
19
 D e p o s i t i o n o f W a 1 t e r •^ • • • •>• *-"' r' • * ^ M n.»v ?;. ~ 
i 
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intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent 
in fact. 
CONCLUSION 
1 his matter is bi 01 ight befoi e the Court by former employees, belatedly claiming that they 
were offended by their previous work environment. No complaint was ever made during the 
period of employment. Plaintiffs' first complain' i aine :'iore ihun <• -\ months later. Opening the 
door and encouraging litigation after the f; " • . .. • to encourage a wide-open 
flood gate of unfounded and frivolous suits. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 1995. 
Bv ^L> ^ X
~
 /
 Lken D. Martin / 
Attorney at Lav. 
CERTMC \ V r E O F S E ^ ICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above Reply To 
Plaintiffs' Second Objection To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, was placed in fhr 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on the 31st day of March, 1995, addressed to the following: 
Law Offices 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 We-*. ^ • •'•^  
Provo, Utah 84 c~ -. & 
U /{. \t\AAi_ 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT TRANSLATIONS 01 V-J 
WALTER SEMTDFY • XFFTDA^^ "• S SI JBMTTP"7' r ; v : i JXTIFhV 
COUNSEL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 The Affidavit of Walter Semidey, dated October 31, 1994, was first submitted to 
tr.:>> Court by Plaintiffs' Objectvp To Defendants* Motion For vimi :arv judgment, liated 
. . . > i > . i ! i. -J i^ ^ r . / ; . . . . . . 1 
the Spanish version. 
•i Amended Translation Oi -\ffida\ w Of Walter Semidey was submitted to this 
COIII: • : : :: M-* -^-, ! : • * •• - * :. ' on I :" Dr Si immar> 
Judgment. 
vniHifty counsel has also made extensive argument over the translation of 
.i an attempt to determine what all the fuss was about, Defendants' counsel made a 
standard interlinear comparison of Plaintiffs' first and second translations of the Walter Semidey 
Affid.** .r, follows: 
COMPARATIVE INTERLINEAR TEXT OF THE TWO TRANSLATIONS: 
Comes Walter Serniday [sic], Plaintiff in the above entitled case, and states the following: 
• . - • ' ' . * ' • . • < , $ 
hired, I hau an iiik\ \w- . . ; : ,); \ iant maiiaar, Mu)>e I:U:S:C was MiguelAngel Lsqunel. During 
this inten w\\ he asked MIL \i I '. ^ .i member ^Hhe Morn SOL ; DS ! Hie letters, "LDS" were not 
• : j ":r.a! N; .;•. • a. *ua?- aiY.' ivit ) I i * * • •• a member. rhen he asked 
me il 1 had a temple recommen.: I told him thai \e>, I ^ u .... . . ,. ^.d to see it I thought this 
was a strange thing, because never in my life had someone asked to ee my temple recommend in 
1 \J \J \J 
EXHIBIT A 
an. [employment] job interview, but I wanted the job, so I gave it to him so that he could see it. I 
-\. :i K. , , du I)( >TS business S^MC mree months 1 )uring my
 4,:.ie there, I observed 
things that I had never seen before .in-my life. For example, even- ;• me thai Mr. Esquivel got angry 
v* - ' d. : " * * '•* '••:! r T ' - -v ; i - - t i i e entire '.. ' together. • \. 
was almost always [He wir,, angry, ana ik v^e^; .*, ^ ^ .. .. ... . [strong] loud .oice or yell at us. 
He would sav dui lie had had to [lay off some] send several people home for a few days. [Many] 
Severn p:iK^ • -.- i-.. .' ' " • -^Htll were pas me <a. -•::. a"'. ir.er. wr-- • - . -i-.-.r • e 
were laid [e#| off for a lew day,, we siiouki go to our bishop and a-;, !.;i i^ip, because e.L , .advh 
had the responsibility to compensate us ioi die daws were were [sic 1 laid off [if] when we were 
paying 01 n tithing I\ lan> t - • ' ' •>• • e: -• -:v '.'* * | 
On one occasion he threatened that he was going to search us an ... ,*,c ;eii ^ . ih , DCCIUM:. [ te 
$®*&] according to him, someone was stealing the stamps. 
tl .n bK majoritN i" ie NCI .- ,i.s ,: 1 nis[. o! I tiling about accusing it-Re] people oi oemg illegals, 
he used it as a threat. [As I saw4fc] In mv opinion, it was a wa> of reminding the people that tne\ 
v " " ' ' r v * - ' tl' : !he€+>u!di v- ith one phone call he could e.:i: i ?nem mam problems. 
[wttx lie itaeiHh±iiy-eb4iiit>iieti ti:c j \\ as me meinoci he generally useu to control pt op, . . • v •.*- j 
make them behave the way he w anted them to. 
1
 .• :
Ui
^ ercateM |offenserfe^fse] insult in my opinion, wav vie dav tnat [thev] we were all 
searched ,—run, he I Iei4] gave the oa\ wlf to the dei-a
 t *.t ... ,•• k v.-erican 
women, worked. He sent everyone in that department home. After, he gathered the rest of us 
together. !Vv>; Theie \\cr>% \h\y or forty [people] of us. and .{!! •M**^  were Hispanic [people He 
informed . . i^H^rf; . UA„ twenty dollai s, -S-U.IL ,U •• e e:~ 
2 ( | 
EXHIBi. ^ 
that was against the !.•*• -iit tl •». lie was going to do it. U-haf] which was[-r] to search us all \i -:o 
open to whoever wanted to leave. Furthermore, the door was quite distant, around thirty feet, 
from,, where we were seated. After that he left the area and left us with the supervisors. There 
were iwo groups oi women ,\ nne wen; seaiehed in flu iipstans h ithrnom, others were searched 
[beiew-j downstairs in an offic IThe] We men, were all searched upstairs in the men's bathroom. 
I was up^et. ;: ** 'is. '" * :<:H: I aimoM could1"1 ivh-\v e 1 asked myself [and kept asking 
myseln again ana again. •: , , , : • > , , ; ir '\ ••-: . 
twent\ iloila; \-\Y\ that had beer lost and a twenty dollar bill thai nue 'v i had in my wallet? t ^ould 
r-* i^derstand h'w i: ix ihourM to prove anything. I felt anxious and threatened. I believed that 
clothes, and that they were going to touch jrae-m] every part of my bod\. 1 did not A aiu to ')c 
searched, but I did not see any way to [liberate] free myself from, [there] the situation. 
Upon enterh.L - .* •:::.« ,^ > . . . _ . , * . - r , ;1"r - ''' ••- • • 
in my wallet was the iwenr\ tLa had been lost. He did not k:u>w ^ :,v.i to answer. Alter the search 
I felt ashamee aec ruminated I tell emotional!) [destroyed] devastated. I got angrv with v \ wire 
[seme] several days, like a WCCK. until after Christmas. The searei iud 11-t iuk; an\ result d\. 
1 oi Know if thi^ was going to liappen again 01 n- • i was not able to calm dow* until 1 was let go 
to return there on a dail\ naM^ and li\r uncU 1 tin lineal H another .search. 1 ee ran to cairn eown 
and to feel better. 
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I [i] THE TRANSLATOR: Not in translation, but I 
j [2] have translated for the Church and m y schoo l . 
i pi MS. JONES: But y o u don't have any specif ic | u] training in translation. 
f PI THE TRANSLATOR: No. 
j [6] MS. JONES: I'm g o i n g to reserve t h e right 
[7] at this point that if there's anything — like if 
[8] there's a problem, I will stop the deposit ion, because 
[B] if there's a problem wi th translation I don't w a n t to 
[to] continue. 
[HI MR. MARTIN: W e e x p e c t that. Okay .That ' s 
[121 w h y I wanted to have — okay. Very good . S ince w e all 
[13] speak Spanish — 
[14] (laughter) 
[is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) All right.Maybe w e start 
[16] again. Is that okay? N ow , state your name, your full 
[17] name. 
[ifl A: Rosa Mazariegos. 
[i9j Q: Your address. 
po) A: (By the translator) 430 North, Provo, Utah, 
C2i] Apartment * 3 , 8 4 0 1 . 
P2] Q: It's missing o n e number. 
P3] A: (By the translator) 6 0 1 . 
124] Q: What schools have y o u attended? 
E25] A: (By the translator) In her country, 
Page 4 
April 19 ,1994 PROCEEDINGS 5:25 p.m. 
MR. MARTIN: We're here for a deposition, 
and let me ask you if you will state your name first, 
please. 
THE WITNESS: Rosa. 
MR. MARTIN: And your last name? 
THE WITNESS: Mazariegos. 
ROSA MAZARIEGOS, 
having been first duly sworn, through the interpreter, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MARTIN: 
Q: Maybe before w e start you could tell us: 
What is the source of your Spanish? 
A: (By the translator) I born in Mexico City, 
and I have been living here for about 30 years. 
MR. MARTIN: Do you have training also in 
English? 
THE TRANSLATOR: Yes, of course, I have. 
MR. MARTIN: Would you tell us that also. 
THE TRANSLATOR: Yes. I have a master's 
degree in psychology and attended the University of 
Utah. 
MS, JONES: Do you have any training in 
translation? 
Page 3 
[1] secondary education. 
[2] Q: W h a t country? 
p] A: (By t h e translator) Honduras . 
W Q: D o y o u s p e a k English? 
P] A: (By t h e translator) Little biL S h e 
[5] understands a little bit and speaks a little bit. N o t 
[7] much. 
P3 Q: D o y o u understand w h y w e are here? 
n A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[io] Q: D o y o u understand that it's a deposition? 
[11] A: (By the translator) H o w deposit ion or — 
[12] Q: That is to ask y o u questions under oath. 
[13] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[u] Q: D o y o u understand w h a t it means to b e under 
[is] oath? 
[16] A: (By the translator) Yes, she understands. 
[17] Q: Do you understand that if you were to say 
[is] something which was false, then that could b e used 
[185 against you? 
m A: (By the translator) Yes, she understands. 
pi] Q: And also maybe charges of perjury, if 
[22] appropriate . 
[23] A: (By t h e translator) I unders tand that if 
P4] o n e lies, not only man can punish but also God. 
ps] Q: Do y o u understand that after the deposi t ion 
Page5 
R O S A MAZAREEGOS S E M I D E Y v s . L Y N T O N 
[1] you'd have the opportuni ty to read through that w i t h 
[2] your counse l and make any corrections? 
Pi A: (By the translator) Yes. 
:-*] Q: Going back to D e c e m b e r 16 or 17, w h e r e w e r e 
15\ you e m p l o y e d in 1992? 
[6i A: (By the translator) In the factory of 
[7] stamps. 
[8] Q: W h e r e w a s that located? 
Pl A: (By the translator) She doesn't remember. 
[iq Q: You'll n e e d to speak up maybe a little 
n 1] louder for the recorder. Would y o u tell her that. And 
[i2i you also. 
[13] THE TRANSLATOR: Si. 
[u] Q: (By Mr. Martin) What was your assignment at 
[is] that p lace w h e r e y o u worked? 
[16] A: (By the translator) She cut stamps. 
[17] Q: With w h o m did she work? 
[is] THE TRANSLATOR: As a companion or her boss? 
[19] MR. MARTIN: Companion first. 
[20] A: (By the translator) T h e y work individually 
pi] in each table. 
P2] Q: (By Mr. Martin) And w h o w a s your 
[23] supervisor? 
P4] A: (By t h e translator) Miguelangel Esquivel. 
[25] Q: H o w long before t h e 16th or 17th o f D e c e m b e r 
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[1] o f 492 had y o u w o r k e d there? 
[2] A: (By the translator) Sincerely, she had b e e n 
P] work ing there a short t ime. 
w Q: What do y o u mean, a "short time"? 
[5] A: (By t h e translator) She doesn' t r e m e m b e r if 
[6] two months or one month. 
[7] Q: W h e r e had y o u w o r k e d before then? 
P] A: (By the translator) She was working in the 
m agricultural, in the apples . 
m Q: For h o w long? 
[11] A: (By the translator) Also a short t ime w h e n 
[12] she just c a m e back from her country w h e n she started 
Ci3] work ing there. 
[14] Q: W h e r e w a s that agricultural work? 
[is] A: (By t h e translator) In Provo. 
[16] Q: D i d y o u w o r k in Honduras? 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) Yes . 
[is] Q: D o i n g what? 
[19] A: (By t h e translator) She w o r k e d also in 
[2D] agriculture in a factory. Bananas. 
pi] Q: W h e n y o u w o r k e d agriculrure in Provo, h o w 
[22] w e r e y o u paid? 
\zs\ MS. JONES: Is that relevant? 
M MR. MARTIN: Mm-hm. 
[25] MS. JONES: I'll o b j e c t for the record. Go 
Page 7 
! [1] ahead and answer it. | p] A: (By the translator) Cash. | pi Q: (By Mr. Martin) Were y o u paid by the hour? 
W A: (By the translator) By hour. 
j (si Q: H o w much? 
j [6] A: (By the translator) $4 .25 . 
I m Q: What was the name of the c o m p a n y y o u w o r k e d 
j [8] for w h e n you cut stamps? 
in THE TRANSLATOR: In her country or here? 
no] MR. MARTIN: Here. 
[11] A: (By t h e translator) She doesn ' t remember . 
[121 The only thing she remembers is that his name w a s ScotL 
[131 I think — 
[u] Q: (By Mr. Martin) The name w h e n you're 
[is] working cutting stamps. 
I [16] A: (By the translator) She doesn't remember. 
j [17] Q: H o w were you paid? 
j [18] MS. JONES: N o . There's s o m e confus ion here 
[is] as to what the quest ion — w h a t y o u want to ask — the 
[20] s e n s e in Spanish is different than t h e s e n s e in English. 
pi] Q: (By Mr. Martin) With w h a t w e r e y o u paid? 
P2] THE TRANSLATOR: With what? 
P3] MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
P4] A: (By the translator) Wi th c h e c k s . 
[25] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Were y o u paid b y t h e hour? 
Page 8 
[1] A: (By the translator) $ 4 . 7 5 . 
H Q: H o w often w e r e y o u paid? 
p] A: (By the translator) Every 15 days. 
[4] Q: H o w long did y o u work in o n e day? 
[5] A: (By t h e translator) Most o f t h e t ime e ight 
[6] hours, but sometimes there was not enough work and they 
n had to go. 
m Q: On the 16th or 17th of December '92, what 
pi happened? Do you remember an unusual thing that 
[ip] happened in your work? 
i [11] A: (By the translator) I don't remember 
I [12] exact ly the date, but I think it w a s t h e 17th. 
j [13] Q: What first h a p p e n e d unusual? 
[u] A: (By the translator) That day s o m e m o n e y w a s 
| [is] lost. S20 were lost. 
I [16] Q: H o w did she k n o w this? H o w do y o u k n o w 
[17] this? 
| [is] A: (By t h e translator) B e c a u s e t h e supervisor; 
[19] Mr. Esquivel, said that they had lost — $20 were lost. 
poj Q: Did you k n o w or were you told w h o had lost 
pi] the money? 
[22] A: (By the translator) She said the m o n e y 
j pa] be longed to a girl w h o s e name she doesn't remember, but 
[24] she does remember her face. 
P5] Q: A coworker? 
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SEMTOEY v s . L Y N T O N ROSA MAZARIEGOS 
[1] 
Pi 
[31 
£ * 1 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
[10] 
[11] 
[12] 
[13] 
[14] 
[15] 
[16] 
[17] 
[18] 
[19] 
[20] 
[21] 
[22] 
[23] 
[24] 
[25] 
A: (By the translator) Yes, another coworker. 
Q: A person who worked near you? 
A: (By the translator) Not very close. 
Q: How well did you know this person? 
A: (By the translator) Only as a worker, as a 
p a n of the personnel where she worked. 
Q: What I understand is that someone told you 
that $20 had been questioned. 
A: (By the translator) Could you clear out 
how? 
Q: No. I 'm saying wha t I understand is that 
she — you are saying someone told you that $20 was 
missing. 
A: (By the translator) Mr. Esquivel said that 
the S20 were lost. 
Q: Can you remember the exact words he said? 
A: (By the translator) He called everybody and 
said he was going to have a meeting. 
Q: What time? 
A: (By the translator) I don ' t remember the 
time exactly. 
Q: Morning or afternoon? 
A: (By the translator) It was late in the 
morning. 
Q: Where were you w h e n you first heard this 
10 
[1] message? 
pj MS. JONES: No. Excuse me . You're adding 
[3] things to what he 's saying. Don' t do that. 
W A: (By the translator) Working. 
[5] Q: (By Mr. Martin) In what location? 
[6] A: (By the translator) In he r table whe re she 
[7] cut the stamps. 
[8] Q: Could you make a drawing of the warehouse? 
Pi (The witness complies.) 
[10] A: (By the translator) More or less this way. 
[ii] I work here . There 's some shelves where they pu t 
[12] stamps, and then the office of this man, and then some 
[13] desks and tables, and she was there. 
[u] Q: Where were you — well, let me, if I may, 
[is] make just a rectangular shape, and if you would indicate 
[16] on this rectangular shape approximately whe re you w e r e 
[17] located. 
[is] A: (By the translator) Always on this side. 
[is] Q: I 'm putt ing an "X," o r a star, on that 
[20] location. Do you k n o w which direction would be north? 
pi] A: (By the translator) North over here , and 
[223 make south here . 
[23] Q: Put an ttN" on north, and south with question 
34] mark. Where is the door in which you usually enter? 
[25] A: (By the translator) There . She enters 
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[11 
521 
PI 
W 
[5] 
m 
m 
PI 
PI 
[10] 
[111 
[12] 
[13] 
[14] 
[15] 
[16] 
[17] 
[18] 
[19] 
(20J 
PI] 
[22] 
[23] 
P4] 
PS] 
usually from there. 
Q: Big door or small door? 
A: (By the translator) It's a small door, 
because there's a big door, but they usually don't open 
it. 
Q: I put the word "entrance" by the place. Is 
this correct, this location? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Q: Is there a large door? 
A: (By the translator) There is a big door, 
but they usually don't open it. Only the little one. 
Q: Where is the big door? 
A: (By the translator) Where the small one is. 
Q: Would you mark that. 
(The witness complies.) 
A: (By the translator) By this side, it is. 
Q: She's indicated with a line running 
horizontal with the word "entrance" and on the north 
side of the small door. Are there any other doors? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. I could see other 
doors, but they don't open. 
Q: I don't care if they are open or not. It's 
not important to me. 
A: (By the translator) Yes, there's more 
doors. 
Page 12 
[1] Q: Where? 
E A: (By the translator) In t he side, bu t I 
\?] don' t remember h o w many are there . 
W Q: She indicated, as she was speaking, the 
Pi entire line south of the word "entrance." 
Pl A: (By the translator) The entrance door is 
m only one that is that, 
p] Q: Small? 
PI A: (By the translator) It's little. 
rtd Q: All o f the o ther doors are large? 
[11] A: (By the translator) Sincerely, I don ' t 
[12] remember. 
[13] Q: Do you remember any doors on the south side? 
[u] A: (By the translator) No. 
[is] Q: On the west side? 
[16] A: (By the translator) If there 's any, she 
[17] doesn't remember them. She didn't pay attention. 
[is] Q: Does Mr. Esquivel have an office? 
[19] A: Si. 
j po] Q: Where is that? 
| pi] A: (By the translator) In this side. 
| p2] Q: Would you mark this. 
I [23] (The witness complies.) 
! p4] Q: She's made a mark on the north side o f t h e 
!
 [25] north line, and I will mark this "Esquivel." 
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ROSA MAZAREEGOS SEMIDEY vs . LYNTON 
[1] Where was he when you first heard him say 
[2i $ 2 0 is lost? 
Pi MS. JONES: N o . Excuse m e . 
M THE TRANSLATOR: I'm sorry. 
[5i MS. JONES: Ask the ques t ion again, 
[6i because — listen to it again, please. 
[7] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Where w e r e y o u w h e n the 
[si question was asked about the $20? 
Pi A: (By the translator) Working. 
[10J Q: At the location marked here with the star? 
[1 ii A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[121 Q: What was the next thing that happened? 
[i3i A: (By the translator) For his o w n mouth, she 
[u] learned that that m o n e y w a s lost. 
[151 Q: What happened after that? 
[i6i A: (By the translator) He called everybody to 
[171 a reunion. 
[is] MS. JONES: A meet ing . 
[191 THE TRANSLATOR: A m e e t i n g . 
pel MR. MARTIN: W h a t w o r d did s h e use? 
[2ii THE TRANSLATOR: Reunion . R e u n i o n is -— 
[22i MR. MARTIN: Yes. I understand. 
[23i Q: (By Mr. Martin) Where? 
[24i A: (By the translator) In t h e dining r o o m or 
[2si dining — eating area. 
[1] Q: Where is that located? 
pi A: (By the translator) T h e eating area is 
pi here, and they have tables there. 
[4] Q: I 'm marking this ea t ing area. This is t h e 
[5i area w h e r e she made three parallel lines from north to 
[6] south. 
[7i Q: D i d e v e r y o n e g o to that area? 
[si A: (By t h e translator) Everybody. 
PI Q: You saw no o n e leave? 
[101 A: (By the translator) N o . 
[111 Q: W h e r e in the area did y o u go? 
[121 A: (By t h e translator) I sat here . 
[13] MR. MARTIN: W e m a y m a k e th i s a star. I 'm 
[i4i putting the numeral 1 at her work location and the 
[151 numeral 2 at the place w h e r e she sat in the eating area. 
[161 Q: ( B y Mr. Martin) W e r e y o u sitt ing o r 
[17] standing in t h e eating area? 
[iai A: (By t h e translator) Sit. 
[191 Q: W h o w a s in charge? 
[20] A: (By t h e translator) Mr. Esquivel . 
pi] Q: H o w long did it take everyone to get there 
[22i from the t ime he first announced the meeting? 
[23i A: (By the translator) Maybe three minutes to 
124] get all together. 
[253 Q: W h e n everyone was together, w h o spoke? 
j [i] A: (By the translator) Mr. Esquivel. 
:
 [2] Q: What did he say? 
' 31 A: (By the translator) He said there has b e e n 
W lost some money and that's w h y he was getting them all 
[5i together. 
I [6i Q: Did anyone else speak at that moment? 
I [7] A: (By the translator) N o . 
j pi Q: What did he say next? 
PI A: (By t h e translator) H e said, G e n t l e m e n , 
! no] there has b e e n lost some money. $20, h e said. 
j [1 ii Q: After he said that, what did he say? 
[i2j A: (By the translator) He said, Nobody's going 
[13] to leave this place if you don't give me that money. 
[u] Q: H o w many peop le w e r e there? 
I [is] A: (By the translator) I don't k n o w the number 
[16] of p e o p l e working there, but h e does . 
I [17] Q: More t h a n 20? 
I [is] A: (By t h e translator) Yes . Many m o r e . 
[191 Q: More than 50? 
po] A: (By the translator) I don't k n o w exactly 
pi] h o w many workers are there, but there w e r e a lot of 
I [22i people. 
j [23] Q: Was Jeanette Lynton present? 
P4] A: (By the translator) N o . 
psi Q: After h e said, N o b o d y is going to leave, 
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[1] what did he say? 
H A: (By the translator) He said everybody's 
I pi going to be checked to see w h o has that money. 
j W Q: Do you remember the exact words? 
| [5i A: (By the translator) That, what she said. 
[6] Q: What did he say next? 
[7] A: (By the translator) Raise your hand w h o e v e r 
j pi doesn't want to be checked . 
pi Q: What did she understand by the w o r d 
[id "checked"? 
j [ii] A: (By the translator) "To check," for her, 
! [12] means to look up to everything they have for what he's 
| [13] looking. 
i [u] Q: Did anyone raise their hand? 
j [is] A: (By the translator) N o b o d y raised their 
| [i6i hand, because he said that if somebody didn't raise 
! [171 their hand w o u l d be for some reason. 
j [iai Q: W h e n did he say that? 
! [i9j A: (By the translator) After h e said to raise 
! pel their hand, and that if s o m e b o d y didn't raise their hand 
| pii is because they were afraid o f something. 
j p2j Q: Did anyone else speak? 
I [23] A: (By the translator) N o . 
I [24] Q: Did any companions speak? 
| psi A: (By The translator) N o . 
! Page 17 
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[1] Q: What happened next? 
Pl A: (By the translator) Then he send the woman 
[3] supervisor to c h e c k the w o m a n , and the man supervisor to 
[4] check ail the men. 
[5] Q: Who was the woman supervisor? 
[6] A: (By the translator) The one that check her 
[7i they call her "Cookies," but she doesn't k n o w the name. 
[si Q: H o w many w o m e n companions? 
[93 A: (By the translator) Everybody, many, but I 
[ioi don't k n o w the number, 
[Hi Q*. Did the w o m e n g o to a different area? 
[121 A: (By the translator) We w e r e in the same 
[i3i place. It was in that area, and they sat around like 
[uj that. 
[151 Q: Was that in the eating area? 
[161 A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[i7i Q: Did y o u m o v e into male and female groups? 
[iai A: (By the translator) T h e y take o n e by o n e 
[191 the w o m a n to the ladies r o o m and the man to t h e man's 
pq r o o m wi th the supervisors. 
pii Q: H o w long did this take in total? 
[22j A: (By the translator) More than an hour, 
[231 because I look at the c lock and it w a s past an hour. 
[24] Q: Did t h e y go in groups or singly? 
[25] A: (By the translator) O n e by o n e they 
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[2] Q: "They," meaning whom? 
Pi A: (By the translator) They — they, the two 
[4] w o m a n supervisors, and him, the supervisor man. 
[5] Q: Were there t w o supervisors? 
[6] A: (By t h e translator) Only o n e I remember . 
[7] Q: Did p e o p l e leave and g o out o f the bui lding 
[8] after they had been checked? 
[9] A: (By the translator) No, they went back to 
[ioi work. 
[uj Q: Was any money found that she knows about? 
[12] THE TRANSLATOR: Excuse me? 
[13] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Was any money found that 
[uj she knows about? 
[15] A: (By the translator) She doesn't know. She 
[16] didn't find out. 
[17] Q: Where is the w o m e n ' s rest room? 
[18] A: (By the translator) It's in the upper part, 
[19] and I cou ld not try there because it's in the u p p e r 
[20] pan. 
pi] Q: Did more than one person with a supervisor 
[22] g o to the u p p e r part? 
[23] A: (By t h e translator) N o . Only o n e by o n e 
[24] with a supervisor. 
[25] Q: Did any other woman object? 
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! [1] A: (By the translator) No. Nobody was 
; [2] supposed to be checked. 
| pi Q: After you were checked, did you go back to 
i Kl work? 
! [5] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
• [6] Q: Were you offended in feelings? 
I [7] A: (By the translator) Yes, of course. 
[8] Q: Did you say that to anyone? 
pi A: (By the translator) At h o m e . 
[ioi Q: Did you ever say that y o u had b e e n o f fended 
[11] and say that to any other person than at home? 
I [12] A: (By t h e translator) N o , but I felt very b a d 
[13] that they w o u l d c h e c k me , because I k n e w that I didn't 
[uj have that money. 
[151 Q: Did anyone p u s h you? 
[is] A: (By t h e translator) H o w — w h a t do y o u 
[17] mean? 
[181 Q: Push w i t h t h e hands . 
[ioi A: (By t h e translator) N o . 
poj Q: Did anyone hit you? 
pii A: (By t h e translator) N o . 
[22] Q: D id anyone cause y o u pain? 
P3i A: (By t h e translator) Physical pa in — 
P4i Q: Yes. 
E25] A: (By the translator) — o r moral? 
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[1] Q: Physical pain. 
pi A: (By t h e translator) N o . 
B) Q: Did anyone t o u c h you? 
Kl A: (By the translator) Yes . 
[5] Q : W h o ? 
[6] A: (By the translator) Cookie , t h e o n e that 
[7] check her. 
pi Q: Did she touch you while you were in the 
pi eating area? 
[ioi A: (By the translator) No, in the rest room. 
[11] Q: Was anyone else present? 
[12] A: (By the translator) No, only the two of us. 
[13] Q: Where did she touch you? 
I [uj A: (By the translator) When she got her turn 
j [15] to check — to be checked in her body — when she got 
J [16] her turn, she asked her to take off her shoes and her 
j [17] socks. 
[is] MS. JONES: If I may make a suggestion here. 
[19] Speak in the first person, as though you're just 
i poi speaking for her. 
I [21] THE TRANSLATOR: Okay. 
j p2] MS. JONES: You're saying "she," and it's 
j [23] getting confusing, because there's lots of "she's." 
[24] THE TRANSLATOR: Okay. 
! p5] MR. MARTIN: Thank you, counselor. 
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:*>] MS. JONES: Anyway, do you want to ask her 
7\ to repeat what she just said. 
[3] A: (By the translator) Yes. When it was my 
W turn, the lady asked me to take off my tennis shoes and 
[5] my socks. 
[6] Q: (By Mr. Martin) What type of stockings, or 
7i socks? 
[8i A: (By the translator) Like this ones that I 
Pl have on, socks. 
pa] MR. MARTIN: Well, counsel, would you care 
[11] to describe that, or should P 
[121 MS. JONES: White cotton socks, not ankles, 
[131 Slightly mid calf. 
[u] Q: (By Mr. Martin) What e l se w e r e y o u wearing? 
[is] A: (By the translator) Always in m y pants, 
[16] because w h e n it's cold I always use pants. But she 
[17] said — w h e n she asked her to take off her shoes, she 
[is] asked — I asked, Why do I have to take my shoes, and 
[19] she said, Because this are the orders from the boss. 
po] Q: You said that Cookie touched you. 
pi] A: (By the translator) Yes, because she said, 
[22] Roll your pants to the knees, because she wanted check 
l?3] right. 
[24] Q: T h e quest ion was: Did Cookie t o u c h you , and 
ps] where? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Yes, b e c a u s e w h e n I 
[2] roll my pants she asked me to loosen pants, and she did 
Pi this, (indicating) and then she asked me — 
[4] Q: Let the record indicate that she took her 
[5] right hand and put it across h e r waist f rom left to 
[6] right. 
7i A: (By the translator) And then she asked me 
Pi to loosen my bra, and she check inside. She — with a 
m pencil she went like that to her hair. 
no] MR. MARTIN: As to the bra, as she was 
[11] speaking she was indicating that she was putting the 
[12] fingers along the bottom of the bra. This is a comment. 
[13] If counsel has an objection — 
[u] MS. JONES: Yeah. And I would also add that 
[151 in both cases the indication was under the clothing. 
[is] MR. MARTIN: By gesture, yes. 
[171 A: (By t h e translator) Yes. W h e n she l o o s e n e d 
[18] her bra, she went with her fingers like that to see if 
[19] the money got loose and something fcR from there. 
pq Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did she have a shirt o n at 
pi] that time or no? 
[22] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[23] Q: On or no. 
P4] A: (By the translator) Yes, on. 
ps] Q: Were your pants ever removed? 
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[11 A: (By the translator) N o . She just u n d o n e 
[2i t h e m and she just shook t h e m like that. 
Pi MR. MARTIN: She's indicating a shaking 
W mot ion at the front of her shirt about the waist . Is 
[5i that right, counsel? 
m MS. JONES: (Nods her head) 
[7] Q: (By Mr. Martin) After that did y o u leave or 
[8] go back downstairs? 
Pi A: (By the translator) Yes, and another went 
[io] on as her turn came. 
[11] Q: Did you have a purse or carrying case with 
[12] y o u of any kind? 
[13] A: (By the translator) Yes. I always — yes , 
[H] I always have a purse, and she also c h e c k e d it. 
[is] Q: "She," meaning Cookie? 
[16] A: (By the translator) Yes . 
[17] Q: Upstairs or in the eating area? 
[18] A: (By t h e translator) Upstairs in the 
[19] bathroom. 
[20] Q: Did she check that before or after she asked 
pi] to have you take off your shoes and socks? 
[22] A: (By the translator) After she checked me 
[23] she checked my purse. 
P4] Q: Describe h o w she checked the purse. 
ps] A: (By the translator) She asked her to take 
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[1] her things out and — 
pi Q: She asked "me." 
Pl A: (By the translator) She asked me to take my 
[4] things out, and after I took them out she checked in the 
[5] purse. 
[6] Q: Was anything found that looked like money 
m which had been taken? 
Pl A: (By the translator) No . 
p] Q: Did Cookie ever ask you if you had taken any 
[io] money? 
[11] A: (By the translator) No . She just said that 
[121 she had to check everybody because they were orders from 
[13] the boss. 
[H] Q: Rosa, did you tell her that you did not take 
[is] any money? 
[161 A: (By the translator) She said, I had orders 
[17] from the boss, and that's why she checked her. 
[181 MS. JONES: Back up, because — 
[iq MR. MARTIN: You need to go a phrase at a 
[20] time. 
pi] MS. JONES: W h y don't y o u back up and ask 
[221 that quest ion again. 
P3] (The p e n d i n g quest ion w a s read as fo l lows: 
P4] Q: Rosa, did y o u tell her that 
ps] y o u did not take any money?) 
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[1] MS. JONES: Can you read the question again? 
[2] I'd just like it stated again. 
Pi MR. MARTIN: What did y o u sav just then? 
W THE TRANSLATOR: Rosa — 
[5] MR. MARTIN: N o . T h e q u e s t i o n w a s : W h a t 
[6i did she just n o w say, not — 
[7] MS. JONES: She's not — e x c u s e m e . T h e 
[8] translation of the original quest ion that you asked is 
Pi incorrect — 
[id THE TRANSLATOR: I don't think so . 
[it] MS. JONES: — and I'm going to object to 
[12] have that — the translation w a s incorrect. And so t h e 
[13] quest ion was not the quest ion you asked, but it was a 
[u] different question. 
[is] THE TRANSLATOR: I didn't think- so, but if 
[16] y o u have it — 
[17] MS. JONES: Would y o u read the quest ion 
[18] back, please. 
[19] (The pending quest ion w a s read as follows: 
po] Q: Rosa, did you tell her that 
pi] you did not take any money?) 
[22] A: (By the translator) Yes. I said that I 
P3] haven't taken the money. 
P4] Q: (By Mr. Martin) W h e n did you say that? 
[25] A: (By the translator) W h e n she was going to 
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[1] c h e c k me, I told her that I haven't taken the money, and 
p] she said she was sorry. 
Pi Q: Did she do anything else to you than what 
W you have described? 
[5] A: (By t h e translator) N o . 
;6] Q: Did y o u cooperate in t h e checking? 
[7] A: (By t h e translator) I didn't want to b e 
[8] checked, but— 
[9] Q: But what? 
[ioj A: (By t h e translator) But s h e — 
[11] Q:ButaI." 
[12] MS. JONES: But "she." 
[13] MR. MARTIN: That ' s r ight . 
[u] A: (By the translator) But she said that she 
[is] had to check me because t h e y were orders from the boss. 
[16] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did s h e use the name to 
[17] descr ibe the boss? 
[ia] A: (By t h e translator) T h e name, no , but w e 
[19] k n o w that h e is the boss . 
[2q Q: "He," referring to Mr. Esquivel? 
521] A: (By t h e translator) Yes. 
[223 Q: Did y o u ever compla in to anyone at work? 
(23] A: (By the translator) N o . 
[24] Q: At anytime? 
[25] A: (By t h e translator) Only wi th m y family. 
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; [i] Q: Did anyone ever treat y o u differently after 
I [2j the checking than before? 
I pi A: (By the translator) N o . 
I K) Q: Were you ever paid more or less either 
! [5] before or after the checking? 
| [6] A: (By the translator) N o . T h e y always paid 
j [7] me the same. 
[8] Q: Did anyone tell y o u that if y o u did not 
I pi cooperate you w o u l d lose your job? 
[iaj A: (By the translator) N o . 
[11] Q: Did anyone take anything from you? 
[12] A: (By the translator) N o . 
[13] Q: Did anyone lock any doors so that y o u cou ld 
[u] not leave? 
[15] A: (By the translator) N o , but I didn't have 
[16] to go out because it was time to be working. 
[17] Q: Did anyone ever use threatening words? 
[18] A: (By the translator) For threatening, no , 
[19] but offending, yes . 
[20] Q: What offending words? 
pi] A: (By the translator) After t h e m o n e y w a s 
[22] lost, they say that all of us w e r e robbers, stealing. 
I p3] Q: W h o said these words? 
P4] A: (By the translator) Mr. Esquivel. 
[25] Q: What did he say exactly? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) He said, T h e m o n e y 
ia didn't appear. All in here are robbers . 
p] Q: W h e n was that said? 
W A: (By the translator) At t h e m o m e n t that t h e 
[5] m o n e y was lost and h e didn't find it, h e said that all 
[6] o f us w e r e robbers. 
[7] I'm translating here exact ly w h a t she's 
[8i stating. 
p] MS. JONES: N o . That's a mistranslat ion. 
[ioj A: (By the translator) She said, After the 
[11] money was lost and he didn't find it, he said all of us 
[12] w e r e robbers. 
[13] MS. FARNSWORTH: W h a t d o y o u th ink s h e said? 
[u] MS. J O N E S : W h a t d o I t h i n k s h e said? 
| [is] MS. FARNSWORTH: ( N o d s h e r h e a d ) 
j [16] MS. JONES: He said this. What I think she 
{[17] said was, At the beginning, w h e n he announced the m o n e y 
j [iaj was lost, he said, If w e don't find the money, then 
j [ig] everyone here are robbers and thieves . 
j po] THE TRANSLATOR: N o . She says, W h e n the 
| pi] m o n e y was lost and he didn't find it. 
! [22] MR. MARTIN: Okay. We wi l l ask that 
| [23] quest ion again. 
j [24] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did h e say that everyone 
PS] was robbers before the c h e c k i n g or after? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Before and after. 
[2] MS. FARNSWORTH: Are you satisfied with 
Pi that? 
>] MS. JONES: (Nods her head) 
•5] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Who was present when he 
[6] said this before? 
[7] A: (By the translator) Everybody. 
raj Q: Who was present when he said this after the 
p] checking? 
[iq A: (By the translator) All the workers. To 
[11] all of us he said this. 
[121 Q: Did anyone object? 
[i3i A: (By the translator) Of course nobody liked 
[ui this, because w e can't see. 
[i5i Q: Can't see what? 
[i6i A: (By the translator) Because when they were 
[171 going out everybody was complaining that — why did they 
[is] do this, because they didn't have an order to do this. 
[191 Q: What does she mean by an "order*? 
C2oi A: (By the translator) That's what I heard, 
pi] that this wasn't right, because they needed an order 
[22] of — a legal order to do this. 
pa] Q: From the police? 
[24] A: (By the translator) Maybe. Yes, I think 
ps] the police, because they are the only ones that could 
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[1] check. 
Pi Q: If the police had been there, would that 
Pi have been non-offensive? 
[4] A: (By the translator) I feel that, yes, w e 
[5] would be offended, but it would have been an order of 
W the police. 
n Q: Did anyone tell you that your job would 
[B] terminate if you did not cooperate? 
[91 A: (By the translator) Well, in those days he 
[io] threw out some of us from work. 
[ui Q: Before or after the checking? 
[12] A: (By the translator) After he check he threw 
[13] some of us from work because — 
[u] Q: Because why? 
[15] A: (By the translator) Because w e complain and 
[161 he threw out those of us w h o complain. 
[17] Q: Who? Names, please. 
[iai A: (By the translator) Walter — Santiago, I 
[191 think is his last name. Humberto and another from South 
120] America that I don't know the name, but I know w h o he 
pi] is. Another three that went back to Mexico. 
P2] Q: When? 
P3] A: (By the translator) After they threw them, 
(24] they say that they would go back because they didn't 
[25] like the way they treated them here. 
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[1] Q: These arc the people leaving? 
71 A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[3] Q: Who said this? 
W A: (By the translator) They, the ones that 
[5] went back, because they say that they didn't like the 
[6] treatment that the boss is keeping here. 
m Q: "Going back," does that mean going to your 
[8] home country? 
p] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[io] Q: When did this happen? How many days or 
[111 months after the checking? 
[12] A: (By the translator) After they checked, 
[13] because they threw them out or laid them off from work, 
[14] that's when they left. 
[is] Q: How long — how many days or months after 
[16] the checking? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Before Christmas they 
[is] left. 
[191 Q: W h e n is Christmas? Wha t day? 
(20] A: (By the translator) December 24. 
pi] Q: Less than t en days? 
I22] A: (By the translator) Yes. I r emember t hey 
[23] say they were going to spend Christmas with their 
P4] families, and they left. I don ' t k n o w exactly. They 
ps] left, bu t they say that. 
Page 32 
[1] 
PI 
m 
w 
Pi 
[6] 
m 
PI 
PI 
[10] 
[11] 
,[12] 
|[131 
I [1*1 
;[15] 
;[16] 
| [17] 
| [181 
! [191 
! caai 
I [21] 
' [22] 
| [23] 
;[24] 
I [25] 
Q: Did you leave also at the same time? 
A: (By the translator) No. She stay — I 
stay. 
Q: After the checking at that moment, did you 
say that everyone's companions complained together among 
themselves? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Q: And this would be everyone? 
A: (By the translator) By the faces I saw, 
nobody liked it, and they were commenting. 
Q: They were commenting by their facial 
expression or by word? 
A: (By the translator) By the faces I saw, 
they were commenting, some with words. 
Q: What words were used? 
A: (By the translator) That it was arbitrary, 
because they didn't have an order from the police. 
Q: Who said that5 
A: (By the translator) So many people, I don't 
even remember. 
Q: And only six left? 
A: (By the translator) Nine of the ones that I 
know that were laid off. I don't know if there were any 
more. Q: You do not know the reason why these people 
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[1] left? 
[2] A: (By the translator) T h e y say that t h e y w e r e 
[3] leaving for that, because t h e y have talked to 
[4] Mr. Esquivel . 
[5] Q: And for this t h e y g o back to Honduras? 
;s] A: (By the translator) N o . T h e y w e n t to 
m Mex ico , because they are from Mexico . Mexicans. 
[8] Q: And they left solely because of the 
m checking? 
[ioi A: (By the translator) Well, only for that, 
[1 ij no, but they say they were discouraged because what 
[i2i happened. 
[13] MS. JONES: Excuse m e . If she's changing 
[14] that, I'd like to wait. 
[is] (Off the record briefly.) 
[i6i Q: (By Mr. Martin) You d o not k n o w w h y t h e y 
[17] left. You only k n o w what they said. 
[181 A: (By t h e translator) Yes . I don't k n o w w h y 
[19] they left. 
[20] Q: Did y o u also leave t h e c o m p a n y at that time? 
pi] A: (By the translator) Yes, b e c a u s e t h e m a n 
[22] threw me out because I complained to him. 
[23] Q: Y o u be l i eve that. 
[24i A: (By t h e translator) Yes . 
[2si Q: You d o not k n o w that Senor Esquivel be l i eves 
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[1] that. 
Pi A: (By the translator) Yes. I know, because 
Pl he got angry w h e n I complained to him, and after three 
[4] days, t w o or three days — she said t w o days or three 
[5] days — I don't r e m e m b e r — that h e w a s go ing to let us 
[6] go because w e complained. I don't remember — I k n o w 
[7] that he got angry and he let us go. 
Pi Q: Were you replaced by others? 
[9] A: (By the translator) I don't know. 
[io] Q: D o you believe the sole reason you left the 
[11] c o m p a n y w a s b e c a u s e o f your complaining? 
[12] A: (By the translator) Well, I don't k n o w if 
[13] it's the only reason. 
[u] Q: What o ther reasons may have been? 
[is] A: (By the translator) I don't k n o w . 
[16] Q: Were y o u at the c o m p a n y Christmas party? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Yes. N o . I'm sorry. 
[18] I only w e n t to — w h e n they gave some presents, but I 
[19] didn't g o to the party. 
[20] Q: So y o u w e r e still w o r k i n g at t h e c o m p a n y at 
[21] Christmastime. 
[22j A: (By the translator) Yes . 
[23] Q: Were y o u still w o r k i n g at t h e c o m p a n y o n 
[24] N e w Year's Day or after? 
[25] A: (By t h e translator) I don't remember . 
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[1] Q: Were you ever told by a n y o n e as a 
[2] supervisor — or by a supervisor about the quality o f 
[3] your work? 
\A) A: (By the translator) N o . 
[5] Q: W h e r e are y o u working now? 
[6] A: (By the translator) In the c o m p a n y Jo lenc 
, [7] Factory o f Sewing, a s e w i n g company. 
• [8] Q: W h e n did y o u start work ing there? 
| [9] A: (By the translator) In October . 
j [io] Q: Of w h a t year? 
; [11] A: (By the translator) Last year. 
! [12] Q: Did y o u work from t h e t ime y o u left t h e 
I [13] company in this case until you began working at the one 
! [14] y o u w o r k now? 
j [is] A: (By t h e translator) I stay h o m e a long t ime 
i [161 until n o w that I started working again. 
! [17] Q: W h y did y o u start work ing again? 
j [i8i A: (By the translator) Because I n e e d to . I 
l [19] can't stay idle or doing nothing. 
poj Q: W h y did y o u stay home? For chi ldren o r 
pi] family? 
[22] A: (By the translator) For m y family. 
[23] Q: Did y o u try to look for w o r k during that 
[24] t ime? 
ps] A: (By the translator) N o . 
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[1] Q: Other than the checking, did these people 
Pi offend you in any other way? 
PI A: (By the translator) The truth is that he 
[4i a lways had meet ings and h e made us waste t ime. 
[5] Q: ttHe," meaning w h o m ? 
[6] A: (By the translator) Mr. Esquivel. He w a s 
173 a lways having meet ings . 
[8] Q: H o w does having a meet ing or always having a 
[9] meeting offend you? 
no] A: (By the translator) Because he always 
[11] called us and he said that w e were going to have a 
[12] meeting, he said. And w h e n he got us all together, and 
[13] he would get us together there just to offend us. 
[u] Q: For the sole purpose? 
[is] A: (By the translator) I didn't see any 
[16] purpose , and I w o u l d ask myself, Why, w h a t is the 
[17] purpose? I didn't s e e any p u r p o s e . 
[18] Q: If y o u s a w n o purpose , t h e n y o u c o n c l u d e d 
[19] that it was for the purpose of offending you. 
[20] A: (By the translator) Yes. To offend me, no, 
pi] but everybody. 
P2] Q: H o w many meetings in a week? 
ps] A: (By the translator) Almost every day. It 
[24] w a s rare if he didn't c a l l u s . 
[25] Q: H o w many meet ings in a day? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Sometimes one, 
3 sometimes two. 
3i Q: Did he say nothing at these meetings? 
W A: (By the translator) He said that he called 
[5] us because we were not doing anything, that we had to 
;6i hurry u p and work. 
[7] Q: This is unusual for a business? 
[si A: (By the translator) Well, this of fends m e . 
[9i MS. JONES: Wait. That's not w h a t she said. 
(101 A: (By the translator) O h , this doesn't — 
[1 ii wel l , this doesn't offend. Okay. She talked so fast — 
[12J yeah, okay. 
[13] This is not an of fense , but I look at t h e 
[ui c lock, and I said, We are wast ing t ime. A n d she said, 
[is] You are la2y p e o p l e . A n d h e used to say, I'm sure that 
[16] y o u are not paying your tithing. That's w h y y o u don't 
[17] do we l l at work. 
[is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Always say this, or on ly 
[191 once? 
C20] A: (By the translator) About t w o or three 
pi] t imes h e said that w e didn't pay tithing in church . 
P2] Q: So what? 
[23] A: (By the translator) He used to say lazy and 
P4] that w e didn't pay tithing, and o n e day h e e v e n m a d e 
[25] like a — like an interview in church. 
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[1] Q: Wi th music? 
[2] A: (By the translator) N o . 
Pl (Laughter) 
[4] MR. MARTIN: Let's take a break. 
[5] (A recess w a s taken.) 
[6i MS. JONES: I just w a n t to descr ibe this for 
m the record. This is a diagram that w a s drawn b a s e d 
[8] on — 
[9] MR. MARTIN: During t h e interv iew w i t h Rosa. 
[io] MS. JONES: — Mr. Martin's quest ions during 
[113 the depos i t ion process , based o n Mr. Martin's quest ions , 
[12] and with some direction by the deponent, Rosa 
[13] Mazariegos. 
[U] MR. MARTIN: That's Exhibit 1. 
[is] (Exhibit N u m b e r 1 w a s marked for identification.) 
[«si Q: (By Mr. Martin) During this c h e c k i n g w a s 
[17] t h e r e a translator? 
[1 a] A: (By the translator) N o . W h y translating? 
[191 The p e r s o n that c h e c k m e w a s Hispanic. 
pq Q: D i d y o u g o to lunch after the checking? 
pi] A: (By the translator) It's that I don't 
P2] remember if this w a s before or after lunch. 
[23] Q: During all o f these meet ings that y o u found 
[24] offensive, were you paid for the time spent in the 
125] meeting? 
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HI A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Pi Q: Was there any mee t ing w h i c h y o u at tended for 
PI any g o o d purpose? 
W A: (By the translator) I don't remember. 
[5] Q: Is there anything that y o u think posi t ive 
Pi about the company? 
[7] A: (By the translator) Positive in w h i c h form? 
Pi Q: In any form. 
pi A: (By the translator) T h e only o n e thing that 
[101 it bothers me was the offenses from him. The rest I 
[ui feel it's okay. 
[121 Q: "Him," meaning Esquivel. 
[13] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[ui Q: Everyone else is good? 
[15] A: (By the translator) I never had problems 
[16] w i t h anybody there. 
[17] Q: D o y o u have prob lems w i t h Jeanette Lynton? 
[18] A: (By the translator) N o . 
[19] Q: W h y in your court papers do y o u compla in 
poi against Jeanette Lynton? 
pi] A: (By the translator) I haven't c o m p l a i n e d 
[22i about her. Maybe she's there because she's the owner. 
P3] Q: Owner of what' 
[24i A: (By the translator) Maybe she is the owner. 
P51 I think she is, because she went a couple of times there 
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[1] to where we work, and I know she is her. 
H Q: Do you comprehend the difference between a 
PI corporation and a person? 
[4] A: (By the translator) I k n o w that w h e n it is 
PI a company there's several owners. 
[6] Q: D o y o u think Mr. Esquivel is also an owner? 
[7] A: (By the translator) N o . 
PI Q: D o y o u think that an o w n e r o f a c o m p a n y is 
PI personal ly liable? 
[ioi MS. JONES: I'm go ing to object , b e c a u s e I 
[11] think that calls for a legal conclusion. 
[12] . MR. MARTIN: I u n d e r s t a n d . I 'm a s k i n g w h a t 
[13] she believes. 
[H] A: (By the translator) What is "liable"? 
[is] MS. JONES: N o , y o u said it right, but y o u 
[is] didn't finish w h a t h e said. 
[17] A: (By the translator) I think so . 
[18] Q: (By Mr. Martin) D o y o u ever hear about the 
[191 w o r d "limitados"? 
poi A: (By the translator) I understand that a 
pi] limit is something that on ly g o e s so far. 
P2] Q: Did you intend to compla in against the 
[23] company? Did y o u intend to compla in against the c o m p a n y 
P4] or Jeanette Lynton as an individual? 
[25] A: (By the translator) I never have had 
Page 41 
S E M I D E Y v s . L Y N T O N R O S A M A Z A R I E G O S 
[1] treatment with her. I don' t know her. I never have 
[2] even spoken to her. 
[3] Q: Was she present during the checking? 
W A: (By the translator) No. 
[5] Q: The major complaint seems to be, biggest 
[6] compla in t , tha t you do no t like Mr. Esquivel. 
[7] A: (By t he translator) I d o n ' t have b a d 
[8] feelings for him. And I don ' t have any r ancor for him. 
[9] T h e only thing is that I feel really bad because never 
[io] in my life have anybody c h e c k my b o d y for someth ing that 
[11] was lost. 
[12] Q: Do you believe tha t everyone ' s b o d y w a s 
[13] c h e c k e d in the same fashion? 
[u] A: (By t h e translator) I cannot say, because I 
[15] wasn't present, but I only k n o w that mine was checked. 
[16] Q: Did you ever take off your clothing and 
[17] demand further checking than was asked? 
[is] A: (By the translator) Never before somebody 
[19] had done it. 
po] Q: D u r i n g — n o . 
pi] THE TRANSLATOR: Okay. 
P2] Q: (By Mr. Martin) No . During t h e check ing 
P3] upstairs, did you take off clothing and d e m a n d that you 
P4] be checked to guarantee — 
[25] A: (By the translator) No. She didn't ask. 
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[i; because he laid t h e m off. Me too. If h e haven ' t left 
[2] me off, I w o u l d stay work ing the re . 
[3] Q: If you found out that you we re not replaced, 
W would you conc lude that you were laid off because of 
[5i less work at t h e company? 
[6] A: (By the translator) That , I don ' t know. 
[7j Q: Did any man ever t o u c h you at t he checking? 
[8] A: (By the translator) No. 
pi Q: Were you touched in an offensive manne r 
[io] o the r than the checking itself? 
[11] A: (By t h e translator) For m e it's an offense 
[12] to be checked to find something in my body that I don' t 
j [13] have . 
I [u] Q: Yes, bu t that 's not t he answer to t he 
i [is] question. 
| [is] THE TRANSLATOR: I don't think she 
i [17] understands. 
[is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Were y o u t o u c h e d in a 
[19] sexual way? 
po] A: (By t h e translator) N o . 
pi] Q: Were you t o u c h e d for rudeness? 
P2] A: (By t h e translator) For m e it is r u d e to b e 
[23] checked and shaken to see if they find something. It's 
P4] no t a caress. 
[25] Q: Did Cookie t o u c h your breasts o r just y o u r 
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[1] She just w i th h e r h a n d . 
[2] Q: N o . Did she hersel f r eques t more? 
[3] A: (By t h e translator) N o . I was feel ing b a d 
[4] because they were checking me. 
[5] MS. FARNSWORTH: I don't think she 
[6] understands. 
[7] THE TRANSLATOR: Did you — 
[8] MS. JONES: Wait. Wait. Let him clarify. 
[9] These are comments on the side. 
[io] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did you ask Cookie to look 
[11] more? 
[12] A: (By t h e t ranslator) N o . 
[13] Q: Do y o u bel ieve tha t Mr. Esquivel is a g o o d 
[u] manager? 
[is] A: (By t h e t ranslator) If t h e o w n e r has h i m 
[16] there, it's because probably he does a good job for her. 
[17] Q: What is your opinion? 
[18] A: (By the translator) Her opinion is that if 
[19] he 's still working there it's because he 's good at his 
po] job at work. 
pi] Q: No. I want to k n o w — 
[22] A: (By the translator) But to treat people 
[23] there, he 's not okay, he 's not good. 
[24] Q: But only eight people left. 
[25] A: (By the translator) Eight people left 
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[1] bra? 
[2] A: (By t h e translator) No, only t h e bra. She 
p] shook it. 
W Q: So you w e r e offended b y the check ing a n d no t 
[5] by the touching. 
[6] A: (By the translator) It's the same. 
[7] Q: We have two things that offended you: the 
[8] checking and stupid meetings. 
m A: (By the translator) Yes. It offended me, 
[io] because he would take our time from working and then he 
[11] would tell us that w e were not working enough. 
[12] Q: Then you just believed it was bad 
[13] management . 
[u] A: (By the translator) He offends t h e p e o p l e 
[is] very much . 
[16] Q: After so much t ime, w h y only four p e o p l e 
I [17] complain in court? 
j [18] A: (By t h e translator) Four. Not only four. 
; [i9i All t he ones that w e r e laid off complain to her. W h a t 
; (2oj happens is that they went out of the country. They left 
j pi] for Mexico. 
; [22] Q: Of course, everyone w h o is laid off would 
; [23] compla in abou t someth ing . D o you bel ieve this? 
| [24] A: (By t h e translator) I d o n ' t know. There ' s 
| ps] people that can't take a lot. 
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[1] the meetings, if there is any other objection she has 
G?) against Mr. Esquivel or the company. 
[3] A: (By the translator) No . 
W Q: Or Jeanette Lynton. 
05] A: (By the translator) I don't have anything 
OB] against her. 
m Q: Is there anything — and please list them — 
[8] any offense that these people committed against you? 
m A: (By the translator) Not her. She hasn't 
[io] offend me o n anything. 
[11] Q: Or Mr. Esquivel. 
[12] A: (By the translator) No, there's no more. 
[i3] Q: Only the meetings and the checking. 
[t4] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[is] Q: During the checking, would you have left the 
[16] plant if there had been no checking? 
[17] A: (By the translator) I would have continued 
[ia] working, because I need a job. 
[19] Q: No. During the time of the checking, if the 
[20] checking had not occurred, would you have left and gone 
pi] outside? 
[22] A: (By the translator) Outside, you mean — 
[23] excuse me. Do you mean out of the building? 
P4] Q: To go out of the building. 
PS] A: (By the translator) No. Why should I go 
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l [1] out? I was working. I had to stay in my work. 
j pi Q: Why, then, do you claim that you were 
I pi falsely kept in the building? 
j w A: (By the translator) How "detained"? 
j [5] Q: "Mr. Esquivel refused to allow me to leave 
j [6] work." 
cn A: (By the translator) I haven't say that. 
j p] Q: Did you want to leave the building during 
pi the checking? 
[io] A: (By the translator) I don't know. I only 
[11] know that I had to be in my work. 
[12] MR. MARTIN: We need just a brief break, I 
[13] think. Then w e can pretty well wrap up. 
I [u] (A recess was taken.) 
[is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) You came back to work the 
[16] next day after the checking? 
[17] A: (By the translator) I think so. I don't 
[is] remember. 
[19] Q: Were you angry the next time you came to 
po] work? 
pi] A: (By the translator) Yes. I was upset. I 
pq was feeling bad for about a month. 
P3] Q: Feeling bad with anger? 
(24] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
ps] Q: Angry enough to break things? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) No. I never do that 
Pi even if I am very angry. 
p] Q: Angry enough to hurt someone? 
M A: (By the translator) No. I don't hurt 
[5] anybody w h e n I get angry. 
m Q: Angry enough to yell at children or family? 
[7] A: (By the translator) No. 
Pi Q: Angry enough to sit up at night and plan 
Pl revenge? 
[io] A: (By the translator) No. I don't get angry 
[11] like that to people that — that's something to me. 
I [12] Q: Angry enough to stay awake all night or — 
j [13] A: (By the translator) Yes. I stay several 
I [u] days without being able to sleep, but not because of 
I [15] anger. I was — I couldn't sleep because I didn't have 
[16] work, a job. 
[17] Q: Oh. After you left the company, this is 
[18] when you were lying awake at night because you did not 
[181 have work? 
I po] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
pi] Q: Did it not cause you to lie awake also on 
122] the checking? 
t p3] THE TRANSLATOR: Excuse me. Could you make 
[24] that question again? 
ps] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Yes. Did you also lie 
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Q: When you worked in Honduras, did you leave 
voluntarily? 
A: (By the translator) Yes, voluntarily, 
because I wanted to come here. 
Q: Because you would be paid more. 
A: (By the translator) Everybody wants to come 
to United States. 
Q: How has this checking caused you money 
damage? 
A: (By the translator) In which form? 
Q: Money. 
A: (By the translator) Because I would have 
continued working there, but they laid me off. 
Q: Who told you that you were laid off because 
of the checking? 
A: (By the translator) Not because of the 
checking, but Mr. Esquivel. When I complain, he got 
angry and laid her off — laid me off. 
Q: Immediately? 
A: (By the translator) About one or two days 
after. 
Q: Why the delay? 
A: (By the translator) For me, one day is not 
delay. One or two days is fast. 
Q: I want to know, other than the checking and 
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[1] awake as a result of the checking? 
[2] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[3] Q: All the time and every night until you left 
W the company? 
[si A: (By the translator) No, because they lay me 
[6i off soon, and I couldn't s leep because I was upset. 
[7i Q: Did you have to go to a doctor? 
[si A: (By the translator) Because it's so 
Pi expensive, I don't. I just take things in the house . I 
[ioj have b e e n drinking tila tea so that I could s leep. 
[111 Q: Are you okay now? 
tig A: (By the translator) Yes. It's a long time 
[131 since this happened. 
[MI Q: Did you have difficulty finding employment 
[151 because of this company? 
[16] A: (By the translator) No. Because of her 
[171 company, no. 
[i8i Q: Did you believe that Cookie searched you 
[19] because of anger or malice? 
poi A: (By the translator) If I check a person, 
E21] it's because I have malice in my mind. I think her 
[22j malice was to humiliate one person. 
[23i Q: The entire checking was just for the purpose 
[24] o f humil iat ing you? 
ps] A: (By t h e translator) I think so , b e c a u s e if 
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[1] I am in her place, if I was a supervisor and he has 
[2] given me the order to check somebody, he wouldn't k n o w 
Pi h o w she checked me. Then I would have say to her 
[4] that — she check us I think because of malice or 
[5] because the boss told her to do it. 
[6i Q: The question was: Do you believe that the 
[7] entire checking procedure was only for the purpose of 
[8] offending you? 
[9] A: (By the translator) I think so. 
[101 MS. JONES: No. 
[HI MR. MARTIN: D o y o u b e l i e v e that s h e 
[12] misunderstood the question? 
[13] MS. JONES: Yeah. Okay. Excuse me. You're 
[u] saying "you," okay? She's using a different verb. 
[is] She's using the objective pronoun. You're saying, Was 
[16] it to offend you personally? She's saying, Was it to 
[17] offend everybody? 
[is] THE TRANSLATOR: No, no, no, no. To offend 
[19] you. 
[20] MR. MARTIN: Okay. Ask her again. 
pi] MS. JONES: Make it speci f ic , t h e n . 
[22] Q: (By Mr. Martin) D o y o u be l i eve that t h e 
[23] purpose of the checking was to offend you as an 
[24] individual person, solo? 
ps] A: (By the translator) I think they wanted to 
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[1] know w h o had the money. 
[2] Q: It's "yes'1 or "no." 
[3] A: (By the translator) Both things, to offend 
[4] and to find the money. If they check it's because they 
[5] think they have the money. 
[6] Q: The question is to offend — a plan to 
[7] offend everyone or to offend only you? 
[8] A: (By the translator) I don't know. They 
Pl were looking for money, and they check everybody, and 
[iq this is what offends. 
[11] Q: Would she think that it would be offensive 
[i2i if the company had knowledge or reason to believe that 
[13] money had b e e n taken and did nothing? 
[Hi A: (By the translator) I don't think —I feel 
[15] that everywhere where you work things are lost, and this 
[iq had never happened to her. I'm going to say something 
[17] that I remember now. I think that it was to offend 
[181 everybody, because before that he said that some of the 
[191 stamps were lost. 
poi Q: So does she believe that there was no m o n e y 
pi] missing? 
[22] A: (By the translator) No . Before that money 
P3] was lost, he used to say that stamps were lost. 
[24] Q: So you believe that Mr. Esquivel's request 
ps] for checking was intended by him to offend every 
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Hi employee. 
p] A: (By the translator) Yes, because he was 
pi always offending. That's what I believe, yes. 
W Q: Okay. Do you ever think that Mr. Esquivel 
[5] had a purpose of trying to encourage or manage people? 
[6] THE TRANSLATOR: Encourage or what? 
[7] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Encourage or manage people 
Pi with the purpose of running a business the best he k n e w 
p] how? 
[ioj A: (By the translator) Well, I think you're 
[11] always asking me the same thing. I will repeat again. 
[121 He was offending us in every meeting. 
[13] Q: Would she acknowledge that all she really 
[u] knows is that only she was offended in exactly this 
! [15] manner? 
j [16] A: (By the translator) I fee l that every h u m a n 
i [17] being gets offended w h e n w e are told naughty things. 
! [is] Q: Naughty things? 
| [is] MS. JONES: There's not a translation for 
| po] it. 
i pii MR. MARTIN: W o u l d inappropriate — 
i [22] THE TRANSLATOR: Offenses . 
| [23] MS. JONES: Offenses is probably the bes t 
| [24] translation. 
| ps] Q: (By Mr. Martin) A n d y o u be l ieve that a 
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purpose not Mr. Esquivel to ask you about your own 
finances? 
THE TRANSLATOR: What? 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Your own money. Church, if 
he did. Okay. Your purpose of Mr. Esquivel if he asked 
you about church was for the purpose of offending you 
also? 
A: (By the translator) I think so, because she 
doesn't need to know if somebody else paid the tithing 
or not. That is only for me and for God to know. 
Q: For telling "yes" or "no," what's the 
difference? 
A: (By the translator) Yes, it's offense, 
because that is for me and God. 
Q: What are you being paid now at your 
employment? 
A: (By the translator) It is variable. 
Depends on what we do. Sometimes five, sometimes six, 
sometimes seven, even eight sometimes. 
Q: More than what you were paid at this 
company? 
A: (By the translator) Yes, much more. 
Q: And in your application for employment did 
you ever tell them that you had been employed by this 
company? 
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A: (By the translator) No. 
MS. FARNSWORTH: Are you satisfied with that 
one? 
MS. JONES: Yeah. 
MS. FARNSWORTH: Why are you shaking your 
head? 
MS. JONES: Because the question wasn't 
translated right. 
MS. FARNSWORTH: Ask it again. 
THE TRANSLATOR: I — 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did you ever tell anyone 
that you had worked at this company? 
A: (By the translator) No. 
Q: Why? 
A: (By the translator) I don't gain anything. 
Q: Do you know or do you believe that you 
cannot bring a court action against somebody for having 
stupid meetings? 
A: (By the translator) No. I did it because 
they checked me. 
Q: For that alone? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Q: No other reason? 
A: (By the translator) There's no other 
reason, but since you are asking me I have to say the 
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truth. 
Q: What is the truth? 
A: (By the translator) Because you — they 
checked me, but because you are asking me I have to say 
the truth. 
Q: That is the offense is the checking? 
A: (By the translator) Yes, because they make 
me unbutton my bra and take off my shoes and my socks. 
Q: Okay. That's the sole, only claim? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. 
MR. MARTIN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 
(The deposition concluded at 8:25 p.m.) 
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WITNESS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that 1 have read the foregoing 
testimony consisting of 54 pages, numbered from 3 to 56, 
inclusive, and the same is a true and correct record of 
said testimony, with the exception of the following 
corrections listed below, giving my reasons therefor. 
Page Line ChangevCorrectton Reason 
ROSA MAZARIEGOS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to at Satt Lake C*y, Utah, 
thfe dayof .1994. 
Notary Pub&c 
My commission expires: 
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REPORTER CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)». 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, CAROLE A. KING, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness, 
Rosa Mazariegos, was duly sworn to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth; 
That the testimony of said witness was taken down 
by me in stenotype on April 19,1994 at the time and 
place herein stated and was thereafter caused by me to 
be transcribed into typewriting, and that a ful, true 
and correct transcription of said testimony so taken and 
transcnbed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
from 3 through 56, inclusive. 
I further certify that after the said deposition 
was transcnbed the original of same was sent to 
Mr. Loren D. Martin, attorney for defendants, to be 
submitted to the wftness for reading, signed before a 
notary public, and returned to Independent Reporting 
Service. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that I am not interested in the 
event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 22nd day of April, 
1994. 
CAROLE A. KING, CSR/RPR 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My commission expires: 
September 20,1997 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL 
SANTIAGO, HUMBERTO 
BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON,/aka/ 
JEANETTE ROMERO MARKHAM, 
/dba/D.O.T.S., DOZENS OF 
STAMPS, MIGUELANGEL 
EQUIVEL; JOHN DOES I & II 
AND JANE DOES I-III, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Deposition of: 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
CERTIFIED COPY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of April, 
1994, the deposition of Walter Semidey, produced as a 
witness herein at the instance of the Defendants Jeanette R. 
Lynton and Miguelangel Esquivel herein, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before Carole A. King, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 12:25 p.m. of said day at the 
offices of Loren D. Martin, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
CAROLE KING 
CSR No. 330 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
S E M I D E Y v s . L Y N T O N WALTER S E M I D E Y 
APPEARANCES 
For tne Pteuntiffs: Ms. Marti Jones 
Attorney at Law 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
40 South 100 West, #33 
Provo, Utan 84601 
(801) 373-0276 
For the Defendants Mr. Loren D. Martin 
Jeanette R. Lynton Attorney at Law 
and MigueJangel Esquivei 1200 Beneficial Lie Tower 
36 South State Street 
Sal Lake Cdy, Utah 84111 
The Translator Mr. Grant Andersen 
Ateo Present: Ms. Denise Famsworth 
Ms. Jeanette R. Lynton 
Mr. Miguetangel Esquivel 
INDEX 
Wtness Page 
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PI April 2 1 , 1 9 9 4 PROCEEDINGS 12:25 p . m . 
(a W A L T E R SEMIDEY, 
Pi having been first duly sworn, through the interpreter, 
W was examined and testified as follows: 
[5] EXAMINATION 
[6i BY MR. M A R T I N : 
171 Q: N a m e a n d address , p lease . 
[a] A: (By t h e translator) 95 South 600 East, #2 , 
Pi in Provo. 
[io] Q: W h e r e are you employed? 
[11] A: N u Skin Internat ional . 
tig Q: W h a t do you do at N u Skin? 
[13] A: (By t h e translator) I work in t h e 
[uj depar tment of o rder assembly, t he o rder assembly 
[15] department. 
[16] Q: Doing what' 
[17] A: (By the translator) What we do in this 
[is] department is we put the orders in different boxes to be 
[is] sent out to the distributors. 
po] Q: Are you a supervisor? 
pi] A: No. 
P2] Q: H o w many p e o p l e work in tha t depar tment as 
[23] compan ions of you? 
P4] A: In m y g roup , t h e r e is five p e o p l e . 
[25] Q: Is o n e of t hose supervisors? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) There 's five employees, 
pi the supervisor, and leader. 
Pi Q: How many hours do you work each work? 
W A: 40. 
[5] Q: Are you pa id by t h e hour? 
[6] A: Y e s . 
[7] Q: H o w much? 
m A: $5.16. 
PI Q: W h e n did you first begin work ing there? 
[io] A: In March of last year. 
in] Q: March of 1993? 
[12] A: Yes. 
[13] Q: W h e r e w e r e you employed pr ior to work ing at 
[u] N u Skin? 
[is] A: (By t h e translator) I was work ing in t h e 
[16] Los Hermanos Restaurant. T h e r e was a cleaning c o m p a n y 
[17] ou t of Salt Lake tha t cleans t he Mervyn's store in 
[is] Provo. 
[is] Q: Do you w o r k at that cleaning company? 
go] A: (By the translator) Yes, part-t ime. 
pi] Q: Los Hermanos , h o w many hours did you w o r k 
P2] there? 
P3] A: (By t h e translator) 20. 
P4] Q: Did you w o r k at t h e same t ime at t h e 
P5] cleaning company? 
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[1] A: It's t h ree day: Tuesday, Friday, and 
H Saturday. And Sunday is Mervyn's cleaning. 
p] Q: Just as an aside he re , I've b e e n informed 
W that you have possibly a medical condi t ion that may 
P] cause you to ask for — to move a round o r wha teve r you 
[6] feel like. 
m A: (By the translator) I had a surgical 
m operation nine days ago. They opened me up pretty wide 
m here in front, and I may feel a little bit 
no] uncomfortable. 
[11] Q: If you do a n d n e e d anything, please let us 
[12] know. 
[13] A: Okay. 
[uj Q: Are you raking any medicat ion, prescr ipt ion? 
[15] A: For pain. 
[16] Q: Do you k n o w t h e n a m e of this prescript ion? 
[17] A: (By the translator) PercoceL I 'm not 
[is] taking it. I only take it w h e n I 'm in pain. 
[19] Q: Did you take any wi th in t he last four hours? 
po] A: No . 
pi] Q: Does your medical condit ion o r the 
P2] medicat ion cause you to in any way not b e able to answer 
P3i quest ions and think correctly? 
P4] A: (By the translator) No. Only — w h e n I 
^si take the pain medicat ion, I feel a little bit groggy. 
Pages 
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[1] But n o . 
[2i Q: You're not groggy now? 
P] A: No. 
[4] Q: My apology for be ing requi red to ask those 
[si quest ions . Tell me wha t formal educa t ion you have 
;s] received. 
— A: High school. One year — one year — 
[si A: (By the translator) One year of technical 
[91 institute. Technical school, I suppose, would be the 
[ioi equivalent. 
[HI Q: Where was the high schootf 
[121 A: (By the translator) In the town that I 
[i3j lived in, in Ponce. 
(ui Q: Was that in Puerto Rico? 
[isj A: Yes. 
[181 Q: And where 's the technical s c h o o l 
[17] A: In Puerto Rico. 
[i«l Q: In the technical school, what was the nature 
[191 of your studies? 
poi A: (By the translator) I 'm studying 
pii electronics, digital electronics. 
[22i Q: You obviously k n o w that we ' re here . I 
P31 wonder if you know we ' re here for a deposition. 
p*] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
psi Q: Do you understand what a deposition means? 
Pag© 6 
[1] A: (By the translator) I under s t and from my 
[2i point of view what a deposition is. 
pj Q: Please explain that to me. 
[4i A: (By the translator) A deposition concerning 
[5j a — 
[6i MS. JONES: Client. 
- THE TRANSLATOR: Thank you. 
[8i MS. JONES: That 's t h e English t e r m for w h a t 
[9i you're looking for. 
[ioi A: (By the translator) — about a complaint 
[1 ii that has been made, or a specific case of some 
[12] complaint. 
[i3i Q: (By Mr. Martin) Do you understand — excuse 
[MI me for not being polite in asking these questions. Do 
[15] you understand the nature of the oath to swear to tell 
[isj the truth? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
rial Q: Explain to me wha t you understand that to 
rig] mean. 
I20] A: (By the translator) For me it's quite — 
pi] for me, it gives me an immense feeling of tranquility to 
[22i be able to just express the situation exactly as I feel 
[23i it inside m e . 
[24] Q: Do you unders t and tha t in explaining h o w y o u 
[25] feel it mus t be truthful? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[2] Q: Going back to — so I can understand Los 
Pi Hennanos and the cleaning company. You work 20 hours at 
W Los Hennanos, and then you work maybe three days at the 
- c leaning company. Was tha t all dur ing t h e same time? 
(61 A: (By t h e translator) Yes. Also including 
- Nu Skin. All three of those jobs were part-time. 
pi Q: When did you commence work at Los Hennanos? 
pi A: (By the translator) I only worked there two 
[ioi months: January and February. That same t ime I was 
[111 working at the cleaning company. 
[121 Q: Also for the same two months? 
[131 A: (By the translator) Yes, because in March 
[M] t h e y offered m e a full-time posi t ion at N u Skin, and I 
[isj w e n t to N u Skin. 
[id Q- Did you c o m m e n c e work ing wi th t h e cleaning 
[171 company in January? 
[i8j A: (By the translator) In January, yes. 
[igi Q: The same day as you began work at Los 
poi Hennanos? 
pi] A: (By the translator) Yeah. It was almost 
pg just side by side. 
P3i Q: Approximately what day? 
P4j A: (By the translator) At Los Hennanos I 
psi started on a Thursday, and I also started the cleaning 
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[11 place on a Thursday. 
Pl Q: Approximately the day of the month, if you 
Pl please. 
W A: (By the translator) I don' t remember it 
- specifically. 
Pi Q: Beginning of January? Shortly after t h e n e w 
- year? 
[81 A: (By the translator) I 'm not sure if it was 
Pl the end of January or somewhere around then . 
[ioi Q: W h e n you worked at Los Hcrmanos, were you 
[ui paid by the hour? 
[121 A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[131 Q: How much? 
[M] A: (By the translator) I started out at $4.10. 
[isj Q: And ended? 
[i6j A: (By the translator) And ended what 7 
[171 Q: With the same amount of pay? 
[is] A: (By the translator) Ended with the same 
[io] amount of pay, yes. 
poi Q: Were you paid by the hour at the cleaning 
pii company? 
P2j A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[23i Q: H o w much? 
P4i A: (By the translator) The minimum wage. 
psi Wasn't it 4.25? 
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.[i] 0' And w h e n did you begin working at Nu Skin* 
[2i A: (By the translator) Full t ime I b r a i n in 
Pi March. 
m Q: Part-time w h e n did you begin? 
[5] A: (By t h e translator) Let's see. Let m e 
[6] pe ruse my memory. It was all little by little the same. 
C7] I think it was s o m e w h e r e a round February or something 
[8} like that. 
pj MR. MARTIN: Counsel, wou ld you be able to 
[ioi provide those, or provide us with releases so w e can 
[11] make requests? 
[121 MS. JONES: T h e exac t date? 
[13] MR. MARTIN: T h e exac t dates . 
[HI MS. JONES: Yeah. You may want to do it, in, 
[151 the form of a — 
[16] MR. MARTIN: We will subnm just i first set 
[17] of interrogatories after w e are completed here . 
[18] Q: (By Mr. Martin) This may not be easy to 
[191 calculate, bu t I 'm trying to determine, maybe 
[20] approximate , h o w m u c h you were working each w e e k with 
pi] all three of these companies and h o w much you w e r e 
pa] earning total, approximately, an hour. Maybe w e should 
[23] say this is based upon an assumed 40-hour p e r week 
[24] basis. 
ps] A: (By t h e translator) Mm-hm. Certainly. 
Pag« 10 
! ini Sure, 1 was working 20' hours in "the cleaning. It 
pj wasn' t always 20 set hours , because it all depended 
[3] on — the hours would go d o w n in the restaurant. 
[4] Sometimes they were 20 hours . Sometimes they w e r e less, 
[5] At N u Skin I work from 5:00 to 9:00. Those 
[6] were the hours that I had when I started, four hours. 
n Q: And the cleaning company? 
H A: (By the translator) 20,20 hours. 
im Q: And t h e rate of pay you rece ived at t he 
11 oi Nu Skin c o m p a n y w h e n y o u w e r e part-t ime was 1111 \» 11 \" b "l 
in] A: (By t h e translator) Part-time t h e y pa id 
[12] me — let's see. Part-time they paid m e $4.50. 
113i Q: Our brief calculations would indicate that 
i;i4] you received approximately $80 to $84 pe r week torn, the 
[is; cleaning company and Los Hermanos. 
i i q A: (By t h e translator) You m e a n b o t h of t hose 
1 combined? 
I '8i Q: N o . 
11»i A: (By t h e translator) N o . That ' s right. 
|2oi Q: And approximate ly t h e same from N u Skin? 
i"2ii A: (By t h e translator) More o r less t he same. 
22j Q: W h e r e did you w o r k before Los Hermanos and 
f23] t he cleaning c o m p a n y a n d N u Skin? 
[24i A: (By t h e translator) W h e r e I w o r k e d before 
[25] that? T h e c o m p a n y the re in D.O.T.S 
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1 Q: Do you know if D.O.T.S. is a corporation, a 
pi partnership, a limitados, a — what type of company did 
[3i you understand D.O.T.S. to be? 
W THE TRANSLATOR: I don ' t know what II 
I5i "limitados" is. 
f] MR. MARTIN: A limitados is a Spanish 
/1 limited liability-type company, or in English w e say 
[B] liability company. It's more limitados in 
pi Spanish-speaking companies . GMBH is German 
no] THE TRANSLATOR: Let's see if I can remember 
that question. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
u rBy Mr. Martin) Were you paid in, cash o r b y 
[<4j c h e c k ? 
:ih- A: (By the translator) We were paid by check. 
Do you remember the name o n the check? 
A. (By the translator) I don ' t remember; no . 
:*.f . don t remember w h e r e the check was from. I don't: 
; * remember wha t the name was . 
Q: Did you have an employment application that 
; v on made for D.O.T.S.? 
•22] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
23] Q: When did you finish your work at D.O.T.S., 
;2*: or did you leave D.O.T.S.? Should I restate that? 
T H F TRANSLATOR: The reason that 's a little 
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Ii] hard for me is because w h e n you say "finish your work," 
pi it sounds — it's just like wha t time of day did you 
P I l e a ? c ? .,., •. • -, .• .. 
W MR. MARTIN: Yes, I k n o w . 
[5] THE TRANSLATOR: T h a n k s for r e p h r a s i n g t h a t 
[6] one for me. 
m Q: (ByMr . iV^ < . * *-*rfc :* ?i r* 
I is] until what day? 
I m A: (By the translator; Up um ,. 
[ioi December o f ' 92 . 
I i Q: How long have you workt a *u / .*; . :: 
l iki] A: Three months . 
I [13] Q: Were you paid by 'the hour? | [14] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[is] Q: H o w much? 
[is] A: (By the translator) I s tar ted ou t at 
[17] minimum wage, a n d I e n d e d u p at $4.50. 
[is] Q: Wha t did you d o at D.O.T.S.? 
[isj A: (By t h e translator) I w o r k e d in t h e 
po] department of the ovens, or furnaces they call them, 
! pij burners, for lack of a better word on my part 
I [22] Q: Describe,, please,, what you did in that 
| [23] department . 
j p4] A: (By the translator) That depar tment is, in 
| psi my opinion,, the .main, or principal depar tment in t he 
I Page 13 
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[1] whole setup. 
P] Q: And what did y o u do there? 
[3] A: (By the translator) There y o u take the 
w molds , the castings with w h i c h rubber stamps w e r e made. 
;5] Q: And what do you do wi th the molds and the 
[6] castings? 
m A: (By the translator) That's w h a t w e used to 
[8] make the rubber stamps so the cl ients w o u l d order 
pj through catalogs, whatever. 
[io] Q: With w h o m did y o u work? 
[11] A: (By the translator) Those of us that worked 
[iz] in the department were Geraldo, Angel, and me, a sorer. 
[13] Q: W h o was the supervisor? 
[u] A: (By the translator) Mr. Humberto . 
[15] Q: N o w , y o u understand in a depos i t ion that I 
[16] want to ask y o u and have y o u respond to things that y o u 
[17] k n e w or s a w yourself personally. 
[18] A: Mm-hm. 
[19] Q: You said that y o u made rubber stamps th?t 
PC] w e r e so ld through catalogs. 
pi] A: (By the translator) T h e c o m p a n y has a 
P2] certain procedure . T h e y have a subcontractor, sub — an 
f23] under-seller. And what w e did w a s w e made t h e things 
[24] that the others sold. And then we'd have a halt on 
[25] the — an end to the amount of the — or to the quantity 
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[1] o f the rubber stamps that w e ' d sell. 
[2] Q: Did y o u ever s ee a catalog? 
[3] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
54] Q: Did y o u k n o w if the c o m p a n y sold things 
[5] o ther than through a catalog? 
[6] A: (By the translator) N o , I don't know. 
Pi Q: D o y o u bel ieve that y o u k n o w e n o u g h about 
[8] the c o m p a n y to say w h e t h e r or not the work requirements 
[9] o f product ion w e r e seasonal? 
[iq A: N o . 
[11] Q: Are y o u okay? 
[12] A: (By the translator) Every o n c e in a w h i l e 
[13] the sore hurts m e . 
[u] Q: Is this okay to continue? 
[is] A: Yes. 
[16] Q: D o y o u remember if there w a s any information 
[17] y o u had before Christmastime that there w o u l d b e an 
[18] increase in the number o f stamps purchased or produced? 
rig] A: (By the translator) If there w a s an 
[20] increase in what? 
[21] Q: In number of stamps p r o d u c e d to m e e t a 
[22] h igher demand for purchase . 
[23] A: (By the translator) Every business has its 
[24] ups and d o w n s . It had its ups and d o w n s , and at 
[25] Christmastime sell more than at o ther t imes, yes . W h e n 
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[1] I entered into the company there were a lot of orders, 
p] because everything was backlogged and there was a lot of 
p] work. 
W Q: What was the situation as you just described 
PI at the time y o u left the company? Was there a lot of 
[6] backlog or more or less woxk? 
[7] A: (By the translator) W h e n I left the 
pi company, I k n o w there was work. 
pj Q: Backlog work, the same as w h e n you w e r e 
[to] working there the total time? 
[11] A: (By the translator) The orders for that 
[i2] m o n t h o f D e c e m b e r w e r e at the point o f be ing entered to 
[13] e x e c u t e them, orders. 
[u] Q: Yes, but the quest ion is: From your 
[is] observations did y o u see more or less? 
[16] A: (By the translator) More or less of what? 
[17] Q: More or less product ion. 
[18] A: (By the translator) More production. 
[19] Q: More product ion than in January? than in 
[20] November? 
[21] A: (By t h e translator) Yes, sir. In January I 
[22] can't tell you , because I left t h e 3rd o f December . 
[23] Q: On 2 9 December , compared to the first day o f 
[24] November, from your observation w a s there more or less 
P5] demand for stamps? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) There was a greater 
p] demand. 
p] Q: Explain the basis for that conclus ion. 
W A: (By the translator) We w e r e required t o 
[5] work more, w e w e r e given overtime; and that meant that 
[6] there was a demand. 
[7] Q: H o w m u c h overtime, if y o u remember, p e r w e e k 
[8] before Christmas? 
pi A: (By the translator) We w o r k e d u p until 9:00 
[io] at night. We didn't start at 9:00. We started at 8:00. 
[Hi Q: Started at 8:00 a.m.? 
[12] A: Mm-hm. 
[13] Q: And w o r k e d until 9:00 p JTL? 
[H] A: (By the translator) Yes, w i th our little 
[15] break times, our little lapses for breaks. 
[iq Q: Did y o u receive any information from anyone 
[17] at t h e company and in regard to Christmas deadlines? 
[18] A: N o . 
[19] THE TRANSLATOR: Maybe y o u cou ld explain 
poj "deadline" a little better. Deadl ines for what? 
pi] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did y o u ever hear the w o r d 
P2] "deadline" at anytime y o u w e r e e m p l o y e d by D.O.T.S.? 
P3] THE TRANSLATOR: I'm probably giving the 
(24] w o r d for deadline that t h e y use in school . 
ps] A: (By the translator) We always tried to 
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[1] respect the orders that came in, to try and finish t h e m 
pi in time, because the manager would let us know, the 
l3i manager of the company wou ld let us k n o w about it. 
W Q: (By Mr. Martin) Would your manager let you 
is] k n o w that so many stamps had to be comple ted by a 
[6i certain day? 
m A: (By the translator) They would tell us w h e n 
\s\ the orders were — they'd say we have this month, we're 
m behind on things, and that's how they informed us about 
(101 h o w the p roduc t was coming off. 
[11] Q: If I unders tand w h a t you have said, you are 
[12] saying that you worked from eight o 'c lock a.m. until 
(131 9:00 p .m. before Christmas and that after Christmas you 
[u] worked even more hours . 
[is] A: (By the translator) After Christmas w e 
[161 didn ' t work quite so many hours , but w e did work ou r 
[17] regular hou r s they 'd give us . 
[18] Q: That wou ld be maybe 40 hours a week? 
[19] A: (By t h e translator) No . Wha t do you mean? 
(2oj W h e n they give us over t ime o r 40 regular hours? 
pi] Q: 40 regular hours . 
P2] A: 40 regular hours . 
[23] Q: So you w o r k e d over t ime only before 
P4] Christmas? 
PS] A: (By t h e translator) That 's h o w it was . 
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[1] Q: T h e n w e could reasonably conc lude that t he 
Pi work requi rement was reduced after Christmas. 
Pi A: (By the translator) In the depar tment from 
[4] which the production comes out, the production comes off 
[5] of, w e had b e e n informed that w e w e r e going to work 
[6] regularly. Other depar tments did not have the 
[7] materials, r aw materials maybe, bu t w e did. But w e had 
m things to do . We did have work . 
Pi Q: You did have w o r k bu t did not have over t ime. 
[iq A: (By the translator) Mm-hm. Right. That 's 
[11] right. 
[12] Q: Would it be a t rue s tatement tha t you w o r k e d 
[13] in t h e only depar tmen t w h i c h had r a w materials? 
[HI A: (By t h e translator) Well, t he depa r tmen t 
[15] that is the focal point, the axis of the plant. 
[16] Q: That is w h e r e you were? 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) Yes. 
[is] Q: And if your work was reduced , tha t wou ld in 
[19] some manner r educe the work of t he entire plant? 
poj A: (By t he translator) That 's right. 
pi] Q: I unders tand w h y you say that you we re in 
[22] t h e cen te r of things, o r important . I m e a n important to 
[23] t he operat ion of the entire plant. 
P4] A: (By t he translator) The plant, yes. 
[25] Q: Would it b e t rue to say that you did not 
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[1] k n o w immediately h o w many orders w e r e being received 
! bv 
K the company? 
j pi A: No. 
I w 0: No, meaning it is t rue that you did not 
I [5] know? Please explain. 
j [6] A: (By the translator) Exact quantity, no . 
l [7] Yes. But w e we re required to do the rubber, t h e stamps. 
[8] Q: And if you did no t do rubber , nobody worked . 
m THE TRANSLATOR: W h e n you say " y o u / do you 
[io] mean singular o r plural? 
[111 MR. MARTIN: Singular. 
[12] A: (By the translator) No , if t h e g roup didn ' t 
[13] make the rubber, nobody worked . 
[H] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Five important persons; is 
[15] this correct? 
[16] A: Y e s . 
[17] Q: Let's take a break. Would this b e helpful? 
[18] A: (By the translator) No , it's fine. 
[19] Q: We can wai t until a n o t h e r day. Is this 
C20] okay? 
pi] A: (By the translator) Cont inue . 
[22] Q: You have desc r ibed your unders tanding of t h e 
[23] company as based u p o n a series of levels of sales o r 
[24] salespersons; is this correct? 
P5] A: (By the translator) What? 
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[1] Q: Okay. You descr ibed underpe r sons or o the r 
[2] persons in the sales force. 
PI A: (By the translator) Well, I really don ' t 
W understand the quest ion. The quest ion is still no t 
[5i clear to me. 
[6i Q: What I am asking is your understanding of 
PI what made up the organization that collected the orders 
Pi for stamps. Maybe we think about that while we take a 
pi break. 
[ioi (A recess was taken.) 
[11] MR. MARTIN: If you would read back the last 
[12] question. 
[13] (The pending question was read.) 
[14] A: (By the translator) I'm saying I worked in 
[15] that one department, and I didn't work in the order 
[16] department. 
[17] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Would it be true, then, to 
[18] say tha t you w o u l d have no knowledge of any lead t ime o r 
[19] order time between receipt of a sale to a purchaser and 
poj the ultimate delivery of the product? 
pi] THE TRANSLATOR: The time between the 
(22] receipt of an order and — 
[23] MR. MARTIN: The receipt of the order and 
[24] delivery of the p roduc t . 
ps] A: (By the translator) We k n e w about t h e 
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[1] orders, but I'm going to repeat this because — the 
[2] managers told us, Now, these are the orders for this 
[3] month, and this is what we need to do for this month, 
-A] and we're behind such and such for this month. 
;5] Q: (By Mr. iMartin) There was a Christmas 
[6] fiesta? 
m A: (By the translator) Yes, there was a 
[si Christmas party. 
m Q: Did this par ty not just s eem to b e o n a 
[ioj calendar bu t also b e significant as to complet ion of 
[1 ii orders for the year or for that month? 
[121 A: (By the translator) When they held this 
[i3j recognition party, it was for the workers that had — 
[i4i you know, that had been working there, and I hadn't 
[151 worked there a year yet. And I say 'recognition," 
[i6i because that's how Jeanette made the employees feel, 
[17] very grateful for the production that had taken place 
[is] during that year. 
[191 Q: When you received orders for production, was 
poj that written on paper or verbal? 
pi] A: (By the translator) They didn't give us the 
[22] stuff from the order department. You know, there's the 
G23] cutting out department and the something-or-other 
[24] department. The supervisor of each department would 
PS] give the written orders of the stamps that they needed 
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[11 so that they could maintain a cutoff point and maintain 
[2] a certain inventory. 
Pi Q: Do you know if the orders that you saw were 
W written by the salesperson or by the supervisor in the 
[5] plant? 
m A: (By the translator) I tell you again that 
[7] they asked — they made the request, requisitioned the 
Pi orders, only by the supervisors of the plant, the plant 
[9] supervisors, those that knew what the need was. 
[iq Q: So you did not know what the need was until 
[11] you w e r e told by a supervisor. 
[12] A: (The witness nods his head. ) 
[131 Q: Your employment wi th t he company e n d e d o n 
[i4i the 30th of December , correct? 
[i5i A: (By t h e translator) Correct . 
[is] Q: At w h a t time? 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) Well, early in t h e 
rial morning. 
[19] Q: Had you b e e n working that morning at t h e 
[201 plant? 
pi! A: (By the translator) No. I was resting that 
[221 day. I was off that day. It was my day off. 
[23] Q: Tell me what happened then, please. 
[24] A: (By the translator) Our department, 
[251 according to the information we'd received from 
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i [ii Mr. Migueiangel in a meeting in his office — he had let 
• pi us know that the burners, the people that do the 
! pi burning — this is my own addition, I suppose, those 
| w that work with the furnaces or the ovens, whichever they 
i pi are — would never have to be laid off. 
; [si Q: The question, though, was: What happened on 
j [7] December 30? 
pi A: (By the translator) Well, I'm answering 
[91 your quest ion about t h e 30th of December; because I had 
[ioj a day off, and t h e supervisor called m e at h o m e telling 
[111 me that I wasn ' t working for t h e company anymore . 
[121 Q: What w a s said? 
[13] A: (By t h e translator) I 'm in the process of 
[14] explaining to you, and then you want me to answer again? 
[151 Q: Just on the 30th. 
[iq A: (By the translator) They called me at home 
[17] telling me I wasn't working for the company. 
[is] Q: Who called? 
[191 A: (By the translator) Humberto, supervisor. 
po) Q: What did Humberto say? 
pi] A: (By the translator) That it would no more 
—l be necessary to show up at the company because there 
P3] wasn ' t any more work . 
[24] Q: Was that t he total conversat ion that day, o n 
P51 the 30th, with Humberto? 
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[ij A: (By the translator) Yes, Humberto. I asked 
[2] him — I told him — I communicated to him that, How is 
pi that possible? In the meeting before, Migueiangel had 
[4] told us that no one was going to be without work. 
- Q: Is that all you said at that moment? 
[si A: To Humberto? 
[7i Q: Correct. 
[8] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Pi Q: What did he say then after you had said 
[iq this? 
[1 ij A: (By the translator) He says, Well, Fm 
[12] sorry. And then I told him that I needed a written 
[i3i document that stated that I was not working for the 
[14] company anymore. 
[151 Q: What did he say? Humberto. 
[is] A: (By the translator) He told me to stop by 
[17] and pick it up. 
[igl Q: Was that the end of the conversation then? 
[19] A: (By the translator) The conversation ended. 
poj Q: When did you receive your last paycheck? 
pi! A: (By the translator) I received it the week 
P2] after losing die job. 
P3i Q: Maybe seven or eight, nine January? 
[24] A: (By the translator) Yeah. I got it on a 
C25] Friday. I had to wait until they run down their list so 
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[1] they could run my check. 
[2i Q: Were you working with ei ther Los Hermanos, 
Pi t he cleaning company, o r Nu Skin before you received 
W that check? 
[5i A: No . 
[61 Q: H o w long after that check was received 
[7i before you were working with one of these o the r 
[8] companies? 
pi A: (By the translator) I was — I was — 
[ioi around about two to three months. 
nil Q: Before you even worked pan-time? 
[12] A: (By the translator) I received that last 
[13] check — from there till the time I started working for 
[u] the other companies, I had to wait till —-1 started to 
[is] work, but I didn't get paid immediately. I had to wait 
[16] till they paid people, ran their checks. 
[171 Q: But the question was: How long after you 
[i8i received the check did you commence work with the other 
[is] companies, or was that before you received the check? 
pq A: (By the translator) No, it was not before I 
pii received the check. For the other company, like I 
P21 repeat, three months. 
[23] Q: I do not understand. You commenced working 
C24] full t ime for N u Skin in March, 
ps] A: (By the translator) That 's wha t I told you, 
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Hi be tween two and three months. I don' t k n o w exactly, 
pj because I can't remember the date. 
Pi Q: I can understand that, but you had said you 
w had worked for two months with these companies before 
[5] you w o r k e d full t ime wi th Nu Skin. Please explain, if 
[6] that he lps you remember . 
[7] A: (By the translator) In the company in 
[8] N u Skin, I started on t h e 24th of March, and I started 
PI part-time. So I was working pan-t ime a month o r t w o 
[10] months. I don't remember. 
[11] Q: Do you remember, then, the meeting that you 
[121 said was in Senor Esquivel's office? 
[131 A: (By the translator) This was a round about 
[14] the month of November . 
[is] Q: W h o was present? 
[is] A: (By t h e translator) Mr. Humber to and 
[17] Mr. Angel. Oh, I forgot the name of that kid. Geraldo. 
[is] Q: Was that everyone present? 
[191 A: (By the translator) And Mr. Esquivel and a 
poi server, and then one other person: Ruben. 
pi] MS. JONES: Could I stop this for a minute? 
P2i (A discussion was held between Ms. Jones and the 
P3i translator.) 
P4] MS. JONES: We've just clarified the point 
P5] that "servant" o r "server" is a Hispanic cultural term. 
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[1] It's being translated into English that way. In reality 
[2i it's a Spanish cultural t e rm to refer to oneself, such 
Pi as, your faithful servant. 
W A: (By the translator) I 'm referring to my o w n 
[5] person. 
[6i Q: (By Mr. Martin) Was this meeting in 
[7] November? 
pi A: (The witness nods his head.) 
pi Q: How many o the r meetings we re held that you 
[ioi a t tended in Mr. Esqufvel's office? 
[11] A: (By the translator) Later on there was 
[121 another, w h e n they informed us of t he overt ime and that 
[131 so — I say in his private office, si. 
[14] Q: Only two that you at tended, then? 
[is] A: (By the translator) I a t tended many 
[is] meetings with the whole plant. 
[17] Q: I 'm only talking about the meetings in 
[is] Esquivel's office. 
[19] A: (By the translator) I was just in two . 
[20] Q: W h e n was the o the r one , o the r than November? 
pi] A: (By the translator) W h e n they informed us 
P2] about the overtime and they asked our cooperation to 
C23] work overt ime. 
P4] Q: W h e n was that meeting? 
[25] A: (By the translator) Before the overt ime, 
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m quite a bit before Christmas, in the month of December , 
pi What I 'm talking about, meetings in groups in his 
PI office, group meetings in his office. 
W Q: Oh. I think I begin to understand. That 's 
pi something that 's helpful. See if this explanation is 
[6] correct . W h e n you began woik ing you w e r e working 
[7i regular t ime approximately 40 hours a day — not a day. 
pi Then sometime in December you we re asked about maybe 
pi woik ing overtime, and so you w o r k e d overt ime sometime 
no] after t h e 1 st of December until approximately Christmas. 
[11] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[121 Q: And then after that you w o r k e d back to 
I [13] regular time? 
I [14] A: (By t h e t ranslator) Yes. 
[15] Q: Being the center o r most important pa r t of 
[16] the plant, then, that wou ld b e reflective of t h e total 
[17] work or product ion rate; is that correct? 
I [18] A: (By the translator) Correct . 
j [is] Q: So the work in November was regular, t h e n an 
E20] increase the beginning — sometime after t h e beginning 
pii of December, and work reduct ion after D e c e m b e r 25. 
I [22] A: (By the translator) Correct . 
I p3] Q: Do you k n o w if t he November meet ing was at 
P4] the beginning of November or toward the end of November? 
(25] A: (By the translator) Oh, beginning of 
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[11 November. 
[2i Q: H o w long was the meeting? 
[3i THE TRANSLATOR: D o you want me to translate 
\A\ that? 
[5i MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
[6i A: (By the translator) One hour. 
71 Q: (By Mr. Martin) Tell m e as m u c h as you can 
[si remember w h a t was said at that meet ing. 
[si A: (By the translator) This meet ing w a s called 
[ioi because in our department w e w e r e , quote-unquote , 
[1 ii burning. There was s o m e difference in the relationship 
[i2j b e t w e e n the orders and t h e requisitions that w e 
[131 received, the orders w e received. Sometimes w e w e r e 
[u] doing some stamps and then other times they asked us to 
[151 do others. Like as if there weren' t a coordination. 
[i6j And t h e n there at that t ime that w a s w h e n 
[171 Mr. Geraldo — I don't k n o w w h e t h e r you'd call it a 
[181 little quarrel or a — just s o m e problems. 
[19] And so Mr. Miguelangel asked us to tell him 
[20] what our feelings were , h o w w e felt about it. Each o n e 
pi] said h o w he felt. Mr. Miguelangel, the only thing that 
[22i he rectified or set straight there was that Mr. Angel 
[23i Santiago and I w e r e go ing to continue working in the 
[24] furnace or o v e n department and that w e w o u l d stay there . 
ps] We w e r e an important team, b e c a u s e if there wasn't any 
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[1] rubber then there wasn't any product ion, there wouldn ' t 
[2] b e any product ion, and that his spirit had told h i m that 
Pi w e were strong spirits, and that's w h e r e everything 
[A] ended. 
[5] THE TRANSLATOR: I w a n t t o a d d just as an 
[6] aside here. Somet imes w h e n w e translate "spirit," "his 
[7] spirit," y o u cou ld also translate that as his mind, his 
pi sense of the situation. 
pi Q: (By Mr. Martin) Would it b e fair to say 
[ioi that y o u understand at that t ime that this w a s a 
[11] compl iment for work performed, that it w a s an indication 
[12] o f the amount of work in the plant at that t ime, or t h e 
[13] work that was e x p e c t e d to c o m e in, and a general 
[u] compliment as to the work that you in that department 
[is] were performing? 
[is] A: (By the translator) In my opinion, what he 
[17] wanted to say was that h e was satisfied wi th the 
[18] product ion that w a s c o m i n g off. 
[19] Q: If this is true, certainly y o u wouldn' t have 
poi considered this as a guarantee personally to y o u for 
C2i] e m p l o y m e n t . Is that a fair statement? 
[22i A: (By the translator) For m e , in m y o p i n i o n , 
[23] it was just that h e w a s p l eased wi th my o w n personal 
m work and that of Angel . 
ps] Q: If I understand, then , your posit ion, y o u 
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i [1] are not saying that the c o m p a n y call made to y o u by | [2i Humbert© o n D e c e m b e r 30th w a s uniawfuL 
J pi A: (By the translator) Pardon me? Could y o u 
i w please repeat the question? 
[5] Q: Okay. The reason w h y we're here is not 
[si because you are taking, then , the posit ion that the 
[7i company, in having Humberto call you and tell y o u your 
PI work was complete , was s o m e h o w unlawful. 
PI A: (By the translator) Are y o u referring to my 
[ioj termination with the company? 
in] Q: Yes. 
[12] A: (By the translator) N o . 
[131 Q: Please explain. Maybe my question w a s so 
[u] long I n e e d an explanation. 
[151 A: (By the translator) My opinion, it's not 
[16] unlawful that I e n d e d u p wi thout a job. 
[17] Q: Arc y o u okay? 
[18] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[is] Q: My first thought w h e n y o u said that, w a s 
[20] maybe it was not unlawful, but unfortunate. 
pi] A: (By the translator) In m y o w n consc ience I 
P2] k n o w that I did a g o o d job for the company, and that's 
P3] enough for me. 
P4] Q: Very good. 
ps] A: (By the translator) N o , I don't have any — 
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[1] Q: Listening to your descript ion of your 
p] employment wi th N u Skin, maybe it w a s fortunate. 
pi A: (By the translator) N o t that somebody's 
W luckier or fortunate for trying to s h o w the — to d o 
[5] their best and produce and that, to k n o w that someone's 
[6] sure in the company that they're in, to g^vt it their 
[7] maximum. 
Pi Q: I a p o l o g i z e if I just re ferred t o this as 
PI pure luck. For whatever reason, at least w e arc happy 
[ioj mutually to see your situation improved. 
[11] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[12] Q: Would you agree wi th this? 
[13] A: Yes. | [u] Q: Congratulations. 
[is] What concerns m e now, then, at the m o m r m , 
[16] is — w h a t is the reason for n o w the complaint against 
[17] t h e company , m e a n i n g D.O.T.S.? 
[18] A: (By t h e translator) It's d u e t o t h e 
[19] irregularities and the ncgl igency that they had w h i c h 
poj were harmful to one's person. 
I pi] Q: Please, I don't mean to b e c o m e too personal 
j p2j or impolite, but if you could — and please explain 
| p3] maybe in one , t w o , three, four order, if this is 
P4] possible. 
ps] A: (By the translator) Okay. The thing that 
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(1] has affected me the most as a person is to feel accused 
[2] of things that you didn't do, accused of rainring 
Pi someone or taking a little — the name to t h e m of being 
W a r ipoff o r a liar w h e r e the intimidation — w h e r e 
[5] everybody feels intimidated. In my case it was they 
[6] searched my person without any authorization. 
[7] Q: What would be your understanding of 
[8] "authorization"? 
pj A: (By t h e translator) A pe r son that has 
[io] permiss ion, tha t is legal in doing things. 
[11] Q: Is there anyone who would be a person who 
[12] could do the sarnr thing, in your understanding, in a 
[13] legal manner? 
[u] A: (By the translator) I didn't understand the 
[15] question. 
[16] Q: Okay. You said two things: One, with 
[17] permission of the individual, yourself, or someone who 
[18] had an authorization under law. First I asked the 
[is] quest ion about w h o would have permission, in your 
[20] understanding under the law, if anyone. 
pi] A: (By the translator) You mean that might 
(22) have the authorization? 
P3] Q: Yes . 
P4] A: (By t h e translator) I wou ld say t h e law. 
ps] Q: You m e a n t h e police? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Yes, in every judicial 
H aspect. 
p] Q: If the police had been called to the plant 
W at that moment and done the same thing, would that have 
[5] been as offensive? 
[6] A: (By the translator) No. 
[7] Q: If the police had done exactly the same 
[8] thing, t he re w o u l d have b e e n no offense? 
m A: (By t he translator) As long as the re 
no] wouldn't have been no offense, as long as there was 
[11] authorization. 
[12] Q: But I thought we already covered that. We 
[13] had agreed, maybe, that your understanding was that the 
[U] police would have authorization. 
[15] A: (By the translator) No. The police is 
[16] authorized only when the law gives them that 
[17] authorization. 
[is] Q: In this circumstance, as you understood the 
[19] complaint that money was missing or property was missing 
[20] or some crime had occurred or something had been wrong, 
[21] do you think under that circumstance that the police 
;22j would have had authorization? 
[23] I'm not asking for a question as to the 
•24] legal opinion. I'm just asking for your understanding. 
[25] Of course, I realize that all of us in this room may 
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;i; have a different opinion. I 'm just asking for yours. 
73 A: (By the translator) I repeat again, yes, 
3] the police have certain p o w e r but have to base w h a t they 
u] do on the law, on if it's right or not. That's why if 
;5] they don't have — if they're not authorized, they can't 
& do it. Now, yes, I can say that if the police is here 
;T: then I can say, yes, go ahead and search me. So there's 
[8] a witness. 
[9] Q: Did I make a mistake in believing that 
[io] previously you had said tha t if the pol ice h a d b e e n 
[11] there there would have been no offense? 
[12] A: (By the translator) There would not have 
[13] been any, because he is a witness unde r the law. 
[u] Q: So the conduc t that was — maybe I cor rec t 
[is] this. The major quest ion was one of a p rope r witness. 
j [16] A: (By the translator) Right. 
| [17] Q: If there had b e e n a p r o p e r witness present , 
j [18] t h e n there would have b e e n no offense; is tha t correct? 
[19] A: (By the translator) Yes, correct , under t h e 
poj law. 
[21] Q: This is how you would feel about it 
[22] personally; is that correct? 
P3] A: (By the translator) As long as it's under 
P4] the law. 
gs] Q: I understand this. Then what happened to 
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you was offensive because you believed it to be 
unlawful? 
A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
Q: I think we begin to understand each other 
better. I can appreciate that. What I'm trying to make 
the distinction in my own mind is to determine exactly 
what was the cause of the offense. The cause of the 
offense was not the specific conduct, excluding maybe 
offensive words used. Is that a iair statement? 
A: (By the translator) Fair in what sense? 
Q: Fair in your opinion. Fm just trying to 
express what I understand would be your opinion. 
A: (By the translator) Well, it's just that 
besides the words that were said there was a search of 
my person. 
Q: But if there had been a proper witness 
present there would have been no offense? 
A: (By the translator) Like I tell you again, 
as long as it's under the law, lawful. 
Q: Tell me, as you remember, the sequence of 
what you have described as the search of your person. 
A: (By the translator) The supervisor asked us 
to go to the bathroom. In the bathroom they took our — 
our shoes were taken off, our socks. We emptied out our 
pockets, and we handed over our wallet. 
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Hi Q: This is unfortunate that everyone felt 
•zi accused. Everyone can understand that son of feeling. 
[3i However, if an accusation has been made by someone, true 
[4] or no, would it in your opinion have been the best thing 
[si to do to call the police to conduct this search? What 
[6i w o u l d you have done? 
71 A: (By t h e translator) T h e y say tha t in o rde r 
[si to accuse someone you have to have proof. You have t o 
[91 have proof. At that time if they had at that time proof 
[ioj in their hand and they had the authorization, authority 
[Hi of the law, then they could do it. 
[i2i Q: Okay. Suppose for a momen t that you are t h e 
[131 supervisor in the plant where you work for D.O.T.S. and 
[ui someone came to you and said someone has stolen $20. 
[151 How would you respond to that? What would you do? 
[i6i Suppose you didn't even believe this, the accusation? 
[i7i A: (By the translator) In the case that the 
[iai at torney is explaining here , m e as a supervisor, if t h e 
[to] person that was informed was the supervisor and h e w e n t 
pq and spoke with the manager, t he next corresponding 
pi] person, to see what opinion the manager had about t he 
[22] case, and me as a person, as a supervisor, I wouldn't 
[23] dare search anyone. 
[24] I mean, just like t hey say in my country, 
P5] once the little ball has been loosed, then it goes to 
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[11 the next line — upline in chain of command and let 
[2] t h e m — because the next person up the line has more 
Pi authority. 
[4] Q: I appreciate the correctness and care with 
[5] the question. Now, if you'd please permit me to make 
m you the manager of the plant. Maybe my apology for 
[7] doing so. Now, what do you do? 
m A: (By the translator) At t he point of the 
PI manager there 's another pe r son that is in authority over 
[io] me that 's the owner. The situation or the case would b e 
[11] discussed and opinions would be heard. 
[121 Q: Okay. I think you know what I'm going to do 
[i3i to you next. 
[ui A: (By the translator) The next question is 
[15] w h e n it's heard. 
[is] Q: Meaning the owner. Please respond, 
[i7i supposing you were the — wha t would b e your order? 
[is] A: (By the translator) The order would b e to 
[19] speak with the work force personnel , explain the 
po] situation to them, with love. 
pi] Q: An important distinction. 
[22] A: (By the translator) Lovingly. If a person 
123] does not show their confidence towards an employee, then 
[24] the employee doesn't draw close to us, the employee 
[25] won't express their feelings. And if someone has seen 
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what happened at that rime, their cooperation is asked 
for, and it's a very delicate matter to treat. 
Q: Yes, I agree. 
A: (By the translator) Like I told you, the 
cooperation of the personnel, all of the work force 
would be solicited, and it would — and ask the 
supervisors to — you know, to wait on — to kind of be 
over their groups to receive any information that might 
come from them. 
Q: Very good. No person walks up to confess. 
A: (By the translator) Exactly. I know that. 
Q: And yet you have one person in the plant who 
is accusing everyone and doesn't know where the money 
went. It could be anywhere, any person. Would you try 
to explain, maybe a difference in love, which I 
appreciate. Would the search then become not 
necessarily a search, but to show this one person, 
whoever it may be, that no one is a thief, that we did 
something at least in response to the complaint? Is 
this a possibility? 
A: (By the translator) It would be a 
possibility as long as — like I say, as long as it's 
based on some law. 
Q: Sure. Now, you said that you — 
A: (By the translator) I asked Humbert© when 
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[11 h e had my wallet — I said, What difference is the re 
P] b e t w e e n m y S20 that are right here in this wallet and 
p] t he $20 that were taken? 
W Q: Very good point, yes. But the quest ion is: 
[5j Do you search or no? Do you ask questions of employees 
[6i or no? Do you tell the employees that an accusation has 
[7] b e e n made by someone o r say nothing? 
Pi A: (By t h e translator) W h a t I 'm saying is tha t 
PI t h e case has different ways of arriving at a conclusion, 
[101 but the way that was taken or chosen was illegal. 
[11] Q: Maybe impolite, but maybe not unlawful 
[12] Maybe also in poor taste or — the question maybe is: 
[131 Did anyone or did you yourself say, I object to the 
[ui procedure or the question prior to the time that you 
[is] opened your pockets or your wallet ' 
[16] A: (By the translator) Me? Well, in my case I 
[17] was not opposed, because Mr. Migueiangel was — because 
[181 he intimidated the personnel, like I said. They told us 
[191 that w e w e r e rip-offo and stealing at that momrnr , as a 
poi manager. And he himself recognizes — he sa id Tm 
pi] going to do something that 's unlawful, but w e going 
P2] to search everyone — 
P3] Q: Maybe everyone just go ahead. Excuse me. 
[24] A: (By the translator) — whether you like it 
ps] or not. 
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[11 Q: But this is a n e w phrase I've not heard 
pi before from anyone else. I think this phrase makes a 
Pi difference. Lets go back for a moment to the point 
W where you were in the rest room with others. Who was 
[5i present? 
[si A: (By the translator) Just Humberto and I 
[7i alone. Only Humberto and I. 
Pi Q: He removed your shoes and stockings? 
Pi A: (By the translator) Yes. 
HP] Q: He himself, rather than asking you to remove 
in] your shoes and stockings? 
[i2j A: (By the translator) What he asked us to do 
[i3j was to empty out our pockets and the billfold. 
[u] Q: And you did that yourself? 
[isi A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[i6j Q: You said something about removing your shoes 
[17] and stockings. 
[is) A: (By the translator) I didn't do that. What 
[isi he asked us, that w e empty out — and then he proceeded 
pel to the shoes. 
[2ii Q: Tell me, as close as you can remember, what 
[22] Humberto said. 
[231 A: (By the translator) That he was going to 
[24i search us with the authorization of Miguelangel. The 
psj only thing that I imagined was like you see in the 
_ _ _ _
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[11 movies w h e r e they search you. I don ' t k n o w if t hey 
PI thought that the money was in the shoes or in the socks. 
Pi Q: Did you ever see any force used against any 
[4j pe r son to facilitate t h e search? 
[5j A: (By t h e translator) No, because t h e m e n 
[6i went into the men's bathroom and the women into the 
[7i w o m e n ' s . W e w e n t in voluntarily. 
Pi Q: And possibly, f rom Humber to ' s poin t of view, 
Pi o p e n e d your pocke t s voluntarily? 
[10J A: (By t h e translator) Because h e asked us . 
[1 ii He said w e had to s h o w h im our billfold and w e had to 
[121 empty our pockets. And the people that had a little 
[131 lunch sack, they had to get it out and open it. 
[HI Q: But Humberto's point of view would be that 
[isi this was consented to or done by each person individual, 
[16] by you and o the r s voluntarily. 
[171 A: (By the translator) Those were the orders 
[is] that h e gave, to search us. The search was verbal, bu t 
[19] h e asked us to do it. 
po] Q: And you did. 
pi] A: (By t h e translator) And they did it. I 'm 
P21 talking just about w h a t happened to me . 
P3] Q: Of course . I apprecia te that correctness . 
[24] After this o c c u r r e d did you make any suggestions to a 
P5] supervisor o r an officer of the company that maybe 
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;i] something had h a p p e n e d thai was inappropriate? 
[2] A: (By the translator) Noth ing was done , 
,-31 because the gent leman had told us at the beg inning — 
\M the gentleman, Miguelangel, had told us to do something 
[5] that I know is not supported by the law, but Tm going 
: [6i to do it. No one did anything. 
[7] Q: Did he say, If anybody objects, please raise 
| pi your right hand, or anything* 
I pi A: (By the translator) Nothing, because he 
[io] said that he's going to do it whether you like it or 
in] not. 
I [12] Q: I did not mean it to be impolite, but I 
j [131 really do not believe that everyone in the plant would 
[14] be little sheep, would just follow along without saying 
I [15] anything if there was such an offense. 
| [16] A: (By the translator) If a person feels — 
j [17] you know. I mean, you say a little like a lirde sheep, 
! [is] but that's more or less h o w you kind of feel, because if 
[isi I hadn't — I say if I had not allowed myself to be 
po] searched I would have lost my job. 
pii Q: Which the company could have done anyway, 
P2] correct? 
[23i A: (By the translator) It has the right to d o 
! [24] it, to do so . But at that t ime m y desire w a s to stay 
I [25] with the company, because I worked out of necessity. 
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[1] Q: Similar to all of us. My apology if w e look 
[2] impolite. This is just a — not only a very serious 
[ pi matter for you but a very serious matter for w e w h o are 
| [4] on the other side of the table. And we're just trying 
; p] to determine accurately h o w this became v i ewed by some 
I PI people to be a personal offense to such a degree as to 
j [7] justify court action many months later. Why only four? 
p] Why so many more months later? 
PI A: I don't know. 
[ioi Q: Did the four s o m e h o w get together? And if 
j [11] so, how? I do not mean to b e impoli te . We just must 
! [121 know. 
! [131 A: (By the translator) W h a t — h o w should I 
! [14] say? The only answer I have is that it's intimidation | [is] towards the personnel, towards the work force.There 
i [16] are many peop l e . Many p e o p l e work ou t of necessity. 
: [17] Many have very personal problems, matters of how they 
j [is] are here in this country. 
I [191 Q: I think all of us who have seen anything in 
j po] the news would understand what you Vc just said and 
j pi] would appreciate that. When did the four get together; 
! (22] though? Six months later? T w o months later? How? 
I [23] W h y ? W h a t ? 
I [24] A: (By t h e translator) Not six mon ths after. 
j psj It was immediately after, w h e n w e left. 
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Hi Q: W h e r e ? 
[2i A: (By the translator) We did it in the 
m attorney's office. 
u] Q: When? 
[5i A: (By the translator) I don't remember the 
161 exac t date, but some lawyer at BYU. 
m Q: Before or after Easter, if y o u remember? 
Pi A: (By the translator) I'd say it w a s around 
Pi February or March or thereabouts . 
[ioi Q: This w a s the first t ime that anyone ever 
[1 ij talked about this? Was that this meet ing at the 
[121 university? 
[131 A: N o . 
(uj Q: W h e n w a s the first time? 
[is] A: (By the translator) We didn't m e e t at the 
[161 university. We met at the h o m e of another person . 
[17] Q: W h o ? 
[181 A: (By the translator) He w a s working for the 
[191 Latin Council, Conciiio Latino. 
poi Q: W h o was present? 
pi] A: (By the translator) We were Humberto, 
p2] Rosa — I don't remember the name of that little guy 
pal that w e n t — another b o y that worked at the plant. N o w 
[24] I can't remember his name. Angel. Rosio. There was 
ps] Jorge. I don't remember the others. I can't remember. 
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[1] The feelings were not those of just four people, but 
pi those of 12 people. 
S3] Q: W h o cal led the meeting? W h o organi2ed t h e 
[4] meeting? 
[5] A: (By the translator) T h e o n e from the Latin 
[6] Counci l . 
[7] Q: Were there 12 p e o p l e present? 
[8] A: (The witness nods his head.) 
pi Q: Plus the Latin Council person. 
[ioi A: (By the translator) Yes, and that lawyer 
[1 ii from BYU. I don't k n o w w h o it is. I don't k n o w him 
[12] Q: W h o called you, or h o w did you find out to 
[131 go to a meeting? 
[14] A: (By the translator) Because t h e y called us 
[i5i individually, and t h e y to ld us to m e e t at that place . 
[16] Q: W h o called? 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) Each individual t o o k 
[is] responsibility to call another person. 
[191 Q: W h o cal led you? 
m A: (By the translator) A g u y cal led m e that I 
pii can't r e m e m b e r his name, from Mex ico . 
[22i Q: W h o did y o u call? 
[23] A: (By t h e translator) I just i n f o r m e d Ange l . 
[24] Q: T h e person w h o called you, what words did h e 
75] use? 
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[1] MS. JONES: I'm going to object to this line 
Pi of objection formally. I'm not sure that it has that 
pj much relevance to the cause of action for which we're 
W here, and I think it has the possibility o f leading in 
[si other directions that I think are inappropriate. 
m MR. MARTIN: From this side of the table it 
m appears that it already has b e e n inappropriate before w e 
[8] w e r e ever informed. 
pi Q: (By Mr. Martin) Please answer just the 
[ioj quest ions. Was this just s o m e o n e w h o w a n t e d to s e c if 
[11] a n y o n e w a s angry at D.O.T.S.? W h a t w e r e t h e words? 
[121 What w e r e the words that this person w h o called y o u 
[131 used? 
[uj A: (By the translator) T h e person just 
[151 informed m e of the meet ing . I'd felt t h e reasons that 
[161 IVe given and that I base mysel f o n this search. I 
[171 don't k n o w the opinions o f e a c h individual person. What 
[181 w e felt about these opinions w e continued together. 
[191 What w e didn't, well, I don't know. 
poi Q: I understand this, but the question is: 
pi] What words did the person use w h o called you? 
P2] A: (By the translator) He just told m e to go 
[23i to the meet ing and to give m y test imony about w h a t had 
p4i happened . Nothing more . He didn't tell m e anything 
[25i e lse . I don't k n o w his personal feel ing towards the 
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HI company. I don't know. 
la Q: That w a s all he said? 
pi A: (By the translator) Yes, that's all h e 
W said. 
pj Q: Then h o w did y o u k n o w that it w a s a meet ing 
[6i for the purpose of trying to put together a group of 
[7] peop le w h o had a complaint against D.O.T.S.? 
pj A: (By the translator) How's the question? 
pi Q: If that is all the words this person used, 
[ioj the person w h o called you, then h o w did you k n o w there 
[111 even was a meeting concerning D.O.T.S.? 
[121 A: (By the translator) Well, each person gave 
! [131 their testimony. 
j [14] Q: To who? | [151 A: (By the translator) To the person from the 
j[i6j Latin Council and to the attorney. 
i [17] Q: H o w did this person — do y o u have any idea 
i [is] h o w this person k n e w to call you? 
[191 A: (By the translator) Because what was 
! po] wanted, what was — w h a t w a s being looked for was some 
j pi] orientation as to what could be done. 
j p2] Q: Because somebody wanted to hurt D.O.T.S. 
| p3] because someone was offended. And you don't — 
| (24] A: (By the translator) I was offended. 
psi Q: Yes, but you did not organize the meeting 
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Hi nor do you know, it seems , w h o may really b e beh ind all 
p] of this. 
p] MS. JONES: I'm object ing again.There's 
W implications that are in that quest ion that are 
[5] inappropriate . I think they're irrelevant. I think 
[6i there's n o basis to them. 
[7] Q: (By Mr. Martin) We're finding — y o u 
pi understand, though, the question? 
m A: (By the translator) Yes, and IVe answered 
(101 it. 
[11] Q: W h o , if you know, called this meet ing o r 
[121 organized it or initiated it? You don't know? 
(131 A: (By the translator) I didn't make any 
[uj meeting. 
[i5j Q: Was the purpose o f the meet ing to damage or 
[IQ get back at for offense? Was it personal? 
[i7i A: (By the translator) Me, as a person, I w e n t 
[is] to look for s o m e orientation that — what could b e d o n e 
[i9i into — about w h a t I cons idered to b e illegal. 
poj Q: Of course . 
£11 A: (By the translator) That's it. 
P3 Q: At anytime in the search or anything o f that 
[23i sort was Jeanette Lynton present ' 
P4i A: (By the translator) At the search? 
psi Q: Yes. 
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[13 A: (By the translator) No . 
Pi Q: Why do you decide to put her name first? 
pi MS. JONES: Again I'm going to object. That 
M calls for a legal conclusion. 
[5j MR. MARTIN: N o . I ' m a s k i n g just h i s 
[6i opinion as to why she is listed first. 
[7j Q: (By Mr. Martin) Why do you do that' 
Pi A: (By the translator) Her name's at the top 
Pi of the list because I feel that she as a manager, as the 
[iq owner of the company, ought to know what happened o n 
[HI that day. 
[i2i Q: She did not know. Is she still personally 
[i3i liable for someone else's — 
Ci4] MS. JONES: Object again. That calls for a 
fi5j icgal conclusion. 
[163 MR. MARTIN: His o p i n i o n . 
[173 A: (By the translator) I answered that. She 
[i8j is the owner of the company. She needs to know it all. 
[191 Q: (By Mr. Martin) Yeah, but y o u w o r k e d for 
pq the company. 
[2ij A: Mm-hm. 
j2zi Q; In this searching, w e r e you hurt in any 
[23i m a n n e r physical ly? 
[2*3 A: N o . 
[2si Q." Was there any discussion at this meet ing — 
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i [1] and this, maybe it's just a personal curiosity — that 
| (2) s o m e o n e organized this meet ing for a general reason that 
I m they thought Latinos were be ing mistreated at D.O.T.S. 
I w and w e had to do something to correct this problem? Yes 
I [5j or no? 
j [63 A: (By the translator) In m y point, because o f 
j m what has been already e x p o s e d here, because o f the 
i pj search. 
j pi Q: The question was what occurred at the 
[ioj meeting, and the motivation. 
[t tj MS. JONES: Tm going to object again. I 
[121 think that the motivation o f that original meet ing is 
[i3j irrelevant to the quest ion and to the issues and to the 
[uj issues in this case. 
[151 MR. MARTIN: Okay. I disagree. 
[iq Q: (By Mr. Martin) Please answer the question. 
[17] A: (By the translator) T h e quest ion is that if 
[iej the motivation for the meet ing was — was what points? 
[i9j Q: N o , I'm not asking y o u for a conclusion. 
pq I'm asking you if anything w a s said about general or 
gij specific maltreatment o f Latinos at the company named 
P2j D.O.T.S. 
C23i A: (By the translator) We're all Latins there. 
[24i Almost everybody is Latin there . At the present t ime 
[251 those of us that are in this case were Latins. And 
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113 we're going to see. 
C23 Q: Yes. I understand the explanation, but this 
Pi is not responsive to the question. The question is: Do 
W you remember anything about this meeting? Yes or no? 
[5i A: No. 
\ m Q: Is this because you're afraid to remember or 
[73 because you have a total lapse o f memory as to this 
Pi meeting? 
P3 A: (By the translator) I can't answer 
[ioi because — for the same reasons that the others can't 
[113 answer. 
[iq MR. MARTIN: I just no t i ced that counsel has 
[131 nodded her head to her client in the negative. 
[uj MS. JONES: N o . I said — I'm actually 
[isi nodding at the translator. That is not what m y cl ient 
[161 answered. 
[17] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Was this a secret meeting? 
[isi Si or no? 
[191 A: Yes. 
I poi Q: Did you agree to secrecy, y o u personally? 
[211 A: (By the translator) The meeting? 
[221 Q: Yes. 
P3] A: N o . 
I p4] Q: W h y did y o u say, then, that it w a s secret? 
j psi A: (By the translator) Secret in the sense 
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[1] This is the first t ime that w e ' v e ever heard 
(2j anything about a meet ing, and this is the first ftm<» 
C3j which n o w counsel for the four plaintiffs is attempting 
E*l to exercise attorney/client privilege for someone else. 
[5] And that's not appropriate. 
[6] MS. JONES: I'm attempting to exerc i se 
m attorney/cl ient privilege and perhaps indicate to m y 
[8] client where he has a privilege that he is not aware of. 
m MR. MARTIN: The questions were who called 
no] the meeting, h o w it got together, and what was the 
[11] motivation for this meet ing. 
[12] MS. JONES: You w e r e also asking about w h a t 
[13] was said during the meet ing . 
[u] MR. MARTIN: That's correct. And if s o m e o n e 
[15] is representation of this meeting or is claiming that 
[is] they represent them as counsel, then I would ask them to 
[i 7] step forward. And it appears that this was a mee t ing 
[131 specifically for damaging m y client and c o m m e n c i n g it in 
[is] some secret fashion. Certainly that w o u l d s e e m to 
[20] s o m e o n e else to be as inappropriate as, unfortunate: 
[2i] though it may be , a response to someone ' s claim that 
C22] money had been taken. 
[23] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Do you at least understand 
[24] w h a t I 'm saying? Si o r no? 
[2S] A: ( B y t h e translator) Yes , I unders tand . 
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[1] Q: At this checking or searching or — w a s 
[zi there a forced detention other than w h a t you thought, 
[3i e v e n though unexpressed to you, that if y o u objec ted in 
W any w a y y o u w o u l d be terminated in your employment? 
pi A: (By the translator) Like I said before, I 
Pi felt intimidated. There was nothing that w a s 
[7] obligatory, but it was very clearly said y e s or no . W h y 
m should I make any objection? Or if I make an object ion 
W Fd lose m y job or I stay o r I don't k n o w . 
[iq Q: Were any doors l ocked or c l o s e d and everyone 
[11] w a s to ld not to leave? Were those w o r d s used, or did 
[12] that act ion happen? 
[13] THE TRANSLATOR: Did you say windows? 
[1*1 MR. MARTIN: No, just doors. 
[13 A: (By the translator) What d o y o u m e a n the 
[is] d o o r is closed? W e w e r e working. 
[17] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did anyone say that y o u 
[is] w e r e prohibited from leaving? Yes or no? 
[is] A: No. 
[20] Q: Did anyone take anything from y o u that w o u l d 
pij have b e e n your o w n property? 
tzq A: (By the translator) To acquire it? 
P3j Q: Yes. 
P4] A: (By the translator) N o . 
psi Q: Did anyone stand u p as guard in their 
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[1] appearance or in words to prevent anyone from leaving? 
pi A: N o . 
I pi Q: Did anyone touch y o u to cause pain? 
j KI A: N o . 
j [5] Q: Or pressure to feel , or in an indecent 
j m fashion? 
! [7] A: N o . 
j [BI Q: N o o n e t o u c h e d y o u at all? 
[si A: (By the translator) Just for t h e shoes . 
[iq Q: D i d y o u ever have a feel ing yourself o ther 
[111 than — f i r s t o f all — 
[12] THE TRANSLATOR: D o y o u want m e to translate 
! [13] that first thing y o u did? 
! [u] MR. MARTIN: Sure.Translate first. 
! [isi Q: (By Mr. Martin) Okay. Correct that 
[16] ques t ion to say — just to say at this m o m e n t . T h e 
| [17] quest ion is: Did y o u ever have an understanding o r 
| [18] fee l ing that y o u w e r e prohibited in leaving? 
j [is* A: (By the translator) Like I said, I w a s 
I [20] afraid to leave, afraid for m y job. 
j [21] Q: That's all? That's t h e on ly reason, w h i c h 
j E22i you never told anyone? 
| p3] A: No. 
I (a*] Q: During this checking or searching, was it 
| psj done with anger or embarrassed? 
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that what we were looking for at that timr was 
orientation. I was looking for orientation, and I 
continued the orientation. 
MS. JONES: I'm going to object again. I 
think this meeting is fairly characterized as an 
official meeting with counsel, and therefore there's 
some issues of privilege involved here. 
MR. MARTIN: Are you saying that you were 
present? 
MS. JONES: I'm not saying that I was 
present, but I'm saying there was an attorney present. 
It was an initial meeting with counsel. 
MR. MARTIN: Have you been advised that this 
attorney was representing the group? What's the basis 
for your objection? 
MS. JONES: I think that the objection — 
and w e may need to take it up in court. But the 
particular objection is that these people got together 
to talk with an attorney, together looking for 
orientation as to their personal individual rights. 
MR. MARTIN: I'm wondering if you were 
involved in organizing the meeting. It makes me wonder 
when you first found out about it, or if this is the 
first information, or if this attorney is unknown and if 
all the other people are unknown. 
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[11 A: (By the translator) It wasn ' t d o n e wi th 
[2] anger, because it was d o n e by the o rde r of him. 
Pi Q: Did he have — "him," meaning — he ' s 
Kl referring to Esquivel? 
[5] A: (By the translator) Esquivel, yes. He 
[6i o rde red it and Humbcr to did it. 
[7] Q: Because of personal animosity toward you? 
[si A: (By the translator) You mean, h e searched 
P] me? 
[iq Q: No , that h e had some personal animosity 
[HI t oward you. 
[i2j A: (By the translator) Who? Humberto? 
[i3i Q: Yes . 
[u] A: (By the translator) No , because he 's just 
[is] following orders . 
[is] Q: No, about Mr. Esquivel. 
[17] A: (By the translator) No , because everyone 
[is] was being searched. 
[is] Q: Did h e announce animosity toward everyone? 
po] I 'm angry toward everyone? 
pii A: (By the translator) As far as I know, no . 
(22] Q: Now, maybe this sounds silly. It seems tha t 
P3] from your explanation he re today that as a result of 
cat] this act ion you suffered n o mone ta ry loss. Is this 
P5] true? 
^ Page 58 
[1] A: (By t h e translator) Yes, right. 
g] Q: You w e r e no t damaged in any w a y excep t b y 
[3i feelings? 
W A: (By the translator) That 's right. 
[5] Q: It also seems that you did not claim, other 
m than your own fear, that there was any forced detention 
[7] of any person. Is this t rue? 
Pi A: (By the translator) For m y o w n person? 
Pl Only to my person? 
[iq Q: Yes . 
[11] A: (By t h e translator) Right. 
[12] Q: Is that an answer? In o t he r w o r d s — maybe 
[13] we're not communicating. 
[u] The sole reason for us being here is the 
[is] feeling of offense as a result of this conduct, meaning 
[16] the search incident. Is this true? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[is] Q: I can unders tand this .But I can also 
[19] unders tand w h e r e feelings of misunderstanding can be o n 
m b o t h sides. And I do no t think that o n e injury 
[21] justifies another . I do believe that some informal — 
[22] at least, information received by t h e company by someone 
[23] wou ld b e appropr ia te . Do you agree? 
P4] A: (By the translator) Please pu t t o g e t h e r 
ps] everything you told m e so that I can -=- please t ry and 
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[1] translate a whole sen tence at once , not just little bits 
j [2i and chunks . 
i pi Q: Very good. 
I w THE TRANSLATOR: I told him thanks for t h e 
I [5] suggestion. 
pi Q: (By Mr. Martin) You were offended by t h e 
[7] checking, true? 
pi A: (By the translator) Yes. 
pj Q: Why no te lephone call, letter, personal 
[ioi communicat ion to any pe r son in t h e company from any 
[111 person w h o had felt offended to even make a small 
[12] suggestion of the offense? Isn't this also an offense? 
[13] A: (By the translator) Because the re was n o 
[H] trusting communicat ion b e t w e e n t he manager of t h e 
[15] company. 
[16] Q: Meaning Mr. Esquivel? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Uh-huh. Even to 
[is] eventually — to Jeanette that was on the other side of 
[19] this. 
poi Q: Pick up the telephone and call her on the 
pi] phone . Why not9 
[22] A: (By t h e translator) I tell you again. 
P3] Because w e V e always b e e n told you have to follow this 
E24] pat tern . In order to get u p to M s . — h e ' s using a 
P5] title to address Jeanet te — you have to go th rough 
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[1] Miguel first to get to her. 
pi Q: Even w h e n you're no longer employed by t h e 
pi company, w h y no p h o n e call after? W h y no contact? Such 
M anger is instilled in these peop le that you feci that 
PI these peop le and this conduc t is making no offense bu t 
pi is totally justified. Fear? 
[7] A: (By the translator) I didn' t unders tand 
pi wha t you just said. 
pi THE TRANSLATOR: And I said I didn' t either. 
[iq Q: (By Mr. Martin) Someone as an observer; a 
[11] neutral observer, could maybe say tha t this compla in t 
[12] n o w against t he company is some vendet ta . W h y w o u l d you 
[13] say that it would no t a p p e a r some vendetta? 
[H] A: (By the translator) I just w a n t e d to make 
[15] sure of wha t my legal rights we re . That 's w h y I 'm he re , 
[16] just for that . If I had c o m e and asked you for legal 
[17] advise, I would still b e he re , 
[is] Q: You mean from t h e first t ime you asked m e 
[19] legal advise you would have been living here or — I 
po] don't know. 
pi] THE TRANSLATOR: No, that's — 
P2] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Wha t isn't, w h a t is a 
[23] complaint? 
P4] A: (By t h e translator) That ' s w h y I 'm he re , 
P5] for the legal thing. I 'm no t looking for illegalities. 
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[1] I'm looking for what's legal. 
71 Q: Were you t o u c h e d in a harmful or offensive 
31 way? 
*l A: (By t h e translator) In a search , n o . Just 
[5i touching the bottom of my feet for me. 
1^ Q: Humberto touched your feet? 
[7j A: (By t h e translator) That 's all. 
[8] Q: For clarification, y e s o r no? 
[91 A: (By the translator) Did h e t o u c h m y feet? 
[ioj Q: Did H u m b e n o t o u c h your feet? 
[Hi A: Yeah. 
[i2i MR. MARTIN: Let's t ake m a y b e just a br ie f 
[13] break. 
[14] (A recess w a s taken.) 
[is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) I'm just curious about the 
[16] t ime of these first meet ings , if y o u can r e m e m b e r 
[17] approximately t h e m o n t h and day. 
[18] A: (By t h e translator) Exactly, I don ' t 
[19] remember. 
[20] Q: Approximately. As c lose as y o u can 
pi] remember. Or if y o u c o u l d relate it to another day or 
M event. 
[23] A: (By the translator) February or March, 
[24] those t w o months . I don't remember exactly. 
[253 Q: And w h e r e w a s the meet ing held? 
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[1] A: (By t h e translator) In a h o u s e . 
[2] Q: Address , approximate ly? 
Pi A: (By t h e translator) There in Orem. I don' t 
C4] remember . 
[5] Q: Top of the hill or on the bottom of the 
m hill? North or south? 
m A: (By t h e translator) Let's s e e . South . 
[8] Q: Do you remember the name of the person whose 
[9] house at which the meeting was held? 
[io] A: (By the translator) IVe got the name right 
[11] there, but it just w o n ' t c o m e out . 
[12] Q". If y o u w e r e in an automobi le , cou ld y o u 
[13] drive to t h e place? 
[14] A: (By the translator) Yes . 
[151 Q: How were the four of you selected? 
[16] A: (By the translator) H o w w e r e — w h a t w a s 
[17] t h e question? 
[18] Q: How were those four selected from 12, or 
[19] f rom 50? 
[20] A: (By the translator) They weren't selected. 
[2i] Because the others were just going away. They went to 
[22] their o w n country. 
P3] Q: All o f t h e m left e x c e p t four? 
[24] A: (By the translator) Because w e four l ived 
E25] here. All the others don't live here anymore. 
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[1] Q: Do you know what countries? 
[2] A: (By the translator) The majority of the 
Pi people were Mexican. 
Ki Q: Just the date, without asking more, w h e n was 
[5] the first t ime y o u met wi th your current counse l , 
[6] approximate ly? 
I7j A: (By t h e translator) Td say a b o u t a year. 
[8] Q: A year after t h e first m e e t i n g at this 
p] house? 
{ioj A: No . 
pi] Q: What month, approximately, o f w h a t year? 
[121 A: (By the translator) I can't say. 
[13] Q: H o w long after the meet ing at the h o u s e — 
[u] A: (By the translator) I'd say it w a s probably 
[is] about four months . 
[i6j Q: The person's house w h e r e y o u met , did t h e y 
[17] also l eave t h e Uni ted States? 
[18] A: N o . 
pel Q: D o t h e y still live at the same residence? 
cap] A: (By the translator) I don't know. 
pi] Q: Is it true y o u do not remember the n a m e o f a 
[22] p e r s o n w h o w a s introduced as a lawyer from the BYU? 
P3] A: (By the translator) He came just to g ive an 
P4] assessment. It w a s an o lder person. I don't r e m e m b e r 
[25] the name. 
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PI Q: Her name? 
pi A: (By t h e translator) I don't r e m e m b e r t h e 
pi n a m e . 
[4] Q: T h e name o f the male o r -
is] A: (By t h e translator) I w o u l d say e v e n a n 
m elderly person. 
[73 Q: W h o introduced this person and said that 
pi this person w a s an attorney? 
Pi A: (By the translator) It w a s the person from 
[ioj the conciHo. 
[11] Q: Concilio? 
[12] A: (By t h e translator) C o n c i l i o Latino, t h e 
[13] Latin C o u n c i l . 
[H] Q: W h e r e is that located? 
[151 A: (By t h e translator) P r o v o . 
[16] Q: D o y o u k n o w the address o r t e l e p h o n e number? 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) In t h e Provo county, 
[18] right to the side there. I don't know the name of that 
[191 building 
C2oi Q: Is it Provo City, I suspect? 
pii A: (By t h e translator) Yes . 
[22] Q: I don' t k n o w . Is this l i s ted in t h e 
[23] t e l e p h o n e book? A regular office? 
P4] A: (By the translator) Because t h e off ice 
[25] still exists, the program still exists. 
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til Q: My apologies for my ignorance. Did that 
pi office recommend lawyers? 
Pi A: N o . 
W Q: Did the person introduced as a lawyer from 
[si BYU recommend lawyers? 
lei A : N o . 
[7j A: (By the translator) He either. 
Pi Q: I'm not trying to be offensive with this 
Pl question, but did you just look through the telephone 
[ioi book to find an attorney? 
[111 A: (By the translator) You mean if I went to 
[i2i the phone book to — 
[131 Q: Well, how? How did you find the attorney? 
[14] A: (By the translator) Through an attorney. 
[i5i Q: Ah. Okay. Some other attorney recommended 
[i6j someone. 
[i7i A: (By the translator) Of all the attorneys 
[ig] that had spoken previously with us, they didn't 
[191 recommend any attorneys. Like he says, through the 
[201 phone book, and that person told us about another 
pi] person. 
[22i Q: And then you finally came over to the office 
P3] of either Senorita or Senora Jones — trying to speak 
P4] with respect at least — beings approximately four 
P5] months after the first meeting? 
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[13 A: (The witness nods his head.) 
pi Q: Is that correct, from what you remember? 
PI A: (By the translator) Yeah, from what I 
[4i remember, yes. 
PI Q: Okay. Very good. Maybe — I count on my 
[6] fingers —maybe about June of'93? 
m A: June or July. 
m Q: Before or after Independence Day, do you 
Pi know, if you remember? 
[io] A: (By the translator) I don't remember. 
[11] MR. MARTIN: Okay. Thank you. 
[12] MS. JONES: No questions. 
[13] (The deposition concluded at 4:35 p.m.) 
[U] 
[151 
[161 
[17] 
[18] 
[191 
[2DJ 
[21] 
m 
m 
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WALTER SEMIDEY 
WrTNESS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read tte foregoing 
testimony consisting of 65 pages, numbered from 3 to 67, 
inclusive, and the same is a true and correct record ot 
said testimony, wtth the exception ot the foiowJng 
corrections feted below, giving my reasons therefor. 
Page Line Change/Correction Reason 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to at Sat Lake Ctty, Utah, 
this dayof .1994. 
Notary Pubic 
My commission expires: 
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REPORTER CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I. CAROLE A. KING, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State ot Utah, do 
hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the wtness, 
Waiter Semidey, was duly sworn to tel the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth; 
That the testimony of said wtness was taken down 
by me in stenotype on April 21,1994 at the time and 
place herein staled and was thereafter caused by me to 
be transcribed into typewriting, and that a ful, true 
and correct transcription ot said testimony so taken and 
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
from 3 through 67, industoe. 
I further certify that after the said deposition 
was transenbed the original ot same was sent to 
Mr. Loren D. Martin, attorney for Defendants. 
I further certify that 1 am not of Wn or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
causa of action and that i am not interested in the 
event thereof. 
WFTNESS MY HAND AND SEAL thte 29th day of Apri, 
1994. 
CAROLE A. KING, CSR/RPR 
Notary Pubic 
Residing in Saft Lake County 
My commission expires: 
September 20,1997 
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Tab 21 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL 
SANTIAGO, HUMBERTO 
BARDALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON,/aka/ 
JEANETTE ROMERO MARKHAM, 
/dba/D.O.T.S., DOZENS OF 
STAMPS, MIGUELANGEL 
EQUIVEL; JOHN DOES I & II 
AND JANE DOES I-III, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 930400503 PI 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Deposition of: 
JOSE HUMBERTO BARDALES 
CERTIFIED COPY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of April, 
1994, the deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, produced as 
a witness herein at the instance of the Defendants Jeanette 
R. Lynton and Miguelangel Esquivel herein, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before Carole A. King, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 8:20 p.m. of said day at the 
offices of Linda Q. Jones, 40 South 100 West, #33, Provo, 
Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice. 
CAROLE KING 
CSR No. 330 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
> %— JM^JM - » & * U +1mi **£*» _YT_C***»3*fttf7 
SEMIDEY v s . LYNTON JOSE HUMBEKTO BARDAUES 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiffs. Ms. Marti Jones 
Attorney at Law 
Law Offices of Unda Q. Jones 
40 South 100 West, #33 
Provo. Utah 84601 
(801)373-0276 
For the Defendants Mr. Loren 0. Martin 
Jeanette R. Lynton Attorney at Law 
and Miguelangei EsquiveJ 1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Satt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The Translator Mr. Grant Andersen 
Also Present: Ms. Dentse Famsworth 
Ms. Jeanette R. Lynton 
Mr. Miguelangei Esqurvel 
INDEX 
Witness Page 
JOSE HUMBERTO BARDALES 
Examination by Mr. Martin 3 
EXHIBrTS 
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[1] April 21,1994 PROCEEDINGS 8:20 p.m. 
P] JOSE HUMBERTO BARDALES, 
p] having been first duly sworn, through the interpreter; 
W was examined and testified as follows: 
[5] E X A M I N A T I O N 
I5i B Y M R . M A R T I N : 
[7] Q: Please state your full name and address. 
Pi A: I am Jose Humberto Bardales. My address is 
[9] 1818 South Columbia Lane, Orem. The zip code is 84058. 
[10] Q: Where are you employed? 
[11] A: For now I work for National Security. It's 
[12] in American Fork. 
[13] Q: What do you do at National Security? 
[u] A: This is a — oh, bar sander. We make the 
[is] safety box. 
[163 Q: What size? 
[17] A: Boxes? 
[18] Q: Yes. 
[19] A: Any size. 
[20] Q: Huge? Big? 
pi] A: Yeah. It's for the big business, small 
[22] business. 
[23] Q: And what do you do specifically in the 
[24] company? 
[25] A: Sander, bar sander. 
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[1] 
(?) 
P] 
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[10] 
[11] 
112] 
[13] 
[14] 
[15] 
[16] 
[17] 
[18] 
[19] 
[20] 
P1J 
[22] 
[23] 
P4] 
P5] 
Q: Is it bar sander? 
A: Yes. 
Q: For — 
A: I sand boxes. 
Q: Prior to painting, I suspect. Before. 
A: Oh, before? 
Q: Or in preparation for painting of the boxes. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Arc you paid by the hour? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How much are you paid by the hour? 
A: Five dollar. 
Q: You work 40 hours a week? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how long have you been working at 
National Security? 
A: Oh, this is a month. 
Q: Eight months? 
A: No, one month. 
Q: Where did you work before then? 
A: Excuse me? 
Q: Before National Security? 
A: Oh, I was work for the Deseret Industries, 
D.I. It's in Provo. 
Q: How long did you work at Deseret Industries? 
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[1] A: One year. 
[2] Q: And your position? 
p] A: In the washer/dryer technician. 
W Q: Were you paid by the hour? 
[5] A: Yes. 
[6] Q: How much? 
[7] A: This is 4.25. 
[8] Q: Four-two-fivc? 
[9] A: Yeah, four dollars and Gvc cents. 
[io] Q: Thank you. Do you work only now for 
[11] National Security? 
[12] A: I had another part-time for the landscaping. 
[13] Q: What is this? 
[u] A: (By the translator) Landscaping. 
[is] Q: My apology. I look at the same letters and 
[16] pronounce them differently, Hke somebody who's a — 
[17] A: My English no very good. 
[18] Q: Your English is good. My Spanish is not 
[19] very good. That's why we have an interpreter. And this 
(20] is a help. 
pi] A: Yes, I know. 
[22] Q: Just to make you feel more comfortable. It 
[23] is not something which we do just to be impolite or to 
[24] not show respect, but for accuracy. 
[25] Do you understand the nature of deposition? 
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What is it? ;i] 
Now, in what we — 3 
\E TRANSLATOR: He's asking me for another 31 
L w 
3. MARTIN: Yes, I understand. is] 
(By Mr. Martin) Not to be impolite, again, m 
)t to show respect for the English that you have, m 
± makes me feel rather inadequate for only being a pi 
e language person, but because of the formality of m 
meeting, his assignment, meaning the interpreter, ' no) 
repeat word for word what I say in Spanish and | [n] 
to repeat back if we could in Spanish word for | [121 
1. Otherwise, we send him home and he looks bad. i [13] 
is okay? :u] 
Oh , yes. j pq 
: Because t h e reason w e have to do this is pq 
kuse h e r responsibility is to r ecord every w o r d — i [i7j 
Okay. I [is] 
: — instead of conversation between the two | pgj 
>u trying to help with words which don't translate ; poj 
1 one language to another easily. Do you understand j pi] 
\m 
: Yes. j p3] 
: Okay. Now, we will work — may I address | p*l 
man as if it were you? jpsj 
Page 6! 
: (The witness nods his head.) 
: And he would say then in Spanish to you, and 
respond, please, in Spanish, and then he tells her 
Qglish what was described, so that we do not have an 
pendent conversation. 
: (The witness nods his head.) 
: Is this okay? 
: Yes. 
: Thank you. Do you understand that this 
ting is a deposition? 
: (By the translator) In other words, for 
osition. 
I: Correct. 
HE TRANSLATOR: He's asking for another 
nition of "deposition." 
I: (By Mr. Martin) A statement made by you, 
ien by a recorder, after you make an oath to tell 
truth. Do you understand this? 
n (By the translator) I understand this. 
nk you for the definition. 
I: So that you will understand, then, I ask him 
peak each word that I say, meaning the interpreter. 
vou understand this? 
I: Yes. 
I: Before you worked at Deserct Industries, 
Page 7 
 where did you work? 
1 A: In D.O.T.S. In D.O.T.S. I went to work. 
l Q: Is D.O.T.S. a corporation? 
1 A: (By the translator) What I understand is 
) that on the paychecks it says D.O.T.S. — Adventures? 
1 Q: That's correct. 
3 A: (By the translator) Inc., I-n-c. 
l Q: Do you understand I-n-c? 
1 A: (By the translator) Not really. I don't 
1 know what the term is in English. 
] Q: YouVe heard of the word "corporation"? 
1 A: (The witness nods his head.) 
] Q: Now, you nodded affirmatively, and she must 
] write down a word, so if you could answer "yes" or "no." 
1 A: Yes. 
l Q: Explain to me what is your understanding of 
I a corporation. 
1 A: (By the translator) What I understand is a 
I corporation is when there exists more than one owner: 
l That's what I understand. 
! Q: Is your understanding, then, that a single 
I stockholder would not be a lawful corporation? 
I MS. JONES: I'm going to object. That calls 
I for a legal conclusion. 
I MR. MARTIN: I'm just asking for his 
Page 8 
understanding. 
THE TRANSLATOR: Maybe it would be best to 
ask the question again, please. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) I think maybe make it in 
two questions. Do you understand what a shareholder is 
of stock? 
THE TRANSLATOR: May I use the dictionary, 
or maybe somebody ought to help me. 
MR. MARTIN: Maybe I could say it easier. 
MS. JONES: Ask him in Spanish. 
A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Tell me what your 
understanding is, what x^s means, understanding of what 
stockholder is. 
A: (By the translator) As far as I understand 
it, a stockholder is a person that holds a certain 
quantity value which has been invested in something 
Q: Perhaps a corporation. 
A: Yeah. 
A: (By the translator) We could say so. 
Q: Is it your understanding that a lawful 
corporation must have more than one stockholder? 
A: (By the translator) I really don't know for 
a surety. I'm not quite acquainted, really, with all 
these terms that have to do with corporations and 
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m partnerships. 
[2] Q: One reason I asked this question is because 
[3] of a feeling I have that o thers may have believed o r had 
W an unders tanding that if Jeanet te Lynton — w h e t h e r o r 
is] not it's t rue — was a sole stockholder, there must be 
[6] something wrong. Do you k n o w or have you ever talked 
[7] wi th any of the o ther th ree plaintiffs that indicated 
[8] this to you? 
Pi A: (By the translator) You mean about a 
[io] corporation or a partnership? 
[11] Q: Yeah, a corporation. 
[12] A: (By the translator) No. 
[13] Q: I still don' t understand. On this paper 
[u] which has your name and three others, there 's a personal 
[is] complaint against Jeanette Lynton rather than the 
[16] company D.O.T.S. Aventures, Inc. 
[17] MS. JONES: Again, I think that calls for a 
[is] legal conclusion. 
[19] THE TRANSLATOR: Am I supposed to be 
po] interpret ing all of these objections and — 
pi] MS. JONES: Yes. 
P2] THE TRANSLATOR: Okay. 
[23] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Okay. W h a t is your 
[24] unders tanding? 
[25] A: (By t h e translator) I 'm confused because of 
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[1] all t he translation and things. What is the actual 
[2] ques t ion again? 
P] Q: T h e actual ques t ion is: Did you k n o w tha t 
[4j an allegation that you have filed wi th the cour t is 
K against Jeanet te Lynton personally rather than against 
[6] t h e company D.O.T.S. Adventures, Inc.? 
[7] MS. JONES: Again — 
[8] A: (By the translator) I unders tand that it's 
p] against t he business w h e r e o n e worked . I unders tand 
[io] that it doesn ' t mat ter w h i c h person is presiding over a 
[11] business. There ' s a — w h a t c h a call it? There 's 
[121 owners , or people that are responsible, in charge. 
[13] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did you personally intend 
[u] an allegation to be against Jeanette Lynton personally? 
[is] A: (By the translator) It doesn't matter w h o 
[16] t he o w n e r is. It's just w h o e v e r is responsible for that 
[17] business. For example , I unders tand that in t he 
[is] workplace , in the business one works , there ' s certain 
[19] peop le that if something happens t hey are directly 
po] responsible. It doesn ' t mat ter if some line of 
[21] authori ty exists or not . And I understand that there ' s 
[22] an ult imate p e r s o n that 's responsible . And it's against 
[23] t h e m that I am doing w h a t I 'm doing or complaining 
[24] Q: Did anyone ever explain to you that t he 
[25] p u r p o s e of a corpora t ion is to limit personal liability? 
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[1] THE TRANSLATOR: Tm having a little t rouble 
p] with the word "liability." Any helpers? 
pi MR. MARTIN: Labili ty means — 
W THE TRANSLATOR: I said persona l 
[5] responsibility is the way — 
[6] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Okay. "Responsibility" is 
[7] not the same as "liability." 
m THE TRANSLATOR: (Reading from dict ionary) 
[8] Liabilities, duties — let m e just find it real quick 
no] before reading all this. It says "responsabitidad" a 
[11] whole lot in here . 
[12] MR. MARTIN: Maybe this is par t of o u r 
[13] problem. 
[u] THE TRANSLATOR: "Responsibilidad" is a lot 
[15] broader, I think. It covers a lot b roader spec t rum of 
[16] meaning. 
[17] MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
us] THE TRANSLATOR: I don't know. 
[ig] MR. MARTIN: I think so. Let m e explain — 
po] A: (By the translator) T h e ques t ion tha t I 
pi] unders tood was if t he corpora t ion is i m m u n e from 
[22] complaints. 
P3] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Ah, t he reverse . Has 
P4] anyone ever told you it's t he reverse that ' s t rue? A 
PS] corporation may b e liable, u n d e r the law, and t he 
Page 12 
[1] individual o w n e r is not . Have you ever heard this 
p] before? 
p] A: (By the translator) N o . 
[4] THE TRANSLATOR: T h e w o r d "liable," 
[5] jurisprudential definition — 
[6] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Ah. That ' s par t of t he 
[7] problem. Do you k n o w or believe that Jeanet te Lynton as 
[8] an individual did anything wrongful t o you personally, 
PI by h e r o w n choice? Translate tha t please, if y o u can. 
[io] MS. JONES: Yeah. I 'm waving because h e 
[11] asked you something, and w h e n h e asks you something you 
[12] need to translate it back ra ther than answering. You're 
[13] having conversations wi th him. 
• [u] MR. MARTIN: Maybe. You haven ' t said 
; [is] anything yet. 
j [16] A: (By the translator) Let's go back a little 
• [17] bit and we'l l get it. | [is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Do you have any reason o r 
i [is] do you believe that Jeane t te Lynton as an individual did | [20] something wrongful to you intentionally? 
'
l
 [21] A: (By the translator) Well, t o t he po in t tha t 
j [22] I realized w h e n I was working there, t he pe r son that | [23] most represented — oh, not represented — the person 
\ P4] that stood as the o w n e r of the company. However, the 
j p5] person that was always there was Migueiangcl. 
j Page 13 
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id what I understand, that if Jcancttc 
an was the only — I always realized that 
ligueiangcl was under the direction of 
eancttc. If there were any people above Jcanette, 
tever knew about it. We never realized it. 
: Part of the deposition purpose is to ask a 
don, and you listen to the question to respond and 
rcr or give an answer to the question on what you 
v — 
: (By the translator) Right. I understand 
But it also must be understood that I'm going to 
rcr the way I'm receiving it, because it's not a 
:t discussion. It's through an interpreter. And I 
w by my experience that some things will be lost or 
iged. 
: Very good. 
a did Jeanette Lynton ever arrest you or 
ane you or prevent you from freely moving from one 
e to another? 
:No. 
: (By the translator) No. While we were 
king there, she was never direcdy in charge of us. 
ter, Mr. Miguelangel. 
: So the answer is no. 
: (By the translator) No. Directly from her, 
Page 14 
j [1] Q: Okay. The question is: Did Mr. Esquivel, 
| [2i you believe, arrest, detain o r prevent your freedom on 
i p] only one occasion, or more? 
| («] A: (By the translator) I understand what he 's 
I is] saying in that thing, in that sense, right. You're 
j [6] supposing that — you're hypothesizing that he was maybe 
, [7] with a machete or some o ther w e a p o n threatening me, and 
I pi I want to explain to you. 
M Q: No. 
no] A: (By the translator) Yes.That 's the way 
[11] I 'm understanding. 
[12] Q: Okay. Then let m e explain. You must answer 
[13] the question or we'll be here all night. Do you have a 
[u] complaint against Mr. Esquivel for one occasion or more? 
[is] A: (By the translator) I unders tand that t he 
[16] question of the lawyer is if I was detained or if my 
[17] liberty — my freedom was taken away more than one t ime. 
[is] That 's what I want to explain. 
[is] Q: The question is one or more? 
poj A: (By the translator) I 'm going to re turn to 
pi] the question. 
C22] Q: No. The question must be answered. 
P3] A: (By the translator) How can I answer 
[24] something — I mean, I unders tand t h e tone of voice wi th 
ps] which he 's saying the question. Since h e was 
Page 16 
Something that w e were always told that — 
uelangel told us, told all of us, that anything that 
night say would b e as if Mrs. Jeanet te had said it 
that he had all of he r approbat ion or approval to do 
i i ing in the company. He repeated that many t imes, 
many ears heard it. 
I: T h e n I ask you the same question about 
uelangel, Mr. Esquivel. 
ii (By the translator) What was the question 
ut him? 
I: T h e question: Did Mr. Esquivel ever arrest 
, detain you, o r s top you by force from freely moving 
n one place to t he other? Si or no? 
i: (By the translator) I 'm going to answer the 
stion concerning a specific case in wh ich I felt 
:, yes, I was restricted, and it was on one occasion 
en $20 had been lost, which was the quantity tha t was 
I to all of us had been lost. 
J: One moment . Is there only one occasion, 
n, in wh ich you believe that Mr. Esquivel arrested, 
ained, o r forcibly prevented you from moving wi th 
:dom? 
i: (By the translator) I understand that if h e 
> in the company it was in order to have someone that 
> directing the company, and so — 
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[1] responsible w e received orders from him, and that can be 
p] just — that can be a little different from the way that 
I p] you're stating it. 
1
 H Q: Okay. W h e n I asked you t he question if h e 
[5] had arrested or detained you or restrained your liberty, 
i [6] you said, Yes, on one occasion. 
| [7] A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
| p] Q: Only one? 
j p] A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
I [io] Q: Thank you. Only that w e try to b e correct . 
| [11] And I appreciate your he lp in trying to make questions 
[12] accurate also. However, the reason w e are he re is 
[13] because of my understanding that you and others have a 
[u] complaint against the action of Mr. Esquivel. Is this a 
[15] single incident or more? 
I [is] A: (By the translator) Just one incident of 
, [17] what 5 
i pa] Q: In which you feel that Mr. Esquivel in some 
[19] manner restrained your liberty. 
, poj A: (By the translator) Well, in a direct way I 
C2i] t*""k that — m which I felt that — in that Esquivel 
J22] was the best way to call to our attention, even though 
[23] maybe he didn't tell us exactly — like in this manner. 
, [24] "Don't move from there" — maybe not in that way, but in 
j [25] a way that he was always gathering us together for a lot 
i Page 17 
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[1] of meetings to call to our attention, to the workers 
[2] that were gathered together, that w e were thieves and 
p] that we were stealing things from there . 
W Or another situation too, always is calling 
[5] a meeting to call something to our attention, which 
[6] never really came to t he case. 
Pi Q: Very good. However, in all of those cases 
pi it was you be ing in a posi t ion of an employee a n d h e 
PB] being in a position of a manager, and you were always 
no] paid for the t ime. 
[11] A: (By the translator) Right, but I understand 
[12] that a person works out of necessity. For that reason, 
[13] many times, because a person has needs to support their 
[H] family, one puts up with the humiliations or even with 
[15] things that are incorrect just because the need that o n e 
[iq has. If there were any o ther alternative, a person 
[17] would not endure all the things that he exper ienced with 
[is] Miguelangel. 
[19] Q: I understand you may b e part a phi losopher 
po] and disagree with management of a company, and may 
pi] believe that this is demeaning and of no consequence o r 
P2] p u r p o s e . This is the responsibility of t h e manager. 
[23] A: (By the translator) O n e momen t . 
P4] Q: Wi th this you may disagree, bu t w h a t is a 
PS] cause of act ion unde r law may be different than just 
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[1] And then we didn' t all go h o m e , but t h e 
[2] promise was that w e would be paid for the hours that 
p] made up that difference, which would have been four 
W hours. And so the promise was made, and it wasn't 
K fulfilled. And so me personally, I went to the office 
[6] with Miguelangel to complain about the fact that on my 
Pi check the balance — or the difference of the hours that 
p] I'd been promised to be paid for did not appear. 
j p] But yes, they did appear, bu t those four 
I po] hours had been paid only to t w o people of which I k n o w | [11] about, and they are Walter Scmidey and Angel Santiago. 
[12] And so I asked him why. 
[13] Q: Okay. You asked h im why. 
[u] A: (By the translator) So his answer w a s — 
[15] and he told me, Brother, you believe that I am God. And 
[is] I told h im no in answer to that question, but w h y had 
[17] this money been paid to Walter Senridey and Angel 
[is] Santiago and to the o ther peop le not been paid? 
[19] And so he told me that I was fired because 
po] of that complaint. But then I told him that I needed a 
pi] letter of dismissal, and h e gave me one, and I have it 
P2] n o w signed by him. He said in t h e next check coming h e 
P3] was going to speak with the accountant or with Jcanet te 
[24] and that w e would b e paid t h e hours , for the missing 
P5] hours , and that it wou ld b e pa id to everyone. And it 
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[1] rudeness or lack of respect . 
p] A: Okay. 
[3] Q: Now, however, restraint of liberty is an 
W accusation you have made on a specific incident. 
[5] A: (By the translator) Specifically, yes. 
[6] Q: I understand philosophy. We may talk in 
m general terms of the total circumstance, but do you 
[B] understand that w e are here for the purpose of a single 
[9] incident? 
[io] A: (By the translator) Right. 
[11] Q: Is this also true from wha t you understand? 
[12] A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
[13] Q: Maybe w e progressed. The question may t hen 
[u] be more correctly to your understanding: Is there more 
[is] than one incident which you believe was unlawful? 
[16] A: (By the translator) More than the one that 
[17] is with accusation or besides the complaint? 
[is] Q: Yes. And if more than one , then be specific 
[19] as to each incident. Otherwise, it's impossible for us 
po] to communicate or understand. 
pi] A: (By the translator) There was an incident 
[22] in which w e were told that w e were not going to work 
;23] from midday n o o n o n because w e w e r e going to make some 
[24] prepara t ions for a Christmas par ty w h i c h was going to 
[25] take place, and Mr. Miguelangel told us to go h o m e . 
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[1] was paid to everyone. 
pj So things of this nature, even though 
p] they ' re a condit ion of someone that 's directing t h e 
W company, he can do those things. But personally I felt 
[5] offended. And I perce ived it as an unfair action. 
[6] Q: Wha t day was this? 
[7] A: (By the translator) I don ' t k n o w t h e day 
[8] exactly, but I have that letter at home, and it's on the 
p] day that letter is dated. The letter has t he date. 
[io] Q: You have explained two incidents. 
[11] A: (By the translator) In this last o n e that I 
[12] just barely explained, I unders tand that pe rhaps t o m e 
[13] it's bad, but under the law it may be all right, because 
[u] if someone doesn't want to k e e p an employee that 's made 
[is] a complaint of this nature, he can unemploy. 
[16] Q: Did you ever believe otherwise? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Like what? Did I 
[is] believe that? 
[19] Q: Did you ever believe tha t the company o r an 
[20] employer did not have a right under the law to tell you 
pi] to no longer work? 
P2] A: (By the translator) No. That ' s w h y I 'm 
[23] saying it. I 'm saying that if t he pe r son that 's in 
[24] charge, because of this act ion that he did to me , 
[25] p rovoked by this type of a complaint, if I complained 
Page 21 
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ainst him, a complaint of this nature that I just 
lished explaining, he was in his line of duty to 
smiss me, unemploy me. 
THE TRANSLATOR: I'm asking him what the very 
t phrase was. I thought there had been something 
• e . 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Do you believe that 
O.T.S. Adventures owes you money? Yes or no? 
A: (By the translator) In payment for my work? 
Q: Yes. 
A: (By the translator) No. I was paid to the 
ry last cent. 
Q: Or for any other reason? 
A: (By the translator) I am making a complaint 
th this lawyer because, as far as I understand, my 
hts to freedom were violated. 
Q: Is this the only reason? 
A: (By the translator) I think, yes. 
Q: D.O.T.S. Adventures, then, owes you 
mpensation for violation of your liberty? 
MS. JONES: Again, I think that calls for a 
;al conclusion. 
A: (By the translator) If the law dictates it 
lsly, I think that's the way it should be. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Did any supervisor or 
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. Esquivel ever say to you you cannot leave? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. When this 
idem happened they said that no one could leave, 
x we all had to line the sides of the cafeteria 
:ause he was going to do something that he knew is 
Linst the law, but that he was going to do it, and it 
s to search us until the money that had been lost 
seared. 
rcnhen he said that, I immediately realized 
t that is against the law in my country and that this 
intry could not make an exception to the law. It's 
nething that had never happened to me, and I would 
z to tell Mrs. Jeanette what happened, because at 
t time perhaps she didn't realize, and I would like 
Express my feelings how I felt about that action. 
ETien that was said and it was my turn to go 
h the person designated by Mr. Esquivel to search us, 
It offended and I felt deprived of my rights as a 
zen, because never has a situation like this 
opened to me. 
rhe country where I'm from, for someone to 
able to do what was done to me — that is, for 
aeone to do that that happened to me on this occasion, 
re must be proof that I am delinquent. And there has 
se a legal authorization. 
Page 23 
And that was the thing that — well, I 
really fcix bad. I felt all torn up, humiliated because 
of this situation, because in my culture not even 
someone's wife does that. No one, absolutely no one. 
So, why can it be allowed in this country, 
it can be permitted in this country — excuse me. Why 
in this country any person without legal authorization 
can take upon themselves this authorization to search a 
person or determine a set group of people. 
Q: Do you believe that if the police had done 
the same thing exactly it would have been lawful? If 
possible in less than three minutes, an answer. 
A: (By the translator) Yes. I said that as 
far as I understand the laws in my country — 
Q: No. The question is — yes or no? Is it 
possible for you ever to answer a question "yes" or 
"no"? If police had come to the plant and done exactly 
the same thing, would that have been lawful, in your 
opinion? Yes or no? No. Yes or no? 
A: (By the translator) I do not know the laws 
of this country. 
Q: Do you believe or no? Do you believe, yes 
or no? 
A: (By the translator) I think that — 
Q: No. Yes or no? Do you believe, yes or no? 
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If you say "yes" or "no" — 
A: (By the translator) I insist that — 
Q: If you say "yes" or "no," then we may ask 
you to explain, but you must answer the question instead 
of just your philosophy. This is not permitted. 
A: (By the translator) No. What I want to say 
is that the police, yes, they can do it, or maybe they 
can't do it. If I'm suspect, he could do it. If I'm a 
normal person and they have no referral, no probable 
cause, and he sees me on the street, he could never do 
that. That's what I understand. 
Q: You're not on the street. You're in a plant 
where someone has made an accusation that there was a 
loss. 
A: (By the translator) That's made an 
accusation of what9 
Q: That there was a loss. And yet you wish to 
philosophize as to some different situation. 
A: (By the translator) I don't know whether 
the police would search the person or not. IVe never 
had such an experience in my life. 
Q: Then it's easy to just say "I don't know." 
A: (By the translator) I don't know. 
Q: It seems that you believe that your entire 
time that you worked at D.O.T.S. was offensive to you. 
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p] Is this correa? 
P] A: (By the translator) It was the worst time 
3i of my life with reference to work. My worst experience. 
W Q: How long did you work there? 
[si A: Six months. 
[6] Q: Why? 
m A: (By the translator) Why was it the worst 
[si time? 
Pi Q: No. Why did you work there for so long if 
[ioi you were so offended, and leave more than a year ago — 
[1 ii A: (By the translator) And leave more than a 
[121 year ago? 
[131 Q: Yes. — and leave your employment, either 
[i4i voluntarily or involuntarily, and wait until now to 
[is] spill out your feelings? 
pel A: (By the translator) It's not just up till 
[i7i now that I've spilled my feelings, for your knowledge. 
[is] I've done this before my wife, with my coworkers, and 
[191 with other people. My ecclesiastical leaders, for 
po] example. 
C2i] Q: To anyone who would listen sympathetically. 
022] A: (By the translator) I would explain it to 
[23] any person that I thought would understand my problems. 
P4] Q: Yet you never explained that to any person 
[25i while you worked for the company or after you left. 
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[1] A: (By the translator) While I was working in 
[2] the company, wi th those p e o p l e that I expressed it to; 
Pi for example , my wife . 
W Q: Did y o u ever talk to Jeanette Lynton? Yes 
[5] or no? 
[6] A: (By the translator) I didn't do it. 
[7] Q: N o . Is the answer no? 
[8] A: (By the translator) I'd like to explain the 
pi reason. 
[ioi Q: Well, we' l l be here all night, I'm afraid. 
[ii] You feel like — 
[12] A: (By t h e translator) N o , it's short. 
[13] Q: Yes, but you n e e d this emotional event this 
[14] evening, and I don't mind if we're here all night, but I 
[15] don't k n o w that it serves any purpose, because y o u V e 
[is] already made the complaint. 
[17] A: (By t h e translator) O n e m o m e n t . I'm g o i n g 
[is] to — I'd like to express that I feel a little bit 
[19] uncomfortable at this t ime because of the w a y in w h i c h 
pc] y o u are questioning m e , and the reason is because he's 
[21] doing it "yes or no," "yes or no." Your point of v i e w 
[22] is different from the w a y that I feel about it. 
[23] Q: Of course. But your opt ion if you thought 
[24] you w e r e treated so poorly w o u l d be to leave or stay. 
[25] W h y do y o u endure six months in such enormous pain 
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[1] voluntarily? 
; [2] A: (By the translator) I'm going to explain 
i pi that now. 
1
 w Q: And I would not bel ieve that it was just 
! [5i because you had no other thing in your mind y o u could 
. [6] work anyplace else? 
j [7] A: (By the translator) In the beginning I 
[8] explained that many t imes y o u put up wi th the 
j [9] humiliation and many tilings out o f the necess i ty o f a 
! [ioi job. 
| [ii] Q: I remember all this. 
[121 A: (By the translator) And nevertheless, 
[13] however, whi le I was working there I was go ing to the 
[14] Job Service, the employment office, to look for another 
| [is] job, including o n o n e occas ion I returned to a previous 
j[i6j job to ask if they w o u l d have me back, but at that t ime 
[17] there was not any opportunity to go back. 
[18] MR. MARTIN: Let m e suggest to counsel that 
| [19] you instruct in the nature o f the purpose o f a 
m deposition, that h e answer the questions, or I suspect 
i pi] that w e take it before a judge and have h i m answer the 
[22] questions as instructed by the court. 
[23] MS. JONES: D o you want to take a break? 
P4] MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
[25] (A recess was taken.) 
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HI Q: (By Mr. Martin) If I may draw your 
pi attention to approximately 16 or 17 D e c e m b e r 1992 , is 
| pi this approximately the t ime or date w h e n everyone was 
I w ordered to the cafeteria area? 
[5] A: (By the translator) Approximately, yes , 
[si around that date. 
[7] Q: Where w e r e y o u at the time y o u first heard 
m that there w o u l d b e such an order? 
m A: (By the translator) I w a s working at a 
j [ioi table w h e r e I w a s cutting a — something — a red 
| [ii] something. 
| [12] THE TRANSLATOR: I don't k n o w what an 
| [13] "ooh-lay" (phonetically) — oh , yes, IVe heard of t h e 
j [u] word "ooh-lay" before. Can anyone help m e with the word 
! [is] "ooh-lay"? 
![16] MS. JONES: Rubber, plastic. 
[17] THE TRANSLATOR: This is a different w a y to 
j [is] say plastic than what the Puerto Ricans have. T h e y call 
|[19] it "goma," and h e calls it "ooh-lay." It's the same 
! [20] thing. 
j pi] A: (By the translator) — w h e r e I w a s cutt ing 
\ [22] the raw material that is u s e d to fabricate t h e s tamp. 
; [23] Q: (By Mr. Martin) W h a t country is your 
I [24] origin? 
I ps] A: Honduras . 
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Q: What did you first hear on the 16th or 17th, 
going back to that date, at that moment when you 
first — 
A: (By the translator) That some money had 
been lost. My supervisor came, Mr. Humbcrto Hernandez, 
and said that some money had been lost and Miguelangcl 
wanted us in the cafeteria, that we should all go to the 
cafeteria. 
Q: Were you one of the persons at that time 
that worked with the heaters or, like I say, burning 
rubber or burning — this other word that you used — 
the plastic? What was your job assignment? 
THE TRANSLATOR: I'm having trouble with the 
word heaters — 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Furnaces. 
A: (By the translator) No, I never worked with 
the furnaces. 
Q: Then describe what your work was. 
A: (By the translator) It was to cut these 
rubber plastic into precisely-measured sections. 
Q: I understand. 
A: (By the translator) About 11 by 9. 
Q: After Humberto Hernandez gave you this 
nformation, what did you do? 
A: (By the translator) Obeyed him. Obey him, 
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Q: Let me give you this piece of paper which I 
ave made a rectangle upon with this indication "north," 
(indicating) and presume that this is the place of your 
mployment. Please mark where you were working. 
A: (The witness complies.) 
A: (By the translator) These are the three 
jge doors and there's a table, and there's another 
ible perpendicular to it, or crossways to it, in the 
>rmof a "T." 
Q: Very good. And you have marked the large 
Dors, in Spanish, "puerta." 
A: Puerta. 
Q: And the table "Mesa." 
A: Mm-hm. 
Q: And put a figure here indicating this is 
here you were standing at your work. 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Where is the cafeteria area? And youVe 
arked the cafeteria — 
THE TRANSLATOR: Dining. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) — "comedor." And you 
oved, then, from your place of work to the cafeteria 
ea. Is this correct? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. 
Q: Approximately how many people, including 
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supervisors and Mr. Esquivei, were present in the 
cafeteria area? 
A: (By the translator) Accurately, I don't 
know the precise number. The only thing I know is that 
it was all the employees. No one stayed over here 
(indicating). They have the blueprints, or whatever, 
the plans of the building, so they know better. 
Q: Yes. The only thing I'm asking is what you 
remember. 
A: (By the translator) About the number of 
people? 
Q: Yes.ApproTimately. 
A: (By the translator) There would be about 35 
to 40 people, I think. 
Q: After everyone arrived in the cafeteria 
area, in what area of the cafeteria were you? 
A: (By the translator) In a chair that was on 
this side. The tables were set up like this, like that, 
and there's chairs on that side and on the other side, 
and on that day I was on this side. I didn't always sit 
there at that place. I sat down wherever there was a 
place where it was comfortable. 
Q: You have indicated the west side of the 
cafeteria area. 
A: (By the translator) No, east. It would be 
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east. I'm setting it up this way as though I were right 
there in the place right now. For me that would be the 
west, but — oh, sorry — the east. 
Q: Yes. Maybe I put the "north" on the wrong 
side. You have made a small square as the cafeteria 
area to indicate where you were located. Is this 
correct? 
A: (By the translator) That's where I was 
located on that day. 
Q: At that moment. 
A: (By the translator) Exact. 
Q: Who spoke to the group? 
A: (By the translator) Mr. Migueiangel. 
Q: What did he say? 
A: (By the translator) I repeated it 
beforehand, but I'll go ahead and repeat it again. T m 
going to do something that I know should not be done, 
but I'm going to do it, and it's that we're going to 
search everyone." 
He said some other things, but I can't 
remember it exactly, because it's been more than a year 
since this happened. 
Q: Did anyone else speak at that time? 
A: (By the translator) I don't remember. 
Q: What happened after Mr. Esquivel spoke to 
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[1] the group? 
Pi A: (By the translator) Proceeded as order had 
pi been given. The w o m e n wen t with some — the Spanish 
J*] women . A division was made . The Hispanic w o m e n w e n t 
[5] with Mrs. Maria Rigue. And the American w o m e n w e n t with 
[6i Mrs. Zulecka. And I think that maybe one or so Hispanic 
C7j w o m e n that were bilingual wen t with Mrs. Zulccka. Women 
[8] went to the men's bathroom. We went to the bathroom 
pj with Mr. Humberto Hernandez as he called us. 
no] (Exhibit N u m b e r 1 w a s marked for identification.) 
[11] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Let m e show you n o w w h a t 
[12] has been marked Deposit ion Exhibit 1, and would you 
[13] please identify this, t he paper , please. In o ther 
[u] words, is this t he p a p e r that you were drawing upon? 
[is] A: (By the translator) Sure. 
[16] Q: We do this just for t he record. 
[17] A: (By the translator) Tha t ' s fine. 
[is] Q: Did you go to , you said, t he men ' s rest r o o m , 
[19] firstly or later? 
po] A: (By the translator) If I was the first 
pi] person? Is that t he question? 
pz] Q: Yes. 
[23] A: N o . 
C24] Q: And if I take a total number, approximately 
[25] whe re were you in that order? 
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[1] A: (By the translator) Exactly, I don ' t know. 
H I just k n o w that I w e n t in. 
[3] Q: Somewhere in the middle? 
M A: (By the translator) Maybe, possibly. 
[5] Q: One person at a t ime, o r more than one at a 
[6] time? 
[7] A; (By the translator) One person — well, it 
[8] was individual. 
[9] Q: Do you r emember if before going to the rest 
[10] rooms anyone had spoken to the group and asked t h e m to 
[11] raise their hand if they had any objection? 
[12] A: (By the translator) Is someone asking us 
[13] for an objection or if — 
[u] Q: Yes. In o ther words , for comment from the 
[is] group by raising their hand or in any o ther manner. 
[16] A: (By the translator) I don ' t r emember that 
[17] anyone raised their hand to — 
[is] Q: Do you r emember if anyone asked the 
[19] question, Would there anyone raise their hand? 
m THE TRANSLATOR: T h e last part of that 
;2i] question was, Would anyone raise their hand? 
[22] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Let m e maybe restate this. 
[23] Do you remember if anyone asked about anyone raising 
[24] their hand at anytime? 
[25] A: (By the translator) For any reason? 
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i [1] Q: For any reason. 
! p] A: (By the translator) I don ' t r ememben 
| p] Q: You don' t r emember w h e t h e r or not it 
| w occurred? 
J [5] A: (By the translator) No, I don ' t remember . 
[6] Q: Would you say that it did or did not occur 
[7] with any certainty? 
p] A: (By the translator) I don ' t remember. I 
p] don' t remember. I don ' t remember . 
i [io] Q: You were asked to go into the rest room with 
in] whom? 
[12] A: (By the translator) Mr. Humber to Hernandez 
[13] called me . 
j [uj Q: Do you r e m e m b e r if Mr. Hernandez o r 
[is] Mr. Esquivel said w o r d s mean ing no o n e is pe rmi t t ed to 
[is] leave? 
[17] A: (By the translator) Miguelangel said that 
[18] nobody could leave, that everyone was going to be 
[is] searched. 
po] Q: When was this said? 
pi] A: (By the translator) W h e n he called us to 
[ [22] tell us everything. That 's at t h e beginning 
[23] Q: Is it possible tha t you could — I 'm asking 
P4] if it's possible — that you could pre tend for a moment 
P5] tha t you are Mr. Esquivel. 
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[1] A: (By t h e t ransla tor) T h e ques t i on again, 
p] please. I mean, I didn' t understand the meaning of t he 
p] question. 
W Q: I'm just trying to say, wi thout being 
[5] offensive, would you for a momen t pre tend that you we re 
I [6] Mr. Esquivel at that moment , that day? 
j [7] A: (By the translator) IVe always liked to b e 
[8] myself. I never r e m e m b e r be ing anyone else. 
p] Q: I unders tand. I 'm just t rying to see if y o u 
[io] could s h o w us h o w Mr. Esquivel ac ted at t ha t moment , 
[11] A: (By t h e translator) You w a n t m e to explain 
[12] my point of v iew as to h o w I perce ived Mr. Esquivel o n 
| [13] that day? 
[u] Q: Correct . Maybe w e should s top for just a 
I [15] moment, please. We 've run out of things. 
[16] (Off the record.) 
[17] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Just by chance , maybe this 
j [18] would be easier wi th Mr. Esquivel no t here at t he 
j [i?i present. 
[20] A: (By the translator) In the first place, I 
! pi] don't feel any fear towards Mr. Esquivel. It's the same 
j [22] to m e . 
j P3] Q: Would you p lease give us y o u r in te rpre ta t ion 
I p4] of how he acted at this moment . 
[25] A: (By the translator) He showed that he 
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sn't happy. First, he said that he was — that, in an 
gry manner. 
0: Maybe it would be helpful if you just acted 
tic did, if it's possible. 
A: No. 
A: (By the translator) I'm sorry, but I 
ren't got the gift of being able to interpret other 
Dple's — or to act out other people's personalities. 
d besides that, it was not a good experience for me, 
it's not worth the trouble for me. 
3: Okay. Then can you continue to describe, if 
1 would, his action? 
\: (By the translator) He did it in that 
liner, and he did it like he always was used to doing 
3: He always acted in some angry manner? 
\: (By the translator) That's his character 
rays, at least when I'm working there. 
3: An angry manner. Does this mean a louder 
ce? 
\: (By the translator) Yes, right. 
3: With facial expression that is appropriate 
inger, gross anger? 
THE TRANSLATOR: Gross anger? 
UR. MARTIN: Yeah. Large, b ig . 
Page 38 
\: (By the translator) No, not in that way 
t you're — not in this way like you were describing 
3: (By Mr. Martin) That's why I asked you 
ybe to describe it. | 
\: (By the translator) I said it in an angry i 
y, not just for the way that it was being said. 
THE TRANSLATOR: I don't know. Anything 
re? J 
3: (By Mr. Martin) Then, during the entire j 
te you worked at D.O.T.S., Mr. Esqurvel always » 
lducted himself with the appearance of anger? . 
\ : (By the translator) That's what normally — | 
t's how I saw it. | 
3: During the entire six months? 
\: (By the translator) He rarely acted j 
fcrent than that. A little more flexible or so to I 
3: When you went into the rest room with j 
mberto Hernandez, describe in sequence what happened, j 
ase. I 
\: (By the translator) When I entered with , 
Humbcrto Hernandez? I 
3: Of course. | 
\: (By the translator) Well, I went up where I 
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the rest rooms were. And he told me then that he wanted 
to see my billfold. So I showed him my billfold. He 
looked through it, and he handed it to me again. And 
then he said that he wanted to see my pockets. 
So I pulled out my pockets and shook them 
like this, (indicating) and my pockets in back. And I 
had a jacket, a coat, it was black in color, red and 
black, and I showed that to him too to show him that 
there wasn't anything 
Q: This is everything? The question was: 
Describe the entire sequence maybe from the time you 
went in until you left. 
A: (By the translator) Right. He was on one 
side. I was on the other side. We were face-to-race. 
He was standing up and I was also standing up. He asked 
me to show him my wallet. I gave it to him. He opened 
it. He gave it back to me, said he wanted to see what 
was in my pant pockets. I pulled them out. I showed 
him, and also on the backside, my pockets in back. 
I had this coat on. I was wearing a coat. 
I opened it in the way that I had it opened so that he 
could see the pockets and tell that there wasn't 
anything there. 
I asked him if he wanted me to do anything 
else. I asked him if he wanted me to take off my shoes 
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or anything else. He said, No, that was sufficient. 
Then I left, and the next person went in. 
Q: Now, so we may understand each other better, 
the purpose of us being here is to ask questions 
accurately and to answer accurately, which you have, so 
that someone may make a determination based upon this 
description — some neutral person, possibly a judge, 
possibly counsel — that based upon this specific fact 
situation there would be determination that this conduct 
was not only offensive but unlawful. This is just an 
explanation. There was no question asked except, Is 
this your understanding also? 
A: (By the translator) Right. 
Q: Did you say anything to Humberto Hernandez 
in the rest room other Th?n, Do you wish me to take off 
my shoes also? 
A; (By the translator) Right. To culminate 
the doubts concerning my integrity, I asked him if that 
was all he wanted me to do. He said, Yes, and I left 
Q: Nothing else? 
A: (By the translator) Yes, nothing more. 
Q: Did Mr. Hernandez touch your person with his 
hands or otherwise? 
A: (By the translator) No. The only thing was 
that he — well, I gave it to him and he opened it. 
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[1] Okay? He gave it to me, and I put it back. 
Pi Q: Did Mr. Hernandez keep anything that 
Pi belonged to you? 
W A: No. 
[5] Q: At the time Mr. Esquivel first spoke when 
[6] people were in the cafeteria, did anyone move to secure 
[7i the doors or the exits? 
pi A: (By the translator) The doors were always 
[9] kept shut, so there was no need to do that. 
[101 Q: Oh. This is a correct answer to the 
[1 ii question. I appreciate that. Did anyone that you saw 
[123 secure or lock the doors? 
[13] A: No. 
[uj Q: Did anyone exhibit to you or anyone else a 
[15] show of force, of physical resistance to anyone's exit? 
[161 A: (By the translator) Show or exhibit or sit? 
[17] Q: Show or exhibit. 
[is] A: (By the translator) No. It was just siL 
[is] Q: I understand before what you may be 
po] referring to now is the words which you remember stated 
pi] by Mr. Esquivel where you describe he said, No one is to 
[22] leave. Is this correct? 
[23] A: (By the translator) Correct. 
[24] Q: Any other statement made other than that or 
P5] in addition to Mr. Esqiuvel's statement indicating that 
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[1] n o o n e w a s to leave? Maybe I can correct this to h e l p 
Pi the translation. 
P3 THE TRANSLATOR: That's quite a 
W hypertactical sentence , convoluted syntax. 
[5] MR. MARTIN: Stupido sentence . 
[6] (Laughter) 
[7] MR. MARTIN: IVe b e e n a lawyer so long I do 
[8] not know how to communicate. 
Pl THE TRANSLATOR: IVe been a linguist so 
[io] long — 
[11] MR. MARTIN: Tell him what we said anyway. 
[12] (The translator complies.) 
[13] MR. MARTIN: I think you enjoyed that too 
[u] much. 
[15] (Laughter) 
[is] THE TRANSLATOR: I'm sorry. I just hope 
[17] that the judge laughs a litde bit too when he — oh, 
[is] okay. 
[19] Q: (By Mr. Martin) In addition to 
po] Mr. Esquivel's statement, w a s there anything else w h i c h 
pi] indicated to y o u no o n e w o u l d b e permitted to leave? 
[22] A: (By the translator) Just what h e said. 
[23] Q: Nothing in addition to that from any other 
[24] p e r s o n or from Mr. EsquivcP 
ps] A: N o . 
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! [1] Q: Did anyone t o u c h your person, o ther than 
: [2] what youVe described, in any way? 
! pj A: No. 
W Q: Included — I'm saying this only because 
j [5] it's written, because it is in the accusation that there 
i [6] was a harmful or offensive touching. The quest ion is: 
j [7] D o you remember see ing any person w h o w a s t o u c h e d in a 
j pi harmful or offensive manner? 
| p\ A: (By the translator) It w a s all in private. 
! [iq There w e r e just the p e r s o n that was searching and the 
[ii] person that was go ing to b e searched. 
[12] Q: Yes, I understand the inference, but did y o u 
j [13] see any person t o u c h e d in a harmful or offensive manner? 
j [u] A: (By the translator) N o . In the plant, n o . 
i £15] Q: At anytime? 
j [16] A: N o . 
j [17] Q: I think every person can understand, at 
[is] least in this country, be ing very m u c h of fended by an 
[19] extreme discourtesy, lack of courtesy. Did this, as y o u 
po] described, exceptional lack o f courtesy, appear to y o u 
pi] to be done with a purpose intending to inflict injury, 
[22] mental or physical? 
P3] A: (By the translator) I understand that not 
P4] just the lack of courtesy, but I consider it an attack 
ps] to the person. Personally, I felt emotionally very bad 
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[1] that whole day, an experience that never happened to me. 
[2] Worse, I never thought that in this country that cou ld 
p] h a p p e n to me . IVe always tried to maintain m y 
I w principles, and I've always b e e n — and I've never had 
[5] any problem. This is the first t ime that I find myself 
[6] in this situation. 
[7i Q: I can understand this and appreciate your 
[8] explanation. Was the same attack against you, as y o u V e 
[9] described it, consistent w i th every person's exper ience , 
[io] so far as you could see? 
[11] THE TRANSLATOR: W i t h e v e r y p e r s o n ' s 
J [12] experience so far as you could see? 
j [13] MR. M A R T I N : Y e s . 
i [u] A: (By the translator) I perce ived it in that 
, [is] manner. However, s o m e of the p e o p l e that I k n o w that 
j [is] w e r e involved o n that day, their exper i ence w a s w o r s e . 
| [17] Like the case of Rosa Mazariegos. 
i [is] Q: (By Mr. Martin) Okay. Your k n o w l e d g e o f 
! [19] s o m e o n e else's exper ience , because of the individual 
! po] checking, must be only based upon what s o m e o n e else has 
I pi] told you. Is this true? 
| p2] A: (By the translator) The question again, 
i [23] please. 
I [24] Q: Your knowledge o f s o m e o n e else's exper i ence , 
> [25] because of the separate individual checking, must be 
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Independent Renort inc Service Min-U-Script® Page 42 - Page 45 
• HUMBERTO BARD ALES SEMIDEY vs . LYNTON 
ased solely upon someone else's description to you of 
'hat happened. Is this true? 
A: (By the translator) My experience is 
ersonal, and the experience of someone else is their 
sperience. 
Q: Yes. And you did not see someone else's 
tperience; you saw only your own. This is true? 
A: (By the translator) Exactly. 
Q: So, as an example, Rosa's experience you did 
Dtsec. 
A: No. 
Q: And is only based on her telling you what 
ippencd or someone else. 
A: (By the translator) She told me personally 
at same day. 
Q: Bueno. Can you tell us what she said 
ippened to her, if you remember? 
MS. JONES: That's hearsay. 
MR. MARTIN: I understand that. 
A: (By the translator) No. She lived that 
iperience. She told me. I believe it. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) I understand this, but what 
d she tell you? 
MS. JONES: I'm going to object again 
rmalfy. I mean, this isn't evidence that's going to 
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• admissible in court, because it is hearsay. You have 
e witness that's actually been through the experience. 
>u can ask her. 
MR. MARTIN: I disagree. However, this is 
st to preserve any objection for future. Today we 
5t create a record. 
A: (By the translator) I really don't know 
erything she told me. The only thing I remember is 
at she felt very badly emotionally. The reason is 
cause she traveled in my car with me. Her gesture, or 
e way that she felt, was totally different than on 
me other occasion. I saw in the expression on her 
:e, but I can't remember all the words, because it's 
en more than a year. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) Tell me all the words you 
n remember. 
A: (By the translator) I don't remember. 
Q: You don't remember any words? 
A: (By the translator) I don't remember one 
3rd. It seems strange, but I don't remember one word. 
emember more than anything else how I saw her. 
Q: How did the four people listed on the 
mplaint first get together? 
A: (By the translator) In the beginning there 
:re 11 of us that were totally in disagreement with — 
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we were disagreed with this action that was done. The 
rest of them have moved. They're outside of this state. 
That's why they haven't done anything legally in this 
regard. 
Q: Well, did the 11 meet together to discuss 
this situation? 
A: (By the translator) Yes. Where we met — 
we spoke to each other by telephone of the unconformity 
of all the actions that had taken place. And the place 
that we met was — in Provo there is a municipal 
building. I don't know what the — that place that's 
across from the tabernacle, an office that's called the 
Utah Latin Council, Latin Council of Utah — to receive 
an assessment. It's an organization that's there to 
give — 
Q: An organization which is there to give — 
A: (By the translator) What? 
Q: This is where you stopped. 
A: (By the translator) We went there and that 
was how we started. 
Q: When was the first time you met with any 
attorney? 
A: (By the translator) I really don't 
remember. I really don't know the exact date. 
Q: The meeting at the Latino Council, was this 
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a meeting with all 11 or four? 
A: (By the translator) No, with everyone. 
Q: How was the meeting organized? 
A: (By the translator) We went to ask for help 
there. They offered an assessment in many areas, in the 
legal area and in other areas. 
Q: All in the same car, or how did you get 
together? 
A: (By the translator) No. Each person went 
on their own account. Some people didn't have 
transportation. They went with the people that did and 
in that manner. 
Q: I was just curious how everyone knew to come 
down to the meeting at the same time. 
A: (By the translator) We had come into 
agreement on the phone. 
Q: Were you the person who did primarily the 
calling, or did someone else? 
A: (By the translator) I was called by, I 
believe, Walter Semidey. I think he called me first. 
MR. MARTIN: For information of everyone 
concerned, the video has expired and we have no more. 
Q: (By Mr. Martin) I'm still very curious 
about Rosa, because what you would say about what she 
described could either strengthen or diminish her own 
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[1] description. Would it help in any manner if you had an 
p] oral representation of what she described before now? 
p] Do you understand the question maybe? 
W A: (By the translator) I don't remember. I 
(5] already said that I didn't remember. I remember more 
[6] the expressions and the way I saw her. 
m Q: Did she ever tell you that someone had 
p] removed all of her clothing, as an example? 
PI A: (By the translator) Yes. 
[ioi Q: If you remember, did she say that someone 
[1 ij else had removed her clothing or that she had removed 
[12] her clothing herself? 
[13] A: (By the translator) I really don't 
[u] remember. 
[is] Q: I understand. 
[16] A: (By the translator) I'm sorry. I don't 
[17] remember. I insist on the fact of what I remember most 
[18] were her expressions and words of — some other word. 
[is] Q: I was just wondering if she was describing 
[20] what someone may think was a total body search of her 
pi] person. 
C22] A: (By the translator) I think that, as far as 
P3] I know, I — how do you say it? — she was already 
[24] interviewed or questioned, and I think she's already 
[25] said it all. I don't remember anything of what she told 
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[1] me with exactness. 
[2] Q: Except that she said she had removed all of 
p] her clothing, or someone had. 
W A: (By the translator) I don't know what the 
[5] exact — I don't know exactly. I don't remember 
[6] exactly, really. 
[7] MR. MARTIN: Just a moment for break. 
[B] (A recess was taken.) 
[9] MR. MARTIN: Let me just say at this point 
[ioi that it's 11:30 at night, and for your information the 
[11] way we feel about the meeting here is that this is an 
[12] unusual time to meet. 
[13] We knew that your employment took you during 
[u] the day, and late, and I hope that you'll just consider 
[15] that this has been not extraordinary, but an unusual 
[is] courtesy. 
[17] And I hope that maybe this experience, maybe 
[is] sometime in the future, and maybe even with the 
[19] frustration that youVe experienced here tonight, that 
[20] somehow this would reduce or help the animosity that — 
[21] that I think wc can understand your personal experience, 
[22] which you have well described. 
[23] THE TRANSLATOR: I missed the last three 
[24] words of that. 
[25] MR. MARTIN: Which you have well described. 
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m And thanks to everyone here. Let's go home, unless 
H counsel has some really inspiring comment that you just 
p] cannot help — 
W MS. JONES: I'm not sure even God would have 
[5] inspiring comments at 11:30. 
K MR. MARTIN: Frankly, I was hoping you 
[7] weren't driven to give us any. Thank you for the 
Pi courtesy of the use of your office. 
m (The deposition concluded at 11:30 p jn.) 
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Q Which months? 
A December, November, October, September--December, 
November--September, August. 
MR. MARTIN: We have to be careful not to assist or 
counsel or advise. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you understand the oath? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Explain that to me. 
A What is an oath--something that when someone is going] 
to tell the truth of the facts as they have happened of "X" 
thing or "X" fact. 
Q Do you understand there may be a penalty if you are 
not truthful? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Do you understand that you would have an opportunity 
to review the transcript and make corrections after you receive) 
that transcript? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me what has been your formal education. 
A High school graduate and some preparation—some 
schooling in plumbing, some formal school in plumbing. 
Q What high school? 
A Porto Rico, a city called Ponce, the name of the 
school is Doctorpila, D-0-C-T-O-R-P-I-L-A. 
Q Was that a 12-year school like we have in the United 
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States or something different? 
A It is the same. 
Q Do you speak English? 
A No. 
Q How long have you lived in the United States? 
A Three and a half years. 
Q When did you first arrive? 
A June of '91. 
Q Where were you first employed in the United States? 
A Deseret Industries. 
Q In Utah? 
A In Provo. 
Q Were you employed before you came to the United 
States? 
A Yes. 
Q Where? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
D.O.T.S. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I worked as a custodian for the church. 
Where was that? 
In the city of Arroyo, Porto Rico, A-R-R-O-Y-O. 
Where were you employed before you worked for 
? 
Lumber in Orem. 
Do you know the name of the company? 
Which? 
The lumber company. 
1 
A That was the name of the company. 
Q What did he do? 
A Operating machine. 
Q What type of a machine? 
A How can I say this? How can I explain this? 
Different sizes of pieces of wood, the machine separated or 
split it into pieces. After the machine had split the wood, I 
had to separate it and make a decision which pieces were good 
and which were not good. 
Q How long did you work there? 
A You mean at the time that I left my work at D.CKT.S.? 
Q Did he work at Lumber before D.O.T.S.? 
A Yes. 
Q For how long? 
A One year. 
Q Did you work someplace between Lumber and D.O.T.S.? 
A No. I quit at Lumber and I went to D.O.T.S. 
Q Why did you quit Lumber? 
A I had an interview, and when I quit—one was working 
inside a building, and in Lumber I worked outside. It was 
really cold. 
Q Were you paid, when you worked for Lumber, by the 
hour? 
A Yes. 
Q How much? 
6 
A 4.25 an hour. 
Q Was that the same pay during the entire year? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you select D.O.T.S.? 
A Some of my co-workers that were at work with me at 
Lumber talked to me about D.O.T.S. 
Q Were you paid at D.O.T.S. by the hour? 
A Yes. 
Q How much? 
A 4.75. 
Q Was that the same amount you were paid the entire 
time at D.O.T.S.? 
A I am not real sure about that. 
Q Was the 4.75 the amount that you were paid at the 
time you left D.O.T.S.? 
A I don't remember that. 
Q How do you remember the 4.75? 
A That is what they offered me. 
Q Was that a beginning salary, then, or a payment? 
A I don't know. 
Q Was your pay ever increased during the time that you 
worked at D.O.T.S.? 
A I believe that at one time they did tell me, yes, 
they were going to give me a raise. 
Q Did that happen? 
7 
MS. JONES: You need to get the names in here. He 
didn't say "they." 
MR. MARTIN: You have to translate accurately. If hej 
uses a name or makes reference to a male or female person or 
supervisor--
MS. JONES: Why don't you back up and ask the 
question again. 
MR. MARTIN: Translate into English what you just 
told him. 
THE INTERPRETER: It seems like I didn't perceive the] 
sound that he said because I thought he said one thing and 
somebody else thought he said something else. 
He confirms that he said--
MR. MARTIN: You have to say what he said. 
THE INTERPRETER: "They told me." 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Who is "they"? What does he mean byj 
they? 
A I thought that they were telling me plural things 
that weren't correct. He told me he was the one that spoke to 
me, nobody else. 
Q The name of "he"—who is this person? 
A Miguelangel. 
Q Okay. What did Miguelangel tell you? 
A About--
Q About the time you said he told you they were going 
8 
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Q What was your job at D.O.T.S.? 
A My work at D.O.T.S. was the furnaces. 
Q Was that your only, single employment at D.O.T.S.? 
A Yes, that is what I did. 
Q Describe what you mean by "furnaces." 
A There is a piece of plastic that they gave us, okay? 
They didn't have anything--there was some little figurines, 
figures that you had to put down on top of the plastic. I put 
these into the furnace, or oven, on a tray, and right there 
they lowered down the—there is a little jack that goes up and 
it presses down on it at the right moment, right time. 
When the time was up, the bell rang and we pulled out] 
the mold and they were all done. 
THE INTERPRETER: Can I ask one thing, kind of a 
side? He says, "Ornoce" (phonetic spelling), and since I don't] 
know all the background of what goes on at D.O.T.S., I don't 
even know what is done there, so I use two words in English 
that means ornoce (phonetic spelling), either furnace or oven 
I don't know whether they are baking bred or making rubber 
doggie biscuits. So is that all right for me to go ahead and—| 
MR. MARTIN: If there is a choice sometime and you 
9 
feel like there should be an explanation between an option in 
two words, if you could explain that. 
THE INTERPRETER: Sure. 
MR. MARTIN: That would be helpful. 
THE INTERPRETER: Sure. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) In fact, that was my next question 
The work you did was to put things in a chamber which would 
apply heat and pressure to whatever you put in? 
A Yes. 
Q Who was your supervisor? 
A Humberto. 
THE INTERPRETER: U-M-B-E-R-T-O. It might be with an 
"H." 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Bardales? 
A B-A-R-D-A-L-E-S. 
Q Is this the same Humberto Bardales— 
A It is Humberto, but not Bardales. Humberto is with 
an "H.fl There were two Humbertos. Humberto Bardales, that was| 
an employee, and Humberto, the supervisor. His last name, I 
never knew what it was. 
Q Was he your only supervisor? 
A Among the men or of the men, it was him--or I guess 
he was a supervisor over the men. 
Q During the entire time you worked at D.O.T.S.? 
A Yes. 
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Q With whom did you interview when you were first 
employed? 
A With Miguelangel. 
Q When did you leave D.O.T.S., what months? 
A December. 
Q What year? 
A '92. 
Q Do you know the date? 
A The exact date? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. December 29th. 
Q Why? 
A I don't know. I wasn't told. The supervisor told mej 
that it was probably because--
Q If you know, then you answer what you know rather 
than what you may believe, unless I ask you. 
A Okay. 
Q In other words, what I would like you to do is just 
think of the question and answer the question. 
A What was the question? Would you repeat it, please? 
Q Any question. It would apply to all questions. 
THE INTERPRETER: I told him that it applied in 
general to all questions. And he said, "Not to that specific 
question you just told me?" 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Yes. 
11 
A Okay. 
Q Then why did you leave? 
THE INTERPRETER: Can I ask one thing here? When you| 
ask questions, "why, what, when," without a subject or a 
complete thought, sometimes quite a bit is lost in the 
communication. So if you say, "Why did you leave," sometimes 
it is a little bit open ended. So if you are a little more 
precise in the way you ask your questions, then maybe you 
will--
Q (By Mr. Martin) On the 29th of December of 1992, 
what was the reason that you left employment at D.O.T.S.? 
A I was fired. 
Q How did you receive this information? 
A The supervisor. 
Q Humberto? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q What did he say? 
A "Angel, your work is through." 
Q At what time of day was this information received? 
A 12:00. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Left. 
Q Where were you employed after you left D.O.T.S.? 
A I went back to Lumber. 
Q What did you do then at Lumber? 
12 
A What do you mean, "What did I do"? With relationship 
to what? 
Q What was his work there when he went back to Lumber? 
A Same, They gave me the same thing. 
Q What were you paid when you went back to Lumber? 
A $5.00 an hour. 
Q Did you commence work on December 30 at Lumber? 
A No. After the Christmastime was over, Monday the 
first day of January, I started work, more or less the first 
day of January. 
Q On the 29th of December in your conversation or 
information received from Humberto, did he say any other words?j 
A No, he didn't tell me anything else. 
Q Where were you at the time Humberto gave you this 
information? 
A I was working with the ovens, the furnaces. 
Q Did you leave alone or did you leave with other 
people on the 29th of December? 
A Alone. 
Q At the moment you left D.O.T.S. on the 29th of 
December, did you know if anyone else had left the day before 
or within maybe five or ten days before? 
THE INTERPRETER: Could you clarify the word "left"? 
MR. MARTIN: Left employment. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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Q (By Mr. Martin) How many? 
A I don't know how many. They had, well, been fired. 
Q What does he mean by "fired"? 
A There is no more work when they throw you out. 
Q Do you understand the difference between fired and 
laid off? 
A He told me that my work was over. 
MR. MARTIN: Translate into English what you just 
told him. 
THE INTERPRETER: I just explained to Angel that here] 
in the United States there is a difference between firing 
someone and laying them off. If there is a word for laying off| 
in Spanish, I don't know of it. I have got my dictionary, I 
could look. But I used beating around the bush to describe to 
him the differences between firing someone--I told him that 
firing someone is generally when the person has done something 
wrong or there is some type of discipline involved and that 
laying someone off is because there is no more work. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you understand the difference in 
the words? 
A Uh-huh. 
(Off the record.) 
Q (By Mr. Martin) The word "fired" would be for bad 
conduct or for cause. Is that what you understand? 
A I feel that I did a good job for Miguelangel, for the! 
14 
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Q Do you know whether they were fired or laid off. 
A No, they were fired. 
Q What is the source of his information? 
A They all talked among themselves right there. 
Q Was that on the 29th of December? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Who else are you talking about? 
THE INTERPRETER: He said, "He's asking me a 
question, I am answering it. About my matter or about someone 
else?" 
Q (By Mr. Martin) About someone else. 
A On the 29th? 
Q Yes. 
A On the 29th, I didn't speak with anyone. 
Q Before the 29th, within ten days, did he speak to 
anyone? 
A Yes. 
Q Who? 
A A young man, a boy that was fired, he commented to m 3 
15 
that he had been fired. 
Q Did he tell you the nature of his bad conduct? 
A No, he said, "I was fired." He didn't talk a lot. 
Q So you wouldn't know if he was fired or he was laid 
off? 
A He told me that he was fired. 
Q Which may or may not be true. 
A He never came back. 
Q We know he never did come back, but he said he was 
fired. That does not mean that you know he was fired. 
A Certainly. 
Q This may sound too simple; however, the distinction 
in court proceedings is important. 
A To know whether he was fired or not? 
Q No. So that when I ask you a question, you answer by] 
saying what you know and not what you heard from someone else. 
Our purpose is to be as accurate or correct as possible. 
A Did he ask me something? 
Q No. 
(Brief recess at 6:15 p.m.) 
Q (By Mr. Martin) You did a good job for D.O.T.S.? 
A Yes. 
Q So you know of no cause for termination? 
A Yes. 
Q So you believe until this moment today that you were 
16 
told to leave for cause? 
A No. 
THE INTERPRETER: He said, "They didn't give me any 
explanations." 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Maybe that was a lack of courtesy or| 
poor management. Do you understand what I mean by this other 
possibility for the abbreviated number of words that you were 
given? 
A That they told me? 
Q Yes. 
A That Humberto told me? 
Q Yes. 
A If I remember, yes, when he fired me. 
Q Did he appear angry? Did Humberto appear angry at 
the time? 
A Humberto? No. 
Q Do you believe that Humberto was angry with you? 
A Not that I know of. That he was angry at me? 
Q Do you have a reason to believe that someone in the 
company would be angry with you without telling you so? 
A I don't believe so. I don't know. 
Q Do you know of any reason why someone in the company 
would be angry with you on December 29th? 
A No. 
Q Why are we here, then? Why do you complain about th i 
17 
company if no one was angry? 
A Is that the question you are asking me now? 
Q Yes. 
A It's one thing, the question that he's asking me 
right now, and a whole other thing, the things that were 
happening inside the company. 
Q Please explain. 
A He asked me a question. He asked me if I like the 
work, if I didn't have any problems at work--
MS. JONES: Excuse me. He's translating this "he" 
and he's speaking to him of you. 
THE WITNESS: You were asking me some questions, if I 
didn't have any enemies at work, if anyone had gotten mad at 
me, if I did a good job, if I knew someone that was fired. The] 
questions that you have asked me, I have answered them. 
Now, the thing that caused the problems that came up 
in the company that I saw is different than the questions that 
you are asking me. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) I understand. 
A What I mean is, I was doing my work and I did my job 
well. Miguelangel knows. From there on out, why any other 
person was fired--I did my job. 
Q Yes. Do you understand there may be other reasons— 
other than someone who thought you were doing a good job--may, 
for business reasons, need to have fewer employees for a period! 
18 
of time? Do you understand that that is a possibility? 
A I don't know. It could be. 
MR. MARTIN: You are writing notes to him or your own) 
notes? You are writing a note to him to explain how to answer 
the question, or what is the note? 
MS. JONES: I am just explaining the reasons for the 
questions. He's very confused as to why you are asking these 
questions. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Is this true, that you are confused 
about the nature of the questions I ask? 
A Yes, a lot of questions I don't know, according to myj 
understanding. 
Q Maybe we ought to go back just a little bit. 
Do you know of any reason why someone in the company 
would tell you to leave for cause? 
A Please repeat the question again. 
Q Do you know of any reason why someone in the company 
would ask you or tell you to leave for cause? 
A You mean right at the time when I was fired? 
Q If you were fired or laid off, yes. 
A No. They never told me why. They never gave me the 
reasons. 
Q The question is: Do you know a reason why someone 
would terminate you or ask you to leave for a cause? 
A No. I am unaware of any reason why they would say 
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that--why they said that. 
Q Do you believe today that someone in the company is 
angry with you? 
A I don't believe so. 
Q Are you angry with someone in the company? 
A What do you mean, "angry"? 
Q To have a feeling that would cause you to take action] 
against that person? 
A Like the action for which we are here today? 
Q Yes. 
A It is not angry or mad. I believe that each 
individual should respect their fellow men. If a manager or a 
supervisor has "X" number of employees, I believe that that 
manager or that supervisor should respect that work force that 
he has in his company. If this work force does a good job or 
"X" job well, he should be pleased with the work that those 
employees at that work force is carrying out. To be angry or 
mad is one thing, and to observe or respect the rights of 
someone or "X" person is something different. 
Q Did you leave the company because someone at the 
company did not show proper respect for fellow persons? 
A First, I did not leave the company. The person that 
spoke to me, the supervisor, Humberto, he spoke and he told me 
to go. Before he fired me, he held meetings, and many times 
these meetings were unnecessary, superfluous. 
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Q Are you saying that nothing was done in the company 
that would have caused you to leave the company voluntarily? 
A There were certain things that were not right. I 
wasn't leaving the company quickly, whether I was going to find] 
a job somewhere else. 
Q Did anything happen which caused you to be so angry 
that you would leave immediately? 
A You mean at work? 
Q Yes. 
A They always held their meetings. They said things 
that were kind of bothersome. Everybody was bothered. 
Q Did you ask everyone in the interview, or how did you| 
determine that everyone was bothered? 
A No. Just people talk. 
Q Are the useless meetings the principal reason that 
you would say there were problems in the company? 
A I believe so. 
Q If I ask you if there are any other principal 
reasons, what would come to mind about management of the 
company or anything else? 
A You are asking me about the administration of the 
company? 
Q Any reason that he would say there would be something] 
as important or maybe not as important as this meeting that 
would give people, or you, a reason to be concerned about the 
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company or lack of respect. 
THE INTERPRETER: Could you please be more specific 
and exact in your question, because this is a very long 
question. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Thank you. We have talked about 
useless meetings. We have talked about lack of respect. This 
would be two reasons why someone, and maybe yourself, would 
find fault with the company. Is there a third reason? 
A You mean besides the meetings? 
Q Besides the meetings and besides, maybe, lack of 
respect. 
A He also organized a big review, a big check. 
(Off the record.) 
Q (By Mr. Martin) I think we understand a review or 
check. Do you understand? 
A (Nodded affirmatively.) 
Q What do you mean by "review," or what do you 
understand by the word "review"? 
A To review, to look for. 
Q Is that different than to check? 
A You mean, is it different? 
Q Yes. 
A Well, maybe it is different. Maybe it doesn't—it 
depends on— 
Q So, we have, number one, useless meetings; is that 
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correct? 
A Unnecessary. 
Q Is that the most important reason why you would be 
concerned about the company? 
A How is that? Please repeat. 
Q The most important cause you would find fault with 
the company is these useless meetings? 
A One of the reasons, one of the causes. 
Q What would you say would be the most important cause? 
A You mean besides the meetings? 
Q I am trying to put things in priority. 
A I don't know. There is no seniority. It is all 
important. 
Q Other than a tone of voice or expression, would you 
give me an example of lack of respect? 
A How is it possible that for a person that has MX" 
number of employees and brings them all together one day or 
some morning and admonishes them, warns them all saying, for 
example, that there is a lot of thieves in the company, a lot 
of stealing going on, or they speculate that people are hauling] 
off with merchandise, or speculate that they are talking bad 
about the company--so if you were to come and see, they almost 
always talk about those same things. And so if I have a 
company that is producing work, I have no reason to hold so 
many meetings to offend people. 
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Q Would you characterize this as poor management or 
malice? 
A You mean what he did? 
Q "HeM meaning whom? 
A Miguelangel. 
Q Yes. 
A You mean whether it was good or bad? 
Q Yes. 
A I feel that it was out of place. 
Q All of the time? 
A What do you refer to when you say "all the time"? 
Q The entire period of your employment. 
A You mean when they had meetings, constantly? 
Q Whether a supervisor would treat you with respect or 
not the total time that you were employed. 
A Well, supervisors never disrespect me. 
Q Is there a single person who would show you 
disrespect? 
A I am a very friendly person, no. 
Q Did any person ever try to confine you or arrest you 
or stop you from leaving or injure you? 
A You mean inside the company, someone that may have 
tried to suppress my right of expression? 
Q No, to freely come and go, your person. 
A You mean like to go out on break and at lunchtime? 
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Is that what you mean? 
Q Yes. 
A No, we have our breaks and our lunchtime. 
Q Did anyone lock the doors and tell you that you were 
not ever permitted to leave until the end of the day? 
A No. 
Q I asked the question if anyone had locked the doors 
and told you that you could not leave until the end of the day. 
Did anyone lock the doors and tell you that you could not leave 
at any time? 
A As far as I remember, no. 
(Brief recess at 6:55 p.m.) 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you understand what a contract 
is? 
A Yes. 
Q Explain your understanding of a contract. 
A An agreement between two or more people. 
Q You have, or had, an agreement for employment or a 
contract with the company? 
MS. JONES: I would like to object to this. I am 
sure that this may be going somewhere, but my objection is the 
fact that the causes of action are fairly clear and had little 
or nothing to do with employment. 
MR. MARTIN: Are you saying there is no cause of 
action related in any way to employment or termination? 
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MS- JONES: I think the complaint speaks for itself 
and the list of causes of action does not include anything 
involving employment, 
MR. MARTIN: Are you saying that--
MS. JONES: I am not being deposed here. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Okay, then I will ask the question: 
Did you have an agreement or contract with the company for 
employment? 
A Application, same as the whole company. 
Q What did you understand was the term or length of 
your agreement with the company? 
A What agreement? 
Q Not a written agreement, but with every association 
there is some agreement. 
A I was an employee. 
Q Do you understand that your employment was for your 
lifetime? 
A No, no. No job is--no employment is for your whole 
life. 
Q Did anyone at the company ever tell you or did anyone] 
give you reason to understand that you could not be terminated 
except for cause? 
A Well, Miguelangel used to tell me that my job 
was—that the work I did was good and that my position was surej 
there. 
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Q Did you have any reason to believe that you could not) 
be told that your work was finished? 
THE INTERPRETER: You need to be more specific in the] 
question. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Do you have any reason to believe 
that the company did not have the right to tell you at any time| 
that your work was complete? 
A I think that when—well, a good employee and a 
company is an intelligent one—when they have a good employee, 
you should keep ahold of him. 
Q Of course, but I am talking about the right of the 
company to say that your work was complete. What I meant to 
say was: Do you believe that the company had no legal right to| 
tell you, "Angel, your work is through"? 
A I believe so. 
Q Why would you ever think that a company, whether for 
a good reason or not, has no right to employ a person or tell 
that same person that their work is through? 
A What I understand is that if a company doesn't have 
financial problems or if it is not bankrupt and it has a group 
of employees that are producing, I believe that they don't have| 
any reason to fire the employee. 
Q We are not talking about reason, we are talking about] 
a legal right to do so. 
A The same as the rights that each employee has. It isj 
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the same. 
Q So an employee can leave at any time; is that true? 
A If an employee--
Q Is it true that an employee, then, could leave 
employment at any time? 
A You mean a person just leave? 
Q Sure. 
A If a person decides to leave a company on his own 
will? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. Sure, he can go on his own will. He can go. 
Q For cause or for no cause? 
A It is up to the discretion of each individual. 
Q Yes. Also, the company can say you are employed or 
not employed on the same basis as the employee may? 
A Before being an employee? 
Q No. The company could tell a person, "You may work 
here." The company agrees that you work here, and the company 
may say, "You are no longer working here;" is this true? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Is that correct? 
A A company employs a person. If the company has the 
desire to get rid of that person, for whatever reason—let me 
explain myself. If a company employs a person and he's given 
that person good work, any old person, "X" person, if the 
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company so desires to get rid of a person without any reason, 
where are the rights of the employee? 
Q Isn't this the same for the employee and the company? 
A I believe it is different. 
Q Tell me how. 
A I don't know. I don't believe--like I said just a 
bit ago, the difference is that when a company is bankrupt—I 
don't know what all these questions are due to. What is the 
cause of all these questions? I believe that we are just--my 
personal opinion is that we are going round and round the 
question at hand, or the matter, and we are not going straight 
to the heart of things, the concrete part of the--
Q Explain what you believe to be the heart of things. 
A The reason why we are here. 
Q Explain the reason why we are here. 
A We are here simply because when you are after a 
person inappropriately, out to get someone--you know the reason] 
why we are here. 
Q Explain why. 
A I already explained myself. I have been pretty 
clear. 
Q If we beat around the bush all the time—I don't know) 
that you have given any explanation. 
A We are just wasting time, then. 
Q Well, then, explain to me why we are here, the heart 
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of the matter. 
A Go ahead and ask the questions, 
Q I just did. I asked the question. 
A You asked the question and I answered it. 
Q You have no reason, then, to explain more than what 
you have said? 
A That I don't have what? 
Q You have no reason to explain more than what you have 
said as to why we are here? 
A Yes, I can explain. 
Q Please. 
A The reason why we are here is because the case of 
D.O.T.S., okay? It is involved with the demand to go after 
someone, to go after—and I believe that is the basic point of 
the case here. 
Q Did someone go after you? 
A Yes. 
Q When? 
A In the company. 
Q Not where, when? 
A The exact day, I can't remember. 
Q Approximately? 
A December. I can't specify the exact day. 
Q Middle— 
A I don't know how to specify— 
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to? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Before Christmas or after? 
Before Christmas. 
A specific incident? 
Concerning some-
what is the specific reason that you are referring 
On that day. 
Q 
A That day Mr. Miguelangel gathered together all the 
employees and he gave us notice that $20 had been lost or 
someone had taken $20, and on that day he said he was going to 
search or check—search. 
MR. MARTIN: Are you poking him or something, 
Counsel? 
MS. JONES: I said, "Excuse me." The translator 
looked like he was going to say something. 
THE INTERPRETER: My translation of chequeayare 
(phonetic spelling) is to check or to search, that is the 
translation I 
with 
that 
gave. 
that translation 
MR. 
translat 
MS. 
paused him. 
him. 
MARTIN: 
ion. 
JONES: 
Apparently, someone is not in 
i. 
Opposing counsel 
agreeance 
is not agreeing i 
He was interrupting his pause, and 
My client was interrupting his pause, and I 
tfith 
I 
paused] 
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Q (By Mr. Martin) Ask him about this translation, what] 
he described. 
A To check, to search. 
Q Review? 
A Uh-huh. Review. 
Q Tell us what happened. 
A Each person was checked, searched, reviewed. They 
checked me, they searched me. I had to take out my wallet. 
They searched through it. The men were checked over. They 
were searched in the men's bathroom and the women in the 
women's bathroom. 
Q Their pockets? 
A I emptied my pockets. 
Q Did anyone reach in your pockets? 
A No. He told me to empty my pockets. 
Q Anyone tell you to look inside of your shirt or in 
your trousers? 
A No. 
Q Or your shoes or your socks? 
A No. 
Q Did they say this in an angry or demanding way? 
A When Miguelangel spoke? 
Q Yes. 
A He was mad. 
Q Describe how you know he was angry. If you are 
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saying he was angry, also describe who he was angry at. 
A Him, with everybody, at everyone. 
Q Okay. Did anyone touch you? 
A No. 
Q Did anyone tell you that the door was locked and you 
could not leave? 
A You mean, if someone told me that? 
Q Yes. 
A You mean, so that I could leave? 
Q Yes. 
A No. You mean, if someone in the moment of the 
checking out if—yes, the door was closed. When they were 
going to search--
Q Locked? 
A Closed. 
Q Locked? 
A Closed. 
Q That is not the question. Was the door locked or was| 
there a guard? 
A If the door had a lock, had its lock been put on it? 
Q Yes. 
A He left and the supervisor stayed there. 
Q Was the door locked? 
A From where I was, it is hard to tell whether the lockj 
there was locked or not, but the door was closed. 
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Q I think I am not the one beating around the bush or 
evading. I think you understand why I am asking the questions 
and I believe you are refusing—or trying to avoid the 
question. 
A No, I am being very precise and exact. 
Q Was the door usually opened? 
A Before or after? 
Q Usually. 
A Usually—it was always opened. Sometimes it was 
closed. 
Q Which door? 
A The little one. A small door that there is to enter 
in the company; sometimes he kept it closed, sometimes it was 
open. 
Q The door was usually opened or usually closed? 
THE INTERPRETER: He said closed in the middle of 
that. 
THE WITNESS: Usually it is closed. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Did you see anyone at this time on 
this day go to the door and close it or lock it? Yes or no. 
A No. 
Q Did you see any guard who would prevent you from 
leaving? 
A I didn't see—I saw the door closed. I saw that the 
door was closed. 
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Q Did this surprise you? 
A No, it was always closed. 
Q So it is not important that the door was open or 
closed? 
A That is not important. What is important is the 
search. 
Q Did any person prevent you from just leaving? 
A No one. 
Q Then the checking was voluntary? 
A It was voluntary, if you think that if someone leaves 
that they loose their job or then they say he took the money. 
Q Who said this? 
A It is obvious to think that. 
Q But no one said that? 
A It is not necessary for them to say it. 
Q Don't evade the question. Did anyone say this? 
A No. 
Q Did anyone leave except Miguelangel? 
A You mean, when Miguelangel left, did someone leave? 
Q Anyone else. 
A No. All the supervisors stayed there. 
Q If you were so offended, why did you not just leave? 
You are paid more money now? 
A I didn't know at that time. I stayed there because I 
had a job and I had to stay. 
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Q But now you say, a year later, that you were so 
offended that you waited a year to complain? 
A I didn't wait for a year. Now we are just seeing 
this. 
Q Did you tell anyone at that time that you were 
offended? 
A To some boy at work? 
Q Anyone. 
A I said that what they were doing was out of place. 
Q But not enough to say that you were so offended that 
you were deprived of personal dignity sufficient to terminate 
your employment? 
A I had to stay. I didn't have any other work, 
employment. What is bad is bad. What is outside of the law is 
outside of the law. 
Q Was everyone checked? | 
A Everyone except the supervisors. 
Q Okay. What contract did you have with the company? 
A An application to work, not a contract. 
Q Something may be not proper, why do you say that it 
is unlawful? 
A You mean the searching? 
Q Yes. 
A The only people that can look for a person can—the 
only person that can search someone is the police. No one else! 
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except the police can do it except, for example, unless they're] 
in a specific department and you see someone taking something, 
then they can stop that person and then they can search, 
Q You did not object, and they believe that you stayed 
voluntarily. 
A How is that? 
Q If you do not object— 
A About— 
Q If you ask me, "Open your pockets," and I open my 
pockets, then where is the unlawful search, if I agree? 
A If a person says that they are going to check me or 
search me and they don't have an order, a warrant to check, 
that is bad and you know that. 
Q No, only if it is the government. 
A The government. 
Q If I open my pockets, it is indicating my consent. 
A That is with the government. 
Q With any person. 
A This has to do with work. It is different for any 
person. 
Q No. A person may consent. 
A It is different. It is not just on the street. This 
is at work. There is a work force that is being accused of 
something, and for something that supposedly occurred, and what| 
is being done or what is happening is outside of the law. 
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Q You believe. 
A I believe it. I accept it and I admit it, that it is 
that way. 
Q You believe this? You believe that it is unlawful— 
A A person that does not have the authority and that 
has not seen anything that has been taken, that is illegal. 
Q Certain things are illegal. Assault. What do you 
understand by assault? 
A Physical assault? 
Q Yes. 
A Hit, to beat. 
Q Did anyone assault you? 
A No. Physically, no. 
Q Do you think you were mentally assaulted? Or why do 
you say "physically, no,f? 
A What do you mean when you say "physically"? 
Q You said "physically." 
A You asked me physically or how. 
Q I just asked you if anyone assaulted you. 
A No. Physically, no. 
Q In any way? 
A They assaulted me, yes. 
Q How? 
A Beyond physically? 
Q The question is: Did anyone assault you? So the 
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answer is no? 
A Physically, no. 
Q Do you mean that someone assaulted you in some manner] 
other than physically? 
A When they did the search, I felt bad because they 
were showing mistrust toward their employees, employees that 
are producing employees for the company. Whether there was $20 
lost or not, it is not known. I never knew. That is the 
reason why one would feel bad about it. 
Q Is there a difference between feeling bad and being 
assaulted? 
A Quite a bit. 
Q Did anyone assault you? 
A Physically, no. 
Q Why not just yes or no? 
A He is asking me if someone assaulted me. He has to 
be specific if it was physically or emotionally. 
Q The only question, under the law, would be physical. 
A You mean to assault? 
Q Yes. Assault means to cause you to be in fear of 
harm. 
A We are not talking about assault, we are talking 
about searching. 
Q Okay. 
A It is different. 
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Q Did anyone assault you? 
A No. 
Q Did anyone cause you to fear for your safety? 
A No, no fear, 
Q Did anyone cause you to believe that you would be 
harmed? 
A No, I don't fear. 
Q Going back to the heart of things is that you have 
some reason to believe that a company, specifically D.O.T.S., 
could not tell you to leave at any time; is this true? Leave, 
meaning leave employment? 
A You mean my person? 
Q Yes. 
A You mean if they had the right to tell me to go? 
Q Yes. 
A I consider that yes. 
Q Who in the company told you that this was permanent 
employment, that they could not ask you to leave your 
employment for no cause? Who told you this at the company? 
A I'll tell you again. Miguelangel told me that the 
position that I had--that I did a good job, and that I was 
going to be all the time there. 
Q Forever? 
A He didn't specify days or dates or anything. 
Q For two weeks? 
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A He wasn't specific "all the time." 
Q Did you tell him that you would be there forever? 
A What I answered. 
Q Yes? 
A It was fine. 
Q That you stay in the company forever? 
A He told me, "Angel, you do a good job. You are going] 
to have your position there." He didn't say any date nor when 
I was going to finish, that I was going to stay there. 
Q Then some day he tells you your work is finished? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Is that unlawful, do you believe? 
A No. 
Q Are we in agreement that it would be lawful for you 
to leave at any time "employment" and also legal for the 
company to say your work is finished? 
A For the company? 
Q Yes. 
A For the company, yes. 
Q Do you understand that there is a difference between 
the company and Jeanette Lynton, a difference? 
A What do you mean, "there is a difference"? 
Q Going back to the heart of the matter, you are listed] 
here--
MS. JONES: I am going to object to this question 
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because I think it calls for a legal conclusion. 
Q (By Mr, Martin) Very good. You are listed here and 
Jeanette R. Lynton is listed here in opposition to you, 
personally. 
A What do you mean? 
Q This is you versus Jeanette Lynton, not D.O.T.S. 
A Who does D.O.T.S. belong to? 
Q The stockholder or holders. 
A And not to Jeanette? 
Q Yes. 
A Does it belong to her? 
Q The stock— 
A I don't know. The stock or the company. 
Q Were you employed by the company? 
A Sure. 
Q Did you receive payment and a check from the company 
named D.O.T.S.? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Was Jeanette Lynton present during the checking? 
A No. 
Q Do you have any reason to say that you may have some 
real action against Jeanette Lynton? 
A When a person is responsible for a company and, in 
this case, Jeanette presents herself as the owner of the 
company, and those persons are responsible for the things that 
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happen in the company but there is more than one person, all ofj 
them are responsible for what happens in a company. 
Q You believe that the person is individually liable 
for all of the business of the company? 
MS. JONES: Objection, I think that calls for a legal] 
conclusion. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) I am asking what he believes. 
A Concerning what--
Q Do you believe that an owner of a company, a 
corporation, is personally liable under the law? 
A Concerning what, concerning the employees? 
Q Yes. 
A Sure. 
Q This is the problem. 
A Why? 
Q Because it is a corporation by which he was employed. 
The corporation paid you? 
MS. JONES: I didn't understand that as a question. 
MR. MARTIN: It was a question. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) Counsel has objected to what I said 
and interrupted, stopping her client from responding, because 
she thought that it was not a question. The question is: Were] 
you employed by Jeanette Lynton or the company, the corporation] 
named D.0.T.S.? 
A D.O.T.S. was the one that contracted me. 
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Q Contracted. This we agree. There was some 
contract— 
THE INTERPRETER: The word contracted and a contract 
is different. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) And when he said "different," he 
indicated with one finger, as if he was writing, upon his left 
hand. 
A A contract is written. 
Q I understand where maybe we have a difference. The 
writing is a contract, and to me an agreement, oral, is also a 
contract. 
A Verbal? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q My apology to you for not making this more clear 
earlier. I did not understand that you were thinking an oral 
agreement may not be a contract. 
A Uh-huh. 
THE INTERPRETER: May I make a comment here? The 
word "contract" in Spanish, one of the definitions that is 
given is "to hire." So words—even though you believe you 
understand all the meanings of the words that I say, I can show] 
you some word in here that has two or three columns of 
definitions, okay? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
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THE INTERPRETER: Even though you want to set a 
specific definition to a word, many times there are multiple 
definitions, depending on the culture the person is coming 
from, the meaning that a person wants to give. 
MR. MARTIN: I understand. I have done some 
translations from Arabic and Hebrew to English. So I 
understand translation, and I appreciate what you are doing, 
and I think that you are doing well, and I appreciate what you 
are doing. And I think that it is just taking us a little more] 
time. If you would translate for him, please. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) This has caused maybe some 
misunderstanding and maybe taken more time around the heart of 
the issue. My apologies. 
A No problem. 
THE INTERPRETER: I also apologize. 
Q (By Mr. Martin) If we can talk a moment about your 
emotions. Explain to me, if you can, the degree of your 
emotions which resulted from the checking. 
A You mean when I was searched, when I was checked? 
Q Yes. 
A Just simply a person feels uncomfortable. 
Q Anyone could understand this. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Did you become so concerned over a week that it 
caused you to lose sleep? 
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1 A The checking? No, I was fine with myself, with my 
2 own conscience. 
3 Q This is good. This was before Christmas? 
4 A Uh-huh. 
5 Q Is there a company social or association or party on 
6 or around Christmas? 
7 A Yes- You mean that the company held? 
8 Q Yes. 
9 A Uh-huh. 
10 Q Did you attend this party--
11 A Yes. 
12 Q —or social? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Any bad feelings that you had at that time as a 
15 result of the checking? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did anyone express to you at the company social or 
18 party that they were emotionally concerned about the checking 
19 at that time? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Did you, at any time with the company, try to express 
22 concern about the checking to a supervisor or officer or any 
23 official? 
24 A No. 
25 Q Not even by suggestion? 
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A No. 
Q Did you give suggestions as to improvements of the 
company? 
A No. 
Q Not at any time? 
A No. 
Q Did you think of maybe giving suggestions to anyone? 
A Some co-worker? 
Q No, to someone in authority. 
A An example, in the department where we work, there in) 
that group among us, we suggested among ourselves to change the) 
other thing in that work area. 
Q Well, natural thing for companions to do. But about 
maybe the heart of the issue. 
A You mean giving a suggestion? 
Q Yes. 
A No. You mean a suggestion in questions of work? 
Q In questions of propriety, what may be appropriate 
conduct between supervisors and employees. 
A On one occasion, the supervisor came up to me and 
made the comment to me that this work was good, because the 
supervisor was talking to me that there was a rumor that this 
person was doing some things bad. He asked me about this 
person. I answered that I had not heard any rumors, and I was 
right. And I told him that all the employees that were there 
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1 were doing their job, as far as I could tell, and that if therej 
2 was any rumor or gossip, maybe the person that had said that 
3 this matter was not good, was bad, was the person that was 
4 talking about him. Because I told him I am not depending on 
5 any gossip that is in the workplace, I do my job. 
6 Q That is good. Would you understand that when someone] 
7 tells you you were doing a good job that is a compliment and is 
8 a usual thing to say for someone who is doing well? 
9 A Uh-huh. 
10 Q Do you understand that that is a normal thing for a 
11 person to do? 
12 A You mean to tell someone you are doing a good job? 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A If it is normal? Please repeat again. 
15 Q Do you believe that it is normal for someone to 
16 compliment an employee for doing a good job? 
17 A That a compliment is given to someone who is doing a 
18 good job? 
19 Q Yes. 
20 A Yeah, if they are doing a good job, sure. 
21 Q Is the reason we are here, maybe the heart of the 
22 issue, because you personally had some reason to think that you) 
23 were told your work is through? 
24 A I didn't understand. 
25 Q Let me say this again. You did a good job; true? 
I 
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A Yes. 
Q For the company, so far as you know? 
A For the company, yes. 
Q And the supervisors and even Miguelangel believes 
that you were doing a good job? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Do you believe that the supervisors and even 
Miguelangel believed that you were doing a good job? 
A There was a time when he told me that, 
Q Yes. Is the heart of the issue maybe that sometime 
unknown someone in the company became angry at you and said 
your job is through because of not being happy with your work? 
A You mean if I knew? 
Q Or had reason to believe. 
A I don't know. 
Q So the only thing and the only reason we are here is 
because of the checking? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Can you think of any reason, in addition to the 
checking, as to why we are here? 
A Besides the checking? 
Q Yes. 
A I believe that besides the checking, the other things] 
that happened, I believe--I think they should be, how do you 
say it, just a combination of things. 
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Q A combination of things that would give you just a 
general feeling of lack of respect? 
A I think so. 
Q Is there anything specific that you can think of, 
other than meetings that had no purpose or the checking? 
A You mean related to work, work related? 
Q Of course• 
A Besides the checking, on one occasion, Miguelangel 
went to pay me, and about when he paid me, he said I was a 
rebel, a real rebel. I never knew why he told me that. I 
never found out why he told me that, and I never asked him, 
either. 
Q With a voice of anger or just general conversation? 
A "Here, you are a real rebel." I don't know whether 
he told me in a way--well, because I wasn't looking at him. I 
was getting some forms, some moldings, and when I picked them 
up, he was already on his way out. 
Q Anything else? 
A Not that I remember right now. I think I have said 
it. 
Q Prior to the checking, was anything said by a 
supervisor that would have invited a person to leave or decline] 
to be checked? 
A What do you mean, "before the checking"? 
Q Maybe at that same moment or approximately the same 
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time? 
A 
Q 
A 
someone 
Q 
You are referring to the checking? 
Yes. 
What happened if somebody--maybe if 
else to leave? 
Or asked if anyone wishes to leave. 
their hand? 
A Of the group? 
someone invited 
Did they raise 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Was the person speaking Miguelangel? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say, if you remember? 
A The day before the checking? 
Q If it is important. 
A He told us that we should go to the area of the 
cafeteria, the dining room. 
Q Is this the day of the checking? 
A Yes. We should go to the dining room area, the 
dining area. Miguelangel was there. He directed words to us. 
He addressed us. 
Q In Spanish? 
A Yes. And he said that he was bothered because there 
were rip-offs in the company and $20 had been stolen from the 
billfold—well, a little purse of one of the employees. And 
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that he was going to check everyone. And that he knew--he 
said, "I know that I am doing wrong, but I am going to do it.11 
Q That is the total words? 
A He said, "The supervisor, Humberto, is going to 
search the men, and the woman supervisor is going to check the 
women." 
Q But so far as you know, no one was physically touched] 
or searched by a supervisor? 
A No. 
Q All of the checking you saw was an asking of a person] 
to open their wallet or open their pockets? I understand that 
a person feeling accused would be upset. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q That would seem normal. But the question is: If we 
talk about a search, it almost sounds like someone went inside 
of my clothing with their own hand. 
A No. 
Q This never occurred? 
A No. 
Q You mentioned your own wallet before, previously. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q How was the checking of your wallet accomplished? 
A My person? 
Q Yes, personal wallet. 
A I took it out and they told me to open it, and I tookl 
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out the papers that were inside, that were in the wallet. I 
emptied it and I pulled out my pocket that he wanted to see andJ 
that all my pockets--
Q I understand this is demeaning. If you are a 
supervisor—suppose for a minute--and an employee tells you 
that, "Someone stole my money"--
A Some employee? 
Q Maybe I will repeat this. 
A If I — 
Q A single employee--
A Uh-huh. 
Q —tells you, as supervisor— 
A That they robbed something from him, that he had been] 
robbed? 
Q That someone took their money. 
A You should complain to the police. That is what is 
right. 
Q If the police came and said, "Okay, everyone will be 
checked," would this be more appropriate? 
A I believe so. 
Q This is a yes? 
A Yes. 
Q If the police had done the same thing in checking, 
then there would be no offense? 
A It is different. 
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Q I know it is different. If the police had done the 
same precise thing as the checking, would there have been no 
offense, personally? 
A I would still feel bad because they are doubting my 
person, my reputation as an employee. It put in the doubt. I 
would always still feel uncomfortable because of that. 
Q But if the police had done the same thing, you 
believe that it would have been lawful? 
A The police? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q If the police had done the same thing, it would have 
been lawful? 
A Sure. 
Q In your opinion? 
A Yes. 
Q I think maybe since the video machine is tired, the 
only thing I have left to ask is: Would it have been important] 
at the checking if there had had been a translator to help? 
A What for? 
Q I just wonder, because we live as neighbors and I 
speak principally English and you speak principally Spanish, 
there may be somebody as an employee—the question is, and this; 
is the final question: Did anyone not understand that you 
knew? 
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A About what? 
Q About the English language—or Spanish—at the 
checking. Was there any confusion? 
A At the time of the checking, there were no Americans, 
only Latins, and there were Americans that worked there. 
Q You are American. 
A I know, but I also consider myself Latin. 
Q Very good. 
MR. MARTIN: This machine, now, is tired. Is 
opposing counsel tired or did you wish to ask questions? 
MS. JONES: No. 
(The deposition concluded at 8:40 p.m.) 
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W I T N E S S C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss 
) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony 
consisting of 53 pages, numbered from 3 to 55, inclusive, and 
the same is a true and correct transcription of said testimony, 
with the exception of the following corrections listed below, 
giving my reasons therefor. 
Page Line Chanqe\Corrections Reasons 
ANGEL SANTIAGO 
Subscribed and sworn to at Provo, Utah, this day 
of , 1994. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of ANGEL SANTIAGO, 
the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken before] 
me, Karri Jensen, a certified shorthand reporter and notary 
public in and for the state of Utah, residing at Salt Lake 
City. 
That the said witness was, before examination, duly sworn 
to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth] 
in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in 
Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
typewriting, and that a full, true, and correct transcription 
of said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages, numbered 3 to 55 inclusive, and said witness 
deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed deposition. 
I further certify that the original transcript of the samej 
was mailed to MARTI JONES, at 40 South 100 West, #303, Provo, 
Utah, to be delivered to the witness and read by him, and to be] 
returned to me within 30 days of the date hereon. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, and] 
that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 23rd day of May, 1994. 
Karri Jensen, C.S/R 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• * * 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
JEANETTE R. LYMTOM 
D e f e n d a n t . 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
** .J'.5h County, State of Utah 
CArtMA 3. SMITH, Clerk 
.- _ . . _ . . _ _ „ Deputy 
Civil No. 930400503 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Tuesday the 16th day 
of August of 1 9 9 4 , the HEARING in the above-entitled matter 
was taken by Richard C. T a t t o n , a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, at the Fourth Judicial 
District Court Building, Provo, Utah 8 4 6 0 1 . 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f 
For the De fendan t : 
Ms. M a r t i Jones 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
40 South 100 West , #303 
P rovo , Utah 84601 
Mr. Loren D. M a r t i n 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
36 South S t a t e S t r e e t #1200 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
P . R . 0 C . I I £ I 1 1 £ I 
THE COURT: This is the matter of Walter 
Semidey et al, vs. l.ynton et al. The matter is before 
the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion 
to Strike and that is you Mr. Martin? 
MR, MARTIN: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: That is your motion Mr. Martin. We 
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will hear from you? 
MR. MARTIN: Thank y o u . Your Honor, this matter 
was o r i g i n a l l y filed including two named p a r t i e s . One 
M r s . Lynton and the other a plant m a n a g e r *or Dot Ventures 
a C o r p o r a t i o n . It centers around an incident which 
occurred on the 16th of 17th of December in which the 
plant m a n a g e r Mr. Esquivel was informed by one of the 
employees that $20.00 had been stolen from the personal 
b e l o n g i n g s . In response to that, at that moment then 
Mr. Equivel announced that e v e r y o n e would meet in the 
lunch room area within the m a n u f a c t u r i n g plant and then fronj 
thereon they were all asked to submit to a checking or 
searching or asked to show their wallets or purses one on on^ 
in the restrooms and that really then results in the 
complaint being filed six m o n t h s later and then served 
a little over a year later upon the Defendant M r s . Lynton 
and also against M r . E s q u i v e l , the plant m a n a g e r of the 
corporation . 
Also included in there, there are several John Does, 
Jane Does or however, they would be c h a r a c t e r i z e d and a 
Motion to Amend s u b s e q u e n t l y was filed. Then the court, 
even though the Statute of L i m i t a t i o n s had run before the 
matter was served. I think in locking at it and saying 
that since M r s . Lynton was the officer and shareholder 
of the corporation that would not be taken as surprise 
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1 I and based on that I think is what the court granted that the) 
2 I motion to include even though the statute had run. 
3 So now we are here with other named defendants also, 
4 meaning those who were acting under Mr. Esquivel's 
5 direction in looking in the wallets or the purses 
6 as they each took one by one and went into a rest room. 
7 Then as a result of that, the accusations include wrongful 
8 detention, civil assaults, civil battery, interference 
9 with personal belongings and on and on as the nature* 
10 of it and everything else on that particular incident, 
11 The question here before the court now is was 
12 Mr, Esquivel acting as an agent of Mrs. Lynton or acting 
13 as an agent of the corporation in a nut shell. 
14 THE COURT: Or acting on his own. 
15 MR. MARTIN: Yes. The argument of course that we 
16 have in the Motion for Summary Judgment that is in any 
17 event,he was'not actirig as an agent of Mrs. Lynton. 
18 The corporation was organized in 1989 in Nevada. 
19 Then it moved its manufacturing plant from the State of 
20 Nevada to Utah in 1992, mid-1992. It is an operating 
21 I business. It presently employees 70 employees and ships 
22 | products tc 45 states and has. been very successful in 
23 | manufacturing and sales and marketing of little 
24 | decorative stamps. You see them all over in gift shops. 
25 | . This is a marketing arm which they have is through one on 
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1 one type contacts. It is not through a retail store. It is 
2 just one to one type sales arrangement that they market 
3 these rubber stamps and extremely successful. It is based 
4 upon really the art and the ability to market. 
5 Well, the thing that looks like and there is certainly 
5 no allegation given that Mrs. Lynton knew cf the incident. 
7 And so there is an attempt now after the court has permitted 
8 the corporation to be joined. There is an attempt to try 
9 and circumvent that corporate structure in two ways. One 
10 of which is most interesting. If I may just use the board 
11 here for a second? 
12 THE C0UR T: Sure. 
13 MR. MARTIN: The Nevada corporation seems that 
14 plaintiffs make no claim that the Nevada corporation Dot 
15 Adventures. Dot Adventures in Nevada corporation and that 
16 doesn't seem there is any allegation that Dot Adventures, 
17 a Nevada Corporation,isn't legally and lawfully created. 
18 There is no claim that they didn't follow all of the corporate 
19 formalities. Then the move and that is 1989. Then the move 
20 to Utah in 1992 and I guess we can put a little box over 
21 there, move to Utah,and opened the manufacturing plant 
22 in 0rem . 
23 Now there is two ways cf trying to attack this to say 
24 that Jeanette Lynton was the employer rather than the 
25 corporation. However, Dot Adventures and here is where the] 
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1 twist is. Utah Law requires the named corporation, 
2 incorporated or the abbreviation or something to that 
3 affect, INC. Utah Law requires that as part cf the name. 
4 Nevada does not. So when a company then comes to Utah, Utah 
5 Law requires does designate inthe name the type of business 
6 entity that it is Dot Adventures Inc. 
7 Now looking if a person were to look at what has been 
8 provided to the court is the computer printout of the 
9 screen, Division of Corporations, it indicates on that 
10 screen name in Nevada and the name in Utah, and then also it jias 
11 down at the bottom the default print out date of the 
12 incorporation. And of course when we go and get the copy 
13 of the application for this business to be registered 
14 with the Division of Corporations in Utah, it shows that 
15 Dot Adventures a Nevada Corporation is registered in 
16 Utah as Dot Adventures Inc., and the date that was filed, 
17 in other words, approved by the Division of Corporations. 
18 you look at the computer screen it doesn't look that way. 
19 if you do the print out, it says the date of the 
20 incorporation and that is nothing more than a tracking 
21 print out. It is the date of qualification or date 
22 of registration. Without looking at the certified copy 
23 of the record and just taking a computer print out which is 
24 not certified, and of course is net really a part of 
25 . the corporate record. Looking at that one line, it says 
Ifi 
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the date of incorporation. 
The plaintiffs then try and say there were two 
corporations, a Dot NEV and they characterize it something 
like Dot of Utah or something. I don't understand, and then 
try and argue that there were two different corporations. 
Since this one was registered in Utah, January 4, 1993, 
and this incident occurred on December 16, 17 of 1992, then 
somewhere this falls intothe cracks and since Dot Adventures 
is either a new corporation that didn't exist until 
January the 4th of 1993, then everything that happened 
was her personal liability. It seems to be just a 
misunderstanding but how and why it is called Dot Adventures 
Inc., in Utah and Dot Adventures in Nevada and nothing 
more or less than that. I can see how that mistake could be 
made, but that is how the law applies. 
All the plaintiffs including Mr. Esquivel for the 
defendant the plant rranager were paid checks not cash or 
something else that didn't clearly indicate corporation but 
all of them , as we provided copies to the court, are paid 
with check written in the name of Dot Adventures Inc., a 
corporation in Utah. All of them were paid in that fashion. 
So the only other theory that could possibly be is some 
how we are going to pierce the corporate veil. If in 
fact Dot Adventures was a corporation organized in 1989, 
we need to maybe round it up just a little bit. If Dot 
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1 Adventures comes to Utah and does business here without 
2 first registering is every corporate act conducted in Utah 
3 null and void but the *act an individual? 
4 Well, asking the court to rule on that and in that 
5 fashion would be to throw out or maybe over state with a 
6 raw brush the full faith and credit clause and Interstate 
7 Commerce Clause Constitution. If every corporation 
8 that came into Utah did not the first thing and the 
9 representative of that corporation did, did not go to the 
10 office of Division of Corporations. Their first act in Utah 
11 was either by mail or personally to appear and get that 
12 registration. Otherwise, the corporation is non-existent 
13 so far as the laws of the State of Utah are concerned, then 
14 you would have indeed very very serious problems about 
15 all types of things, probably get into the Long Arm Statute, 
16 if a person is even called anyway there would be serious, 
17 be serious upheavals in the business law. 
18 Well, Utah Law doesn't provide that. It doesn't require 
19 that. The registration is required for the purpose of 
20 identification of a registered agent and so there might be 
21 some order in things. And the purpose underlying that and 
22 provides for under a new revised Utah Business Corporation 
23 Act, provides for some penalties, civil penalties as 
24 characterized if not recorded within a certain time or 
25 . civil penalties that may be imposed. 
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Then it goes right down to the very last subparagraph 
which we have quoted in our brief to the court, it simply 
says that if a corporation does not register, it does 
not invalidate any of the corporate acts. Well, it couldn't 
be otherwise. If an entity both in under Utah Statute 
and also under the restatement entity which is formally 
incorporated in another law has that same authority over 
here and over here in another law and the standard we go 
back to full faith and credit and Interstate Commerce. 
So that is so. 
So then if Dot Adventures is doing business in Utah 
and doing so successfully, is this a nullification of the faq 
that it is a corporation or when you add , under law, 
Inc., at the end of the name, does that somehow mean this 
is a separate corporation than this one. Oh, you have 
got the certification of all of the records from the 
Utah Division of Corporations related to Dot Adventures In., 
it doesn't show any kind of application or Articles 
of Incorporation that were filed separately as the same 
corporation, and they were all paid under Dot Adventures Inc 
So to try and go around that and have her personally 
liable, there would have to be another theory which now we 
get down to saying, how are you going to pierce the 
corporate veil. Well most of the time these things come in | 
where you have as the wording such as a connection between 
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the two you will find a sparsity of records not even annual 
shareholder's meetings held but what you really find quite 
often , I would guess, I don't know the experience of this 
particular court, we would look at it and say there is a 
mingling of funds, there is payment of debts and obligations 
of the corporation to the principal shareholder and 
officer to the exclusion of other creditors. And the fact 
it depleted all of the assets of the corporation then we 
look at it and say this person didn't have any, in other 
words it was the alter ego of that operation. 
The second prong, and that is the other part is they 
must show that by recognizing the corporate entity will 
be the upholding of a fraud an injustice. That has to be 
looked at on an individual case. First of all the 
corporate formalities, the corporate formalities have all 
been met. There is nothing to really say otherwise. So 
once we have met that, then you have to go to the next one 
and say in addition to that, this operation of this 
corporation as an entity was really upholding that would 
be a verification or validation of a fraud upon the credito 
is what it is amounting to. That is hardly the case here. 
We have 70 employees. The affidavit of Mrs. Lynton as the 
President of the Corporation shows that in that affidavit 
and that is why 1 am referring to that. It says 70 employee! 
and shios to 45 states, incorporated in 1989 and has been 
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incorporated and in good standing since that date. It 
never missed a pay-oil, never been late on a payroll 
including payments to all of the plaintiffs. Dot is current 
in all account payables and Dot is currently on sales tax 
in every state. In fact Dot pays suppliers in 10 days 
of receipt of payment so to take advantage of 
payment discounts. Dot is current in all debts and no 
other litigation is known. 
The amended complaint then just simply makes the 
statement that Dot Adventures is unde- capitalized in an 
attempt to try and use that theory somehow to even 
though we recognize it will pierce the corporate veil under 
some theory. I don't know of any. There is none has been 
presented under Rule 56 if we are coming forward to the courj; 
by admissible evidence that is Dot is current on everything, 
has paid everything. There isn't any dispute there. That 
second prong of the argument fails. 
I don't know whether it was an error or whether it was 
some unrecognized sort of ploy or something of other 
counsel but it says in Paragraph 5 of the amended complaint 
that the plaintiff's allege affirmatively that Defendant 
Jeanette Lynton at all times relevant hereto was the alter { 
ego of Dot Adventures Inc. Well, we say that it certainly 
is not an e-ror, obviously argues that the principal is the 
corporation and it is the reverse of the usual argument 
11 
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that you would hear as the corporation is the alter ego 
of the principal acting party that there is such a close 
mix of accounts and everything. That is just a sham. The 
reverse is stated in the allegations of the complaint that 
Jeanette is the alter ego of the corporation. I don't 
see how that argument could be developed. That certainly 
is what we have got here the allegations against the 
corporation of being under ^unded or statements which are jus| 
made it appears, just to somehow maintain a position of 
saying that the corporation is responsible but yes we 
still want to hold onto her personally. 
It appears from the pleadings that plaintiffs knew of 
the corporate existence before the initial complaint was 
filed. That is why we came back in with the our motion and 
objection to the amendment because it appeared to be a 
conscious objective and selection that was made, not that 
they didn't know about the corporation, not they didn't 
know it didn't exist. The complaint was not signed until 
July of 1993. It wasn't served until the beginning of 
1994. So Plaintiffs really .aren't and that is why we came 
back with that objection,otherwise,we probably wouldn't 
have filed on objection to it. But it appeared to us, 
from looking at the pleadings,that it was a conscious 
objective 'rom the beginning to bring that allegation 
against Mrs. Lynton Personally with the design of sometime 
12 
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1 later will just simply amend this. We would take the 
2 position that having consciously made that decision as a 
3 matter of strategy then they should be bound by that and 
4 net surprised and not object to the basis upon what the 
5 court said that there was no surprise to the corporation 
6 itself. 
7 But now you go to the next step and say now we can hold 
8 them both, both the corporation and Mrs.Lynton personally 
9 liable certainly begs the issue at this point and is not 
10 justified and has no basis here in doing that, and we 
11 would just submit that to the court. 
12 THE COURT: Ms . Jones . 
13 MS. JONES: Your Honor, plaintiffs would present 
14 to the court that the issue as the counsel for the 
15 Defendant Jeanette Lynton has presented it is not as 
16 quite as complex as he would present it. 
17 The issue before the court is a simple one are there 
18 disputed issues of material fact that might, at trial, 
19 provide grounds for holding the Defendant Jeanette Lynton 
20 personalny responsible for the tortuous actions of the 
21 factory manager. And to use counsel's diagram, it is a 
22 undisputed fact, Your Honor, that Dot Adventures is an 
23 incorporated corporation in Nevada. It has properly 
24 been incorporated since 1989. 
25 J It is also an undisputed fact that as of and I think 
the actual date is January the 5th and it doesn't really 
13 
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January 4th of 5th of 1993 there is Dot Adventures 
Incorporated in Nevada , is properly registered as doing 
business in Utah under that name. 
The issue before the court, Y o u v Honor, is who was doing 
business in Utah under the name of Dot Adventures Inc., 
prior to this registration? Counsel for the defendant 
Jeanette Lynton and indeed the Defendant Jeanette Lynton 
in her capacity as the President of this company have 
represented to the court that it was indeed a Nevada 
corporation. However, Your Honor, the only proof that they 
have submitted in support of that is Number 1 the affidavit 
of Jeanette Lynton which they would appear to want to use 
her capacity as President to avoid any possibility of or be! 
responsible of liability as an individual by representing 
as President of the Corporation that it was indeed the 
corporation that was acting without having properly registers! 
under Utah Corporate Law. 
I would submit that the burden of proof upon the 
defendant in this matter is substantially higher than that. 
I think in the case that we cited in our opposition Sterlin^ 
vs. Pettit case, the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
states if you would pardon a brief citation. That the 
defendants were assuming corporate powers wihtcut authority 
byiusing the unregistered name of • Investor's. Publishing 
Company and hence reliable for the debts of that company. 
ing 
14 
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Then the court goes on to say the burden lay on defendants 
to show they were actually representing someone else. 
Now the defendants in this case have also submitted 
some corporate checks made out as what is represented 
to be corporate checks, made out in the name of Dot 
Adventures Inc., with the Utah address, made out during this 
period of time and signed by the Defendant Jeanette Lvnton. 
They have submitted those checks as proof that it was a 
Nevada corporation that was doing business in Utah. I 
submit to, vour Honor, those checks are no p^oof of that. 
Rather, those checks put this case in a much , in a fact 
situation fairly parallel to that of Sterling vs. Pettit 
where the individuals involved had signed corporate checks 
without indication of representing the capacity and with 
a corporate name that wasn't registered. We are then held 
responsible for that check when the funds were unavailable 
in the bank under the company account. 
Although, it is not and this particular case presents 
no issues quite as easy as corporate or non-corporate 
check having been bounced. This case does present issues of 
who was acting during this period of time. Again, the 
defendants have argued that it was undisputedly this 
corporation Dot Adventures. Plaintiffs dispute that claim a 
this point. 
Defendants have submitted that end have argued that 
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plaintiffs have submitted no evidence and contest to 
that. I would submit to Your Honor that is accurate. We 
have and I submit for the record , at this point, our 
initial interrogatories, the originals and the defendant's 
answers to our initial interrogatories. At that time, 
in our request for production no. 3, we asked for copies of 
the minutes, corporate minutes, of whatever entity was doing 
business in Utah as Dot Adventures Inc., during this 
period of time. We asked for the minutes, the business 
minutes from March 1992 through March 1993. Counsel for 
the defendants replied this was an irrelevant issue. 
It appears to me, Your Honor, that this particular 
point in the proceedings that is a highly relevant issue. 
Who was doing business in Utah during that period ? Give 
me some , on the spot, at the time concurrent documented 
evidence as to the fact that the corporation in Nevada 
chose to come in and do business in Utah , set up a factory, 
-ail, ship, do all kinds of major business. 
Now if you permit me to side track. Defendant's 
counsel has argued that to require foreign companies to 
register for any minor business that they do would really 
through ell Interstate Commerce cut of whack. The Utah 
Corporate Code is very cognizant of that fact, Your Honor. 
Because the Utah Corporate Code under coreign Businesses 
and I am net sure of the exact section, I would have to 
16 
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1 look it up. It has a lengthy series of exclusions of people 
2 doing business in Utah that don't need to register as 
3 I a foreign business, as a foreign corporation. However, 
4 that list of exclusions does not include a foreign 
5 business that comes in, hires 70 employees and sets up a 
6 factory to manufacture and ship in the Interstate Commerce, 
7 prod uc ts . 
8 Defendant Lynton also argues that the Utah Code 16-10A, 
9 15-02-6 that particular section in Utah Code, Your Honor, 
10 allows unregistered defendants, okay, let's give a for 
11 example. Let us assume that with proper documentary 
12 evidence, counsel for the defendants are able to support 
13 their allegations at this point that it actually was 
14 a Nevada Corporation doing business in Utah. Then under 
15 that particular section of the Utah Code, this Nevada 
16 Corporation would not be barred from defending in this suit 
17 even where it did not register until this point. But that 
18 is not the question. 
19 The question is not is this corporation barred from 
20 defending. We indeed asked to add the corporation in the 
21 assumption that the defendants are further able to support j 
22 their allegation that it was a corporation acting and not j 
23 the Defendant Lynton. But the fact that that corporation j 
24 could defend does not prove that it was a corporation acting; 
25 it is therefore a disputed material fact whether Lynton 
17 
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1 as an individual was do"ing business as the entity called 
2 Dot Adventures Incorporated in Utah during this period of 
3 time or whether it really was a Nevada corporation who 
4 had failed to register, had failed to register, 
5 If it was Lynton, Your Honor, then her Motion for 
6 Summary Judgment clearly should be denied because of the 
7 principle she is vicariously liable for the actions of her 
8 agents . 
9 If on the other hand, it was the corporation that was 
10 acting, then there is another issue that arises under Utah 
11 Code 16-10A-204 which says that an individual who presents 
12 himself as a corporation knowing that he has not followed 
13 the corporate requirements. That he is not properly 
14 registered to do business in Utah or otherwise is personally 
15 liable for the acts taken while representing themselves 
16 as corporation. The Sterling vs. Pettit case is precisely 
17 an example of individuals who were held personally liable 
18 because they represented themselves, wrote checks on a 
19 cancelled corporation, that presented itself as a company 
20 as an incorporated company when in fact it was not. 
21 Again in pursuing this issue, plaintiffs are 
22 handicapped by the fact that only limited discovery 
23 has occurred in this matter. It is instructive that Lynton 
24 as an individual, was sufficiently aware of corporate 
25 . registration requirements that she did file for the trademark 
18 
744 
1 under which these particular stamps a r e marketed. I think 
2 the original filing for that was done in 19S9 and that 
3 filing was renewed in 1992. Each time that particular 
4 trademark was held privately by Ms. Lynton. Those stamps 
5 that she argues were produced by the corporation were then 
6 marketed under a trademark that was held privately 
M by her. That doesn't necessarily prove anything except 
8 that it proves that sHe had some awareness of licensing 
9 and registration requirements. She may well have chosen 
10
 deliberately not to register in Utah until 1993 for whatever] 
H reason. 
12 in any case, Your Honor, given there are material disputed 
13 facts in the record, it is the plaintiff's request 
14 that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied 
15 at this time. In the a 1 terrative,we would request 
16 a 5 to 6 month continuance under Rule 56F to allow us 
17 additional time to pursue discovery and be able to support 
18 our claims that it was indeed Lynton and not the 
19 corporation that was acting during the interim period. 
20 Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Marti n? 
22 M R . MARTIN: The issue has been raised maybe 
23 attacking Mrs. Lynton's objectives in not applying at an 
24 earlier date. Although, the statute itself, pardon me, I 
25 . brought the wrong file, revised this corporation which 
19 
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1 | referred to really penalties that is 'imposed against 
2 I corporations. vou cannot commence an action as a plaintiff 
3 until you have registered, and that may not seek protection 
4 of the Utah Courts until you are registered with the 
5 Division of Corporations. Then it says that the failure 
6 of a corporation to have authority to transact business in 
7 this state , and this is the relevant part, does not 
8 impair the validity of its corporate acts, nor does the 
9 failure t o prevent the corporation from defending 
10 any proceeding in the State. I hate to use the word "clearly 
11 that it is over used. The corporations or foreign 
12 corporations are foreign corporations when they are 
13 in Utah when there is something to the contrary. 
14 Now the allegations that has been made, although there 
15 is no substance to that and there is no basis, there is 
16 p.o evidence before the court that may be true. That there 
17 was some deviousness in attempting to non-apply for that. 
18 Dot Adventures Inc., was recognized as that when you do 
19 business in Utah the INC only has this requirement where 
20 you put on all the checks. -It isn't just the checks. It 
21 is the affidavit that we have provided to the court. The 
22 affidavit which supports what the checks were and these j 
23 I people all of the plaintiffs and the plant manager were j 
24 | employees of Dot Adventures, Dot Adventures of Utah. Not j 
25 | only that we provided certified copies of the Nevada ' 
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records, corporate records, we provided certified 
copies of Utah Corporate records. This is just some 
hollow claim that a business known operated as a' valid 
corporate entity was doing business. But now the question 
has been raised as to her integrity. We would have to just 
say to the court without being prepared to respond to 
that. The recognition in Utah was first applied in August 
of 1992. Then she was supposed, she had to get the papers 
from Nevada to that time forward. We would just make a 
representation to the court, that we can show that the first] 
time applying for was known. It was in August of 1992 
prior to December 16th and 17th and moved to Utah 
sometime in July . So finally got the records from Nevada 
and applied in Utah the first part of January but 
that is how those things occur. It is not some deviousness 
and not some deception. 
Now where we are is that in the Pettit Case it is 
interesting where they cite that. One of the interesting 
things about that is that Nevada corporation that was a 
Nevada corporation later which the person coming here actually 
entered into a lease himself on a race track. Then went 
to a company saying that it was Bonneville Raceways. 
Then went to an advertising company and procured 
advertisements. Then on a subsequent date when the bill was 
not paid, then a contract was written to Bonneville Raceways 
21 
1 a corporation which he signed then as president. It 
2 appears at the ^irst brush to be a corporate case but it is 
3 not. It is a novation. The question is whether' or not 
4 this person after having personally incurred all of the 
5 debt could say that contract which was subsequently 
6 signed under his corporate capacity was a novation which 
7 went back and released him as to personal liability. The 
8 majority opinion said that obviously he is personally 
9 liable . The interesting thing when you went back 
10 through the statement of facts and say that ch by the way 
11 the Nevada corporation was not in good standing at the time. 
12 Just a little incident even if you want to argue this is 
13 a corporate case. It is not. It is just a novation. The 
14 novation didn't occur and wasn't part of the second contract 
15 and he was not on the personal liability and that is the 
16 Sterling vs. Pettit Case. 
17 Now having presented the affidavit, the certified 
18 copies from Nevada, the certified copies from Utah, copies 
19 of the checks which are attached to the affidavit. The 
20 fact that they were all employees of the Nevada Corporation 
21 that moved to Utah and was engaged in a business here. 
22 Now having presented that, then under Rule 56E, when the 
23 Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported, an 
24 adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials 
25 in their pleadings. But his response by affidavit or 
22 
1 otherwise provide to the state must set forth specific 
2 facts showing that there was and thero is a genuine 
3 issue for trial. If he does not so respond, then Summary 
4 Judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
5 So having come in and shown now that by the certified 
6 copies that Dot Adventures was a corporation certified 
7 copies of the corporate records from the State of Utah that 
8 Dot Adventures is in fact Dot Adventures Inc. The 
9 affidavit of Mrs. Lynton that they were employees of the 
10 corporation and the corporation was doing business and 
11 the corporation had 70 employees. There isn't any evidence 
12 that is used. We are not begging the issue. We are 
13 not trying to deceive someone . We are just saying that to 
14 just make the allegation cannot in theface of that, well 
15 corporate records from both states and the affidavit and the 
16 checks themselves under which they were all paid. 
17 Dot Adventures Inc., now say that we have evidence 
18 to show that the corporation didn't exist or was not 
19 lawfully functioning or was under capitalized. There isn't 
20 any evidence to show any of those. Those are mere allegation 
21 and under Rule 56E where having come in and pleaded 
22 I that, they are not permitted just to repeat the allegation 
23 I that are made without any indication there is evidence 
24 I to support those issues at all. We would say not only is sh| 
25 I as an individual entitled to Summary Judgment but also the 
23 
1 accusations which a re stated of being under funded should 
2 be stricken or under capitalized should be stricken 
3 from the record. 
4 THE COURT: Well. I have read your memorandums 
5 and motions , and it is the court's observation that in this 
6 case that the only evidence really in front of this court 
7 is the affidavit and the attachments with regard 
8 to the Nevada corporation from the Utah corporation and the 
9 statutes that have been cited. I don't believe that the 
10 case cited by counsel is really applicable in this case. 
11 At least, I find a number of distinguishing features in the 
12 case and I don't think it is really reflective of the 
13 situation here nor could we bottom this situation based on 
14 that case and the laws that stems from it. If the law 
15 is clear in that case and is consistent with prior rulings 
16 from the Supreme Court, but it is simply not applicable her^ 
17 I am going to grant your Motion for Summary Judgment 
18 on the basis that this was a Nevada corporation which 
19 was rr-ved to Utah. That all of the evidence before this 
20 court is that they continued to operate as a Nevada 
21 corporation moving its manufacturing plant to Utah it 
22 did not domesticate timely actually but the statutes provid^ 
23 that nevertheless even though they weren't, didn't 
24 domesticate properly there may be some sanctions, but the 
25 sanctions don't go to the point of saying that the party who 
24 
is the stockholder or officer becomes personally 
liable. They continued to operate as a corporation 
in the State of Utah. They paid checks under the name 
of the corporation. The only distinction between the two 
is the addition of Inc. The Utah Statute is required 
that you use some distinctive terminology so that 
people may know that it is a corporation and Nevada's 
corporate law does not require that. Nevada's corporate 
law is somewhat looser than Utah's law. And as a result 
of that, a number of people actually incorporate in Nevada 
as opposed to Utah even though they intend to use business 
in Utah and then domesticate in Utah and file. 
So I am going to grant your Motion for Summary 
Judgment as it relates to Jeanette R. Lynton. You made 
a Motion to Strike, I don't know how appropriate that is 
or what you really want to do with that Motion to Strike. 
That has not been addressed. You talk only about a Motion 
to Strike the allegations of alter ego and under capitalized 
If in fact your Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, 
I don't know what the Motion to Strike is going to 
accompli s h . 
MR. MARTIN: Yes, I understand. What we would lik 
to do of course is and I have been in a situation where 
the court has just granted that motion to not have 
Jeanette Lynton and that changes the character of the name 
25 
of the case and that w o u l d seem to be s u r p l u s e x c e p t 
that it ma'<.es it a public record and there has been 
an a c c u s a t i o n r.ade that it was under c a p i t a M z e d . That 
is the only thing that we would p r i m a r i l y be c o n c e r n e d a b o u t 
THE C O U R T : W e l l , that right now that j u s t s t a n d s 
as a m e r e a l l e g a t i o n and t h e r e is no s u b s t a n c e behind t h a t . 
MR. M A R T I N : I u n d e r s t a n d , Your H o n o r . 
i n 
THE C O U R T : If 
this case based on my 
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1 o n g e r rep 
she is r e m o v e d as a d e f e n d a n t 
g r a n t i n g y o u r M o t i o n , then I d o n ' t 
w e i g h t but I h a v e no p r o b l e m 
to S t r i k e for w h a t e v e r v a l u e 
era is no e v i d e n c e of any u n d e r 
is no e v i d e n c e before the c o u r t 
<e a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r you w a n t me 
t h a t you have filed a M o t i o n 
• p o s i t i o n s and the r e s t r u c t u r e 
i t i o n s by M s . J o n e s . She has to have an j 
r e s p o n d to t h a t . 
M A R T I N : I h a v e been in M e x i c o and we did not 
that b e c a u s e we r e a l l y t h o u g h t that it w o u l d 
C O U R T : It 
y o u r b e n e f 
A/ i t n e s s w h i 
is but I w a n t to m a k e a c o m m e n t on 
i t . When you do this you in fact 
c h i n fact then says that you can 
r e s e n t as c o u n s e l . So you may w a n t to keep 1 
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that in m i n d . 
M S . J O N E S : Okay. f had occasion to 
consult briefly with J(;dge Davis in his capacity as I th^nk 
the chair at least on the c o m m i t t e e of the Utah State Bar 
with regard to i n t e r p r e t e r s and their use in the court 
system. He suggested that it might be m o r e , and he suggested 
a number of possible other avenues that I will probably 
pursue . 
At the time I submitted this for the court, I did not 
n e c e s s a r i l y intend that to be the record, okay. It 
was simply an issue that I was leaving town and I had 
been unable to get in touch with my c l i e n t . And really 
indepth review of the d e p o s i t i o n s of some of them and I 
realized that the t i m l i n e s s upon which d e p o s i t i o n s 
become approved had passed a l r e a d y . But given the p a r t i c u l a r 
issues involved in these d e p o s i t i o n s , the fact that I did nee 
to review and that my client needed to review the video 
tapes and that video tape was only l i m i t e d . I only had 
limited access to it. I wanted to submit something 
to the court saying that I did have o b j e c t i o n s as they 
stood to those d e p o s i t i o n s . And then I either discuss 
it with counsel what further action might be taken and to 
get in touch with a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t e r and sit down and 
look at those video taped d e p o s i t i o n s or s o m e t h i n g . 
THE C O U R T : I think that may be a p p r o p r i a t e . I 
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only bring this up at this time because I didn't want 
you to drop into a hole that you w e r e n ' t aware of and then 
rind y o u r s e l f not being able to r e p r e s e n t your c l i e n t s . 
So I think you may want to just give that some c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
as you and counsel d i s c u s s how to solve the problem and 
maybe and I am not. going to m a k e any r u l i n g s or a n y t h i n g . 
I just wanted to bring that to your a t t e n t i o n that that 
could possibly h a p p e n . I would presume that you would 
rather be counsel for the p l a i n t i f f than a w i t n e s s for the 
pi a i n t i f f . 
Okay, Mr. Martin will you prepare an order and submit 
it to M s . Jones for approval to form. 
MR. M A R T I N : Thank y o u . 
THE C O U R T : And M s . Jones if you will please 
either sign that o r d e r a p p r o v e d to form or have an 
o b j e c t i o n r e g i s t e r that o b j e c t i o n so that I don't want to 
become a b a b y s i t t e r for the order that is a l l . 
M S . J O N E S : Y e s . 
THE C O U R T : I m i g h t indicate that our c o m m u n i c a t i o h 
between our o f f i c e s have been good , Your H o n o r , so I : 
don't invision that there would be any p r o b l e m . \ 
THE C O U R T : Very good thank y o u . Do you want 
to w i t h d r a w these? Do you want to have them made a part j 
i 
! 
of the file? j 
M S . J O N E S : Yes p l e a s e . It is the original of both 
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the interrogatories. 
THE COURT- The court won't read them unless they 
are actually published for so.ne particular purpose or 
made reference to at the time of trial. They really ought 
not to be in the file. Do you have any objection? 
MR. MARTIN: I don't really know how to respond 
to tha t. 
MS. JONES: I made reference to them, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, you made some reference to them 
in the arguments. 
MS. JONES: I would like them a part of the file. 
THE COURT: We will make them a part of the file and 
I just want to advise you that it is not my intention 
to read them. The only advantage of having them in the 
file, is that you have made some reference to them and 
if you want to after this case is ever with and completed 
appeal the matter on the basis of my granting the Summary 
Judgment. Thank you counsel. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Judge. 
MS. JONES: Thank you. 
THE BAILIFF: Everyone please arise, court will 
be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON, this matter was concluded) 
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E R r I F [ C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) ss 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was reported 
by me in S t e n o t y p e , and t h e r e a f t e r caused by me to be 
t r a n s c r i b e d into t y p e w r i t i n g by Richard C. Tatton and that a 
full, true and correct t r a n s c r i p t i o n of said HEARING was so 
ta ken . 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise 
a s s o c i a t e d with a n y of the parties to said cause of action 
and that I am not interesTed in the event t h e r e o f . 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at M i d w a y , 
Utah, this ^ 7 day of S e p t e m b e r , 1995. 
U l P.T?*. 
R I C H A R D C. T A T T O N , CSR. 
My c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s : 
June 15, 1997 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of u*jh County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
Oeouty 
it) 6-^>' 
WALTER SEMIDEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JEANETTE R. LYNTON 
Defendant 
Civil No. 930400503 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, February the 
10th of 1995, the HEARING was video taped before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Fourth Judicial District 
Court Building and was transcribed by Richard C. Tatton, 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Ms. Marti Jones 
Attorney at Law 
40 South 100 West, #303 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Mr. Loren D. Martin 
Attorney at Law 
36 South State Street #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of Walter Sem 
et al, vs. Dot Adventures Inc., et al. This is a Motion 
for Summary Judgment brought by the defendants basically 
seeking to dismiss all causes of action primarily, for 
failure to state a cause. Mr. Martin are you ready? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes sir 
THE COURT: Ms. Jones are you ready? 
MS. JONES: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Martin. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. If it please 
the court there are nine causes of action alleged in the 
complaint. The entire matter rests upon a single incident 
which involves some 50 employees. Many months later, these 
four filed this complaint, and it was served approximately 
a year after the incident. All employees work in a single 
large area engaged in fabrication, shipment of a single 
product. The area in which they work is a large single 
heated warehouse facility containing cafeteria . I know 
that this may be some review, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go right ahead. I am not - -
MR. MARTIN: Containing a cafeteria area, work 
space, office- restrooms and shipping. The product consists 
of a variety of decorative rubber stamps which are widely 
marketed from the single location in Orem. 
On one day the 16th or 17th of December and that is not 
very relevant in any dispute between the parties, an 
employee had reported that there were $20.00 missing and tak 
from her purse. Work was stopped. A search was conducted. 
The money was not found. The employees were asked each 
individually to display their pockets, their pocket books, 
en 
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1 I one at a time to a supervisor in either the women's 
2 restroom or the men's restroom. No money identifiable 
3 as being stolen was found. Everyone went back to work. 
4 During the entire time no person left. No force 
5 was used. No force was displayed or inferred. No door 
6 was blocked. No guard was posted. None was inferred. No 
7 person made any objection then or after. Everyone went 
8 to the cafeteria area. Every person walked one at a time 
9 through the proposed checking process. No person objected 
10 to the process. Everyone including all the plaintiffs 
11 went back to work. 
12 No one ever complained the next day. No one ever 
13 so much as wrote an unsigned note of complaint. No one 
14 objected at the Christmas Party. Finally, more than 
15 six months later when these four persons, plaintiffs, were 
16 working at other companies, someone, somehow, got together | 
17 and persuaded the four that they ought to go back and file 
18 a lawsuit to see what damages they could do to their former 
19 employer . 
20 Having never made any objection while they were there, 
21 I these people now want to go back and persuade this court 
22 | that the conditions there were so oppressive, discriminatory] 
23 I foul, harmful, malicious and disgusting as to warrant 
24 I court intervention demanding punitive damages, exemplary 
25 | damages and compensation unspecified, when they themselves 
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1 | never raised one finger of objection. Their own conduct, 
2 I Your Honor, we say speaks more loudly than their words.-
3 The facts as set forth in Defendant's Memorandum in support 
4 of this Motion for Summary Judgment are not contested. 
5 No person was injured. No person was singled out. No one 
6 ever complained of the nature of the work space. Mo one 
7 ever complained that the working conditions were 
8 inherently damaging. Mo person ever died or complained 
9 of illness. No person ever complained that the working 
10 space was not adequate. No one complained that it was 
11 unhealthly or cramped or in anyway injurious to health. No 
12 person was impressed into the labor. No person was an 
13 indentured servant. Every person had requested employment. 
14 Everyone was free to come and go. No one ever complained 
15 about the work hours. Every person was paid the wages as 
16 agreed. Many people still freely work there. Many people 
17 have worked there for many years. No intent to injury 
18 has ever been alleged. No injury ever occurred. The 
19 entire case hinges upon plaintiff's feelings and emotions. 
20 No one ever said that they suffered a loss. They were even 
21 J Paid for the time during the period of questioning or 
22 | checking. No one was ever docked any hours for such 
23 | interruptions. No one has ever claimed that their careers 
24 | had been damaged nor is there any claim they were damaged 
25 | in their abilities or opportunities for employment. They 
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all have a f f i r m a t i v e l y stated that they have since improved 
their individual employment positions both in level 
and earni ngs . 
Maybe I am too much of a romantic. I have never been 
accused of that but in the history of the American Labor 
Movement, this has got tc be a first. I mean I don't 
pretend to know everything that has happened but this 
is u n i q u e . My old grandfather was a Coal Miner. That 
c o n d i t i o n , we all know what that w a s . That was a part of 
our history. Complaints were m a d e , severe battles fought, 
injuries inflicted and the conditions were improved. Anyone 
looking back at our nation's history can easily see that the 
American Labor Movement developed through hard t i m e s , througlj) 
the Industrial Revolution to our present body of law. Those 
were tough times and they were tough p e o p l e . 
Yet,looking at this case, we can s e e the struggle 
where we have been to develop the body of law that we have 
at the present time and it was hard and harsh, and we could-
see that.But where we have people who are taking a position 
that having been employed and now moved to higher paying 
jobs being unable to show any injury and never rising 
at all to make any complaint except to go back and say that 
their own sensibilities were injured while they worked 
at this former place of e m p l o y m e n t , and then ask t h e court 
tc come in and give them regress for an issue which now is 
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issues in this c a s e . 
The defendants contend that their a c t i o n : in verbally 
abusing, physically searching and falsely imprisoning the 
plaintiffs were not outrageous or deliberately calculated 
to insult and demean them. The plaintiffs dispute this 
characterization of the f a c t s . The only possible purpose 
of the search was to insult and demean them because even if 
a S20.00 bill had been found, there would have been no way 
to prove that the $20.00 bill was the one allegedly stolen. 
There were 35 to 40 people searched in this case, Your 
H o n o r . Let me make it clear that at a very strong 
contributing factor to the passivity of the work force was 
the fact that all of them were Hispanic, Spanish speaking. 
Many of them don't understand t he laws of this country. 
They don't understand their r i g h t s . They are on the whole 
unskilled labor and have limited job prospects if at all. 
Their jobs were important to them. They were threatened 
specifically by the Defendant Esquivel that as he put it 
if anybody in this group wants to object to this search let 
him speak up now and we will know who the thief is. 
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's consent. As 
I cited in my objection to this motion, Your Honor, the 
Restatement of Torts explains that if a reasonable person 
would not understand from the words or conduct the consent 
is given, the other is not justified in acting upon the 
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assumption of consent even though he honestly so believes 
and there is no apparent consent. 
Furthermore , in determining whether someone has , 
whether on the alternative coercion has been used , it is 
not certain that the duress has to be of a type to which 
a person of ordinary firmness or a reasonable person would 
y i e l d . Though this may be important in determining whether 
the other party's will was actually overboard. Age, sex, 
mental capacity I would add race, background, familiarity 
with the procedures of this country, the relation 
of the parties and antecedent circumstances all may be 
significant. The type of conduct to which the other party 
consents is also important. 
The defendant's further claim that there was no evidence 
that they intruded into the plaintiff's personal affairs. 
On the contrary, plaintiffs give specific examples of 
an intrusive and illegal personal questions in an employment 
interview, Your Honor. This was not as the defendants 
have characterized it a routine conversation after 
employment. The plaintiff's give specific examples 
of the search of a physical search of their persons, purses, 
p o c k e t s , w a l l e t s , and lunch bags and other bags they may 
have happened to have with them. 
Finally, Your Honor, the defendants have argued 
that there is no evidence to suppo-t plaintiff's allegations; 
14 
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of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional 
distress . 
On the c o n t r a r y , plaintiff's affidavit cites numerous 
examples of an on going pattern of deliberate 
verbal harassment and put d o w n s . Plaintiffs have cited 
repeated accusations that they were thiefs, r o b b e r s , 
wet backs and lazy g o o d - f o r - n o t h i n g s . One of the plaintiffs 
has testified that she was required as a way of demeaning 
her to clean up dog feces out of a carpet. The culmination 
of this a b u s e , Your Honor, was only the culmination of 
said abuse was the r e q u i r e m e n t that they submit to a 
physical search of their person and p o s s e s s i o n s . 
The defendants have claimed here that there was in 
a c t u a l i t y no physical t o u c h i n g . S p e c i f i c a l l y , in the 
case of M s . S a n t i a g o , Your Honor, that is definitively not 
the c a s e . M s . Santiago states in her affidavit that not 
only was she forced to undue her waste band but undue 
her b l o u s e , undue her bra so that the supervisor could run 
her hands all around her waist and up and down her midriff. 
She was also s u b j e c t e d , Your Honor, to the deliberately 
insulting procedure of the supervisor running a pencil 
through her hair. 
It is clearly Utah Law that where the facts of a case 
are amenable to different interpretations and where issues 
of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s are to be determined, t h o s e issues must 
15 
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be decided by trial. This case is a classic example of 
precisely those issues. 
Defendants wish to characterize their actions as normal 
and appropriate investigative checking to protect the 
plant and other workers from theft. Defendants claim that Mr] 
Esquivel's harangues, and accusations were well intentioned, 
motivational talks to the work force. Defendants also for 
good reason wish to characterize the plaintiffs failure 
to object when threatened as freely giving consent to 
their imprisonment and search. 
On the contrary, it is the plaintiff's reasonable 
contention that these were intentionally tortious acts designed 
to humiliate and demean the plaintiff and also designed to 
dominate and control and force their submission to assault, 
battery, invasion of their personal affairs and interference 
with their 1i berty . 
The defendants have claimed that there were no damages. 
As the affidavits of the relatives of the parties will show 
Your Honor, and they are on the record, there was severe 
stress, severe emotional distress. And in at least one case 
the incapacity to work productively for some period of 
time . I 
The underlying facts of this case may be interpreted j 
in different ways, and the reasonableness of the actions j 
of the defendants and the plaintiffs may also be interpreted! 
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in di ffercnt ways . 
The crucial point of this case. Your Honor, is which 
of these characterizations is right and because the 
facts are clearly disputed a trial is necessary to interpret 
and to determine the reasonabi1ity of the parties' a c t i o n s . 
Therefore, plaintiff's respectfully request that the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. Thank you 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of questions. 
M S . JONES: Yes. 
THE C O U R T : In your memorandum the only as I recall 
and I'll ask you this has been my r e c o l l e c t i o n , if this is 
not a p p r o p r i a t e . The only reference you have made as 
to attached e x h i b i t s . You have not referred to any of the 
other records anywhere is that correct? 
M S . JONES: That is correct, Your Honor. I think 
that the specific exhibits and defendants have cited the 
d e p o s i t i o n s . I have an objection on the record to the use 
of those depositions because I consider the translation 
and interpretation of those depositions significantly 
flawed, to say the least. We have them on video tape. If it 
becomes necessary, I would be willing or would consider 
at least paying s o m e o n e . 
THE COURT 
MS. JONES 
THE COURT 
You have never raised that before? 
Excuse me? 
You have never raised that anywhere in j 
17 
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your argument that has been raised and objection to the 
citing to the record because the record was not a c c u r a t e . 
M S . JONES: Excuse m e . I do specifically state 
that in my o b j e c t i o n . Your H o n o r . 
THE COURT: Where at? 
MS . JONES: That was on file - -
THE COURT: In your argument? 
M S . JONES: In my, quite possibly, let me find 
a page, Page 7, the second p a r a g r a p h . 
THE COURT: Where is your formal o b j e c t i o n s ? 
M S . JONES: They were previously filed probably 
O c t o b e r . 
THE COURT: Who made the transcripts from them? 
M S . JONES: The problem that we are dealing with 
on the d e p o s i t i o n s , Your H o n o r , is that they were video 
taped. Most of them were video taped. The tail end of one 
was not. There was an interpreter present. My objections 
that were filed with the court with that formal objection, 
have to do and the only transcript were English t r a n s c r i p t s . 
None of the Spanish was transcribed. My objection has to do 
with the fact that when I went back and reviewed 
the video t a p e s , there were substantial inaccuracies in 
the translation and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I can give you one 
e x a m p l e . I can't cite exactly which deposition it w a s . 
okay, but counsel for the defendant asked a question 
18 
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something to the affect so you were searched, okay, or 
they searched y o u . The interpreter said , actually excuse 
me, counsel for the defendant said, "So they checked you, 
okay you were c h e c k e d . " The interpreter used a term ; 
"revisar" which in Spanish, Your Honor, means to search. 
i 
It also means to c h e c k . It has both possible interpretations 
Now the person giving the deposition artfully understood the 
search m e a n i n g . What he replied w a s , " Si me revisaror," \ 
they searched m e . " Of course when the interpreter then j 
translated it back what he said w a s , "Yes, they checked 
him or y e s , they checked m e . " Okay, a minor d e t a i l . 
They were consistent inaccuracies throughout with those j 
p r o b l e m s . Given the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and given what I | 
understood at the time to be an agreement between c o u n s e l , ! 
that we would later go over those and revise the translations 
if necessary. I didn't spend the whole , all of the 
deposition objecting to all of these issues. ! 
i 
THE COURT: I would have expected in your j 
| 
memorandum that if you are going to object to any of the ; 
depositions s p e c i f i c a l l y with the areas that he has cited,; 
that you would have raised that and given me some argument 
to the c o n t r a r y . You have given me simply the fact that j 
they have not been transcribed correctly. What does that j 
mean to me? That doesn't mean a n y t h i n g . Does that mean ; 
everything was i n a c c u r a t e ? Does it mean - - ; 
19 
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' M S . J O N E S : No. j 
THE C O U R T : Does it mean that some minuscule thing 
was i n a c c u r a t e . You need to a d d r e s s yourself to the specific 
i 
areas that he is using to bring his m o t i o n . [ 
M S . J O N E S : I would respond too, Your Honor, that j 
wasn't a major issue because he limited the use of the j 
depositions to areas that I had not filed a formal objection! 
i 
or that had not asked for a retrans1 ation of. j 
THE C O U R T : Then you have no objections to his j 
c i t a t i o n s ? 
M S . J O N E S : I have no objections to his c i t a t i o n s . 
H o w e v e r , and this is my point. I do not consider that those! 
depositions as taken give an accurate oicture of what actualjl 
took place given the problems with the interpretation and j 
the t r a n s l a t i o n . 
THE C O U R T : W e l l , let me just turn over to a few 
t h i n g s . I am looking at M U J I . When you get down to j 
drafting the jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , I am rather familiar with J 
this book. I was on the Board of District Judges when we j 
approved it. False imprisonment, the plaintiff has a 
burden of proving each of the following elements to prevail j 
on a claim of false i m p r i s o n m e n t . We don't have any jury 
instruction on wrongful d e t e n t i o n . I assume that is all j 
one in the same thing. The defendant acted intending J 
to confine or restrain the plaintiff. That is o n e . Two, 
Py 
20 
77fi 
the defendant's action resulted in the confinement or 
restrainwent of the plaintiff. Three, the plaintiff 
was conscious of the confinement or restraint or was 
harmed by it. Four, defendant acted without having 
reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff committed 
an offense. And a person is restrained when that person 
is not free or reasonably that person is not free to leave 
a place to which that person has been confined and does not 
consent to the restraint. 
I don't find anywhere, where you meet that burden. Tell 
me where you meet that burden? 
MS. JONES: I will submit, Your Honor, that we 
have clearly stated, No. 1, that the defendants were 
confined in an area, not their work area in the area of 
the cafeteria that they were confined there. 
THE COURT: Who has testified to this? 
MS. JONES: It is in the affidavit, Your Honor. 
Obviously, at this point we don't have testimony. 
THE COURT: Well, we are at a point where 
Summary Judgments have been filed and you need to, the 
burden is on you . You need to come forward with something 
that is a material issue of fact or your ability to meet 
the minimal requirements by the jury instructions. 
MS. JONES: I would submit, Your Honor, that I 
believe we can meet those. I can go through them 
21 
1 | spec i fi ca11y. 
2 | T H E COURT: YO;J have to demonstrate that to this 
3 | court. You are well aware as I am as Mr. Martin is, that 
4 I courts don't like to particularly grant Summary Judgments. 
5 MS . JONES: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: But we will grant them if it appears 
7 that no reasonable mind is going to agree with you on your 
8 allegations which are simply broad spread with a broad 
9 brush. We have to get down to the nitty gritty of these 
10 dnd how are you going to actually prove these. 
11 The next thing that bothers me and in your whole 
12 allegations is that even if they are true, how is your 
13 people been damaged? The fact that they say. "Oh,gee whiz 
14 I went home and I had a hard time for a couple of 
15 months. I couldn't even go look for a job." You have 
16 got to have some reasonable degree of medical certainty 
17 as to their damages. You don't have any of that anywhere. 
18 You don't have any doctor's testimony, any expert's testimony 
19 MS. JONES: Well, Your Honor, if it please the 
20 court, the defendants haven't asked for any list of witnessed 
21 THE COURT: That doesn't matter. It is your 
22 burden. They can go in there with their head in the sand 
23 because it is your burden to carry. 
24 MS. JONES: At trial. I submit that at trial 
25 we will be in a position. 
22 
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1 I THE COURT: Well, but you have got to at this poin 
2 | and time, you have got to convince me that there is either 
3 I some material issue of fact which needs to go to a jury. 
4 I And then further, you have got, if it is net material, well 
5 let me back up. If there are any material issues of 
6 fact in this case that are disputed, then it goes to the j u r ^  
7 I will not give a Motion for Summary Judgment. What Mr. 
8 Martin is saying is there is no really material issues of 
9 fact in this case. Even when you get down through and 
10 you walk through everything, even if we let you walk through 
11 these things which is now mostly on feelings and there 
12 was no objection at the time, do you take issue with that? 
13 MS. JONES: The fact that there was no objections 
14 at the time? 
15 THE COURT: Yes, that there was any objections. 
16 MS. JONES: As I stated, Your Honor, my clients 
17 felt that any attempt to object would result in immediate 
18 termination. 
19 THE COURT: That is a feeling. What have you got 
20 besides a feeling? You can't Cross Examine feelings. What 
21 have you got that is material evidence that there were 
22 threats of job loss and threats of slander if they didn't 
23 submit to this search or whatever term you want to use? 
24 MS. JONES: I have the testimony of three of 
25 the witnesses, plaintiffs excuse me that Mr. Esquivel 
23 
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specifically told them, the whole crowd of them that if I 
anyone objected that, you know, cynically and sarcastically, 
if anybody doesn't want to be searched go ahead'and object arjd 
we will know who the thief is. 
THE COURT: But that is not in any of the 
deposi t ions ? 
M S . JONES: It is not in the d e p o s i t i o n s . Well 
no, that is not t r u e . That is not true. It is in the 
d e p o s i t i o n s . I would have to gc back - -
THE COURT: That language is in some of the 
deposi tions ? 
M S . JONES: 
THE COURT: 
in your m e m o r a n d u m ? 
M S . JONES: I cited, instead to the affidavits 
which I submit are more correctly translated and more accura 
picture of what took p l a c e . 
THE COURT: There is a rule also that says that 
anything that you submit by way of affidavit and a motion 
which is contrary to the discovery is not to be considered 
by the court. 
M S . JONES: I would submit, Your Honor, that nothi 
that we have sent in, submitted by affidavit is contrary. 
That there were questions that were not asked, and there 
was information that was not volunteered in the d e p o s i t i o n . 
That language is in at least one -
But you didn't cite that language 
fce 
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And that information the plaintiff have a valid right to 
supplement those depositions with their affidavit where 
necessary . 
THE COURT: Well, let me draw your attention 
to the assault elements. The defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff for assault if one, the defendant acted 
intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with the 
plaintiff or imminent apprehension of such contact. 
Two, as a result the plaintiff was thereby put in imminent 
apprehension of harm or contact. Three, the plaintiff 
suffered injuries approximately caused by the defendant's 
action. 
Now if what Mr. Martin tells me is true that all of these 
people have actually , are not employed in jobs which 
are better paying then t h e one they had there, where is 
your damage? Where is your damage? 
M S . JONES: There is substantial and significant 
damage - -
THE COURT: Pardon m e . 
M S . JONES: There is substantial and significant 
damage to the health and well being. 
THE COURT: Have you got any doctor expert 
testimony to that affect? 
M S . JONES: To this point, no Your Honor. My 
clients are poor enough and were poor enough at the time thai 
25 
781 
1 they could not afford to go and be evaluated. 
2 THF COURT: Unfortunately, that is not a good 
3 reason. And now to have them examined, how long has 
4 this been over a year, two years whatever it is. What 
5 doctor is going to be able to go back and say, "Gee whiz, 
6 I can reconstruct the fact that you were emotionally 
7 damaged." Then how do you put a dollar figure to that? That 
8 burden is yours. 
g Let me take another step. Intentional infliction of 
10 emotional distress. To prove the claim of intentional 
11 infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove 
12 each of the following elements. One, outrageous conduct by 
13 the defendant. Two, the defendant intended and this is 
14 and two, the defendant intended to cause emotional 
15 distress or acted with reckless disregard to the probability 
16 of causing emotional distress. And three, the plaintiff's 
17 suffered severe or extreme emotional distress which was 
18 approximately caused by the defendant's outrageous 
19 conduct. Even if we get to trial and I let you go to trial, 
20 what are you going to convince the jury that there was 
21 extreme emotional distress where you have absolutely no 
22 expert coming in to testify that these people suffered any 
23 damages as a result of this? Are you not just spinning 
24 your wheels and taking up a lot of court's time for no 
25 cause of action? 
26 
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MS. JONES: I don't think so, Your Honor. I would 
submit that these plaintiffs were damaged and - -
THE COURT: What are you going to use for 
ev i dence for that ? 
MS . JONES: If we have to, we will get expert 
testimony. As it stands, we have the testimony of family 
that witnessed this. 
THE COURT-: Well- -
MS. JONES: The people that associated with them 
in their daily lives that witnessed the distress, depression 
the presstJre. 
THE COURT: Okay, anything further you want to te 
the court? 
MS . JONES 
THE COURT 
MS. JONES 
THE COURT 
Anxiety caused by t h i s . 
Any of them ever go to a doctor? 
They couldn't afford to, Your Honor. 
Do they have a medical plan where they 
worked ? 
MS. JONES: No, they did not. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS . JONES: Excuse me. 
THE COURT: Anything else you want to tell me? 
M S . JONES: I would submit that we can prove 
those issues on each of those that you have stated each of 
those issues we can prove. I have nothing further. 
27 
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THE COURT: Mr. Martin. j 
MR. MARTIN: Just the one comment, Your Honor- - ! 
THE COURT: You have to come up here. We have ! 
video recording and if you are not standing up here it doesn'jt 
do as good a job as it ought to. 
MR. MARTIN: All these new fangled rules. 
THE COURT: Yes, they are getting too complicated 
for me . 
MR. MARTIN: I think that counsel was quoting, 
as I recall from the Restatement and the last phrase of 
the Restatement was or no apparent consent, was the phrase 
I remember. I don't know exactly where that was. 
MS. JONES: That is not what it says. 
MR. MARTIN: You can help us with that at the aid 
of that quote . 
Then just the questions and I can understand the 
questions and the nature of the Labor Law that we have at th^ 
present time as discriminatory processes in the employment. 
So the interview questions where we don't even dare now days 
attach photograph or ask any of the questions about social 
life, I guess, if the person is not hired. 
THE COURT: This all runs to labor discrimination 
and whether or not you are terminated or not hired. 
MR. MARTIN: None of this happened in this case. 
THE COURT: I have a real problem relating that 
28 
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to thi s case . 
MR. MARTIN: The interpreter, we had an 
interpreter by the way on the depositions which was not a 
certified interpreter the first time. There was some 
objection made to that and so we hired a certified 
court interpreter for the other three depositions which 
were conducted, Your Honor. The first one, we had a person 
who was qualified in speaking Spanish and you can see the 
nature of the dispute over that , a word here or there. 
I don't think there is anything else, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: M s . Jones, I am concerned about your 
ability to prove the elements that are required by the j 
i jury instructions in this case. Now you may feel like that ( 
you can do this with additional discovery cr whatever. 
Right at this point and time, I don't think there is 
anything here that would convince me that you could do 
this. I haven't seen any material, real material issues I 
t 
of fact. But it does bother m e . I just hate to j 
I 
dismiss this case when we have a situation of there may be j 
something there, but by the same token I think it is almost; 
a waste of time case. I am concerned about your ability ; 
to meet any of those elements or at least all of them. 1 , 
am really concerned about your ability to meet damages j 
even if you get to the jury on some of these other things, j 
j 
But until you have had an opportunity to maybe to look a ; 
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little deeper , I am a little concerned about the granting 
the motion as well, b e c a u s e if your clients have some sort 
of claim t h e r e . I am sure that the threats of job 
loss and the threats of slander which you allege pushed 
them into s u b m i t t i n g to a search or a check or whatever it 
w a s . If that is all t r u e , then at least will be denied 
on the part of the d e f e n d a n t s h e r e . I don't know who will 
be coming in for w i t n e s s e s on the part of the d e f e n d a n t s . 
Maybe other people that work there and say that never 
h a p p e n e d . But I can tell you , your people thoughts and 
feelings that are not a p p r o p r i a t e for Cross Examination 
and may not even be admitted into e v i d e n c e . It may not even 
get to question on t h o s e . So you have got to have something 
s p e c i f i c , s o m e t h i n g that you can tie too to get a n y w h e r e . 
Now I just spent three weeks in a case somewhat 
similar to this and just plain flat no c a u s e d . I wasn't 
all that happy about spending three weeks on a case 
that I felt from day one was not going a n y w h e r e . So I 
am really inclined to grant m o t i o n s for Summary Judgment 
to save a lot of court time and a lot of e f f o r t . 
What I am going to do which is c o n t r a r y to the rules 
a c t u a l l y , I am going to give you some time to d e m o n s t r a t e 
to this court that you can a c t u a l l y prove some of t h e s e . 
i 
You give me names of w i t n e s s e s who w'll testify that there is 
some damages t h e r e . You give me what you believe to be j 
30 
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1 appropriate translations of the depositions if they 
2 have any bearing on this case whatsoever so that 
3 we can not have a question of improper translation of the 
4 depositions. If it requires reopening depositions you 
5 better do that because I am concerned about the affidavits 
6 in and of themselves. This is something that comes on board 
7 after discovery, and some of it apparently is somewhat 
8 contrary to discovery and that bothers me. I will give you 
9 that opportuni ty . 
10 I will give you 30 days to get that done and prove to 
11 this court that this court sould not grant you, should not 
12 grant Mr. Martin's Motion for Summary Judgment. I will 
13 give him an opportunity to respond to it. If I need 
14 a further hearing I will ask for it, okay. 
15 MR. MARTIN: Do we have a specific date for 
16 that, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: 30 days from today is March 9th. 
18 THE CLERK: It would be the 11th. 
19 T H E COURT: Let's go the following Monday. 
20 MR. MARTIN: The 13th and response time, Your Hono|r? 
21 THE COURT: How much time do you need? 
22 MR. MARTIN: Two weeks, Your Honor, let's say 14 
23 days after that if we may? 
24 THE COURT: Sure. And then if either one of you 
25 want a further hearing - -
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MR. M A R T I N : The 2 7 t h , Your H o n o r ? 
THE C O U R T : That will be f i n e . If you want a 
f u r t h e r h e a r i n g ask for it. If you don't and I feel 
like we need one I will ask for it. If I don't think and 
you don't ask and I don't think we need one I will just 
rule on it. 
MR. M A R T I N : Very good. Thank y o u , Your H o n o r . 
THE C O U R T : Thank y o u . O k a y , I r e a l i z e this 
is a l i t t l e unusual M r . M a r t i n . 
MR. M A R T I N : It is an unusual c a s e , Your H o n o r . 
In f a c t , w h e n I sat down I wish I could help m o r e . Do you 
wish an order p r e p a r e d , Your H o n o r ? 
THE C O U R T : Would you p l e a s e ? If you would prep 
an order and s u b m i t it to M s . Jones for approval to form. 
MR. M A R T I N : Yes s i r . 
THE C O U R T : O k a y , thank y o u , c o u n s e l . 
( W H E R E U P O N , this m a t t e r was c o n c l u d e d ) 
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C E R T F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
ss . 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was 
video taped and transcribed by Richard C. Tatton and that 
it was done to the best of my ab i l i t y . 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise 
a s s o c i a t e d with any of the parties to said cause of action 
and that I am not interested in the event t h e r e o f . 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, 
It 
Utah , t h i s H day of Oc tobe r , 1995. 
'A4io»^. P. ^TrtW^h > 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My c o m m i s s i o n expires 
June 15, 1997 
atta^^te. 
-J 
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Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Attorney for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
538-0066 
Jack L. Schoenhals (2881) 
Attorney for Defendants 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
WALTER SEMIDEY, ANGEL 
SANTIAGO, HUMBERTO 
BARD ALES, and ROSA 
MAZARIEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOT ADVENTURES, INC., 
a Nevada Corporation, et al. 
Defendants 
: INTERIM ORDER 
: REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
: MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
: Civ. No. 930400503 PI 
: Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge presiding, 
for hearing on, February 10, 1995, in regard to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Attending were Marti L. Jones, counsel for the 
Plaintiffs, and Jeanette Lynton, President of DOT Adventures, Inc., and her 
counsel, Loren D. Martin. Having reviewed the pleadings and heard 
argument, the Court Orders the following: 
1. The Court grants Plaintiff until March 13, 1995, to show any basis 
they may have as to why this matter should continue, and that full Summary 
Judgment as requested by Defendant's should not be granted as to all 
remaining alleged causes of action. As a minimum, Plaintiff shall provide 
the following: 
a) a list of witnesses for trial and a proffer as to what each 
witness will say, including the specifics as to what they will say about their 
damages, along with supporting corroboration or expert witnesses, if any; 
b) any tangible evidence that would support Plaintiffs claim 
for damages; and 
c) any appropriate testimony to be presented at trial. 
All documents which Plaintiffs may wish to file with the Court for further 
consideration shall be received and filed on or before close of business on 
March 13,1995. 
2. Defendant shall have until March 27, 1995, to reply. 
3. If any party feels further oral argument is needed, the respective 
party shall make such request. If no further hearing is requested, a decision 
regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary J u d g m e n t ^ ^ E ^ r ^ ^ d e by the 
Court. Any request for hearing shall be madejio later thari.Mauoh 27, 1^5. 
DATED this j j fh day of February, 1995. * ' ^ 
'udge^oyd'f,. Park 
District Judgdv 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 15th day of February, 
1995 to the following: 
Law Offices of Linda Q. Jones 
Linda Q. Jones, 
Marti L. Jones 
40 South 100 West, Suite 303 
Provo,Utah 84604 
njMki & Mc0einuf 
